Merge pull request #16: Fix shared Claude auth — whole sign-in URL, recoverable rejected code

HOW-TO-USE.md

@@ -509,6 +509,10 @@ This lives in the sidebar under **Settings → Claude Authentication**.
    code to copy — this flow finishes on an Anthropic-hosted page, not a local callback.
 4. Paste the code back into Triple-C. The token is captured and written straight to the keychain.
 
+The code is long and easy to truncate. If Anthropic refuses it, the dialog says so and lets you
+paste another one without restarting the sign-in — the CLI is still waiting. After a few refusals
+the flow gives up and reports it rather than sitting there.
+
 Only one sign-in can run at a time, and the whole flow times out after 15 minutes. A long-lived
 token requires a Claude subscription; without one, `setup-token` finishes without printing a token
 and nothing is stored.

TECHNICAL.md

@@ -245,9 +245,31 @@ minutes.
 
 - **Storage** — the OS keychain, under a dedicated service name; the token is never returned to the
   frontend, never written to a log, and no command accepts or returns it.
+- **The sign-in URL comes from the OSC 8 parameter, not the screen.** The CLI emits the URL as a
+  hyperlink and slices the *visible* text of it to the terminal width — measured against 2.1.226, a
+  346-character URL arrives at 80 columns as five separate hyperlink emissions, each carrying the
+  whole URL in its parameter and 80 characters of it on screen. Scraping the visible text yields a
+  URL that parses, points at `claude.com`, and cannot authorise anything, so the ANSI stripper
+  surfaces the hyperlink target and `claude-token-link` carries it to the UI. The frontend applies
+  the `ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS` allowlist to it before display and again before `openUrl` — an OSC 8
+  parameter is container output that is never rendered, which makes it the *easier* place to hide a
+  hostile host, not a trusted one. `stty cols 400` (up from 200, which the URL still overflowed)
+  removes wrapping as a variable elsewhere, but it is not the fix: that line fails silently.
+- **A rejected code is recoverable, not a hang.** On a bad paste the CLI prints
+  `OAuth error: Invalid code…` / `Press Enter to retry.` and blocks on stdin rather than exiting.
+  The streamed output is scanned for that, `claude-token-code-rejected` reopens the input with an
+  explanation, and the Enter is sent so the next code has a prompt to land in — bounded by
+  `MAX_CODE_ATTEMPTS`, after which the flow reports a failure. Without this the exec sat until the
+  15-minute timeout with the UI still saying "Finishing sign-in".
 - **Redaction** — streamed output is stripped of ANSI sequences and passed through a stateful
   redactor that masks anything matching `sk-ant-` with a plausible body, withholding any tail that
-  could still grow into a secret across a chunk boundary.
+  could still grow into a secret across a chunk boundary. A credential split across a hard line
+  wrap is reassembled by both the parser and the redactor from the same `scan_credential_body`, so
+  the two cannot disagree about where a credential ends — previously a wrapped token was rejected
+  as too short *and* its second line, which carries no `sk-ant-` marker, was printed to the UI in
+  clear. A run is only joined across a break that sits at a plausible terminal margin and is not
+  already long enough to be a whole credential; otherwise a repainting TUI would weld one frame's
+  token onto the next frame's first word.
 - **Injection** — `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is set only when the backend is Anthropic, the project
   has not opted out (`use_shared_auth_token`, default `true`), and a non-blank token is stored. When
   those conditions do not hold, the variable is explicitly set to empty rather than omitted, so a

app/src/components/settings/ClaudeAuthModal.test.tsx

@@ -31,6 +31,22 @@ vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/event", () => ({
   }),
 }));
 
+/** Every event the hook subscribes to, so the unmount test counts the right
+ *  number of teardowns instead of a magic number that drifts. */
+const EVENT_NAMES = [
+  "claude-token-progress",
+  "claude-token-output",
+  "claude-token-link",
+  "claude-token-code-rejected",
+];
+
+/** The sign-in URL at its real length (346 characters, measured against
+ *  Claude Code 2.1.226) and the 80-column slice of it that is all the visible
+ *  transcript ever contains. */
+const FULL_URL =
+  "https://claude.com/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true&client_id=9d1c250a-e61b-44d9-88ed-5944d1962f5e&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fplatform.claude.com%2Foauth%2Fcode%2Fcallback&scope=user%3Ainference&code_challenge=RUX5MlWvwld1dmpvF_aPIJQWMBmffuJt4dOdL13zWAg&code_challenge_method=S256&state=su-x9PgZzvkBd3-um6G1llLNDgxptyO6HERvvCSrTbg";
+const TRUNCATED_URL = FULL_URL.slice(0, 80);
+
 function emitOutput(chunk: string, projectId = "p1") {
   act(() => {
     handlers.get("claude-token-output")?.({
@@ -39,6 +55,26 @@ function emitOutput(chunk: string, projectId = "p1") {
   });
 }
 
