diff --git a/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.test.tsx b/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.test.tsx
index b59da3b..723f0e8 100644
--- a/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.test.tsx
+++ b/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.test.tsx
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
 import { render, fireEvent, cleanup, act } from "@testing-library/react";
-import TerminalView, { supersedes } from "./TerminalView";
+import TerminalView, {
+  OSC8_HOVER_CLASS,
+  createOsc8LinkHandler,
+  supersedes,
+} from "./TerminalView";
 import { useAppState } from "../../store/appState";
 import {
   uploadHostFileToTerminal,
@@ -41,6 +45,57 @@ const ptyOutput = vi.hoisted(() => ({
   listeners: new Map<string, (e: { payload: number[] }) => void>(),
 }));
 
+/**
+ * What `TerminalView` actually handed the `Terminal` constructor, and the
+ * instances it built.
+ *
+ * The real xterm is kept — these tests depend on its parser, its modes and its
+ * DOM — and only the constructor is wrapped, because the wiring of
+ * `linkHandler` is otherwise unobservable from outside: xterm decides when to
+ * call it from cell geometry that jsdom has no layout for, so deleting the
+ * `linkHandler:` line changed nothing any assertion could see.
+ */
+const xterm = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  options: null as Record<string, unknown> | null,
+  instances: [] as unknown[],
+}));
+
+/**
+ * The click handler `TerminalView` hands `WebLinksAddon`.
+ *
+ * Captured for the same reason the `Terminal` constructor is: xterm decides
+ * when to call it from cell geometry jsdom has no layout for, so the only way
+ * to ask "does the plain-text-URL path apply the same gate as the OSC 8 one?"
+ * is to hold the function and call it.
+ */
+const webLinks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  handler: null as null | ((event: MouseEvent, uri: string) => void),
+}));
+
+vi.mock("@xterm/xterm", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@xterm/xterm")>();
+  class SpyTerminal extends actual.Terminal {
+    constructor(options?: ConstructorParameters<typeof actual.Terminal>[0]) {
+      super(options);
+      xterm.options = (options ?? null) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+      xterm.instances.push(this);
+    }
+  }
+  return { ...actual, Terminal: SpyTerminal };
+});
+
+vi.mock("@xterm/addon-web-links", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@xterm/addon-web-links")>();
+  type Args = ConstructorParameters<typeof actual.WebLinksAddon>;
+  class SpyWebLinksAddon extends actual.WebLinksAddon {
+    constructor(...args: Args) {
+      super(...args);
+      webLinks.handler = (args[0] ?? null) as typeof webLinks.handler;
+    }
+  }
+  return { ...actual, WebLinksAddon: SpyWebLinksAddon };
+});
+
 /**
  * Shift+Enter has to reach the container as ESC+CR.
  *
@@ -157,6 +212,9 @@ beforeEach(() => {
   useAppState.setState({ toasts: [] });
   document.body.innerHTML = "";
   useAppState.setState({ sessions: [] });
+  xterm.options = null;
+  xterm.instances.length = 0;
+  webLinks.handler = null;
 });
 
 afterEach(() => {
@@ -1074,3 +1132,653 @@ describe("TerminalView — releasing a captured mouse", () => {
     expect(terminalInput).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 });
+
+describe("the hover hint names the key that actually works", () => {
+  const platform = (value: string) =>
+    Object.defineProperty(navigator, "platform", { value, configurable: true });
+  const original = navigator.platform;
+  afterEach(() => platform(original));
+
+  const hoverHint = (
+    tracking: boolean,
+    macOptionClickForcesSelection = true,
+  ): string => {
+    const host = document.createElement("div");
+    createOsc8LinkHandler(() => host, () => ({
+      mouseTracking: tracking,
+      hasSelection: false,
+      macOptionClickForcesSelection,
+    })).hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), "https://example.com/x", {
+      start: { x: 1, y: 1 },
+      end: { x: 1, y: 1 },
+    });
+    return host.textContent ?? "";
+  };
+
+  // The hint and the gate read one predicate; these pin that they cannot
+  // drift, because a hint naming a key the gate does not accept is the bug
+  // that was already fixed once on this branch.
+  it("says Option on a Mac, because that is xterm's force-selection modifier there", () => {
+    platform("MacIntel");
+    expect(hoverHint(true)).toContain("Option+click");
+    expect(hoverHint(true)).not.toContain("Shift+click");
+  });
+
+  it("says Shift everywhere else", () => {
+    platform("Linux x86_64");
+    expect(hoverHint(true)).toContain("Shift+click");
+  });
+
+  // No program holds the mouse, so no modifier is needed — and naming one
+  // would tell the user to press a key the gate ignores.
+  it("names no modifier at all while nothing is tracking the mouse", () => {
+    platform("Linux x86_64");
+    const hint = hoverHint(false);
+    expect(hint).toContain("Click to open");
+    expect(hint).not.toContain("Shift+click");
+
+    platform("MacIntel");
+    expect(hoverHint(false)).not.toContain("Option+click");
+  });
+
+  // `macOptionClickForcesSelection` defaults to false in xterm and this view
+  // sets it true, so the Mac branch is only live because of that line. If it
+  // ever goes, Option stops being the force-selection modifier and the gate
+  // can never pass while a program holds the mouse — so the card must not go
+  // on naming a key that does nothing.
+  it("does not promise Option+click when the option behind it is off", () => {
+    platform("MacIntel");
+    const hint = hoverHint(true, false);
+    expect(hint).not.toContain("Option+click");
+    expect(hint).not.toContain("Shift+click");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("createOsc8LinkHandler — clicking a link Claude Code printed", () => {
+  /**
+   * The handler is exercised directly rather than through a rendered terminal.
+   *
+   * xterm decides *when* to call it from cell geometry, and jsdom gives every
+   * element a zero-sized box — so a test driving the mouse over the pane would
+   * be asserting that jsdom's layout engine exists, not that this app validates
+   * what it opens. What xterm hands over is the OSC 8 parameter verbatim, which
+   * is exactly what these arguments are.
+   */
+  const range = {
+    start: { x: 1, y: 1 },
+    end: { x: 80, y: 1 },
+  } as unknown as Parameters<
+    NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof createOsc8LinkHandler>["hover"]>
+  >[2];
+
+  let host: HTMLDivElement;
+  let handler: ReturnType<typeof createOsc8LinkHandler>;
+  /**
+   * What the terminal answers about itself when the gate asks, per test.
+   *
+   * Mutable rather than fixed at construction because both of the first two
+   * change *under* the handler: the container sets the mouse mode with a
+   * DECSET, and the selection is whatever the gesture that ended in this
+   * mouseup left behind.
