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Merge branch 'r4/scrub' into ship/core

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shadow-test
2026-08-23 17:12:34 -07:00
parent 11216c45e3 913aa85805
commit a323047964
2 changed files with 947 additions and 68 deletions
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app/src-tauri/src/commands/migration_commands.rs
+169 -30
View File
@@ -1071,21 +1071,54 @@ fn reconcile_retries() -> &'static std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<St
RETRIES.get_or_init(|| std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()))
}
/// One project's place in [`reconcile_retries`], handed back on drop.
///
/// RAII for the reason [`crate::project_lock::ProjectGuard`] sets out, and this
/// claim is the case that proves the rule: the release used to be a trailing
/// statement at the bottom of the spawned task in
/// [`defer_migration_reconcile`], sitting after an `.await` on
/// [`reconcile_migration_now`]. A panic in there — or the future simply being
/// dropped, which is what happens to every in-flight task at shutdown — skips
/// the statement, and nothing else ever removes an id from that set. The
/// project is then fenced off from *every* later deferral for the rest of the
/// process: each `reconcile_project_statuses` pass finds it held, fails to
/// claim, and returns, so the phase stays un-normalised, no resume or rollback
/// is offered, and the `:pre-migration-*` pin stays `Claimed`. That is the
/// session-long silence deferring was written to end, reintroduced one panic
/// later and lasting until the app is restarted.
///
/// Dropping this hands the claim straight back, so a caller that discards the
/// value has claimed nothing while reading as though it had; `#[must_use]`
/// makes that a compile warning rather than a second waiter on one record.
#[must_use = "the claim is handed back the moment this guard drops; bind it inside the waiting task, for the whole task"]
struct ReconcileRetryClaim {
project_id: String,
}
impl Drop for ReconcileRetryClaim {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// `into_inner` past poisoning, as in `project_lock`: the only thing
// ever done while holding this mutex is a single `HashSet` insert or
// remove, so a panic on another thread cannot have left it half
// written — and declining to release here would strand the project
// permanently, which is the exact failure the guard exists to stop.
reconcile_retries()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.remove(&self.project_id);
}
}
/// Claim the right to be the one deferred reconcile for `project_id`.
/// `false` means somebody else already is.
fn claim_reconcile_retry(project_id: &str) -> bool {
/// `None` means somebody else already is.
fn claim_reconcile_retry(project_id: &str) -> Option<ReconcileRetryClaim> {
reconcile_retries()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.insert(project_id.to_string())
}
/// Give the claim back, so a later `reconcile_project_statuses` can defer again.
fn release_reconcile_retry(project_id: &str) {
reconcile_retries()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
.remove(project_id);
.then(|| ReconcileRetryClaim {
project_id: project_id.to_string(),
})
}
/// Come back to a project that was held when [`reconcile_migration`] reached it.
@@ -1108,13 +1141,19 @@ fn defer_migration_reconcile(project: &Project, app_handle: &tauri::AppHandle) {
if !migration_store::has_record(&project.id).unwrap_or(true) {
return;
}
if !claim_reconcile_retry(&project.id) {
let Some(claim) = claim_reconcile_retry(&project.id) else {
return;
}
};
let project = project.clone();
let app_handle = app_handle.clone();
tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async move {
// Moved in and bound for the whole body, rather than released by a
// statement at the bottom: everything below this line can panic or be
// dropped mid-await, and a claim that only comes back on the happy path
// is a claim that eventually does not come back at all. See
// [`ReconcileRetryClaim`].
let _claim = claim;
let released =
await_release(&project.id, RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL, RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS).await;
if released {
@@ -1133,28 +1172,42 @@ fn defer_migration_reconcile(project: &Project, app_handle: &tauri::AppHandle) {
RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL.as_secs() as usize * RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS / 60
);
}
release_reconcile_retry(&project.id);
});
}
/// Wait for `project_id` to stop being held, up to `attempts` looks
/// `interval` apart. `true` means it was released, `false` that the budget ran
/// out with it still held.
/// Wait for `project_id` to stop being held: `attempts` looks, the first
/// immediate and the rest `interval` apart. `true` means it was released,
/// `false` that the budget ran out with it still held.
///
/// Split out of [`defer_migration_reconcile`] so the waiting can be tested
/// against a real [`crate::project_lock`] guard on a paused clock — the part
/// that is easy to get wrong is "gives up while still holding the claim" and
/// "never looks again", neither of which is visible from the constants.
/// against a real [`crate::project_lock`] guard on a paused clock — the parts
/// that are easy to get wrong are "gives up while still holding the claim",
/// "never looks again", and the ordering of the look against the sleep, none of
/// which is visible from the constants.
async fn await_release(
project_id: &str,
interval: std::time::Duration,
attempts: usize,
) -> bool {
for _ in 0..attempts {
tokio::time::sleep(interval).await;
for attempt in 0..attempts {
// Look first, sleep second. Sleeping first charged every deferral a
// full interval before anyone read the map even once, and the common
// case is a holder that has already let go: `held()` is sampled in
// `reconcile_migration`, a task is spawned, and by the time it is first
// polled the Reset that was on its last step is frequently finished.
// That bought nothing and cost twenty seconds of a startup pass waiting
// on a lock nobody holds, in front of a check that is one `HashMap`
// lookup.
if crate::project_lock::held(project_id).is_none() {
return true;
}
// And no sleep after the final look: nothing reads the map again
// afterwards, so it is twenty seconds of delay in front of a `false`
// that has already been decided. The budget is still `attempts` looks,
// which is what the constants above are chosen against.
if attempt + 1 < attempts {
tokio::time::sleep(interval).await;
}
}
false
}
@@ -2217,6 +2270,34 @@ mod tests {
assert!(budget >= std::time::Duration::from_secs(15 * 60), "{:?}", budget);
}
/// MEDIUM: an unheld project is reconciled now, not in twenty seconds.
///
/// The wait slept before its first look, so a holder that let go between
/// `reconcile_migration` sampling `held()` and this task being polled — the
/// *common* case, since a deferral is only taken when something was on its
/// way out — still cost a full `RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL` of a startup pass
/// waiting on a lock nobody held. On a paused clock the assertion is exact:
/// the fixed shape returns without the clock moving at all, the sleep-first
/// shape cannot return before it has advanced one interval.