+function emitLink(url: string, projectId = "p1") {
+  act(() => {
+    handlers.get("claude-token-link")?.({
+      payload: { project_id: projectId, url },
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function emitCodeRejected(message: string, attemptsRemaining: number) {
+  act(() => {
+    handlers.get("claude-token-code-rejected")?.({
+      payload: {
+        project_id: "p1",
+        message,
+        attempts_remaining: attemptsRemaining,
+      },
+    });
+  });
+}
+
 function renderModal(
   overrides: { onClose?: () => void; onAuthenticated?: () => void } = {},
 ) {
@@ -200,6 +236,93 @@ describe("ClaudeAuthModal", () => {
     const { unmount } = renderModal();
     await flowStarted();
     unmount();
-    await waitFor(() => expect(unlisten).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(unlisten).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(EVENT_NAMES.length),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── The hyperlink target, not the wrapped display text ────────────────
+  //
+  // `claude setup-token` slices the *visible* text of its OSC 8 hyperlink to
+  // the terminal width, so the transcript holds five 80-character pieces of a
+  // 346-character URL. The backend lifts the whole thing out of the hyperlink
+  // parameter and sends it on `claude-token-link`.
+
+  it("prefers the hyperlink target over the wrapped copy in the transcript", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    // What the transcript holds: the first slice only.
+    emitOutput(`Browser didn't open? Use the url below to sign in\n${TRUNCATED_URL}\n`);
+    // What the hyperlink parameter holds: all of it.
+    emitLink(FULL_URL);
+
+    const link = await screen.findByRole("link", { name: FULL_URL });
+    fireEvent.click(link);
+    await waitFor(() => expect(openUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith(FULL_URL));
+    expect(openUrl).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(TRUNCATED_URL);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a hyperlink target that is not an Anthropic sign-in address", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    emitLink("https://evil.tld/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true");
+
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("link")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(openUrl).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("ignores a hyperlink belonging to a different project", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    emitLink(FULL_URL, "p2");
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("link")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+
+  // ── A refused code is recoverable, not a hang ─────────────────────────
+
+  it("reports a rejected code and lets another one be submitted", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    const input = screen.getByLabelText("Authentication code");
+    fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "truncated" } });
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Submit code" }));
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(submitClaudeTokenCode).toHaveBeenCalledWith("truncated"),
+    );
+    // Before the rejection arrives the UI claims the sign-in is completing.
+    expect(screen.getByText("Finishing sign-in")).toBeInTheDocument();
+
+    emitCodeRejected(
+      "That code was rejected — `claude setup-token` reports the full code was not copied. Copy it again from the Anthropic page and submit it; 2 attempts left.",
+      2,
+    );
+
+    // Reported, not waited out — and the flow is still live.
+    await screen.findByText(/That code was rejected/);
+    expect(screen.getByText("Code rejected — try again")).toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(screen.queryByText("Finishing sign-in")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(screen.queryByTestId("claude-auth-error")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+
+    // A second code goes through without restarting the whole flow.
+    fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "the-whole-code" } });
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Submit code" }));
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(submitClaudeTokenCode).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith("the-whole-code"),
+    );
+    expect(acquireClaudeToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("ends with a reported failure when the retries run out", async () => {
+    acquireClaudeToken.mockRejectedValue(
+      "`claude setup-token` rejected the code 3 times, so the sign-in was abandoned. No token was stored.",
+    );
+    renderModal();
+
+    const banner = await screen.findByTestId("claude-auth-error");
+    expect(banner).toHaveTextContent(/rejected the code 3 times/);
   });
 });

