Inject the corporate CA certificate into containers
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Behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy every HTTPS call inside a container
fails — npm, pip, git, curl, the browser-view pane, and Claude Code's own API
requests. There was no mechanism at all: installing the certificate by hand
inside a container is lost on Reset and had to be repeated per project.

A global CA path in AppSettings with a per-project override on Project, taking
either a single certificate file or a directory. It is bind-mounted read-only
at /tmp/.host-ca (mirroring /tmp/.host-ssh and /tmp/.host-aws) and applied by
entrypoint.sh on every start, so it survives recreation, migration and Reset.

Four things this gets right that are easy to get wrong:

* update-ca-certificates globs *.crt case-sensitively, so a .pem that is merely
  copied in is ignored in silence. Certificates are renamed, by
  container_cert_name() in Rust and a mirrored few lines of shell.
* The system store only serves curl/git/apt. Node — and so Claude Code itself —
  needs NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, Python needs REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE/SSL_CERT_FILE, and
  Chromium reads neither: it wants ~/.pki/nssdb, seeded with certutil
  (libnss3-tools, added to the image).
* Those vars are set from Rust at creation, never exported by the entrypoint —
  a terminal is a docker exec and sees nothing the entrypoint exported. They are
  emitted empty when no CA is configured, since docker commit bakes env into the
  snapshot image.
* triple-c.ca-fingerprint hashes the certificate bytes as well as the path, so
  a CA rotated in at the same location still forces a recreation.

Verified end to end against a real container and a self-signed CA: curl, node,
python and git all complete a TLS handshake against a server signed by it and
all three fail in the same container without it; the env vars are visible from
a docker exec session; the store is cleaned when the setting is cleared.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-08-10 10:40:21 -07:00
parent 584fcdd837
commit 7a5823cb2b
19 changed files with 1367 additions and 5 deletions
+580
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
//! Corporate CA certificate injection.
//!
//! Users behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy need their organisation's
//! root CA inside every container, or **every** HTTPS call fails — npm, pip,
//! git, curl, the Playwright browser, and Claude Code's own API calls.
//!
//! The mechanism follows the SSH/AWS host-mount pattern in [`super::container`]:
//! a host path is bind-mounted **read-only** into the container and
//! `entrypoint.sh` applies it on every start. That is what makes it durable
//! across container recreation, base-image migration and Reset — a certificate
//! installed by hand inside a running container is lost the first time any of
//! those happen.
//!
//! ## Two things that are easy to get wrong
//!
//! 1. **`update-ca-certificates` only reads `*.crt`.** It globs
//! `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/*.crt` case-sensitively, so a `.pem`
//! (the far more common export format) that is merely *copied* in is
//! silently ignored — no warning, no error, just a container that still
//! cannot speak HTTPS. Certificates must be **renamed**, which is what
//! [`container_cert_name`] does.
//!
//! 2. **The system trust store is not enough.** Only curl/git/apt read it.
//! Node — and therefore Claude Code itself — needs `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`,
//! Python/requests need `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`/`SSL_CERT_FILE`, and
//! Chrome/Chromium read neither: they have their own NSS database at
//! `~/.pki/nssdb`, seeded by `certutil` in the entrypoint.
//!
//! ## Why the env vars are set from Rust and not exported by the entrypoint
//!
//! An `export` in `entrypoint.sh` reaches only the entrypoint's own children.
//! Every terminal session is a separate `docker exec`, which inherits the
//! *container's* configured env and sees nothing the entrypoint exported —
//! the same lesson that forced `$BROWSER` to become an image-level `ENV` for
//! the URL relay shim. Since the bundle path written by
//! `update-ca-certificates` is deterministic ([`CA_BUNDLE_PATH`]), Rust can set
//! all three vars at container creation, where `docker exec` will see them.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
/// Where the host's CA material is bind-mounted, read-only. Mirrors
/// `/tmp/.host-ssh` and `/tmp/.host-aws`.