+   */
+  let state: {
+    mouseTracking: boolean;
+    hasSelection: boolean;
+    macOptionClickForcesSelection: boolean;
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    host = document.createElement("div");
+    document.body.appendChild(host);
+    state = {
+      mouseTracking: false,
+      hasSelection: false,
+      // What `TerminalView` sets on the real terminal.
+      macOptionClickForcesSelection: true,
+    };
+    handler = createOsc8LinkHandler(() => host, () => state);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => host.remove());
+
+  function hoverCard(): HTMLElement | null {
+    return host.querySelector<HTMLElement>(`.${OSC8_HOVER_CLASS}`);
+  }
+
+  /** A real single click: one press, one release, `detail` 1. */
+  const click = (init: MouseEventInit = {}) =>
+    new MouseEvent("click", { button: 0, detail: 1, ...init });
+
+  it("refuses a target that fails validation, without reaching the opener", () => {
+    // The visible text can be anything; the parameter is what gets opened, and
+    // a container is free to put a scheme in it that the host must never hand
+    // to an OS-level opener.
+    handler.activate(click(), "javascript:alert(1)", range);
+    handler.activate(click(), "file:///etc/passwd", range);
+    handler.activate(click(), "https://claude.ai@evil.tld/authorize", range);
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("opens a valid target through the one sink", async () => {
+    const url =
+      "https://claude.ai/oauth/authorize?code=true&client_id=abc123&scope=user%3Ainference";
+    await act(async () => {
+      handler.activate(click(), url, range);
+      await Promise.resolve();
+    });
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(url);
+  });
+
+  describe("the gate on activation", () => {
+    const URL = "https://example.com/x";
+
+    /**
+     * The attack this gate exists for.
+     *
+     * xterm's mouse-reporting mousedown does *not* cancel anything —
+     * `cancelEvents` defaults to false — and the Linkifier is a descendant of
+     * the element those listeners are bound to, so the link layer sees every
+     * click first and `_handleMouseUp` activates with no modifier, button or
+     * mode check of its own. A TUI widget the user is meant to click can
+     * therefore be wrapped in an OSC 8 pointing anywhere, and a plain click
+     * opens the host browser on it while the mouse report still reaches the
+     * program, so nothing looks wrong. The modifier is the only thing that
+     * separates "I clicked the menu item" from "I asked to leave the app".
+     */
+    it("refuses a plain click while a program is tracking the mouse", () => {
+      state.mouseTracking = true;
+
+      handler.activate(click(), URL, range);
+
+      expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it("opens on the force-selection modifier while tracking", async () => {
+      state.mouseTracking = true;
+
+      await act(async () => {
+        handler.activate(click({ shiftKey: true }), URL, range);
+        await Promise.resolve();
+      });
+
+      expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+    });
+
+    it("opens on a plain click when nothing holds the mouse", async () => {
+      // A normal shell. This is what `WebLinksAddon` does for the plain-text
+      // URLs in the same buffer, and asking for a modifier here would read as
+      // a broken link.
+      state.mouseTracking = false;
+
+      await act(async () => {
+        handler.activate(click(), URL, range);
+        await Promise.resolve();
+      });
+
+      expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+    });
+
+    it("ignores every button but the primary one", () => {
+      // Right-click is the context menu this pane already binds; middle-click
+      // is paste. Neither is a request to leave the app.
+      state.mouseTracking = false;
+
+      handler.activate(click({ button: 2 }), URL, range);
+      handler.activate(click({ button: 1 }), URL, range);
+      handler.activate(click({ button: 2, shiftKey: true }), URL, range);
+
+      expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    /**
+     * Selecting text is not asking to leave the app.
+     *
+     * `Linkifier._handleMouseUp` has no `detail` check, no drag threshold and
+     * no timestamp — it activates whenever the mouseup lands on the same link
+     * the mousedown did. `SelectionService` is bound on the *document* and the
+     * Linkifier on `screenElement`, so the selection gesture and the link
+     * activation both run, the link layer first. Every gesture below is one a
+     * user makes to *copy* a string, and none of them may open a browser.
+     */
+    describe("a selection gesture is not a click", () => {
+      it("refuses a double-click, which selects the word under it", () => {
+        // xterm selects the word on the *mousedown* of the second click, so
+        // by this mouseup the selection is already there.
+        state.hasSelection = true;
+
+        handler.activate(click({ detail: 2 }), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      it("refuses a triple-click, which selects the whole row", () => {
+        state.hasSelection = true;
+
+        handler.activate(click({ detail: 3 }), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      // The one the click count cannot see: a drag is a single press and a
+      // single release, so `detail` is 1 throughout. Only the selection it
+      // left behind distinguishes it from a click.
+      it("refuses a drag that selected characters, at click count 1", () => {
+        state.hasSelection = true;
+
+        handler.activate(click(), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      /**
+       * The worst version, and the reason the modifier alone is not a gate.
+       *
+       * While a program holds the mouse, Shift/Option+drag is the *only* way
+       * to select text at all — so "the deliberate request to leave the app"
+       * and "I am copying this line" are byte-identical gestures. A container
+       * that wraps each of its output rows in an OSC 8 turns every legitimate
+       * copy into a browser open.
+       */
+      it("refuses a force-selection drag while a program holds the mouse", () => {
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        state.hasSelection = true;
+
+        handler.activate(click({ shiftKey: true }), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      // Belt to the selection check's braces: independent of whether xterm
+      // managed to select anything (a double-click on trailing whitespace
+      // selects nothing), a second click is not a first one.
+      it("refuses a repeat click even when nothing ended up selected", () => {
+        state.hasSelection = false;
+
+        handler.activate(click({ detail: 2 }), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+    });
+
+    /**
+     * The card and the gate must not disagree about what the user has to do.
+     *
+     * The hint is computed once, when the pointer arrives; the mode it was
+     * computed from is the container's to change, and `?1002l` takes effect
+     * synchronously with the write. So a card reading "Shift+click to open"
+     * can be on screen while the live mode says a bare click is enough —
+     * which is also the shape of the flicker attack in FINDING 2. The gate
+     * therefore honours the *stricter* of what was promised and what is true
+     * now: a modifier the card asked for is still required when the click
+     * lands.
+     */
+    describe("what the card promised still binds when the click lands", () => {
+      it("keeps demanding the modifier after the container drops tracking", () => {
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), URL, range);
+        expect(host.textContent).toContain("+click to open");
+
+        // `?1002l`, mid-hover.