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn an_unheld_project_is_seen_without_waiting_out_an_interval() {
let id = format!("await-release-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
assert!(
crate::project_lock::held(&id).is_none(),
"a fresh uuid is not held"
);
let before = tokio::time::Instant::now();
assert!(await_release(&id, RECONCILE_RETRY_INTERVAL, RECONCILE_RETRY_ATTEMPTS).await);
let waited = tokio::time::Instant::now() - before;
assert_eq!(
waited,
std::time::Duration::ZERO,
"an already-released project cost {:?} before anyone looked",
waited
);
}
#[test]
fn only_one_deferred_reconcile_waits_per_project() {
// Every "Docker became available" walks every project, so without the
@@ -2224,14 +2305,72 @@ mod tests {
// per call — all of which then reconcile the same record in a row.
let id = format!("retry-claim-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let other = format!("retry-claim-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
assert!(claim_reconcile_retry(&id));
assert!(!claim_reconcile_retry(&id), "a second waiter was allowed in");
assert!(claim_reconcile_retry(&other), "the claim is not per-project");
release_reconcile_retry(&id);
assert!(claim_reconcile_retry(&id), "the claim was never handed back");
release_reconcile_retry(&id);
release_reconcile_retry(&other);
// Releasing something that was never claimed is not an error.
release_reconcile_retry(&id);
let first = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("a fresh project id is unclaimed");
assert!(
claim_reconcile_retry(&id).is_none(),
"a second waiter was allowed in"
);
let other_claim =
claim_reconcile_retry(&other).expect("the claim is not per-project");
drop(first);
// Bound rather than discarded: the guard releases on drop, so
// `claim_reconcile_retry(&id);` as a bare statement would test nothing
// — which is what `#[must_use]` is there to catch in real callers.
let retaken = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("the claim was never handed back");
drop(retaken);
drop(other_claim);
// And the other project's claim was never the same claim.
drop(claim_reconcile_retry(&other).expect("released independently"));
}
/// MEDIUM: the claim survives the task that holds it dying badly.
///
/// The release used to be a trailing statement after
/// `reconcile_migration_now(...).await` at the bottom of the spawned task,
/// so a panic anywhere in that call — or the future being dropped at
/// shutdown — skipped it and left the id in the set with no task behind it.
/// Nothing removes it afterwards, so that project could never be deferred
/// again for the rest of the process: exactly the state deferring was added
/// to prevent, now permanent instead of one pass long. Fails against the
/// trailing-statement shape, which is the point.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_panicking_deferred_reconcile_hands_its_claim_back() {
let id = format!("retry-claim-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let claimed = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("a fresh project id is unclaimed");
// Spawned, not just called: the real claim is held across an await
// inside a `tauri::async_runtime::spawn`, and a task panic is caught by
// the runtime rather than unwinding the caller.
let task = {
let id = id.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _claim = claimed;
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
panic!("reconcile_migration_now blew up on '{}'", id);
})
};
assert!(task.await.is_err(), "the task was supposed to panic");
let after = claim_reconcile_retry(&id);
assert!(
after.is_some(),
"a panicking reconcile stranded the claim — this project can never be \
deferred again for the rest of the process"
);
drop(after);
// The other half of the same failure: a task that is simply dropped
// mid-flight, which is every in-flight task at shutdown.
let claimed = claim_reconcile_retry(&id).expect("released above");
let never_finishes = tokio::spawn(async move {
let _claim = claimed;
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
});
never_finishes.abort();
let _ = never_finishes.await;
assert!(
claim_reconcile_retry(&id).is_some(),
"a dropped task stranded the claim"
);
}
}
app/src-tauri/src/docker/container.rs
+778 -38
View File
@@ -1118,6 +1118,49 @@ fn explain_container_failure(action: &str, err: &str) -> String {
format!("Failed to {} container: {}", action, err)
}
/// One bind mount per stored project path, skipping the rows that cannot
/// produce a usable one.
///
/// Both halves of the filter are about data that is **already on disk**, which
/// is why this is a silent skip and not a validation error. `project_commands`
/// now refuses an empty `mount_name` or `host_path` on save, and the Workspace
/// pane can no longer send a half-filled row — but neither of those reaches a
/// record written before they existed, and the two failures such a record
/// causes are not equally visible:
///
/// * An empty `host_path` becomes `{"Target":"/workspace/x","Source":""}`, and
/// the daemon answers `invalid mount config for type "bind": field Source
/// must not be empty` for the whole create. The project cannot be started or
/// recreated at all — it is bricked, and it stays bricked however carefully
/// the next save is validated. Skipping the row lets it start again, minus a
/// mount that was never going to work.
/// * An empty `mount_name` targets `/workspace/` itself, mounting the row's
/// host directory *over* the workspace volume. The daemon then creates the
/// other rows' mount points inside the user's real folder, which is a
/// directory tree appearing in their project from nowhere.
///
/// Failing louder is the wrong instinct here: the loud version is the one that
/// already happened, and it took the project down with it. See
/// `project_commands.rs`'s `check_mount_name_stays_under_workspace` for the
/// save-time half — deliberately still tolerant of an empty name there, since
/// refusing it would re-brick every project holding a legacy row.
fn project_path_mounts(paths: &[crate::models::project::ProjectPath]) -> Vec<Mount> {
paths
.iter()
// Trimmed, because a name of `" "` targets `/workspace/ ` and a source
// of `" "` is a path the daemon will happily create at the filesystem
// root — neither is what anyone typed on purpose.
.filter(|pp| !pp.mount_name.trim().is_empty() && !pp.host_path.trim().is_empty())
.map(|pp| Mount {
target: Some(format!("/workspace/{}", pp.mount_name)),
source: Some(pp.host_path.clone()),
typ: Some(MountTypeEnum::BIND),
read_only: Some(false),
..Default::default()
})
.collect()
}
pub async fn create_container(
project: &Project,
docker_socket_path: &str,
@@ -1539,15 +1582,7 @@ pub async fn create_container(
let mut mounts: Vec<Mount> = Vec::new();
// Project directories -> /workspace/{mount_name}
for pp in &project.paths {
mounts.push(Mount {
target: Some(format!("/workspace/{}", pp.mount_name)),
source: Some(pp.host_path.clone()),
typ: Some(MountTypeEnum::BIND),
read_only: Some(false),
..Default::default()
});
}
mounts.extend(project_path_mounts(&project.paths));
// Named volume for the entire home directory — preserves ~/.claude.json,
// ~/.local (pip/npm globals), and any other user-level state across
@@ -2163,6 +2198,16 @@ const SCRUB_MARKER: &str = "###TRIPLE-C-SCRUBBED ";
/// `parse_scrub_total` can never mistake one for the other.
const SCRUB_UNAVAILABLE_MARKER: &str = "###TRIPLE-C-SCRUB-UNAVAILABLE ";
/// The external tools [`snapshot_scrub_script`] probes for before it will
/// delete anything, in the order the probe names them.
