fix(ci): verify the binary inside the installers, not the loose target copy
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The first fully signed run (signer CN=OLS Digital LLC) signed the app
binary, the MSI, the NSIS installer and the uninstaller, and skipped the
seven build-time DLLs. It still failed verification on
target\release\triple-c.exe. Tauri patches that file with bundle-type
information before each bundle, signs it, packages it, and patches it
again, so the loose copy is unsigned by design and is not what ships.

Verification now:
- checks the installers themselves;
- unpacks the MSI with `msiexec /a` and checks the binaries inside it;
- for NSIS, which can't be unpacked that way, requires the signing log to
  show that the app binary and the uninstaller were signed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-23 18:53:58 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 947bb8e020
commit 08cd05000c
3 changed files with 82 additions and 36 deletions
+11 -5
View File
@@ -857,14 +857,20 @@ merge, dispatch `build-app.yml` on the branch. Every publishing step there is ga
- `scripts/windows-sign.ps1` is the sign command: `signtool sign /dlib` with SHA-256 and the
Microsoft timestamp server, retried. Credentials never reach a command line — the dlib reads
`AZURE_TENANT_ID` / `AZURE_CLIENT_ID` / `AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` from the environment.
**It signs only an allowlist of what ships**, about 4 signatures per release. Tauri also
presents build-time tools: the WiX extension DLLs, the NSIS plugins, and the app binary a
second time for the second bundle type. Signing those would roughly triple the metered count
for no user-visible benefit. If the app ever ships resource DLLs or sidecars, extend the
**It signs only an allowlist of what ships**: 5 signatures per release (the app binary twice,
because Tauri re-patches it between the MSI and NSIS bundles; the MSI; the NSIS installer;
and its uninstaller). Tauri also presents build-time tools, the WiX extension DLLs and NSIS
plugins, and signing those would more than double the metered count for no user-visible
benefit. If the app ever ships resource DLLs or sidecars, extend the
allowlist, or they will go out unsigned. Tauri reports a failed sign command only as
"failed to run powershell", so the script keeps a transcript (`.code-signing/sign-output.log`,
`signtool /debug` included), and the job prints it on failure.
- `scripts/windows-verify-signatures.ps1` checks `signtool verify /pa` plus a timestamp.
- `scripts/windows-verify-signatures.ps1` checks `signtool verify /pa` plus a timestamp on the
installers, and on the binaries **inside** the MSI (an administrative `msiexec /a` extract).
It deliberately does not check `target\release\triple-c.exe`: Tauri patches that file again
after packaging, so the loose copy is unsigned by design and is not what ships. For the NSIS
installer, which cannot be unpacked that way, it requires the signing log to show the app
binary and the uninstaller were signed.
Secrets (repository): the three `AZURE_*` above plus `ARTIFACT_SIGNING_ENDPOINT`,
`ARTIFACT_SIGNING_ACCOUNT_NAME`, `ARTIFACT_SIGNING_PROFILE_NAME`. They are referenced only by the