168b61d6328c34fc40b296bd9d361883702825d1
159
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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168b61d632 |
Close two cross-file handoffs from the round-3 fixes
The terminal's drop target derived the tar entry name from the host path *after* symlink resolution, so dropping ~/Downloads/latest.log — where latest.log is a symlink — landed the file in the container under the target's name. Nothing errored; the user got a name they never typed. The Files pane had the identical bug and was fixed with `host_upload_name`; the terminal now calls the same helper, so the two drop targets cannot drift. It also drops the "dropped-file" fallback, which silently renamed anything the old `file_name()` could not parse. `migration_store::load` told the user a backup existed when it had deliberately not written one. `load` runs on every reconcile, survey and reaper pass, so a persistently corrupt record reaches MAX_CORRUPT_BACKUPS within seconds; from then on the copy was skipped while the log still read "(a copy was kept at <path>)". Three outcomes are now distinct, and the "enough already" case says so rather than naming a file that is not there — that being the message someone reads immediately before going to look for their data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-test
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73dfaf5785 | Merge branch 'r3/auth' into ship/core | ||
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shadow-test
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01fd38bc4b | Merge branch 'r3/files' into ship/core | ||
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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00128f9b1a |
Make the scrub work off /usr/bin, and stop a log level deciding whether it runs
H3 — the pre-commit scrub was a silent no-op on any base image whose coreutils
are not under /usr/bin. Hardening against a PATH-planted `stat` shim by naming
every tool absolutely bought nothing the `PATH` reset on the first line had not
already bought — the shim lives in the persisted home volume, and uid 1000
cannot write /usr/bin or /bin — and it cost the whole feature on Alpine, which
Settings -> Docker -> Custom accepts. Measured on one seeded tree in a real
container: the absolute-path script printed `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUBBED 0` and left
every planted file in place; the PATH-resolved one reclaims 77824 bytes. The
default image is unchanged at 521038.
It was silent three times over, and all three are fixed:
* The script now probes for all six things it needs (`command -v` for the five
tools, plus the root device id reading back as a number) and, if any is
missing, prints `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUB-UNAVAILABLE <what>` and no total at all.
* `scrub_writable_layer` reads that marker first and returns a new
`ScrubOutcome::Unavailable`, warning with what the image is missing; a
genuine `Reclaimed(0)` now leaves a debug line rather than nothing.
* `commit_log_suffix` renders `Reclaimed(0)` as "ran and found nothing to drop"
rather than "0.00 MB dropped", which is what a scrub that could not run used
to look like.
Verified in real containers: the mount-at-the-match defence still holds with a
home-volume `stat` shim first on PATH (the volume survives; deleting the PATH
reset from the same script empties it, so the harness can tell the difference).
H2 — the pre-migration scrub had been folded into `log::info!`'s argument list
to satisfy `#[must_use]`. `log::info!` expands to `if Info <= max_level() { … }`,
so the awaited scrub lived inside the level check, and `logging::init`
tolerates `dispatch.apply()` failing — which returns before `set_max_level` and
leaves the process at `Off`. In that state the scrub never ran and the layer
was committed into the longest-lived snapshot the app takes. The outcome is
bound first now, `logging::init` restores the level on failure and says so on
stderr, and a test scans all four files for an `.await` inside any `log::*!`
argument list.
Also:
* `reconcile_migration` deferred a held project instead of dropping it. Its
only caller fires once per "Docker became available", so a project held at
that instant was never revisited for the session — phase un-normalised, no
resume or rollback offered, pin left `Claimed`. It now waits for the holder
to let go (20s x 90, one waiter per project) and reconciles then.
* The scrub's byte total counts what a partly failed `rm` removed, by
re-measuring rather than dropping the whole subtree on a non-zero exit —
which was exactly the `--one-file-system` case.
* The scrub exec blanks `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_AUDIT` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`.
`LD_PRELOAD` is in none of the reserved env families, so a project's custom
env var reached a root exec and injected code into every tool the scrub runs,
`PATH` reset or not. Verified against Engine 29.7 that `docker exec -e` wins.
* The device test is described honestly: it is a mount test under `overlay2`
and not under `vfs`, where checks 1 and 2 are what still hold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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39934299f9 |
Stop the snapshot retry being an unconfirmed revoke, and unbrick legacy configs
Three things, all reachable from a single credential-handling round.
**The "Retry snapshot cleanup" button deleted the token.** `clear_claude_token`
called `secure::delete_claude_oauth_token()` unconditionally; the `mode`
argument only changed the toast wording, so there was no sweep-only path on the
wire. The leftover panel rendered on `leftover !== null` alone and
`onAuthenticated` never cleared it, so the sequence revoke -> snapshot skipped
-> re-authenticate from the button directly above -> press the retry the panel
is still offering threw away the token acquired seconds earlier, announced by a
message about images. The deliberate Revoke needs a confirmation modal; this
needed nothing.
`sweep_claude_token_snapshots` is the honest primitive: it rewrites the images
and never touches the keychain. The images are the durable record, so the retry
re-derives its work from Docker and needs no stored token. Re-authenticating
now clears the panel, and the Authenticate button is disabled while a cleanup
runs — a sweep is a per-image inspect/create/commit/rmi over the Docker socket
and takes minutes.