///
/// Named once rather than spelled into the script text, because
/// [`parse_scrub_unavailable`] has to be able to tell a missing *tool* from the
/// other two prerequisites — the root device id, and an `rm` that takes
/// `--one-file-system` — so that the log line reads as a sentence rather than
/// as a list with `root-device-id` wedged into it.
const SCRUB_PREREQ_TOOLS: &[&str] = &["stat", "rm", "du", "cut", "find"];
/// Environment the scrub exec sets explicitly, rather than inheriting.
///
/// The exec inherits the container's configured env, and a project's *custom*
@@ -2183,8 +2228,93 @@ const SCRUB_UNAVAILABLE_MARKER: &str = "###TRIPLE-C-SCRUB-UNAVAILABLE ";
/// `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` is here for the same reason as `LD_PRELOAD`: it is
/// searched ahead of the cache for every `DT_NEEDED` library, so a planted
/// `libselinux.so.1` is as good as a preload.
///
/// M2: [`SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP`] now starts the shell that runs the script under
/// `env -i`, so none of these three reaches the script's own tools whatever
/// this list says. They are kept because they still reach the *two processes
/// in front of it* — the `/bin/sh` that runs the bootstrap and the `env` it
/// calls — and an `env` with a preload in it is an `env` that can hand its
/// child any environment it likes. Blanking here and emptying there are the
/// same defence applied at the two points it has to hold at.
const SCRUB_EXEC_ENV: &[&str] = &["LD_PRELOAD=", "LD_AUDIT=", "LD_LIBRARY_PATH="];
/// The `/bin/sh -c` program that starts the real scrub, with
/// [`snapshot_scrub_script`] passed to it as `$1` rather than spliced into it.
///
/// ## Why the script is not simply the exec's command (M2)
///
/// `docker exec` cannot *replace* a container's environment, only add to and
/// override it — which is why [`SCRUB_EXEC_ENV`] works by naming keys. The env
/// a project carries is therefore inherited by whatever shell the exec starts,
/// and a shell reads more out of its environment than variables.
///
/// `bash` imports **functions** from the environment: an env var named
/// `BASH_FUNC_stat%%` becomes a shell function called `stat`. Function lookup
/// happens *before* `PATH` is ever consulted, so resetting `PATH` does not
/// touch it, and `command -v` reports a function as found — so a planted
/// function passes the prerequisite probe and then answers the containment
/// checks. Measured against `bash` 5.2 on `ubuntu:24.04`, an environment
/// carrying `BASH_FUNC_stat%%` had `stat -c %d` return a constant of its
/// choosing while `command -v stat` said the tool was present.
///
/// Every in-shell answer to that was tried and measured, and each one is
/// itself importable: `unset -f stat` is defeated by `BASH_FUNC_unset%%`,
/// `command stat` by `BASH_FUNC_command%%`, and — this is what settles it —
/// `[`, `test`, `pwd` and `cd` import just as readily, which is checks 0, 1
/// and 2 of the containment guarantee, not merely the tools. There is no
/// subset of the script that can be written in shell and still be trusted
/// inside a shell that has already imported the attacker's functions.
///
/// So the script is not run by that shell. This bootstrap is, and everything
/// it uses is either a reserved word (`case`, `esac`), a parameter expansion,
/// or a command word containing a `/` — and `bash` refuses to import a
/// function whose name contains a `/`, verified on the same image. It hands
/// the script to a **second** `/bin/sh` started by `env -i`, which has no
/// environment at all: no `BASH_FUNC_*`, no `LD_*`, no `ENV`/`BASH_ENV`, and
/// no `PATH` but the one named here. The inner shell's builtins are its own
/// again, and the script does not have to care what `/bin/sh` is.
///
/// Measured on an `ubuntu:24.04` with `/bin/sh -> bash`, a project env var of
/// `BASH_FUNC_stat%%=() { echo 1; }` set on the container the way a custom env
/// var is, and a named volume mounted **at** the match `/tmp/claude-x` — the
/// position checks 3 and 4 exist for:
///
/// * `/bin/sh -c <script>`, which is what the exec used to be, emptied the
/// volume and printed `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUBBED 306565`;
/// * `/bin/sh -c <bootstrap> triple-c-scrub <script>` left the volume intact,
/// reclaimed the real scratchpad beside it, and printed `65536`.
///
/// The same script, unchanged, in both runs.
///
/// `env` is not assumed to be usr-merged, for the reason spelled out under
/// [`snapshot_scrub_script_under`]: `/usr/bin/env` first, `/bin/env` on a
/// literal 127, which is the pair that covers `ubuntu`, `debian`, `alpine`,
/// `busybox` and `node:*-slim` (checked). An image with neither runs nothing,
/// prints no marker, and is reported as [`ScrubOutcome::Failed`] — loud, and
/// preferable to falling back to a shell that would run the script in the
/// environment this exists to keep away from it.
///
/// Passing the script as `$1` rather than interpolating it into a quoted inner
/// command string is not a style choice: the script contains single quotes in
/// every `scrub_in` call, and a nested quoting bug in a string that runs
/// `rm -rf` as root is the whole class of defect this module keeps having.
const SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP: &str = concat!(
r#"/usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/sh -c "$1"; "#,
r#"case $? in 127) /bin/env -i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/sh -c "$1" ;; esac"#,
);
/// The argv the scrub exec is created with: [`SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP`], then the
/// `$0` a diagnostic would name the shell by, then the script itself as `$1`.
fn scrub_exec_cmd(script: &str) -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"/bin/sh".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP.to_string(),
"triple-c-scrub".to_string(),
script.to_string(),
]
}
/// Split a [`SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS`] entry into the literal directory it is
/// anchored to and the glob to expand inside it.
///
@@ -2201,6 +2331,23 @@ fn split_scrub_pattern(pattern: &str) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
}
/// The `/bin/sh` program run inside the container to perform the scrub.
///
/// ## Never run the string this returns anywhere but inside a container
///
/// It is anchored at `/`, and its first pattern is `/tmp/claude-*`. A Triple-C
/// development container keeps every agent's scratchpad — working files,
/// backups of the very sources being edited, task output — under
/// `/tmp/claude-<uid>/`, which that glob matches exactly. Running this as root
/// on a development machine or in the dev container deletes all of it, reports
/// a healthy byte total, and leaves nothing to say what happened.
