Address PR review: backup correctness/security + drop hardening
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Fixes from the code review of this branch:

- Backup requires a running container (it runs via `docker exec`, which
  can't run on a stopped one). Removed the misleading "Backup" button
  from the stopped-project actions, added an explicit running check with
  a clear error, and corrected the doc comment. (H1)
- jq sanitization fallback no longer leaks secrets: if ~/.claude.json
  can't be parsed, the backup substitutes an empty object and warns to
  stderr instead of copying the raw file (which held primaryApiKey /
  oauthAccount). Verified the raw key never reaches the archive. (H2)
- Dropped-file paths typed into the terminal are now always single-quoted
  (with '\'' escaping), not only when they contain whitespace — a name
  like `foo$(whoami).txt` was previously sent raw into the shell. (M2)
- write_bedrock_static_credentials checks the exec exit code via the new
  exec_oneshot_env_status and fails loudly on a write/chmod error instead
  of silently reporting success. exec_oneshot keeps its
  ignore-exit-code behavior so list_container_files is unaffected. (M4)
- Backup removes a partial/truncated archive on any stream error and
  treats a non-zero tar exit code as failure (a truncated gzip was
  previously reported as success). (L1)
- Dropped files are capped at 256 MiB to avoid ballooning host RAM
  (the file is read fully into memory then re-tarred). (M3)
- Stopped excluding .git/objects from the backup so git history,
  including unpushed commits, is preserved faithfully. (L3)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-30 14:28:00 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 84e0bdf7b4
commit edf0698774
6 changed files with 131 additions and 36 deletions
+11 -4
View File
@@ -1163,10 +1163,17 @@ fi
chmod 600 "$HOME/.aws/credentials""#;
let cmd = vec!["sh".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), script.to_string()];
crate::docker::exec::exec_oneshot_env(container_id, cmd, env)
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write AWS credentials into container: {}", e))?;
let (output, exit_code) =
crate::docker::exec::exec_oneshot_env_status(container_id, cmd, env)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to write AWS credentials into container: {}", e))?;
if exit_code != 0 {
return Err(format!(
"Writing AWS credentials into container failed (exit {}): {}",
exit_code,
output.trim()
));
}
log::info!("Wrote Bedrock static credentials into container {}", container_id);
Ok(())
+30 -4
View File
@@ -288,11 +288,27 @@ pub async fn exec_oneshot(container_id: &str, cmd: Vec<String>) -> Result<String
/// process. Secrets passed this way live only in `/proc/<pid>/environ` (readable
/// by the same user / root) rather than in the process argv, so they are not
/// exposed via `ps`.
///
/// NOTE: the command's exit code is NOT checked — callers that need to know
/// whether the command succeeded should use `exec_oneshot_env_status`.
pub async fn exec_oneshot_env(
container_id: &str,
cmd: Vec<String>,
env: Vec<String>,
) -> Result<String, String> {
exec_oneshot_env_status(container_id, cmd, env)
.await
.map(|(output, _exit_code)| output)
}
/// Like `exec_oneshot_env`, but also returns the command's exit code (0 on
/// success). The returned string contains both stdout and stderr, interleaved
/// in arrival order, which is useful for surfacing failure detail.
pub async fn exec_oneshot_env_status(
container_id: &str,
cmd: Vec<String>,
env: Vec<String>,
) -> Result<(String, i64), String> {
let docker = get_docker()?;
let exec = docker
@@ -315,17 +331,27 @@ pub async fn exec_oneshot_env(
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?;
let mut combined = String::new();
match result {
StartExecResults::Attached { mut output, .. } => {
let mut stdout = String::new();
while let Some(msg) = output.next().await {
match msg {
Ok(data) => stdout.push_str(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&data.into_bytes())),
Ok(data) => combined.push_str(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&data.into_bytes())),
Err(e) => return Err(format!("Exec output error: {}", e)),
}
}
Ok(stdout)
}
StartExecResults::Detached => Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()),
StartExecResults::Detached => return Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()),
}
// Exit code is only available after the process has finished (the stream above
// has drained), so inspect now.
let exit_code = docker
.inspect_exec(&exec.id)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to inspect exec: {}", e))?
.exit_code
.unwrap_or(0);
Ok((combined, exit_code))
}