///
/// A *directory* on the host is mounted here as-is. A single *file* is mounted
/// at `<CA_MOUNT_DIR>/<normalised name>` — Docker creates the parent — so the
/// entrypoint only ever has to deal with a directory, and the certificate keeps
/// a recognisable name instead of becoming the literal path `.host-ca`.
pub const CA_MOUNT_DIR: &str = "/tmp/.host-ca";
/// The concatenated PEM bundle `update-ca-certificates` writes on
/// Debian/Ubuntu. Deterministic, which is what lets the env vars below be set
/// at container-creation time, before the entrypoint has run.
pub const CA_BUNDLE_PATH: &str = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt";
/// Consulted by Node — and therefore by Claude Code itself, which is the whole
/// reason this feature exists.
pub const NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: &str = "NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS";
/// Consulted by `requests` (and so by pip's vendored copy).
pub const REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE: &str = "REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE";
/// Consulted by OpenSSL, and so by Python's `ssl` module.
pub const SSL_CERT_FILE: &str = "SSL_CERT_FILE";
/// Every env var this module owns, in a fixed order.
///
/// Also the list that must be *cleared* when no CA is configured: `docker
/// commit` bakes a container's env into the project's snapshot image, and
/// create-time env replaces image `ENV` per key — so without an explicit empty
/// value, removing the setting would leave the vars live in every future
/// container. Empty is safe for all three (verified on Ubuntu 24.04: curl,
/// `openssl s_client` and Python's `ssl` all behave exactly as they do with the
/// variable unset).
pub const CA_ENV_KEYS: &[&str] = &[NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, SSL_CERT_FILE];
/// Extensions treated as certificates when the configured path is a directory.
/// Matched case-insensitively. DER is deliberately absent — the system store
/// and every consumer here want PEM.
const CERT_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] = &["crt", "pem", "cer", "cert", "ca-bundle"];
/// A configured CA path that has been checked and resolved into everything the
/// container creation path needs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ResolvedCa {
/// The host path, as configured.
pub host_path: String,
/// Whether the host path is a directory (as opposed to a single file).
pub is_dir: bool,
/// The bind-mount target inside the container.
pub mount_target: String,
/// The certificate files found, sorted.
pub cert_files: Vec<PathBuf>,
}
fn sha256_hex(input: &str) -> String {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(input.as_bytes());
format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())
}
/// The file name a certificate is installed as under
/// `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/`.
///
/// `update-ca-certificates` globs `*.crt` **case-sensitively**, so `.pem`,
/// `.cer`, `.CRT` and extension-less files all have to end up as a lowercase
/// `.crt` or they are ignored without a word. Characters outside
/// `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` are replaced so that whitespace cannot break the shell
/// loops that walk the store, and leading dots are stripped so a hidden file
/// does not stay hidden.
///
/// `entrypoint.sh` reimplements exactly this in a few lines of shell (it has to
/// rename the files inside the container); the two must agree, which is what
/// the unit tests below pin down.
pub fn container_cert_name(file_name: &str) -> String {
let sanitized: String = file_name
.chars()
.map(|c| {
if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '-' {
c
} else {
'_'
}
})
.collect();
let sanitized = sanitized.trim_start_matches('.');
// Strip one trailing extension, whatever it is, then force `.crt`. A name
// with no dot keeps its whole self as the stem.
let stem = match sanitized.rfind('.') {
Some(i) => &sanitized[..i],
None => sanitized,
};
let stem = if stem.is_empty() { "corporate-ca" } else { stem };
format!("{}.crt", stem)
}
/// Whether a directory entry looks like a certificate worth installing.
fn is_cert_file(path: &Path) -> bool {
let Some(ext) = path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) else {
return false;
};
let ext = ext.to_ascii_lowercase();
CERT_EXTENSIONS.contains(&ext.as_str())
}
/// The certificate files a configured path contributes.
///
/// A file is taken at face value — the user pointed at it explicitly, so its
/// extension is not second-guessed. A directory is scanned one level deep
/// (matching the entrypoint's `find -maxdepth 1`) and filtered by extension,
/// so an `openssl.cnf` or a README sitting next to the certs is skipped.