///
/// Anything that wants to *exercise* the scrub outside a container must use
/// [`snapshot_scrub_script_under`] with a freshly generated, uuid-named
/// throwaway root, and that applies to negative controls too: a control that
/// plants a symlink to show the vulnerable version follows it must point that
/// symlink **inside the same throwaway root**, never at a path derived from
/// the crate, the repository or the environment. The whole point of those
/// controls is that they delete what they are aimed at.
pub(crate) fn snapshot_scrub_script() -> String {
snapshot_scrub_script_under("")
}
@@ -2273,8 +2420,10 @@ pub(crate) fn snapshot_scrub_script() -> String {
/// deletes everything under it. Verified in real containers against
/// `docker run -v vol:/tmp/claude-x`: mounted at the parent (`/var/log/apt`)
/// was refused, mounted one level below the match
/// (`/tmp/claude-x/inner`) was refused, and mounted *as* the match
/// (`/tmp/claude-x`) emptied the volume. In production that mount is the
/// (`/tmp/claude-x/inner`) was refused **on the strength of the flag
/// alone**, and mounted *as* the match (`/tmp/claude-x`) emptied the volume.
/// That middle case is why the flag is a prerequisite rather than an
/// option — see the section on M1 below. In production that mount is the
/// user's own project directory, because a mount name of `../tmp/claude-x`
/// reaches it: the daemon normalises the `/workspace/{mount_name}` target
/// built at [`create_container`] straight back to `/tmp/claude-x`.
@@ -2285,9 +2434,58 @@ pub(crate) fn snapshot_scrub_script() -> String {
/// component have always relied on.
///
/// Inside the loop, an expansion carrying a path separator means the list has
/// changed shape and is skipped, and `rm --one-file-system` (probed, because
/// busybox's `rm` would reject it) refuses to recurse across a mount planted
/// *below* a match — which is the only mount position it does cover.
/// changed shape and is skipped, and `rm --one-file-system` refuses to recurse
/// across a mount planted *below* a match — the one mount position none of the
/// five checks above can see, because it is not the parent and it is not the
/// match.
///
/// ## Why `--one-file-system` is a prerequisite and not an option (M1)
///
/// It used to be probed into a variable:
///
/// ```sh
/// rmopt=;
/// rm --one-file-system --help >/dev/null 2>&1 && rmopt=--one-file-system;
/// rm -rf $rmopt -- "$p";
/// ```
///
/// which fails **open**. `busybox`'s `rm` answers `unrecognized option
/// '--one-file-system'` and exits 1 for that probe, so on any
/// `ImageSource::Custom` busybox- or toybox-derived image `$rmopt` was empty
/// and `rm -rf` ran as root with no cross-filesystem bound at all — and
/// reported the result as a completed `Reclaimed(n)`.
///
/// Measured end to end, `busybox:latest` (BusyBox 1.38), a named volume
/// mounted one level below the match at `/tmp/claude-x/inner`:
///
/// * the probed shape emptied the volume and printed
/// `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUBBED 102423`;
/// * this shape prints `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUB-UNAVAILABLE rm-one-file-system` and
/// removes nothing at all.
///
/// And on `ubuntu:24.04` (GNU coreutils 9.4), same mount, to show the flag is
/// honoured rather than merely accepted: with `--one-file-system` deleted from
/// the one `rm` the volume was emptied and `306565` reported, with it the
/// volume was untouched and the figure was `65536` — exactly the debris that
/// really was next to the mount, so the byte accounting follows the flag too.
///
/// It is one of the six prerequisites now, and an image without it is
/// [`SCRUB_UNAVAILABLE_MARKER`] rather than a scrub that runs unguarded. That
/// is a real cost — an Alpine or busybox base image stops being scrubbed and
/// keeps its debris — and it is the cheaper of the two: declining costs disk,
/// proceeding costs the mount.
///
/// The probe is `rm --one-file-system -f -- ''` rather than `--help`. It is
/// the same question asked of the code path that matters — option parsing
/// followed by an actual run — where `--help` only asks whether a usage
/// message can be printed; and the empty operand is the one argument no
/// filesystem can ever name, so a probe that *does* run cannot remove
/// anything. `-f` makes the resulting `ENOENT` an exit of 0, on GNU
/// `coreutils` and by POSIX both.
///
/// What it cannot check is that the flag is *honoured* rather than merely
/// accepted; that needs a real mount, and it is covered by the container runs
/// recorded above rather than by the probe.
///
/// ## How the byte total is counted
///
@@ -2315,8 +2513,19 @@ pub(crate) fn snapshot_scrub_script() -> String {
/// a volume mounted at `/var/log/apt` — refused by an unshimmed scrub — had its
/// entire contents deleted. The shim lives in the home volume; it cannot live
/// in `/usr/bin` or `/bin`, which uid 1000 cannot write. Resetting `PATH` to
/// exactly those two directories therefore defeats it just as completely as
/// spelling `/usr/bin/stat` out does.
/// exactly those two directories therefore defeats *a shim on `PATH`* as
/// completely as spelling `/usr/bin/stat` out does, and buys the portability
/// that spelling it out gives away.
///
/// M2: that sentence used to stop one clause earlier, at "defeats it just as
/// completely", and read as though the reset settled command lookup. It does
/// not. `PATH` is the **last** step of lookup: a shell tries functions, then
/// builtins, then `PATH`, and `command -v` reports a function as found — so a
/// planted shell function is invisible to everything in this section and
/// passes the tool probe below into the bargain. Nothing written in this
/// script can fix that, because the shell that would run the fix has already
/// imported the function. It is fixed one level up, by [`SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP`],
/// which gives the shell that runs this script no environment to import from.
///
/// Spelling them out as well was strictly *worse*, and it is what H3 was.
/// `/usr/bin/stat` is not where coreutils live on every base image — Settings →
@@ -2337,10 +2546,19 @@ pub(crate) fn snapshot_scrub_script() -> String {
/// half-working state this whole section exists to stop being silent.
///
/// This does not defend against something that can write `/usr/bin` or `/bin`
/// itself, which the agent's passwordless sudo can. It closes the part of the
/// gap that survives a container restart and needs no privileges at all — and
/// see [`SCRUB_EXEC_ENV`] for the `LD_PRELOAD` half of the same question, which
/// `PATH` does nothing about.
/// itself, which the agent's passwordless sudo can — and note what that is
/// *not*: it is not a gap that a container restart closes. A `sudo`-written
/// `/usr/bin/stat` lands in the writable layer, which is precisely what the
/// `docker commit` this runs in front of is about to capture, so it survives
/// into the snapshot and into every container made from it. What the reset
/// closes is the unprivileged half — the three home-volume directories on the
/// front of the image's `PATH`, which the agent writes without `sudo` and
/// which no restart clears either. Both halves persist; only one of them needs
/// a privilege the scrub could not have defended against anyway.