+        state.mouseTracking = false;
+        handler.activate(click(), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      it("still opens on the modifier the card named", async () => {
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), URL, range);
+        state.mouseTracking = false;
+
+        await act(async () => {
+          handler.activate(click({ shiftKey: true }), URL, range);
+          await Promise.resolve();
+        });
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+      });
+
+      it("does not hold a stale demand against the next link", async () => {
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), URL, range);
+        handler.leave?.(new MouseEvent("mouseout"), URL, range);
+
+        // A plain shell now, and a fresh card that says so.
+        state.mouseTracking = false;
+        handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), URL, range);
+        expect(host.textContent).toContain("Click to open");
+
+        await act(async () => {
+          handler.activate(click(), URL, range);
+          await Promise.resolve();
+        });
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+      });
+    });
+
+    /**
+     * FINDING 6: the modifier is xterm's, including the option it hangs on.
+     *
+     * xterm's rule is `isMac ? altKey && macOptionClickForcesSelection :
+     * shiftKey`. Hardcoding `altKey` agrees with the app only for as long as
+     * the app keeps setting that option, and nothing tells you when it stops.
+     */
+    describe("the Mac modifier follows the terminal's own option", () => {
+      const platform = (value: string) =>
+        Object.defineProperty(navigator, "platform", {
+          value,
+          configurable: true,
+        });
+      const original = navigator.platform;
+      afterEach(() => platform(original));
+
+      it("opens on Option+click while the option is on", async () => {
+        platform("MacIntel");
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        state.macOptionClickForcesSelection = true;
+
+        await act(async () => {
+          handler.activate(click({ altKey: true }), URL, range);
+          await Promise.resolve();
+        });
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+      });
+
+      it("refuses Option+click when the terminal does not treat it as force-select", () => {
+        platform("MacIntel");
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        state.macOptionClickForcesSelection = false;
+
+        handler.activate(click({ altKey: true }), URL, range);
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      });
+
+      it("ignores the option off a Mac, where Shift is the modifier", async () => {
+        platform("Linux x86_64");
+        state.mouseTracking = true;
+        state.macOptionClickForcesSelection = false;
+
+        await act(async () => {
+          handler.activate(click({ shiftKey: true }), URL, range);
+          await Promise.resolve();
+        });
+
+        expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("shows the real origin on hover, not the text on screen", () => {
+    // The point of the affordance. OSC 8 decouples label from target: the row
+    // can read `https://claude.ai` while the parameter points anywhere.
+    handler.hover?.(
+      new MouseEvent("mousemove"),
+      "https://evil.example.com/claude.ai/oauth/authorize?code=true",
+      range,
+    );
+
+    const card = hoverCard();
+    expect(card).not.toBeNull();
+    const origin = card!.querySelector('[data-testid="osc8-hover-origin"]');
+    expect(origin?.textContent).toBe("https://evil.example.com");
+    expect(card!.textContent).not.toContain("https://claude.ai");
+
+    handler.leave?.(new MouseEvent("mouseout"), "https://evil.example.com/", range);
+    expect(hoverCard()).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a very long origin whole, and gives way in the remainder instead", () => {
+    // The attacker picks the origin's length. `https://claude.ai.<300 a's>
+    // .evil.tld/` parses, passes every `sanitizeRelayUrl` rule, and under a
+    // non-shrinking flex item runs off the right edge of the pane — which
+    // hides the registrable domain just as effectively as an ellipsis would.
+    const origin = `https://claude.ai.${"a".repeat(300)}.${"b".repeat(200)}.evil.tld`;
+    handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), `${origin}/oauth?code=1`, range);
+
+    const originEl = hoverCard()!.querySelector<HTMLElement>(
+      '[data-testid="osc8-hover-origin"]',
+    )!;
+    // Whole origin or nothing: every character is in the DOM...
+    expect(originEl.textContent).toBe(origin);
+    // ...and it is allowed to wrap rather than be clipped or pushed off-pane.
+    expect(originEl.style.flexShrink).not.toBe("0");
+    expect(originEl.style.whiteSpace).not.toBe("nowrap");
+    expect(originEl.style.overflowWrap).toBe("anywhere");
+
+    // The truncatable half is the remainder, and only the remainder.
+    const restEl = hoverCard()!.querySelector<HTMLElement>(
+      '[data-testid="osc8-hover-rest"]',
+    )!;
+    expect(restEl.style.textOverflow).toBe("ellipsis");
+    expect(restEl.style.whiteSpace).toBe("nowrap");
+  });
+
+  it("cannot take the pointer away from the link that summoned it", () => {
+    // The card is appended to `Terminal.element`, a *sibling* of the
+    // `screenElement` the Linkifier listens on, so `xterm-hover` buys nothing
+    // here: a card under the pointer means `mouseleave` on screenElement, the
+    // card is torn down, and the mouseup that would activate the link lands on
+    // the card instead of the terminal.
+    handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), "https://example.com/x", range);
+
+    expect(hoverCard()!.style.pointerEvents).toBe("none");
+  });
+
+  it("says so on hover when the target would be refused", () => {
+    handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), "javascript:alert(1)", range);
+
+    const card = hoverCard();
+    expect(card).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(card!.querySelector('[data-testid="osc8-hover-origin"]')).toBeNull();
+    // Never echo the rejected target: it is untrusted text on its way to a DOM
+    // node, and the only thing worth saying is that clicking does nothing.
+    expect(card!.textContent).not.toContain("javascript:");
+  });
+
+  it("does not call a refused web address something other than a web address", () => {
+    // `https://claude.ai@evil.tld/` is a perfectly good URL; it is refused
+    // because the userinfo makes the visible host a lie. Telling the user it
+    // "is not a web address" is false, and a false explanation teaches them to
+    // distrust the card.
+    handler.hover?.(
+      new MouseEvent("mousemove"),
+      "https://claude.ai@evil.tld/authorize",
+      range,
+    );
+
+    expect(hoverCard()!.textContent).not.toContain("not a web address");
+  });
+
+  it("drops a stale card when the pane is no longer on screen", () => {
+    // `leave` only ever arrives from the Linkifier's `_clearCurrentLink`, and
+    // switching tabs from the keyboard moves no pointer: without this, the
+    // card is still sitting there when the user comes back.