/// The result is sorted, so the fingerprint is stable across filesystem
/// enumeration order.
pub fn collect_cert_files(path: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
if path.is_file() {
return vec![path.to_path_buf()];
}
if !path.is_dir() {
return Vec::new();
}
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(path) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let mut files: Vec<PathBuf> = entries
.filter_map(|e| e.ok())
.map(|e| e.path())
.filter(|p| p.is_file() && is_cert_file(p))
.collect();
files.sort();
files
}
/// Resolve the configured CA path, or explain why it cannot be used.
///
/// `Ok(None)` means "no CA configured", which is the overwhelmingly common
/// case and must stay free. An `Err` aborts the container start: behind a
/// TLS-intercepting proxy a container without the CA is broken in a dozen
/// confusing ways, so naming the bad path once is far kinder than letting npm,
/// pip and Claude Code each fail their own way.
pub fn resolve(path: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<ResolvedCa>, String> {
let Some(raw) = path.map(str::trim).filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) else {
return Ok(None);
};
let root = Path::new(raw);
if !root.exists() {
return Err(format!(
"Corporate CA certificate path '{}' does not exist. Update it in \
Settings → Certificates, or clear this project's override in \
Project Home → Config → Access.",
raw
));
}
let is_dir = root.is_dir();
if !is_dir && !root.is_file() {
return Err(format!(
"Corporate CA certificate path '{}' is neither a file nor a directory.",
raw
));
}
let cert_files = collect_cert_files(root);
if cert_files.is_empty() {
return Err(format!(
"Corporate CA certificate directory '{}' contains no certificate files \
(looked for {} one level deep).",
raw,
CERT_EXTENSIONS
.iter()
.map(|e| format!(".{}", e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ")
));
}
let mount_target = if is_dir {
CA_MOUNT_DIR.to_string()
} else {
let name = root
.file_name()
.map(|n| container_cert_name(&n.to_string_lossy()))
.unwrap_or_else(|| "corporate-ca.crt".to_string());
format!("{}/{}", CA_MOUNT_DIR, name)
};
Ok(Some(ResolvedCa {
host_path: raw.to_string(),
is_dir,
mount_target,
cert_files,
}))
}
/// Fingerprint of the CA configuration, for the `triple-c.ca-fingerprint`
/// label.
///
/// `container_needs_recreation` is label-based and never diffs env or mounts,
/// so without this, changing the CA path would silently do nothing until some
/// unrelated setting forced a rebuild.
///
/// It covers **both** the resolved path *and the bytes of every certificate*,
/// because replacing a rotated CA at the same path is at least as common as
/// moving it — and the container's copy is made once, at start, so nothing else
/// would notice.
///
/// Never returns an error: a path that has gone missing hashes differently from
/// one that is present, which is exactly the "something changed, recreate"
/// signal wanted here. Reporting the problem is [`resolve`]'s job.
pub fn compute_ca_fingerprint(path: Option<&str>) -> String {
let Some(raw) = path.map(str::trim).filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) else {
return String::new();
};
let mut parts: Vec<String> = vec![raw.to_string()];
let root = Path::new(raw);
if !root.exists() {
parts.push("<missing>".to_string());
} else {
for file in collect_cert_files(root) {
let name = file
.file_name()
.map(|n| container_cert_name(&n.to_string_lossy()))
.unwrap_or_default();
let digest = match std::fs::read(&file) {
Ok(bytes) => {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(&bytes);
format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())
}
Err(_) => "<unreadable>".to_string(),
};
parts.push(format!("{}:{}", name, digest));
}
}
sha256_hex(&parts.join("|"))
}
/// The env vars to set on the container.