app/src/components/settings/ClaudeAuthModal.tsx

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ interface Props {
 const PHASE_STATUS: Record<string, { tone: StatusTone; label: string }> = {
   waiting: { tone: "busy", label: "Waiting for sign-in" },
   finishing: { tone: "busy", label: "Finishing sign-in" },
+  // The CLI refused a code and is back at its prompt. Distinct from "failed":
+  // the flow is still live and another code will be accepted.
+  rejected: { tone: "error", label: "Code rejected — try again" },
   succeeded: { tone: "ok", label: "Token stored" },
   failed: { tone: "error", label: "Authentication failed" },
 };
@@ -88,7 +91,9 @@ export default function ClaudeAuthModal({
         ? PHASE_STATUS.failed
         : flow.codeSubmitted
           ? PHASE_STATUS.finishing
-          : PHASE_STATUS.waiting;
+          : flow.codeRejections > 0
+            ? PHASE_STATUS.rejected
+            : PHASE_STATUS.waiting;
 
   // Split for display only. `flow.signInUrl` has already passed the host
   // allowlist; this decides which half of it an ellipsis is allowed to eat.

app/src/hooks/useClaudeAuth.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
-import { authErrorMessage, extractSignInUrl } from "./useClaudeAuth";
+import {
+  authErrorMessage,
+  extractSignInUrl,
+  pickSignInUrl,
+} from "./useClaudeAuth";
 
 describe("extractSignInUrl", () => {
   it("finds the authorize URL in realistic setup-token output", () => {
@@ -79,6 +83,64 @@ describe("extractSignInUrl", () => {
     const second = "https://platform.claude.com/oauth/authorize?code=true&more=1";
     expect(extractSignInUrl(`${first}\n${second}\n`)).toBe(first);
   });
+
+  // ── Why the scraper is only the fallback ─────────────────────────────────
+  // `claude setup-token` emits the URL as an OSC 8 hyperlink and slices the
+  // *visible* text of it to the terminal width, so the transcript holds five
+  // 80-character pieces of a 346-character URL. Each piece is a valid,
+  // Anthropic-hosted, oauth-looking URL — and none of them authorises
+  // anything.
+
+  it("cannot recover a URL the CLI sliced across lines, which is why the hyperlink wins", () => {
+    const slices = [
+      FULL_URL.slice(0, 80),
+      FULL_URL.slice(80, 160),
+      FULL_URL.slice(160, 240),
+      FULL_URL.slice(240, 320),
+      FULL_URL.slice(320),
+    ];
+    const scraped = extractSignInUrl(slices.join("\n"));
+
+    // Documenting the limit, not endorsing it: the pieces share no prefix, so
+    // the "extends the current pick" rule cannot join them, and guessing at
+    // line joins on an untrusted stream is not on the table.
+    expect(scraped).toBe(slices[0]);
+    expect(scraped).not.toBe(FULL_URL);
+
+    // The hyperlink parameter carries the whole thing, and that is what the
+    // hook prefers.
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([FULL_URL])).toBe(FULL_URL);
+  });
+});
+
+/** The real sign-in URL, at its measured length (346 characters, Claude Code
+ *  2.1.226). */
+const FULL_URL =
+  "https://claude.com/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true&client_id=9d1c250a-e61b-44d9-88ed-5944d1962f5e&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fplatform.claude.com%2Foauth%2Fcode%2Fcallback&scope=user%3Ainference&code_challenge=RUX5MlWvwld1dmpvF_aPIJQWMBmffuJt4dOdL13zWAg&code_challenge_method=S256&state=su-x9PgZzvkBd3-um6G1llLNDgxptyO6HERvvCSrTbg";
+
+describe("pickSignInUrl", () => {
+  it("keeps a 346-character authorize URL intact", () => {
+    expect(FULL_URL).toHaveLength(346);
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([FULL_URL])).toBe(FULL_URL);
+  });
+
+  it("applies the same host allowlist to a hyperlink target", () => {
+    // An OSC 8 parameter is container output like anything else, and it is
+    // never displayed — so it is the *easier* place to hide a hostile host.
+    expect(pickSignInUrl(["https://evil.tld/cai/oauth/authorize"])).toBeNull();
+    expect(
+      pickSignInUrl(["https://claude.ai@evil.tld/oauth/authorize"]),
+    ).toBeNull();
+    expect(pickSignInUrl(["javascript:alert(1)"])).toBeNull();
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([])).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("does not let a later hyperlink displace the one already shown", () => {
+    const real = `${FULL_URL}`;
+    const spoof = "https://claude.com.evil.tld/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true";
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([real, spoof])).toBe(real);
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([spoof, real])).toBe(real);
+  });
 });
 