+    handler.hover?.(new MouseEvent("mousemove"), "https://example.com/x", range);
+    expect(hoverCard()).not.toBeNull();
+
+    handler.dismiss();
+
+    expect(hoverCard()).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("pushes the shared toast when the host opener fails", async () => {
+    vi.mocked(openUrlExternal).mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("no opener"));
+
+    await act(async () => {
+      handler.activate(click(), "https://example.com/x", range);
+      await Promise.resolve();
+    });
+
+    const toasts = useAppState.getState().toasts;
+    expect(toasts).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(toasts[0].kind).toBe("error");
+    expect(toasts[0].detail).toContain("no opener");
+    // Same card as every other dead-opener report in this view.
+    expect(toasts[0].dedupeKey).toBe("host-open-failed");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the link handler is wired into the terminal, and reads its live mode", () => {
+  const range = {
+    start: { x: 1, y: 1 },
+    end: { x: 80, y: 1 },
+  } as unknown as Parameters<
+    NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof createOsc8LinkHandler>["hover"]>
+  >[2];
+
+  /** What the mounted view passed as `linkHandler`. */
+  function wiredHandler() {
+    const handler = xterm.options?.linkHandler as
+      | ReturnType<typeof createOsc8LinkHandler>
+      | undefined;
+    if (!handler) throw new Error("no linkHandler was passed to Terminal");
+    return handler;
+  }
+
+  /** Feed the terminal a DECSET the way the container would. */
+  async function write(data: string) {
+    const term = xterm.instances.at(-1) as { write(d: string, cb: () => void): void };
+    await act(
+      () => new Promise<void>((resolve) => term.write(data, resolve)),
+    );
+  }
+
+  it("passes one at all — without it OSC 8 links are inert", () => {
+    mountSession("claude");
+
+    const handler = wiredHandler();
+    expect(typeof handler.activate).toBe("function");
+    expect(typeof handler.hover).toBe("function");
+  });
+
+  // The gate has to ask the terminal, not a boolean captured at construction:
+  // the mode changes whenever the container prints a DECSET, which is several
+  // times a second in Claude Code.
+  it("refuses a plain click once the container turns mouse tracking on", async () => {
+    mountSession("claude");
+    await write("\x1b[?1002h");
+
+    wiredHandler().activate(
+      new MouseEvent("click", { button: 0, detail: 1 }),
+      "https://example.com/x",
+      range,
+    );
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("opens again once the container gives the mouse back", async () => {
+    mountSession("claude");
+    await write("\x1b[?1002h");
+    await write("\x1b[?1002l");
+
+    await act(async () => {
+      wiredHandler().activate(
+        new MouseEvent("click", { button: 0, detail: 1 }),
+        "https://example.com/x",
+        range,
+      );
+      await Promise.resolve();
+    });
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith("https://example.com/x");
+  });
+});
+
+/**
+ * FINDING 4: the sibling path opens the same browser.
+ *
+ * `WebLinksAddon` matches rendered text and activates through the same
+ * `Linkifier._handleMouseUp`, with the same absence of any check. It also
+ * picks up links the OSC 8 handler never sees: `OscLinkProvider` drops a
+ * non-http(s) hyperlink target before `linkHandler` is reached, which leaves
+ * the addon free to match the *label* — so an OSC 8 with a `javascript:`
+ * target and an `https://evil.tld/x` label arrives here and nowhere else.
+ * Both routes end at `openUrlExternal`, so both ask the same question first.
+ */
+describe("the plain-text URL path is gated the same way", () => {
+  function webLinksHandler() {
+    if (!webLinks.handler) throw new Error("no handler was passed to WebLinksAddon");
+    return webLinks.handler;
+  }
+
+  function term() {
+    return xterm.instances.at(-1) as unknown as {
+      write(d: string, cb: () => void): void;
+      select(column: number, row: number, length: number): void;
+    };
+  }
+
+  async function write(data: string) {
+    await act(() => new Promise<void>((resolve) => term().write(data, resolve)));
+  }
+
+  const click = (init: MouseEventInit = {}) =>
+    new MouseEvent("click", { button: 0, detail: 1, ...init });
+  const URL = "https://example.com/x";
+
+  it("opens on a plain click in an ordinary shell", async () => {
+    mountSession("bash");
+
+    await act(async () => {
+      webLinksHandler()(click(), URL);
+      await Promise.resolve();
+    });
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a plain click while a program holds the mouse", async () => {
+    mountSession("claude");
+    await write("\x1b[?1002h");
+
+    webLinksHandler()(click(), URL);
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("opens on the force-selection modifier while tracking", async () => {
+    mountSession("claude");
+    await write("\x1b[?1002h");
+
+    await act(async () => {
+      webLinksHandler()(click({ shiftKey: true }), URL);
+      await Promise.resolve();
+    });
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).toHaveBeenCalledWith(URL);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses the mouseup that ended a selection", async () => {
+    mountSession("bash");
+    await write("https://example.com/x");
+    await act(async () => {
+      term().select(0, 0, 5);
+    });
+
+    webLinksHandler()(click(), URL);
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a repeat click", async () => {
+    mountSession("bash");
+
+    webLinksHandler()(click({ detail: 2 }), URL);
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("still refuses a target that fails validation", async () => {
+    mountSession("bash");
+
+    webLinksHandler()(click(), "https://claude.ai@evil.tld/authorize");
+
+    expect(openUrlExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
diff --git a/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.tsx b/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.tsx
index 888e1f6..d2ab87b 100644
--- a/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.tsx
+++ b/app/src/components/terminal/TerminalView.tsx
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
-import { Terminal } from "@xterm/xterm";
+import { Terminal, type ILinkHandler } from "@xterm/xterm";
 import { FitAddon } from "@xterm/addon-fit";
 import { WebglAddon } from "@xterm/addon-webgl";
 import { WebLinksAddon } from "@xterm/addon-web-links";
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import {
   extendsUrl,
   parseUrlRelayOsc,
   sanitizeRelayUrl,
+  urlOrigin,
 } from "../../lib/urlRelay";
 import { classifyDrop, DROP_BLOCKED_TOAST } from "../../lib/dropTarget";
 import { useSignInOpenTarget } from "../../hooks/useSignInOpenTarget";
@@ -106,12 +107,460 @@ export function supersedes(
   return extendsUrl(next.url, current.url);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Marks the hover card, for xterm's stylesheet and for the tests.
+ *
+ * It does *not* make xterm route pointer events around the card. xterm only
+ * consults this class inside `Linkifier._handleMouseMove`, which is registered
+ * on `screenElement`; the card is appended to `Terminal.element`, a *sibling*
+ * of that node, so the check never sees it. What keeps the card out of the way
+ * is `pointerEvents: "none"` on the card itself — see `hover` below for what
+ * goes wrong without it.