///
/// Always returns all of [`CA_ENV_KEYS`]: pointing at the bundle when a CA is
/// configured, empty when it is not. The empty case is not cosmetic — see the
/// note on [`CA_ENV_KEYS`].
pub fn ca_env_vars(resolved: Option<&ResolvedCa>) -> Vec<(&'static str, String)> {
let value = if resolved.is_some() { CA_BUNDLE_PATH } else { "" };
CA_ENV_KEYS
.iter()
.map(|key| (*key, value.to_string()))
.collect()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::fs;
/// A scratch directory that cleans itself up. `tempfile` is not a
/// dependency of this crate and this is the only test that needs one.
struct TempDir(PathBuf);
impl TempDir {
fn new(tag: &str) -> Self {
let mut p = std::env::temp_dir();
p.push(format!(
"triple-c-ca-test-{}-{}-{:?}",
tag,
std::process::id(),
std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos()
));
fs::create_dir_all(&p).unwrap();
TempDir(p)
}
fn path(&self) -> &Path {
&self.0
}
fn write(&self, name: &str, contents: &str) -> PathBuf {
let p = self.0.join(name);
fs::write(&p, contents).unwrap();
p
}
}
impl Drop for TempDir {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&self.0);
}
}
// ── container_cert_name ────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn a_pem_is_renamed_to_crt_not_merely_copied() {
// The whole point: update-ca-certificates globs *.crt and would
// silently ignore corp-root.pem.
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corp-root.pem"), "corp-root.crt");
}
#[test]
fn a_crt_keeps_its_name() {
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corp-root.crt"), "corp-root.crt");
}
#[test]
fn other_certificate_extensions_are_renamed_too() {
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("zscaler.cer"), "zscaler.crt");
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("zscaler.cert"), "zscaler.crt");
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("bundle.ca-bundle"), "bundle.crt");
}
#[test]
fn an_uppercase_extension_is_lowercased() {
// `find -name '*.crt'` is case-sensitive, so CA.CRT would be ignored.
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("CA.CRT"), "CA.crt");
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("CA.PEM"), "CA.crt");
}
#[test]
fn a_name_without_an_extension_gains_one() {
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corporate-root"), "corporate-root.crt");
}
#[test]
fn only_the_last_extension_is_replaced() {
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corp.root.ca.pem"), "corp.root.ca.crt");
}
#[test]
fn unsafe_characters_are_replaced() {
assert_eq!(
container_cert_name("Corp Root CA (2026).pem"),
"Corp_Root_CA__2026_.crt"
);
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("a/b.pem"), "a_b.crt");
}
#[test]
fn leading_dots_are_stripped_so_the_file_is_not_hidden() {
assert_eq!(container_cert_name(".hidden.pem"), "hidden.crt");
}
#[test]
fn a_degenerate_name_still_produces_a_usable_file() {
assert_eq!(container_cert_name(".pem"), "pem.crt");
assert_eq!(container_cert_name(""), "corporate-ca.crt");
assert_eq!(container_cert_name("..."), "corporate-ca.crt");
}
#[test]
fn every_produced_name_ends_in_lowercase_crt() {
for input in [
"a.pem", "b.CRT", "c", ".d.pem", "", "e f.cer", "...", "ç.pem",
] {
let out = container_cert_name(input);
assert!(
out.ends_with(".crt"),
"{:?} produced {:?}, which update-ca-certificates would ignore",
input,
out
);
assert!(
out.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '-'),
"{:?} produced {:?}, which is not shell-safe",
input,
out
);
}
}
// ── fingerprint ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn no_configured_path_fingerprints_as_empty() {
assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(None), "");
assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(Some("")), "");
assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(" ")), "");
}
#[test]
fn changing_the_path_changes_the_fingerprint() {
let a = TempDir::new("path-a");
let b = TempDir::new("path-b");
// Identical *content* in both, so only the path differs.
a.write("corp.pem", "CERT-BODY");
b.write("corp.pem", "CERT-BODY");
let fp_a = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(a.path().to_str().unwrap()));
let fp_b = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(b.path().to_str().unwrap()));
assert_ne!(fp_a, "");
assert_ne!(
fp_a, fp_b,
"two different paths must not share a fingerprint"
);
}
#[test]
fn changing_the_certificate_content_at_the_same_path_changes_the_fingerprint() {
// The case a path-only fingerprint would miss: the corporate CA is
// rotated and the new one dropped in at exactly the same location.