///
/// See [`SCRUB_EXEC_ENV`] for the `LD_PRELOAD` half of the same question and
/// [`SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP`] for the shell-function half, neither of which `PATH`
/// does anything about.
///
/// ## Why every line ends in `;`, and why there are no `#` comments
///
@@ -2394,12 +2612,11 @@ fn snapshot_scrub_script_under(root: &str) -> String {
r#"PATH={root}/usr/bin:{root}/bin; export PATH;
total=0;
missing=;
for t in stat rm du cut find; do command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="$missing $t"; done;
for t in {tools}; do command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="$missing $t"; done;
command -v rm >/dev/null 2>&1 && {{ rm --one-file-system -f -- '' >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="$missing rm-one-file-system"; }};
rootdev=$(stat -c %d '{root}/' 2>/dev/null);
case "$rootdev" in ''|*[!0-9]*) rootdev=; missing="$missing root-device-id" ;; esac;
[ -z "$missing" ] || {{ echo "{unavailable}$missing"; exit 0; }};
rmopt=;
rm --one-file-system --help >/dev/null 2>&1 && rmopt=--one-file-system;
scrub_in() {{
n=$(
d=${{1%/*}}; [ -n "$d" ] || d=/;
@@ -2417,7 +2634,7 @@ case "$p" in */*|.|..) continue ;; esac;
[ "$2" = "-" ] || [ -n "$(find "./$p" -maxdepth 0 -mtime +"$2" -print 2>/dev/null)" ] || continue;
sz=$(du -sb -- "$p" 2>/dev/null | cut -f1);
case "$sz" in ''|*[!0-9]*) sz=0 ;; esac;
rm -rf $rmopt -- "$p" 2>/dev/null;
rm --one-file-system -rf -- "$p" 2>/dev/null;
rest=0;
{{ [ -e "$p" ] || [ -L "$p" ]; }} && rest=$(du -sb -- "$p" 2>/dev/null | cut -f1);
case "$rest" in ''|*[!0-9]*) rest=0 ;; esac;
@@ -2435,6 +2652,7 @@ exit 0
root = root,
allowed = allowed,
calls = calls,
tools = SCRUB_PREREQ_TOOLS.join(" "),
marker = SCRUB_MARKER,
unavailable = SCRUB_UNAVAILABLE_MARKER,
)
@@ -2465,14 +2683,33 @@ fn parse_scrub_total(output: &str) -> Option<u64> {
fn parse_scrub_unavailable(output: &str) -> Option<String> {
output.lines().rev().find_map(|line| {
let missing = line.trim().strip_prefix(SCRUB_UNAVAILABLE_MARKER)?.trim();
Some(if missing.is_empty() {
"the image is missing the tools the scrub needs".to_string()
} else {
format!(
"the image has no usable {} on /usr/bin or /bin",
missing.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", ")
)
})
if missing.is_empty() {
return Some("the image is missing the tools the scrub needs".to_string());
}
// Three different things can be missing and only one of them is a file
// on a path, so they cannot share a sentence. M1 added the third and
// it is the one most likely to be read by somebody who does not know
// the history, so it says what the flag is *for* rather than naming it.
let (tools, others): (Vec<&str>, Vec<&str>) = missing
.split_whitespace()
.partition(|t| SCRUB_PREREQ_TOOLS.contains(t));
let mut parts = Vec::new();
if !tools.is_empty() {
parts.push(format!(
"has no usable {} on /usr/bin or /bin",
tools.join(", ")
));
}
parts.extend(others.into_iter().map(|other| match other {
"rm-one-file-system" => "has an `rm` that does not take `--one-file-system`, \
which is the only thing bounding a recursive delete run as root"
.to_string(),
"root-device-id" => {
"will not say which device its root filesystem is on".to_string()
}
other => format!("is missing {}", other),
}));
Some(format!("the image {}", parts.join("; it ")))
})
}
@@ -2603,8 +2840,10 @@ pub async fn scrub_writable_layer(container_id: &str) -> ScrubOutcome {
}
}
let script = snapshot_scrub_script();
let cmd = vec!["/bin/sh".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), script];
// M2: not `/bin/sh -c script`. The shell an exec starts has already read
// the container's environment by the time the script's first line runs —
// see [`SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP`], which hands the script to one that has not.
let cmd = scrub_exec_cmd(&snapshot_scrub_script());
let exec = crate::docker::exec::exec_oneshot_as(
container_id,
"root",
@@ -4146,6 +4385,61 @@ mod tests {
assert!(blind.left_something_behind());
}
/// A stored row that cannot make a usable mount makes none.
///
/// Both shapes here are records already written to disk, which is the whole
/// point: an empty `host_path` sends
/// `field Source must not be empty` back for the *entire* create, so the
/// project cannot be started or recreated at all until the row is gone —
/// and validating the next save does nothing for a record that is already
/// there. An empty `mount_name` is the quieter one: it targets
/// `/workspace/` itself, so the daemon mounts that row over the workspace
/// volume and then creates the other rows' mount points inside the user's
/// real folder.
#[test]
fn a_stored_path_row_that_cannot_mount_produces_no_mount() {
use crate::models::project::ProjectPath;
let row = |host: &str, name: &str| ProjectPath {
host_path: host.to_string(),
mount_name: name.to_string(),
};
let mounts = project_path_mounts(&[
row("/home/me/code", "code"),
// Bricks the create outright.
row("", "orphan"),
// Mounts over /workspace itself.
row("/home/me/other", ""),
// Whitespace is not a name and not a path, however it got there.
row(" ", "blank-source"),
row("/home/me/third", " "),
row("/home/me/docs", "docs"),
]);
assert_eq!(
mounts.len(),
2,
"a row that cannot mount was turned into a mount anyway: {:?}",
mounts
);
assert_eq!(mounts[0].target.as_deref(), Some("/workspace/code"));
assert_eq!(mounts[0].source.as_deref(), Some("/home/me/code"));
assert_eq!(mounts[1].target.as_deref(), Some("/workspace/docs"));
// The two failures, spelled out so a future edit cannot reintroduce
// either by relaxing half the filter.
for m in &mounts {
assert_ne!(m.source.as_deref(), Some(""), "an empty Source reaches the daemon");
assert_ne!(
m.target.as_deref(),
Some("/workspace/"),
"a row is mounted over the workspace volume"
);
}
// And the good rows are unchanged: this is a filter, not a rewrite.