+ */
+export const OSC8_HOVER_CLASS = "xterm-hover";
+
+/**
+ * Report a failed handoff to the host's browser.
+ *
+ * One sink, one card. See the long note on `handleOpenUrl` for what this catch
+ * does *not* catch on Linux; a click that appears to do nothing is the
+ * complaint either way, so every route that opens a URL says the same thing in
+ * the same place.
+ */
+function reportOpenFailure(e: unknown) {
+  useAppState.getState().pushToast({
+    kind: "error",
+    message: "Could not open that link in your browser",
+    detail: String(e),
+    // A dead opener fails for every link in the buffer. One card.
+    dedupeKey: "host-open-failed",
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * `ILinkHandler`, plus the one thing xterm never asks for.
+ *
+ * `leave` is only ever reached through `Linkifier._clearCurrentLink`, i.e. a
+ * pointer that moved. Switching tabs from the keyboard moves no pointer and
+ * the Linkifier's dispose path does not clear either, so the card outlives the
+ * pane and is still there when the user comes back. {@link dismiss} is how the
+ * view says "this pane is gone" without pretending to be a mouse event.
+ */
+export type Osc8LinkHandler = ILinkHandler & { dismiss(): void };
+
+/**
+ * Is a program holding the mouse?
+ *
+ * One expression, two readers that must never disagree: the status-bar badge
+ * (`syncMouseCapture`) and the gate on opening a link ({@link opensOnClick}).
+ * A gate that thought tracking was off while the badge said it was on would be
+ * the whole security hole back again.
+ */
+function terminalTracksMouse(term: Terminal): boolean {
+  return term.modes.mouseTrackingMode !== "none";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Everything the gate asks the terminal, sampled at the moment of the click.
+ *
+ * A struct rather than three getters because the three are read together and
+ * must describe one instant: `hasSelection` is only meaningful against the
+ * `mouseTracking` that decided which gestures could have produced it.
+ */
+export interface ClickContext {
+  /** {@link terminalTracksMouse} — the container's to change, at any time. */
+  mouseTracking: boolean;
+  /** Does the terminal hold a selection *right now*? See {@link opensOnClick}. */
+  hasSelection: boolean;
+  /** xterm's `macOptionClickForcesSelection`, read rather than assumed. */
+  macOptionClickForcesSelection: boolean;
+}
+
+function readClickContext(term: Terminal): ClickContext {
+  return {
+    mouseTracking: terminalTracksMouse(term),
+    hasSelection: term.hasSelection(),
+    macOptionClickForcesSelection:
+      term.options.macOptionClickForcesSelection ?? false,
+  };
+}
+
+/** xterm's `isMac` verbatim (`common/Platform.ts`), so we split where it does. */
+function isMacPlatform(): boolean {
+  const platform = typeof navigator === "undefined" ? "" : navigator.platform;
+  return ["Macintosh", "MacIntel", "MacPPC", "Mac68K"].includes(platform);
+}
+
+/**
+ * xterm's `SelectionService.shouldForceSelection`, mirrored.
+ *
+ * The modifier is not our choice and it must not drift: while a program holds
+ * the mouse, this is the one gesture the user already has for "this click is
+ * for the terminal, not for the program", so it is the gesture that may open a
+ * link. xterm's rule is
+ * `isMac ? e.altKey && rawOptions.macOptionClickForcesSelection : e.shiftKey`,
+ * and the option is read from the terminal rather than assumed: this view sets
+ * it true today, so the two agreed, but xterm's default is false and nothing
+ * would have reported the day that line went. A hardcoded `altKey` would then
+ * accept a modifier xterm no longer treats as force-select.
+ *
+ * The gate and the hint below both call this. A hint that names a key the gate
+ * does not accept is worse than no hint — the user concludes the link is
+ * broken — and that is a bug this branch has already shipped once, so the two
+ * are not allowed separate answers.
+ */
+function forcesSelection(
+  event: { altKey: boolean; shiftKey: boolean },
+  macOptionClickForcesSelection: boolean,
+): boolean {
+  return isMacPlatform()
+    ? event.altKey && macOptionClickForcesSelection
+    : event.shiftKey;
+}
+
+/**
+ * What the card tells the user to do, for the state the terminal is in *now*.
+ *
+ * Conditional because the gesture is: with no program tracking the mouse a
+ * plain click opens the link, and naming a modifier then would send the user
+ * hunting for a key that changes nothing. The last branch is the same rule
+ * once more: on a Mac with `macOptionClickForcesSelection` off there *is* no
+ * force-selection modifier, so {@link opensOnClick} can never pass while a
+ * program holds the mouse, and naming Option would be naming a dead key.
+ */
+function openHintLabel(ctx: ClickContext): string {
+  if (!ctx.mouseTracking) return "Click to open";
+  if (!isMacPlatform()) return "Shift+click to open";
+  if (!ctx.macOptionClickForcesSelection) {
+    return "Not clickable while a program holds the mouse";
+  }
+  return "Option+click to open";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether this mouseup is a request to leave the app for the host browser.
+ *
+ * xterm asks none of this. `Linkifier._handleMouseUp` activates whenever the
+ * mouseup lands on the same link the mousedown did — no button check, no mode
+ * check, no `detail`, no drag threshold, no timestamp (`SelectionService` has
+ * a `_mouseDownTimeStamp`; the Linkifier has nothing). Four refusals, for four
+ * different mistakes:
+ *
+ *  - **Anything but the primary button.** Without this a *right*-click
+ *    activates the link as well as opening this pane's context menu, and a
+ *    middle-click paste opens it too.
+ *  - **A mouseup that ended a selection.** This is the load-bearing one, and
+ *    the reason is that a drag is a single press and a single release, so its
+ *    click count is 1 and nothing else distinguishes it from a click. Both
+ *    gestures a user makes to *copy* a string end here: drag across a few
+ *    characters, or double-click a word (xterm selects it on the second
+ *    mousedown, so the selection is already in the model by the time this
+ *    runs). Worse, while a program holds the mouse Shift/Option+drag is the
+ *    *only* way to select at all — byte-identical to the modifier below — so
+ *    without this check a container that wraps each output row in an OSC 8
+ *    turns every legitimate copy into a browser open. The selection check is
+ *    also cheap to be wrong about in the safe direction: xterm's
+ *    `_handleSingleClick` clears the model on the mousedown of a plain click,
+ *    so an old selection elsewhere in the buffer is already gone by the time a
+ *    real click on a link arrives here.