let dir = TempDir::new("rotate");
dir.write("corp.pem", "OLD-CERT");
let before = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
dir.write("corp.pem", "NEW-CERT");
let after = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
assert_ne!(
before, after,
"replacing the certificate at the same path must force a recreation"
);
}
#[test]
fn adding_or_removing_a_certificate_changes_the_fingerprint() {
let dir = TempDir::new("add");
dir.write("one.pem", "A");
let one = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
dir.write("two.pem", "B");
let two = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
assert_ne!(one, two);
fs::remove_file(dir.path().join("two.pem")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())), one);
}
#[test]
fn an_unchanged_directory_fingerprints_identically() {
let dir = TempDir::new("stable");
dir.write("corp.pem", "SAME");
let a = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
let b = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
assert_eq!(a, b, "the fingerprint must not churn on repeated reads");
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_path_fingerprints_differently_from_a_present_one() {
let dir = TempDir::new("missing");
let present = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
let missing =
compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(&format!("{}-gone", dir.path().to_str().unwrap())));
assert_ne!(present, missing);
assert_ne!(missing, "");
}
#[test]
fn non_certificate_files_in_the_directory_are_ignored() {
let dir = TempDir::new("noise");
dir.write("corp.pem", "CERT");
let before = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
dir.write("README.md", "hello");
dir.write("openssl.cnf", "[req]");
assert_eq!(
compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())),
before
);
}
// ── resolve ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn no_path_resolves_to_nothing() {
assert_eq!(resolve(None).unwrap(), None);
assert_eq!(resolve(Some(" ")).unwrap(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_missing_path_is_an_actionable_error() {
let err = resolve(Some("/definitely/not/here/corp.pem")).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("/definitely/not/here/corp.pem"), "{}", err);
assert!(err.contains("Settings"), "{}", err);
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_directory_is_an_actionable_error() {
let dir = TempDir::new("empty");
let err = resolve(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())).unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("no certificate files"), "{}", err);
assert!(err.contains(".pem"), "{}", err);
}
#[test]
fn a_directory_mounts_at_the_shared_mount_point() {
let dir = TempDir::new("dir");
dir.write("corp.pem", "CERT");
let resolved = resolve(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())).unwrap().unwrap();
assert!(resolved.is_dir);
assert_eq!(resolved.mount_target, CA_MOUNT_DIR);
assert_eq!(resolved.cert_files.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn a_single_file_mounts_under_the_mount_point_with_a_crt_name() {
// Mounting a file *at* /tmp/.host-ca would leave the entrypoint with no
// name to work from, and would make the mount point a file rather than
// the directory the entrypoint expects.
let dir = TempDir::new("file");
let file = dir.write("corp root.pem", "CERT");
let resolved = resolve(Some(file.to_str().unwrap())).unwrap().unwrap();
assert!(!resolved.is_dir);
assert_eq!(
resolved.mount_target,
format!("{}/corp_root.crt", CA_MOUNT_DIR)
);
}
#[test]
fn a_file_is_accepted_whatever_its_extension() {
// The user pointed at it explicitly; don't second-guess.
let dir = TempDir::new("odd-ext");
let file = dir.write("corp.txt", "CERT");
let resolved = resolve(Some(file.to_str().unwrap())).unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(resolved.cert_files, vec![file]);
}
// ── env vars ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn configured_ca_points_every_consumer_at_the_bundle() {
let dir = TempDir::new("env");
dir.write("corp.pem", "CERT");
let resolved = resolve(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())).unwrap();
let vars = ca_env_vars(resolved.as_ref());
assert_eq!(
vars,
vec![
(NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, CA_BUNDLE_PATH.to_string()),
(REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, CA_BUNDLE_PATH.to_string()),
(SSL_CERT_FILE, CA_BUNDLE_PATH.to_string()),
]
);
}
#[test]
fn no_ca_clears_every_var_rather_than_omitting_it() {
// Omitting them would let a value baked into the project's snapshot
// image survive the setting being turned off.
let vars = ca_env_vars(None);
assert_eq!(vars.len(), CA_ENV_KEYS.len());
assert!(vars.iter().all(|(_, v)| v.is_empty()));
}
}