assert!(mounts.iter().all(|m| m.read_only == Some(false)));
assert!(project_path_mounts(&[]).is_empty());
}
// ── Pre-commit scrub (A1, C1) ────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
@@ -4326,11 +4620,24 @@ mod tests {
// at the top level — which is what the vulnerable version was — fails
// here.
assert_eq!(
script.matches("rm -rf").count(),
script.matches(r#"rm --one-file-system -rf -- "$p""#).count(),
1,
"the scrub deletes somewhere other than inside the validated block:\n{}",
script
);
// M1: and the flag is spelled into that one deletion rather than
// reaching it through a `$rmopt` an unsupported `rm` leaves empty.
assert!(
!script.contains("rmopt"),
"the cross-filesystem guard is optional again:\n{}",
script
);
assert_eq!(
script.matches("rm -rf").count(),
0,
"an unguarded recursive delete is back in the script:\n{}",
script
);
// The handle: after this, paths are relative to a validated inode, so
// re-pointing the directory cannot redirect the delete.
assert!(script.contains(r#"cd -P "$d" 2>/dev/null || exit 0;"#));
@@ -4407,6 +4714,12 @@ mod tests {
assert!(script.contains(
r#"for t in stat rm du cut find; do command -v "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="$missing $t"; done;"#
));
// M1: the seventh. `rm` existing is not `rm` taking the one flag that
// bounds a recursive delete run as root, and the difference used to be
// an empty variable nobody could see from the outside.
assert!(script.contains(
r#"command -v rm >/dev/null 2>&1 && { rm --one-file-system -f -- '' >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="$missing rm-one-file-system"; };"#
));
assert!(script.contains(&format!(
r#"[ -z "$missing" ] || {{ echo "{}$missing"; exit 0; }};"#,
SCRUB_UNAVAILABLE_MARKER
@@ -4457,7 +4770,7 @@ mod tests {
// directory, and quoted everywhere it is *used* so a filename with a
// space stays one argument.
assert!(script.contains("for p in $g; do"));
assert!(script.contains(r#"rm -rf $rmopt -- "$p""#));
assert!(script.contains(r#"rm --one-file-system -rf -- "$p""#));
// `rm -rf /` would be catastrophic and is exactly what a botched
// interpolation produces.
assert!(!script.contains("rm -rf -- /\n"));
@@ -4754,6 +5067,427 @@ mod tests {
);
}
/// M1: an `rm` that cannot bound a recursive delete stops the scrub; it
/// does not turn the scrub into an unbounded one.
///
/// `--one-file-system` is the only thing between `rm -rf` run as root and a
/// mount planted *below* a match — the one position checks 0–4 cannot see,
/// because it is neither the parent they validate nor the match they
/// `stat`. It used to be probed into `$rmopt`, and every busybox- or
/// toybox-derived `rm` leaves that empty (BusyBox 1.38 answers
/// `unrecognized option '--one-file-system'` and exits 1, measured), so the
/// guard was absent on exactly the images that reach this code through
/// `ImageSource::Custom` — and the run still reported `Reclaimed(n)`.
///
/// The `rm` planted here answers the way busybox's does. The negative
/// control is the shape this replaces, rebuilt from the real script: it
/// deletes, which is what makes the assertion that the real script does not
/// mean anything.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[test]
fn an_rm_without_the_cross_filesystem_guard_stops_the_scrub() {
use std::fs;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::process::Command;
let base = fs::canonicalize(std::env::temp_dir()).expect("a real temp dir");
let root = base.join(format!("triple-c-scrub-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()));
let root_str = root.to_str().expect("a UTF-8 temp path").to_string();
plant_scrub_tools(&root);
let real_rm = ["/usr/bin/rm", "/bin/rm"]
.iter()
.find(|c| std::path::Path::new(c).exists())
.expect("an rm on this host")
.to_string();
fs::remove_file(root.join("usr/bin/rm")).expect("drop the symlink to the real rm");
fs::write(
root.join("usr/bin/rm"),
format!(
"#!/bin/sh\nfor a in \"$@\"; do case \"$a\" in --one-file-system) echo \"rm: \
unrecognized option '--one-file-system'\" >&2; exit 1 ;; esac; done\nexec {rm} \
\"$@\"\n",
rm = real_rm
),
)
.expect("plant a busybox-shaped rm");
fs::set_permissions(root.join("usr/bin/rm"), fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
let seed = || {
fs::remove_dir_all(root.join("tmp")).ok();
fs::create_dir_all(root.join("tmp/claude-scratch")).expect("mkdir");
fs::write(root.join("tmp/claude-scratch/blob"), vec![0u8; 64 * 1024]).unwrap();
};
let script = snapshot_scrub_script_under(&root_str);
// The pre-M1 shape: the flag asked for with `--help` and kept in a
// variable, which this `rm` leaves empty.
let fail_open = script
.replace(
r#"command -v rm >/dev/null 2>&1 && { rm --one-file-system -f -- '' >/dev/null 2>&1 || missing="$missing rm-one-file-system"; };"#,
"rmopt=;\nrm --one-file-system --help >/dev/null 2>&1 && rmopt=--one-file-system;",
)
.replace(r#"rm --one-file-system -rf -- "$p""#, r#"rm -rf $rmopt -- "$p""#);
assert_ne!(fail_open, script, "the control was rebuilt from stale text");
let run = |sh: &str| {
Command::new("/bin/sh")
.arg("-c")
.arg(sh)
.output()
.expect("run the generated script")
};
seed();
let control = run(&fail_open);
let control_deleted = !root.join("tmp/claude-scratch").exists();
seed();
let real = run(&script);
let real_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&real.stdout).into_owned();
let real_kept = root.join("tmp/claude-scratch/blob").exists();
fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
assert!(
control_deleted,
"the harness cannot tell the difference: the fail-open shape deleted nothing either, \
so the assertions below prove nothing.\nstdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&control.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&control.stderr),
);
assert!(
real_kept,
"the scrub deleted as root with no cross-filesystem bound.\nstdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
real_out,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&real.stderr),
);
// And it is loud about it: a refusal must never render as the `0` a
// healthy container with nothing to clean prints.
assert_eq!(
parse_scrub_total(&real_out),
None,
"a scrub that refused to run still printed a total: {}",
real_out
);
let reason = parse_scrub_unavailable(&real_out)
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no unavailable marker in: {}", real_out));
assert!(
reason.contains("--one-file-system"),
"the reason does not name the guard that is missing: {}",
reason
);
}
/// M1, the other half: the guard is attached to the delete that actually
/// runs, not merely to the script text.