+ *
+ *    The limit of this check, stated because the paragraph above reads
+ *    absolute: it sees a drag only once the drag has spanned a *cell*. A press
+ *    and release inside one character cell, or a drag walked back to where it
+ *    started, leaves `finalSelectionEnd === finalSelectionStart`, so
+ *    `hasSelection()` is false and the link opens. Nothing reached the
+ *    clipboard in that case and the card showed the real origin first, so the
+ *    cost is small — but it is the gap a mousedown/mouseup distance check
+ *    would have closed, and it is the price of not keeping that second source
+ *    of truth.
+ *  - **A repeat click**, `detail > 1`. Belt to the above's braces: it holds
+ *    even when the selection came out empty (a double-click on trailing
+ *    whitespace selects nothing) and it does not depend on xterm having
+ *    updated the selection model before the Linkifier's listener runs. It is
+ *    `!== 1`, not `> 1`: a mouseup derived from a real click always carries
+ *    `detail >= 1`, so `> 1` would have waved through anything synthesised
+ *    with `detail` 0. Nothing in the container can dispatch a DOM event, so
+ *    that is hardening rather than a hole being closed.
+ *    Comparing mousedown and mouseup *coordinates* would be a third signal,
+ *    but xterm hands this handler only the mouseup — the mousedown is not
+ *    ours to see without binding our own listener to the host element, which
+ *    is a second source of truth about the same gesture.
+ *  - **A plain click while a modifier is required.** OSC 8 lets the container
+ *    wrap any clickable TUI widget — a menu row, a "1. Yes", a file chip — in
+ *    a link to anywhere, and because the mouse report still reaches the
+ *    program the widget also responds, so nothing looks wrong. Requiring the
+ *    force-selection modifier there makes the two intents distinguishable.
+ *
+ * `modifierPromised` is that last requirement made sticky, and it is about the
+ * card rather than the click: the hint is rendered once, at hover, from a mode
+ * the container may change before the user's finger comes down. The gate
+ * honours the stricter of what the card promised and what is true now, so a
+ * card reading "Shift+click to open" cannot be on screen while a bare click
+ * opens the link.
+ *
+ * **What this does not close.** `mouseTracking` is a permission the attacker
+ * grants itself — see `activate`.
+ *
+ * With nothing tracking the mouse and nothing promised, a bare click is
+ * correct and expected: it is what `WebLinksAddon` does for the plain-text
+ * URLs in the same buffer, which is why that handler applies this same gate.
+ */
+function opensOnClick(
+  event: MouseEvent,
+  ctx: ClickContext,
+  modifierPromised = false,
+): boolean {
+  if (event.button !== 0) return false;
+  if (event.detail !== 1) return false;
+  if (ctx.hasSelection) return false;
+  if (!ctx.mouseTracking && !modifierPromised) return true;
+  return forcesSelection(event, ctx.macOptionClickForcesSelection);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Makes OSC 8 hyperlinks clickable, and shows where they actually go.
+ *
+ * ## Why xterm's own link matching is not enough
+ *
+ * `WebLinksAddon` matches *rendered text*, row by row. Claude Code prints its
+ * links as OSC 8 hyperlinks whose visible text is hard-wrapped into
+ * terminal-width pieces — measured against 2.1.226, a 346-character sign-in
+ * URL arrives as five emissions, each carrying the whole URL in its OSC 8
+ * parameter and about 80 characters of it on screen (see `lib/urlDetector.ts`,
+ * which had to grow the same second branch). So the addon matches a fragment
+ * or nothing at all, which is the entire reason the URL toast exists. xterm
+ * hands `linkHandler` the complete parameter instead, however the label was
+ * sliced, so this covers exactly the case the addon cannot — and the addon
+ * stays, because it covers the plain-text URLs in ordinary shell output that
+ * carry no OSC 8 at all.
+ *
+ * ## xterm applies no gate of its own, so this one does
+ *
+ * There is a tempting story in which xterm's mouse-reporting mousedown cancels
+ * the event before the link layer sees it, leaving only the force-selection
+ * modifier a way through. It is false in both halves. That branch calls
+ * `cancel(e)`, which is a no-op unless `cancelEvents` is set and it defaults to
+ * false; and the mouse-reporting listeners are bound on `Terminal.element`
+ * while the Linkifier is bound on `screenElement`, a descendant, so bubbling
+ * reaches the link first no matter what. `Linkifier._handleMouseUp` then
+ * activates the link with no check on the button, the modifier or the mouse
+ * mode.
+ *
+ * So the gate is {@link opensOnClick}, applied in `activate`, and everything it
+ * asks about is read from the terminal at the moment of the click rather than
+ * captured — the container changes the mouse mode whenever it likes, and the
+ * selection is whatever the gesture that ended in this mouseup left behind.
+ *
+ * ## What the mouse mode is worth, honestly
+ *
+ * Reading it fresh makes it *current*; it does not make it *trustworthy*. The
+ * mode is set by the container, with a DECSET, and `?1002l` takes effect as
+ * soon as xterm *parses* it (on its queued write task, not synchronously with
+ * the container's output) — so a hostile container can drop tracking for
+ * a few hundred milliseconds at a time and a plain click that lands in one of
+ * those windows passes the mode half of the gate. It cannot time the user's
+ * click, but it does not need to: a fraction of clicks is enough, and the only
+ * tell is the status-bar badge flickering. This is a **known residual**, not
+ * something this gate closes, and the freshness of the read must not be read
+ * as an answer to it.
+ *
+ * Two things narrow it, neither of which depends on the mode. The selection
+ * and click-count checks hold in either tracking state, so the gestures a user
+ * makes to copy text are refused whatever the container has the mode set to —
+ * which removes the "wrap every row in an OSC 8 and harvest the shift-drags"
+ * version entirely. And the hover card's promise is sticky (see
+ * `modifierPromised`): the flicker now has to cover the *hover* as well as the
+ * click, because a card drawn while tracking was on goes on demanding the
+ * modifier after the container drops it. What remains is a container that
+ * drops tracking before the pointer arrives and holds it off until the click —
+ * at which point the card also says "Click to open", so the user is at least
+ * not being told one thing and given another. The real fix is a signal the
+ * container cannot write, and there is none in this pane today.
+ *
+ * ## The hover card is the security half, not a nicety
+ *
+ * OSC 8 fully decouples the visible text from the target: the container can
+ * print `https://claude.ai` and link it anywhere. That is strictly worse than
+ * the userinfo spoofing `sanitizeRelayUrl` already rejects, because here
+ * nothing in the painted row is even *derived* from the destination. So the
+ * origin of the real target is shown before the user commits, the same way the
+ * URL toast shows it and for the same reason ({@link urlOrigin}'s note): the
+ * origin decides where the user's credentials end up, so it is rendered in
+ * full and the *remainder* is the only part an ellipsis may eat.