 describe("authErrorMessage", () => {

app/src/hooks/useClaudeAuth.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import { listen, type UnlistenFn } from "@tauri-apps/api/event";
 import * as commands from "../lib/tauri-commands";
 import { ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS, sanitizeRelayUrl } from "../lib/urlRelay";
 import type {
+  ClaudeTokenCodeRejectedEvent,
+  ClaudeTokenLinkEvent,
   ClaudeTokenOutputEvent,
   ClaudeTokenProgressEvent,
 } from "../lib/types";
@@ -19,10 +21,17 @@ import type {
 /** Emitted by `auth_token_commands.rs`; payload shapes live in `lib/types.ts`. */
 const PROGRESS_EVENT = "claude-token-progress";
 const OUTPUT_EVENT = "claude-token-output";
+const LINK_EVENT = "claude-token-link";
+const CODE_REJECTED_EVENT = "claude-token-code-rejected";
 
 /** Bound on the retained transcript. The tail is the interesting part. */
 const MAX_OUTPUT = 64 * 1024;
 
+/** Bound on retained sign-in candidates. The backend already deduplicates
+ *  consecutive repeats; this stops a container that prints a fresh hyperlink
+ *  every frame from growing state without limit. */
+const MAX_LINKS = 16;
+
 /**
  * Tauri rejects an `invoke` with the Rust `Err(String)` itself, and this
  * backend writes its errors as complete, actionable sentences ("The container
@@ -38,13 +47,13 @@ export function authErrorMessage(e: unknown, fallback: string): string {
 }
 
 /**
- * Pick the sign-in URL out of `claude setup-token`'s transcript.
+ * Choose one sign-in URL from a list of candidates.
  *
- * **The transcript is container output, so every candidate here is
+ * **Every candidate is container output, so all of them are
- * attacker-controlled if the sandboxed agent misbehaves.** It is then rendered
+ * attacker-controlled if the sandboxed agent misbehaves.** The winner is
- * under a heading that says "Sign in with Anthropic" and handed to the host
+ * rendered under a heading that says "Sign in with Anthropic" and handed to the
- * browser, which makes this the highest-value URL in the app to spoof: a user
+ * host browser, which makes this the highest-value URL in the app to spoof: a
- * who follows it types their real Anthropic credentials into whatever it
+ * user who follows it types their real Anthropic credentials into whatever it
  * resolves to. Three rules follow, and none of them are optional:
  *
  *  - Every candidate goes through the shared {@link sanitizeRelayUrl}, with a
@@ -60,14 +69,8 @@ export function authErrorMessage(e: unknown, fallback: string): string {
  *    the complete one — and it cannot swap the origin, because a longer string
  *    with the same prefix has the same host.
  */
-export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
+export function pickSignInUrl(candidates: readonly string[]): string | null {
-  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const cleaned = candidates
-  const matches = text.match(/https?:\/\/[^\s"'`<>\x00-\x20\x7f]+/g);
-  if (!matches) return null;
-
-  const cleaned = matches
-    // Trailing punctuation belongs to the prose, not the URL.
-    .map((url) => url.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]}>'"]+$/, ""))
     .map((url) => sanitizeRelayUrl(url, { allowHosts: ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS }))
     .filter((url): url is string => url !== null);
 
@@ -81,6 +84,33 @@ export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
   return best;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Scrape a sign-in URL out of `claude setup-token`'s visible transcript.
+ *
+ * **This is the fallback, not the primary route.** The CLI emits the URL as an
+ * OSC 8 hyperlink and slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the
+ * terminal width — measured at 80 columns, a 346-character URL arrives as five
+ * 80-character pieces on five lines. Nothing scraping the visible text can put
+ * those back together: the pieces share no prefix, so the "extends the current
+ * pick" rule cannot join them, and joining adjacent lines by guesswork on an
+ * untrusted stream is exactly the sort of thing the rules above exist to
+ * forbid. What comes out is the first 80 characters — a URL that parses, that
+ * points at claude.com, and that cannot authorise anything.
+ *
+ * So the backend lifts the whole URL out of the hyperlink parameter and sends
+ * it on `claude-token-link`, and {@link useClaudeTokenAcquisition} prefers that.
+ * This remains for CLI versions that print a bare URL with no hyperlink at all,
+ * where a URL narrow enough not to wrap is recovered correctly.
+ */
+export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const matches = text.match(/https?:\/\/[^\s"'`<>\x00-\x20\x7f]+/g);
+  if (!matches) return null;
+
+  // Trailing punctuation belongs to the prose, not the URL.
+  return pickSignInUrl(matches.map((url) => url.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]}>'"]+$/, "")));
+}
+
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // Token presence
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -133,6 +163,12 @@ export interface ClaudeTokenAcquisition {
   submitting: boolean;
   codeSubmitted: boolean;
   submitError: string | null;
+  /**
+   * How many codes `claude setup-token` has refused. Non-zero means the CLI is
+   * still alive and waiting for another one — a recoverable state, not the end
+   * of the flow.
+   */
+  codeRejections: number;
   submitCode: (code: string) => Promise<boolean>;
 }
 