///
/// The only assertion this position had was that the string
/// `rm -rf $rmopt -- "$p"` appeared in the script — which says nothing
/// about what `rm` is handed once the shell has expanded it, and an empty
/// `$rmopt` was precisely the defect. So the `rm` the script resolves
/// records its own argv here and the argv is what is asserted.
///
/// A test process cannot create the mount that would exercise the flag for
/// real — no `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and this container refuses `unshare -Urm` as
/// well — so "the flag is honoured at a nested boundary" is measured in
/// containers and recorded on [`snapshot_scrub_script_under`]. "The flag is
/// there at all, on every match" is this.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[test]
fn every_delete_reaches_rm_with_the_cross_filesystem_guard_attached() {
use std::fs;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::process::Command;
let base = fs::canonicalize(std::env::temp_dir()).expect("a real temp dir");
let root = base.join(format!("triple-c-scrub-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()));
let root_str = root.to_str().expect("a UTF-8 temp path").to_string();
plant_scrub_tools(&root);
let real_rm = ["/usr/bin/rm", "/bin/rm"]
.iter()
.find(|c| std::path::Path::new(c).exists())
.expect("an rm on this host")
.to_string();
let argv_log = root.join("argv");
fs::remove_file(root.join("usr/bin/rm")).expect("drop the symlink to the real rm");
fs::write(
root.join("usr/bin/rm"),
format!(
"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' \"$*\" >> {log}\nexec {rm} \"$@\"\n",
log = argv_log.display(),
rm = real_rm
),
)
.expect("plant an argv-recording rm");
fs::set_permissions(root.join("usr/bin/rm"), fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
// Two matches of the same pattern, so "the flag is on the first one"
// cannot pass for "the flag is on every one".
let seed = || {
fs::remove_file(&argv_log).ok();
fs::remove_dir_all(root.join("tmp")).ok();
for name in ["tmp/claude-a", "tmp/claude-b"] {
fs::create_dir_all(root.join(name)).expect("mkdir");
fs::write(root.join(name).join("blob"), vec![0u8; 32 * 1024]).unwrap();
}
};
// Only the deletes, not the `rm --one-file-system -f -- ''` probe.
let deletes = || -> Vec<String> {
fs::read_to_string(&argv_log)
.unwrap_or_default()
.lines()
.filter(|l| l.contains("claude-"))
.map(|l| l.to_string())
.collect()
};
let script = snapshot_scrub_script_under(&root_str);
let unguarded = script.replace(
r#"rm --one-file-system -rf -- "$p""#,
r#"rm -rf -- "$p""#,
);
assert_ne!(unguarded, script, "the control was rebuilt from stale text");
let run = |sh: &str| {
Command::new("/bin/sh")
.arg("-c")
.arg(sh)
.output()
.expect("run the generated script")
};
seed();
run(&script);
let guarded_argv = deletes();
seed();
run(&unguarded);
let unguarded_argv = deletes();
fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
assert_eq!(
guarded_argv.len(),
2,
"both matches should have reached rm exactly once: {:?}",
guarded_argv
);
assert!(
unguarded_argv.len() == 2
&& unguarded_argv.iter().all(|a| !a.contains("--one-file-system")),
"the harness cannot tell the difference: stripping the flag from the script did not \
change the argv rm was handed: {:?}",
unguarded_argv
);
for argv in &guarded_argv {
assert!(
argv.starts_with("--one-file-system "),
"a delete reached rm without the cross-filesystem guard: {:?}",
guarded_argv
);
}
}
/// M2: the script cannot be steered by a shell function, because the shell
/// that runs it has no environment to import one from.
///
/// `bash` builds shell functions out of environment variables named
/// `BASH_FUNC_<name>%%`, and function lookup happens *before* `PATH` — so
/// the `PATH` reset is no defence, and `command -v` reports the function as
/// found, which walks the planted function straight through the
/// prerequisite probe. Nor is any in-script answer one: `[`, `pwd`, `cd`,
/// `command` and `unset` all import just as readily (measured on `bash`
/// 5.2), which is checks 0–2 and both of the things that would remove the
/// function.
///
/// The shipped image's `/bin/sh` is `dash`, which imports nothing, so this
/// is latent there — but the Dockerfile does not pin `/bin/sh` and the base
/// is inherited from `ubuntu:24.04`, and `ImageSource::Custom` takes any
/// image at all. So the inner shell is `bash` here on purpose: it stands in
/// for the image where this is not latent, and it is the only way to show
/// that what protects the script is `env -i` rather than the accident of
/// `dash` being what `/bin/sh` points at.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[test]
fn a_planted_shell_function_cannot_answer_the_containment_checks() {
use std::fs;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::process::Command;
let bash = ["/usr/bin/bash", "/bin/bash"]
.iter()
.find(|c| std::path::Path::new(c).exists())
.expect("a bash on this host to stand in for an image whose /bin/sh is bash")
.to_string();
let base = fs::canonicalize(std::env::temp_dir()).expect("a real temp dir");
let root = base.join(format!("triple-c-scrub-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()));
let root_str = root.to_str().expect("a UTF-8 temp path").to_string();
fs::create_dir_all(root.join("tmp")).expect("mkdir");
plant_scrub_tools(&root);
// The same simulation the mount-at-the-match test uses: a `stat` that
// reports a foreign device for one name is what the kernel reports for
// a mount point, and no test process can make a real one.
fs::remove_file(root.join("usr/bin/stat")).expect("drop the symlink to the real stat");
fs::write(
root.join("usr/bin/stat"),
"#!/bin/sh\nfor a in \"$@\"; do case \"$a\" in claude-mounted|*/claude-mounted) echo 999999; exit 0 ;; esac; done\nexec /usr/bin/stat \"$@\"\n",
)
.expect("overwrite the stat symlink with a stub");
fs::set_permissions(root.join("usr/bin/stat"), fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
let seed = || {
fs::remove_dir_all(root.join("tmp/claude-mounted")).ok();
fs::remove_dir_all(root.join("tmp/claude-real")).ok();
fs::create_dir_all(root.join("tmp/claude-mounted/sub")).expect("mkdir");
fs::create_dir_all(root.join("tmp/claude-real")).expect("mkdir");
fs::write(root.join("tmp/claude-mounted/precious.txt"), "do not delete").unwrap();
fs::write(root.join("tmp/claude-mounted/sub/nested.txt"), "nor this").unwrap();
fs::write(root.join("tmp/claude-real/blob"), vec![0u8; 64 * 1024]).unwrap();
};
let mounted_survived = || {
root.join("tmp/claude-mounted/precious.txt").exists()
&& root.join("tmp/claude-mounted/sub/nested.txt").exists()
};
let script = snapshot_scrub_script_under(&root_str);
// Production's bootstrap with the inner shell swapped for `bash`, i.e.
