2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	22d142c70d	Shift+Enter newline, OAuth URL truncation, and the auth bridge toggle ... Three fixes that all land on the same journey: sign in, paste a prompt, and have the terminal behave the way every other Claude Code host does. Shift+Enter inserts a newline ----------------------------- xterm.js does not consult `shiftKey` for Enter (`Keyboard.ts`, case 13), so Shift+Enter was byte-identical to Enter and submitted the prompt. Both terminals now send `\x1b\r` (ESC+CR) instead, which Claude Code parses as return+meta — the same bytes its own `/terminal-setup` writes into the VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed keymaps, so this is in-band rather than a guess. Not `\n`: Claude Code accepts it, but a shell would run the line, so the two session types would diverge. Bound in Claude sessions only for that reason. `entrypoint.sh` sets `shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled` in `~/.claude.json` so the CLI stops printing its "run /terminal-setup" tip. Purely cosmetic — the decoding is unconditional either way. Alt+Enter has always done the same thing (xterm ESC-prefixes on altKey) and was simply never documented. It is now, along with the rest. OAuth login URL truncation -------------------------- Two producers wrote one toast slot, last-writer-wins. The OSC 7777 relay delivers the URL base64-encoded and therefore exact; ~300 ms later the screen-scraper's debounce fired and overwrote it with a truncated guess at the same link — a URL that parses, points at the right host, and authorises nothing. The user is the one who has to notice. Why the scraper truncated: `ANSI_RE` strips OSC sequences wholesale, including the OSC 8 hyperlink whose parameter carries the complete URL. Claude Code slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the terminal width while every emission carries the whole URL in its parameter. The backend already knew this (`commands/auth_token_commands.rs`); the frontend did not. - `urlDetector` now reads OSC 8 targets out of the raw buffer before stripping, filtered by a port of `usable_sign_in_link`, and tags every candidate with its provenance. - The prompt slot gained `supersedes`: better provenance always wins, worse never does, and between equals only a candidate that *extends* what is showing may replace it. That last rule is `extendsUrl`, factored out of `pickSignInUrl` rather than copied — same rule, same reason, one implementation. - `flatten` splits on a bare `\r` as well as on `\r?\n`, so a `\r`-repainted TUI frame no longer inflates a line past the width and suppresses a join that should have happened; and the width is now sampled at `feed()` rather than read at `scan()`, so a resize inside the 300 ms debounce cannot reassemble 80-column text against a 120-column rule. Also corrects the comment claiming `acquire_claude_token` enables the auth bridge. It deliberately does not, and the module comment in `auth_token_commands.rs` explains at length why not. The auth bridge toggle ---------------------- `setAuthBridgeEnabled` and `getAuthBridgeStatus` had zero call sites: the Rust was complete, the IPC wrapper shipped, and there was nowhere to click — so the docs told users to "enable the Auth Bridge" for a switch that did not exist. `AuthBridgeRow` is that switch, in Config → Runtime. It deliberately does not go through the tab's stopped-only save: the dedicated command exists so the bridge can be flipped while a login is hanging in a running container, which is the only moment anyone reaches for it. It also subscribes to `auth-bridge-changed`, which the poller has been emitting to nobody — so a host port the bridge could not take was a completely silent failure, indistinguishable from a login that hung. `tunnel.rs` promotes the best-effort `::1` bind failure from debug to a warning recorded on the port. Half-bound is the failure mode that looks like success: the status says bridged, and a client that resolves `localhost` to `::1` without falling back is still refused. Finally, for a recognised Anthropic sign-in URL the toast now leads with "In container" and demotes the host "Open". The callback listener is inside the container, so the container-side browser closes the loop with no host round trip and no auth bridge; the host button stays as the fallback. Ordinary URLs are unchanged. Tests: 402 frontend (was 359), 285 Rust (unchanged). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 08:31:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	f239fa1c82	Fix three things found by actually using it ... **The drag showed no tab.** Moving to pointer events lost the drag image the OS used to supply, leaving a dimmed source tab and a 2px line — which reads as "some setting changed", not "I am holding this tab". A copy of the tab now follows the cursor, carrying its glyph and its real label, grabbed at the offset it was picked up by so it sits where the tab was. **The URL relay opened a different URL than the one on screen.** Observed: `repo.anhonesthost.net/…/tag/preview-63f3c54` arrived as `repo.anhonsthost.nt/…/preview-63f3c54Butitprovesyournitpick…`. The detector deleted *every* line break to undo PTY hard-wrapping, but a terminal that wraps at a space emits the break **instead of** the space — so deleting breaks also deletes the separators, gluing the following paragraph onto the link and running the match past the host. Only breaks the terminal inserted may be deleted, and those are exactly the ones at the column width. The detector now takes a live column getter and rejoins a line only when it is exactly that wide; every other break becomes a space, which is also what stops a URL match. Lines *longer* than the width are left alone — the stream had no break there, so the one that follows is the application's own. One case stays ambiguous: a URL whose length is an exact multiple of the width is indistinguishable from one that was cut. That is pinned in a test as known behaviour rather than papered over — the candidate is shown in full and nothing opens without the user pressing Open. **"In container" opened a page nobody could see.** It bound the browser and stopped, leaving the user to find the Browser tab and press Start, with nothing saying so — and from a terminal, no pane on screen at all. Opening a page now starts the viewer if it isn't running, and the terminal's prompt raises the pop-out window, because that caller has nowhere else to put it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 10:36:30 -07:00