Terminal file viewer/editor + per-window app-command lockdown (#60)
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Clicking a file path in Claude's terminal output now opens the file in its own window with a CodeMirror 6 editor. The editor highlights the target line, live-reloads while the file changes, and saves explicitly with hash-based conflict detection. The viewer commands are gated by window label.

Every app command is now ACL-gated per window through a Tauri AppManifest. build.rs checks the handler list against the capability files and fails the build on any mismatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #60.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-23 17:05:50 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 3537b234d8
commit 8305c96e20
65 changed files with 15043 additions and 108 deletions
+19 -14
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub struct FileContents {
/// Hard ceiling on a single viewer read, whatever the caller asks for. The tar
/// path buffers the whole payload in host RAM, so a caller-supplied cap is not
/// something to take on trust.
const MAX_READ_BYTES: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
pub(crate) const MAX_READ_BYTES: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn list_container_files(
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ const CONTAINER_WRITE_ROOTS: &[&str] = &["/workspace", "/home/claude", "/tmp"];
///
/// `what` names the parameter in the error, because these messages are shown to
/// a user who is looking at a folder, not at argv.
fn validate_container_path(what: &str, path: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
pub(crate) fn validate_container_path(what: &str, path: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if path.is_empty() {
return Err(format!("{} path cannot be empty", what));
}
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ fn validate_container_path(what: &str, path: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
/// directly. What it buys is that the *panel* keeps its promise — the roots
/// named in the refusal are the roots it writes to — and that a mis-aimed drop
/// cannot quietly land outside them.
fn validate_container_write_path(what: &str, path: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
pub(crate) fn validate_container_write_path(what: &str, path: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
validate_container_path(what, path)?;
if CONTAINER_WRITE_ROOTS
.iter()
@@ -1178,12 +1178,12 @@ fn push_capped(buf: &mut String, frame: &[u8]) {
}
/// One regular file's bytes, pulled out of a container.
struct FetchedFile {
bytes: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) struct FetchedFile {
pub(crate) bytes: Vec<u8>,
/// The size the tar header declared, i.e. the file's real size — which is
/// not `bytes.len()` once `max_bytes` has cut the read short.
size: u64,
truncated: bool,
pub(crate) size: u64,
pub(crate) truncated: bool,
}
/// Fetch a single regular file from a container as exact bytes.
@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ struct FetchedFile {
/// file — or the whole *directory tree*, since the type check happens after the
/// read — landed in host RAM twice. This function buffers, so every caller of
/// it must name a ceiling.
async fn fetch_container_file(
pub(crate) async fn fetch_container_file(
container_id: &str,
container_path: &str,
max_bytes: u64,
@@ -1448,6 +1448,14 @@ pub async fn create_container_directory(
Ok(dest)
}
/// Every "container is not running" refusal starts with this, so a caller (the file
/// viewer's poll, `app/src/viewer/ipcMessages.ts`) can tell it apart from any other failure.
pub(crate) const NOT_RUNNING_PREFIX: &str = "Start the project before";
pub(crate) fn not_running_message(action: &str, why: &str) -> String {
format!("{} {}{}.", NOT_RUNNING_PREFIX, action, why)
}
/// Refuse, in a sentence, before a Docker error has to speak for us.
///
/// Both file transfers and the backup run through `docker exec`, which needs a
@@ -1456,7 +1464,7 @@ pub async fn create_container_directory(
/// upload it surfaces even less usefully: `resolve_container_dir`'s `realpath`
/// is the first thing to touch the container, so a stopped project fails inside
/// path *validation* and reads like the path was the problem.
async fn require_running(container_id: &str, action: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
pub(crate) async fn require_running(container_id: &str, action: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
let running = docker
.inspect_container(container_id, None)
@@ -1468,10 +1476,7 @@ async fn require_running(container_id: &str, action: &str) -> Result<(), String>
if running {
return Ok(());
}
Err(format!(
"Start the project before {} — it runs inside the running container.",
action
))
Err(not_running_message(action, "it runs inside the running container"))
}
/// Copy one regular file out of a container onto a host path the user chose in
@@ -2011,7 +2016,7 @@ async fn upload_one(
/// call site for why each of those three matters; the short version is that
/// this text ends up inside a toast that renders above every modal, and its
/// author is the container.
fn clip_container_text(text: &str) -> String {
pub(crate) fn clip_container_text(text: &str) -> String {
const MAX: usize = 200;
let flattened: String = text
.trim()