@@ -154,6 +190,13 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
   const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false);
   const [codeSubmitted, setCodeSubmitted] = useState(false);
   const [submitError, setSubmitError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+  const [codeRejections, setCodeRejections] = useState(0);
+  // Candidates from `claude-token-link`, in arrival order. Kept as a list
+  // rather than a single value so `pickSignInUrl` applies the same first-wins
+  // rule here as it does to the scraped transcript — the CLI reprints the same
+  // hyperlink after every retry, and a *different* one arriving later must not
+  // be able to displace the one the user was already shown.
+  const [links, setLinks] = useState<string[]>([]);
 
   // Held in a ref so a fresh callback identity cannot restart the flow.
   const succeededRef = useRef(onSucceeded);
@@ -193,6 +236,26 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
               : next;
           });
         });
+        await register<ClaudeTokenLinkEvent>(LINK_EVENT, (payload) => {
+          if (payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
+          setLinks((prev) =>
+            prev.includes(payload.url) || prev.length >= MAX_LINKS
+              ? prev
+              : [...prev, payload.url],
+          );
+        });
+        await register<ClaudeTokenCodeRejectedEvent>(
+          CODE_REJECTED_EVENT,
+          (payload) => {
+            if (payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
+            // The CLI is alive and back at its prompt, so this is a correction
+            // the user can act on — not a failure. Re-open the input and say
+            // why, rather than leaving "Finishing sign-in" on screen forever.
+            setCodeRejections((n) => n + 1);
+            setCodeSubmitted(false);
+            setSubmitError(payload.message);
+          },
+        );
       } catch (e) {
         if (cancelled) return;
         setPhase("failed");
@@ -261,7 +324,13 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
     }
   }, []);
 
-  const signInUrl = useMemo(() => extractSignInUrl(output), [output]);
+  // The hyperlink parameter wins whenever there is one: it is the only place
+  // the CLI emits the URL contiguously. Scraping the visible text is the
+  // fallback for versions that print a bare URL — see `extractSignInUrl`.
+  const signInUrl = useMemo(
+    () => pickSignInUrl(links) ?? extractSignInUrl(output),
+    [links, output],
+  );
 
   return {
     phase,
@@ -272,6 +341,7 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
     submitting,
     codeSubmitted,
     submitError,
+    codeRejections,
     submitCode,
   };
 }

app/src/lib/types.ts

@@ -502,6 +502,26 @@ export interface ClaudeTokenOutputEvent {
   chunk: string;
 }
 
+/** Payload of the `claude-token-link`: a sign-in URL taken from an OSC 8
+ *  hyperlink parameter, which is the only place the CLI emits it whole — the
+ *  visible text is sliced to the terminal width. **Untrusted**: it is container
+ *  output, so it goes through `sanitizeRelayUrl` with the
+ *  `ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS` allowlist before it is shown or opened. */
+export interface ClaudeTokenLinkEvent {
+  project_id: string;
+  url: string;
+}
+
+/** Payload of `claude-token-code-rejected`: `claude setup-token` refused the
+ *  submitted code and is parked waiting for another one. The flow is still
+ *  alive, so this is recoverable — `attempts_remaining` is how many more codes
+ *  the backend will pass on before giving up. */
+export interface ClaudeTokenCodeRejectedEvent {
+  project_id: string;
+  message: string;
+  attempts_remaining: number;
+}
+
 // ── Container base-image migration ───────────────────────────────────────────
 //
 // A project's container is created from its own `triple-c-snapshot-<id>:latest`