// the image where `/bin/sh` is bash. Nothing else about it changes.
let as_bash = |b: &str| b.replace("/bin/sh -c", &format!("{} -c", bash));
let bootstrap = as_bash(SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP);
// Negative control: the same bootstrap without the `-i`, which is the
// one character that separates "the inner shell has no environment"
// from "the inner shell has the caller's".
let without_env_reset = bootstrap.replace("env -i ", "env ");
assert_ne!(without_env_reset, bootstrap, "the control was rebuilt from stale text");
// One function is enough to own checks 3 and 4; the rest are there to
// show the bootstrap does not care how many of them there are.
let hostile: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
("BASH_FUNC_stat%%", "() { echo 1; }"),
("BASH_FUNC_command%%", "() { echo shadowed; }"),
("BASH_FUNC_unset%%", "() { :; }"),
("BASH_FUNC_[%%", "() { :; }"),
("BASH_FUNC_pwd%%", "() { echo /; }"),
("BASH_FUNC_cd%%", "() { :; }"),
];
let run = |boot: &str, planted: &[(&str, &str)]| {
let mut c = Command::new(&bash);
c.arg("-c").arg(boot).arg("triple-c-scrub").arg(&script);
for (k, v) in planted {
c.env(k, v);
}
c.output().expect("run the bootstrap")
};
seed();
let control = run(&without_env_reset, &hostile[..1]);
let control_kept = mounted_survived();
seed();
let real = run(&bootstrap, &hostile[..1]);
let real_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&real.stdout).into_owned();
let real_kept = mounted_survived();
let real_reclaimed = !root.join("tmp/claude-real/blob").exists();
seed();
let swarm = run(&bootstrap, hostile);
let swarm_out = String::from_utf8_lossy(&swarm.stdout).into_owned();
let swarm_kept = mounted_survived();
let swarm_reclaimed = !root.join("tmp/claude-real/blob").exists();
fs::remove_dir_all(&root).ok();
assert!(
!control_kept,
"the harness cannot tell the difference: a planted `stat` function reached an inner \
shell with the environment intact and the mount survived anyway, so the assertions \
below prove nothing.\nstdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&control.stdout),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&control.stderr),
);
assert!(
real_kept,
"a planted shell function answered the containment checks.\nstdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
real_out,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&real.stderr),
);
assert!(real_reclaimed, "the scrub stopped reclaiming a real scratchpad");
assert_eq!(
parse_scrub_total(&real_out).map(|t| t >= 64 * 1024),
Some(true),
"the reported total does not account for the scratchpad that was removed: {}",
real_out
);
// And with every builtin the script leans on shadowed at once, it is
// still the script's own answers that decide.
assert!(
swarm_kept && swarm_reclaimed,
"a shadowed `[`/`pwd`/`cd`/`command`/`unset` changed what the scrub did.\nstdout: {}\nstderr: {}",
swarm_out,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&swarm.stderr),
);
assert_eq!(parse_scrub_total(&swarm_out).map(|t| t >= 64 * 1024), Some(true));
}
/// M2, the structural half: the exec hands the script over as an argument
/// to a shell that was started with no environment.
#[test]
fn the_scrub_exec_starts_its_shell_with_an_empty_environment() {
let script = snapshot_scrub_script();
let cmd = scrub_exec_cmd(&script);
assert_eq!(cmd.len(), 5);
assert_eq!(cmd[0], "/bin/sh");
assert_eq!(cmd[1], "-c");
assert_eq!(cmd[2], SCRUB_BOOTSTRAP);
// As `$1`, never spliced into the bootstrap: the script is full of
// single quotes and it runs `rm -rf` as root, so a nested-quoting bug
// there is the whole class of defect this module keeps having.
assert_eq!(cmd[4], script);
assert!(
!cmd[2].contains("scrub_in"),
"the script is interpolated into the bootstrap: {}",
cmd[2]
);
assert!(cmd[2].contains(r#"/usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/sh -c "$1""#));
// H3's lesson kept: `env` is no more usr-merged than `stat` is, and a
// hardcoded path that is simply absent must not be the quiet answer.
assert!(cmd[2].contains(r#"/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/sh -c "$1""#));
assert!(cmd[2].contains("case $? in 127)"));
// Everything the *outer* shell evaluates has to be a reserved word, a
// parameter expansion, or a command word containing a `/` — those are
// the three things a planted function cannot reach, and `bash` refuses
// to import a function whose name has a `/` in it.
assert_eq!(
cmd[2].matches("env -i").count(),
cmd[2].matches("/env -i").count(),
"the bootstrap calls `env` by a bare name: {}",
cmd[2]
);
assert_eq!(
cmd[2].matches("sh -c").count(),
cmd[2].matches("/sh -c").count(),
"the bootstrap calls `sh` by a bare name: {}",
cmd[2]
);
// And the one caller builds its argv here rather than assembling its
// own. Everything above is a property of `scrub_exec_cmd`, and a call
// site that quietly went back to `/bin/sh -c script` would satisfy all
// of it while running the script in the environment this exists to
// keep away from it. The needle is assembled rather than written out
// so that this line is not itself the match.
let needle = format!("{}(&{}())", "scrub_exec_cmd", "snapshot_scrub_script");
assert!(
include_str!("container.rs").contains(&needle),
"the scrub exec no longer goes through the bootstrap"
);
}
/// H3, the behavioural half: a base image whose coreutils are not under
/// `/usr/bin`.
///
@@ -4790,8 +5524,14 @@ mod tests {
// `/usr/bin` this root does not have.
let absolute: String = script
.replace(r#"$(stat "#, &format!("$({}/usr/bin/stat ", root_str))
.replace("\nrm --one-file-system", &format!("\n{}/usr/bin/rm --one-file-system", root_str))
.replace("\nrm -rf ", &format!("\n{}/usr/bin/rm -rf ", root_str))
.replace(
"\nrm --one-file-system -rf ",
&format!("\n{}/usr/bin/rm --one-file-system -rf ", root_str),
)
.replace(
"&& { rm --one-file-system",
&format!("&& {{ {}/usr/bin/rm --one-file-system", root_str),
)
.replace("$(du -sb", &format!("$({}/usr/bin/du -sb", root_str))
.replace("| cut -f1", &format!("| {}/usr/bin/cut -f1", root_str))
.replace("$(find ", &format!("$({}/usr/bin/find ", root_str))