CI: sign Windows releases with Azure Artifact Signing (#62)
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Windows releases are now signed with Azure Artifact Signing: the app binary, the MSI, the NSIS installer and its uninstaller, 5 signatures per release. Build-time WiX and NSIS DLLs are skipped. "Verify signatures" fails a release unless the installers, the binaries inside the MSI, and the logged app-binary and uninstaller signatures are all valid and timestamped. Previews are not signed and don't reference the signing secrets. The sign command reaches Tauri through `--config`; the v2 CLI never read TAURI_CONFIG, so the old inline override was a no-op. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #62.
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@@ -836,6 +836,72 @@ verbatim copy yields a launcher entry that starts nothing. It keeps `StartupWMCl
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the bundle sets it, which is what lets the shell match the window to the entry. Extraction uses
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`--appimage-extract`, which needs no FUSE, so the script works before `fuse2` is installed.
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### Windows code signing
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Windows **releases** (`build-app.yml`) are signed with **Azure Artifact Signing**: the app binary,
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the MSI, the NSIS installer and its uninstaller. Three scripts do it, and "Verify signatures"
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fails the job if any of them is unsigned or untimestamped, so an unsigned installer cannot ship
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quietly. **PR previews are deliberately not signed**, and `build-app-preview.yml` must not
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reference the signing secrets. Two reasons: signing is metered (about 1000 signatures a month,
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against roughly 50 preview builds a month), and a PR's workflow runs the PR's own code, so a
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secret available there is available to whoever can push a branch. To exercise signing before a
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merge, dispatch `build-app.yml` on the branch. Every publishing step there is gated on
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`gitea.event_name == 'push'`, so a dispatch builds, signs and verifies without releasing.
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- `scripts/windows-signing-setup.ps1` runs once per job. It downloads the signing client
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(`Microsoft.ArtifactSigning.Client`) and a .NET runtime into `.code-signing/` in the workspace,
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**each pinned by version and hash**, writes the dlib's `metadata.json`, and writes a Tauri
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config file with `bundle.windows.signCommand` that the build passes as
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`cargo tauri build --config`. Nothing is installed on the build VM. To bump
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a pin, take the hash from nuget.org / the .NET `releases.json`, never from your own download.
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- `scripts/windows-sign.ps1` is the sign command: `signtool sign /dlib` with SHA-256 and the
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Microsoft timestamp server, retried. Credentials never reach a command line — the dlib reads
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`AZURE_TENANT_ID` / `AZURE_CLIENT_ID` / `AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` from the environment.
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**It signs only an allowlist of what ships**: 5 signatures per release (the app binary twice,
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because Tauri re-patches it between the MSI and NSIS bundles; the MSI; the NSIS installer;
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and its uninstaller). Tauri also presents build-time tools, the WiX extension DLLs and NSIS
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plugins, and signing those would more than double the metered count for no user-visible
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benefit. If the app ever ships resource DLLs or sidecars, extend the
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allowlist, or they will go out unsigned. Tauri reports a failed sign command only as
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"failed to run powershell", so the script keeps a transcript (`.code-signing/sign-output.log`,
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`signtool /debug` included), and the job prints it on failure.
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- `scripts/windows-verify-signatures.ps1` checks `signtool verify /pa` plus a timestamp on the
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installers, and on the binaries **inside** the MSI (an administrative `msiexec /a` extract).
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It deliberately does not check `target\release\triple-c.exe`: Tauri patches that file again
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after packaging, so the loose copy is unsigned by design and is not what ships. For the NSIS
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installer, which cannot be unpacked that way, it requires the signing log to show the app
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binary and the uninstaller were signed.
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Secrets (repository): the three `AZURE_*` above plus `ARTIFACT_SIGNING_ENDPOINT`,
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`ARTIFACT_SIGNING_ACCOUNT_NAME`, `ARTIFACT_SIGNING_PROFILE_NAME`. They are referenced only by the
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two Windows steps of `build-app.yml` that need them ("Prepare code signing" and "Build Tauri
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app"), never by the preview workflow, never echoed, and never on a command line. The repo is
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public, so its Actions logs are too. Gitea masks the secret values, and the signing dlib's
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`/debug` output carries no tokens (checked against its strings). Anyone who can push to this
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repo can reach the secrets through a workflow file, so repo write access is the boundary.
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`main` is branch-protected (no direct or force pushes; changes land by merging a PR), so a signed
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release only ever comes from a merged, visible change. The
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Azure side should hold the rest: an app registration with only the signer role on this one
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certificate profile, and a client secret with an expiry. Four things are load-bearing:
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- **`metadata.json` excludes every credential but `EnvironmentCredential`.** The dlib uses
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`DefaultAzureCredential`, whose chain ends in `InteractiveBrowserCredential`; the runners run as
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SYSTEM, where that waits forever for a browser.
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- **The sign command goes in through `--config`, never `TAURI_CONFIG`.** The v2 CLI does not read
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that variable — it only sets it, for tauri-build — so a config put there is dropped without an
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error. The Windows jobs set an inline `TAURI_CONFIG` for years and it never applied;
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"Verify signatures" is what exposed it, and it is what would catch a regression.
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- **The signing files and the job's `%TEMP%` live in the workspace.** The NSIS uninstaller is
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written to `%TEMP%` and signed from inside 32-bit `makensis`, under 32-bit PowerShell; WOW64
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redirects SYSTEM's own `%TEMP%` (under System32) for those processes but not for the x64
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signtool, so they would disagree about where the file is. The workspace is under
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`systemprofile\.cache`, which the VM junctions so both views resolve. makensis also ignores
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the sign command's exit code for the uninstaller, so `windows-sign.ps1` logs every file it
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signs and the verify step requires a logged signature under that temp directory.
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- **The build VM is `WindowsBuilder` (VM 110 on the Proxmox host `pve4`)**, carrying both the
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`winvm-builder` and `virtual-builder` runners in host mode. It has the Windows SDK's
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`signtool` (10.0.26100) but no .NET — hence the job-local runtime.
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## Testing
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Frontend tests use Vitest with jsdom environment and React Testing Library. Setup file at `src/test/setup.ts`. Run a single test file:
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