+ *
+ * The card sits at the bottom of the pane rather than beside the pointer —
+ * where a browser puts it, and never underneath the cursor, so it cannot
+ * flicker the link out from under the hover that summoned it.
+ *
+ * @param getHost returns `Terminal.element`, which does not exist until
+ *        `term.open()` has run — hence a getter rather than the element.
+ * @param readState samples {@link ClickContext} — a getter for the same
+ *        reason, and the *only* reason: every one of those answers changes
+ *        under us, between the hover and the click that follows it.
+ */
+export function createOsc8LinkHandler(
+  getHost: () => HTMLElement | null,
+  readState: () => ClickContext,
+): Osc8LinkHandler {
+  let card: HTMLDivElement | null = null;
+  /**
+   * Did the card the user is looking at name a modifier?
+   *
+   * Written whenever a card is drawn, and cleared with it — `hover()` clears
+   * and returns early when there is no host element, which leaves this false,
+   * the stricter of the two directions. xterm only activates a link
+   * it is currently hovering (`Linkifier._currentLink`), so there is always a
+   * fresh hover behind a click — which is what makes this the promise the user
+   * actually read, rather than a stale one. See `opensOnClick`.
+   */
+  let modifierPromised = false;
+
+  const clear = () => {
+    card?.remove();
+    card = null;
+    modifierPromised = false;
+  };
+
+  const span = (text: string, style: Partial<CSSStyleDeclaration>) => {
+    const el = document.createElement("span");
+    el.textContent = text;
+    Object.assign(el.style, style);
+    return el;
+  };
+
+  return {
+    activate(event, text) {
+      // Opening the host browser is the one thing in this pane the container
+      // may not provoke on its own *and* the one thing no selection gesture
+      // may provoke by accident. See `opensOnClick` — including the residual
+      // it does not close.
+      if (!opensOnClick(event, readState(), modifierPromised)) return;
+      // Same sink and same rule as the WebLinksAddon branch: this came off the
+      // container's output, so it is validated before it reaches the OS
+      // opener. One implementation — `sanitizeRelayUrl` — on purpose.
+      const safe = sanitizeRelayUrl(text);
+      if (!safe) {
+        console.warn("Refusing to open a link that failed validation");
+        return;
+      }
+      openUrlExternal(safe).catch(reportOpenFailure);
+    },
+
+    hover(_event, text) {
+      clear();
+      const host = getHost();
+      if (!host) return;
+      const ctx = readState();
+      // Sampled here and held, because this is what the card is about to tell
+      // the user — and the gate has to honour it even if the container has
+      // moved on by the time they click.
+      modifierPromised = ctx.mouseTracking;
+
+      card = document.createElement("div");
+      card.className = OSC8_HOVER_CLASS;
+      card.dataset.testid = "osc8-hover";
+      Object.assign(card.style, {
+        position: "absolute",
+        left: "8px",
+        bottom: "8px",
+        maxWidth: "calc(100% - 16px)",
+        boxSizing: "border-box",
+        zIndex: "30",
+        // The card lands under the pointer for a link in the bottom rows, and
+        // it is not a sibling the Linkifier hit-tests around (see
+        // `OSC8_HOVER_CLASS`). Without this, `screenElement` gets `mouseleave`
+        // the moment the card appears — card removed, pointer back on the
+        // link, card back: a flicker loop — and worse, the `mouseup` that
+        // activates the link lands on the card, so the link cannot be opened
+        // at all. Nothing here is interactive, so nothing is lost.
+        pointerEvents: "none",
+        display: "flex",
+        alignItems: "baseline",
+        gap: "6px",
+        padding: "3px 8px",
+        fontSize: "12px",
+        fontFamily: "monospace",
+        background: "var(--bg-secondary)",
+        border: "1px solid var(--border-color)",
+        // The origin wraps, so the card grows downward rather than sideways;
+        // this is the backstop for anything that still cannot fit.
+        overflow: "hidden",
+        borderRadius: "6px",
+        boxShadow: "var(--shadow-overlay)",
+        color: "var(--text-primary)",
+      } as Partial<CSSStyleDeclaration>);
+
+      const safe = sanitizeRelayUrl(text);
+      const origin = safe && urlOrigin(safe);
+      if (!safe || !origin) {
+        // Nothing of the rejected target is echoed into the DOM — it is
+        // untrusted text, and the only useful thing to say is that the click
+        // will not do anything. Deliberately not "it is not a web address":
+        // `https://claude.ai@evil.tld/` and an over-length URL both are one,
+        // and a card that explains a refusal wrongly teaches the user to
+        // distrust the card.
+        card.appendChild(
+          span("This link will not be opened — it failed the URL safety check", {
+            color: "var(--text-secondary)",
+          }),
+        );
+      } else {
+        const rest = safe.startsWith(origin) ? safe.slice(origin.length) : safe;
+        const originEl = span(origin, {
+          fontWeight: "700",
+          // The part that decides where the credentials go, so all of it is
+          // shown: truncating it *is* the spoof, and so is pushing its tail
+          // off the right edge of the pane. The attacker picks the length —
+          // `https://claude.ai.<300 chars>.evil.tld` parses and passes every
+          // `sanitizeRelayUrl` rule — so "do not shrink" is not enough:
+          // `flex-shrink: 0` pins a flex item at its max-content width and the
+          // text never wraps, it just overflows. It wraps instead, onto as
+          // many lines as it needs, and the truncatable remainder below is the
+          // thing that gives way.
+          flexShrink: "1",
+          minWidth: "0",
+          overflowWrap: "anywhere",
+          whiteSpace: "normal",
+        });
+        originEl.dataset.testid = "osc8-hover-origin";
+        card.appendChild(originEl);
+
+        const restEl = span(rest, {
+          color: "var(--text-secondary)",
+          overflow: "hidden",
+          textOverflow: "ellipsis",
+          whiteSpace: "nowrap",
+          minWidth: "0",
+        });
+        restEl.dataset.testid = "osc8-hover-rest";
+        card.appendChild(restEl);
+
+        const hint = span(openHintLabel(ctx), {
+          color: "var(--text-secondary)",
+          flexShrink: "0",
+          marginLeft: "4px",
+        });
+        card.appendChild(hint);
+      }
+
+      host.appendChild(card);
+    },
+
+    leave: clear,
+
+    dismiss: clear,
+  };
+}
+
 export default function TerminalView({ sessionId, active }: Props) {
   const containerRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
   const terminalContainerRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
   const termRef = useRef<Terminal | null>(null);
   const fitRef = useRef<FitAddon | null>(null);
   const webglRef = useRef<WebglAddon | null>(null);
+  // Held only so the hover card can be taken down when this pane leaves the
+  // screen — see `Osc8LinkHandler.dismiss`.
