Fix review findings: secrets in snapshots, URL spoofing, migration data loss
Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas. This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment. Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly when a tag could not be rewritten. The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken, with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume. URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler). The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as "claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and clicked another. Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the "safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative; data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded while a migration is live. Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion. Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it already conditionally installs Rust and Node. 192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
|
||||
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
|
||||
import UrlToast from "./UrlToast";
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The toast is the *only* thing standing between a container-chosen URL and
|
||||
* the host's browser, so what it shows has to be what will be opened — and the
|
||||
* part that decides that is the origin.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
describe("UrlToast", () => {
|
||||
const noop = () => {};
|
||||
|
||||
it("shows the origin separately from the truncatable remainder", () => {
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<UrlToast
|
||||
url="https://github.com/login/device?code=ABCD-EFGH"
|
||||
onOpen={noop}
|
||||
onDismiss={noop}
|
||||
/>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-origin")).toHaveTextContent(
|
||||
"https://github.com",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-rest")).toHaveTextContent(
|
||||
"/login/device?code=ABCD-EFGH",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("keeps the origin intact when the path is long enough to push it out", () => {
|
||||
const url = `https://evil.tld/${"padding/".repeat(200)}end`;
|
||||
render(<UrlToast url={url} onOpen={noop} onDismiss={noop} />);
|
||||
// The registrable domain must be present in its own element, whole. A
|
||||
// single ellipsised line would render this and show only the padding.
|
||||
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-origin")).toHaveTextContent(
|
||||
"https://evil.tld",
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("exposes the whole URL as a tooltip", () => {
|
||||
const url = "https://example.com/a/b?c=d";
|
||||
render(<UrlToast url={url} onOpen={noop} onDismiss={noop} />);
|
||||
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-url")).toHaveAttribute("title", url);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("announces itself, so a replacement prompt is not silent", () => {
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<UrlToast url="https://example.com/" onOpen={noop} onDismiss={noop} />,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(screen.getByRole("status")).toBeInTheDocument();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("opens only via the button, never on its own", () => {
|
||||
const onOpen = vi.fn();
|
||||
render(
|
||||
<UrlToast url="https://example.com/" onOpen={onOpen} onDismiss={noop} />,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(onOpen).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||
screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Open" }).click();
|
||||
expect(onOpen).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user