+  const osc8LinkHandlerRef = useRef<Osc8LinkHandler | null>(null);
   const detectorRef = useRef<UrlDetector | null>(null);
   const { sendInput, pasteImage, resize, onOutput, onExit } = useTerminal();
   const gpuRenderingSetting = useAppState(s => s.appSettings?.terminal_gpu_rendering ?? null);
@@ -378,7 +827,7 @@ export default function TerminalView({ sessionId, active }: Props) {
   const syncMouseCapture = useCallback(() => {
     const term = termRef.current;
     if (!term) return;
-    const captured = term.modes.mouseTrackingMode !== "none";
+    const captured = terminalTracksMouse(term);
     if (captured === mouseCapturedRef.current) return;
     mouseCapturedRef.current = captured;
     setMouseCaptured(captured);
@@ -410,7 +859,10 @@ export default function TerminalView({ sessionId, active }: Props) {
   useEffect(() => {
     if (!containerRef.current) return;
 
-    const term = new Terminal({
+    // Annotated because `linkHandler` below refers to `term` (for the element
+    // it must anchor its hover card to, which does not exist until
+    // `term.open()`), and TypeScript cannot infer a type it is already using.
+    const term: Terminal = new Terminal({
       cursorBlink: true,
       fontSize: 14,
       // Let the user select text even while a program holds the mouse.
@@ -420,6 +872,17 @@ export default function TerminalView({ sessionId, active }: Props) {
       // the only way to copy from a mouse-driven TUI is to take the mouse back
       // first. `SelectionService.shouldForceSelection`.
       macOptionClickForcesSelection: true,
+      // OSC 8 hyperlinks — the form Claude Code prints its links in, and the
+      // one `WebLinksAddon` structurally cannot match. See
+      // `createOsc8LinkHandler`, including why opening one while a program
+      // holds the mouse needs the same Shift/Option the line above is about.
+      // Both arguments are getters because neither answer exists yet: the
+      // element arrives with `term.open()`, and the mouse mode changes
+      // whenever the container prints a DECSET.
+      linkHandler: (osc8LinkHandlerRef.current = createOsc8LinkHandler(
+        () => term.element ?? null,
+        () => readClickContext(term),
+      )),
       fontFamily: "'JetBrains Mono', 'Fira Code', 'Cascadia Code', Menlo, Monaco, monospace",
       theme: {
         background: "#0d1117",
@@ -453,28 +916,39 @@ export default function TerminalView({ sessionId, active }: Props) {
     // misses OAuth URLs that end mid-line).
     // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
     const urlRegex = /https?:\/\/[^\s'"`<>\x00-\x20\x7f]+/;
-    const webLinksAddon = new WebLinksAddon((_event, uri) => {
-      // Same sink, same rule: what xterm matched came off the container's
-      // output, so it is validated before it reaches the OS opener. A click
-      // here is a deliberate act on visible text, but "visible" is exactly
-      // what a userinfo-spoofed URL subverts.
+    const webLinksAddon = new WebLinksAddon((event, uri) => {
+      // Same gate and same sink as `createOsc8LinkHandler`, because this
+      // reaches the same `openUrlExternal` through the same
+      // `Linkifier._handleMouseUp`, which checks nothing here either. Without
+      // it a container that prints a plausible-looking `https://` row in a TUI
+      // got a browser open on a plain click while it held the mouse, and a
+      // double-click that merely selected a URL opened it.
+      //
+      // It is also the only gate on a real bypass of the OSC 8 one:
+      // `OscLinkProvider` drops a hyperlink whose target is not http(s)
+      // *before* `linkHandler` sees it (`allowNonHttpProtocols` is unset), so
+      // an OSC 8 carrying a `javascript:` target and an `https://evil.tld/x`
+      // label leaves the addon free to match the label. That click arrives
+      // here and nowhere else.
+      //
+      // No `modifierPromised`: this path paints an underline rather than a
+      // card, so it promises the user nothing to be held to.
+      //
+      // This branch is the one where the click really is an act on visible
+      // text — the match *is* the painted characters — so the spoof it has to
+      // survive is a userinfo-spoofed URL, which `sanitizeRelayUrl` rejects.
+      // An OSC 8 link is not like that at all: its label and its target are
+      // unrelated strings, which is why that handler shows the target's origin
+      // on hover before a click can happen. Neither branch replaces the other:
+      // this one covers plain-text URLs in ordinary shell output, which carry
+      // no hyperlink parameter for xterm to hand over.
+      if (!opensOnClick(event, readClickContext(term))) return;
       const safe = sanitizeRelayUrl(uri);
       if (!safe) {
         console.warn("Refusing to open a link that failed validation");
         return;
       }
-      // Same failure reporting as the toast's Open button — see the long note
-      // on `handleOpenUrl`, including what this catch does *not* catch on
-      // Linux. A click that appears to do nothing is the complaint either way.
-      openUrlExternal(safe).catch((e) =>
-        useAppState.getState().pushToast({
-          kind: "error",
-          message: "Could not open that link in your browser",
-          detail: String(e),
-          // A dead opener fails for every link in the buffer. One card.
-          dedupeKey: "host-open-failed",
-        }),
-      );
+      openUrlExternal(safe).catch(reportOpenFailure);
     }, { urlRegex });
     term.loadAddon(webLinksAddon);
 
@@ -763,9 +1237,19 @@ export default function TerminalView({ sessionId, active }: Props) {
       webglRef.current = null;
       term.dispose();
       termRef.current = null;
+      osc8LinkHandlerRef.current = null;
     };
   }, [sessionId]); // eslint-disable-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
 
+  // A hover card only ever clears on a *pointer* leaving the link, so switching
+  // tabs from the keyboard leaves one hanging over a pane nobody is looking at,
+  // to be found still there on the way back. Hiding the wrapper does not fire
+  // `mouseleave`, so nothing else would.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (active) return;
+    osc8LinkHandlerRef.current?.dismiss();
+  }, [active]);
+
   // Manage WebGL lifecycle and re-fit when tab becomes active.
   // Only the active terminal holds a WebGL context to avoid exhausting
   // the browser's limited pool (~8-16 contexts).