**Sweep-first left the token live for that whole window.** The keychain delete
sat behind `list_images` plus the per-image loop, at bollard's 120s-per-request
default, while the UI said "Revoking...". A quit or crash in there and nothing
was revoked at all; worse, `has_claude_token` stayed true and
`shared_claude_auth` reads the keychain at container-*create* time, so a
project whose `SecretScrub` guard had already released could be started later
in the same sweep and be handed a fresh copy of the credential in its env.
Keychain-first now, and the comment that claimed "no window in which a scrubbed
image is re-poisoned" — true of images, silent about containers — is corrected.
The reorder's original justification (crash-mid-sweep recoverability) is what
the sweep-only command covers.
A keychain refusal no longer discards a scrub report, because nothing has been
swept yet, and both remedies stay on screen: Revoke, and the image sweep, which
is now offered in every state rather than only when nothing is stored.
**`update_project` validating every folder list bricked existing projects.** It
validated nothing until recently while `WorkspaceSection` saved `{paths}` on
every blur, so `projects.json` can hold a half-filled row, a mount name with a
space, a duplicate, or `/` as a host path. Any such project became entirely
unsavable — every Config toggle, every permission-mode change and
`useTerminal.ts`'s tab rename came back with a message about folders — and
refusing the save did not unmount anything. `validate_project_paths_update`
admits a row carried over verbatim from what is stored and holds a new or
edited row to every rule, which keeps the escalation closed: introducing a bad
value through this command is exactly what a non-carried-over row is. The
`/workspace/../tmp/claude-x` chain is the one exception and runs on every row
regardless, because a stored one is live data loss rather than untidy data.
`ssh_key_path` and `ca_cert_path` had no check at all; a filesystem root there
read-only bind-mounts the whole host at /tmp/.host-ssh. Refused on change, with
the same grandfathering.
Tests are mutation-checked: reverting to sweep-first fails all four new Rust
ordering tests, pointing the retry back at `clear_claude_token` fails five
frontend tests, and validating an update in isolation fails the legacy-data
tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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c6086b0ab3 |
Stop the file panel refusing ordinary paths, and hanging on a FIFO
H6 (HIGH) — `resolve_host_path` canonicalised the host path and then re-ran the *lexical* policy over the answer, hidden-component rule included. Because canonicalisation resolves through symlinks, that rule started judging where a path happens to live rather than where the user pointed: uploading out of a dependency under pnpm (`node_modules/pkg` → `node_modules/.pnpm/…`) was refused, and so was every download into, or upload out of, a visible directory that leads to `~/.local/share`, `~/.cache`, `~/.var/app`, `~/.nvm` or `~/.cargo`. None of it was refused before the H4 fix landed. The two questions are now separate functions. `validate_host_path` judges the string the user chose, unchanged. `validate_resolved_host_path` judges the canonical form for the things only it can answer — the system roots (a Mac's `/etc` *is* `/private/etc`), the login-item directories, and a new `HOST_CREDENTIAL_DIRS` list. That last one is what keeps H4's escape closed: `Downloads/pub` → `~/.ssh` with a leaf of `authorized_keys` is refused because of where it lands, not because of how the directory is spelled. macOS handling is untouched — `/private/tmp` stays out of `HOST_SYSTEM_ROOTS` and `/var/folders` stays in the exceptions. H8 (HIGH) — the upload reservation claimed its destination with `sh -c 'set -C; : > "$0"'`, and the comment claiming that is `O_EXCL` was wrong for a destination that is not a regular file. Against a FIFO the shell opens it and blocks in `open(2)` forever; `exec_oneshot_raw` has no timeout, so `upload_file_to_container` never returned and the Files pane sat on "Uploading…" for the session with the rest of the batch abandoned. Verified in a fresh ubuntu:24.04: the old form times out and the blocked `sh` stays in `ps`; the new form answers in 35 ms. The reservation is now a `link(2)` — it claims a name atomically, never opens anything, and `EEXIST` is immediate whatever is in the way. A staging file at an unguessable name in the same directory is linked into place and unlinked, under a `trap … EXIT`. `exec_oneshot_as_within` adds a wall-clock ceiling as the second line of defence, opt-in per call site so migration's `apt-get` is unaffected. The upload contract is unchanged: default-refuse, `overwrite: Option<bool>`, and `FILE_EXISTS: <full container path> already exists`. Also fixed, all in the same surface: * A dangling symlink destination was a permanent dead end — `set -C` refused, the confirming `test -e` followed the link and said no, and raw shell text came back with no Replace on offer. `link(2)` does not follow the new-path link, and the script confirms with `[ -L ]`, so it reports as a collision. * An upload through a symlink renamed the file: the leaf came off the *resolved* path, so `~/Downloads/latest.log` landed as `2026-08-23.log` and the collision prompt named a file the user never chose. The name now comes from the path the user gave; the resolved path is still what gets opened. * `download_container_backup` leaked its partial file when the descriptor check fired. It now tracks `created` the way `stream_container_file_to_host` already did. * The failed-upload cleanup was `rm -f` on a path that, the reservation having succeeded, held whatever was written in the interim — a host file under `/workspace/…`. It now removes only an empty regular file, and the comment says what it is doing. * `resolve_container_dir` parsed a combined stdout+stderr buffer as a path. It uses the split-stream helper, like the listing next to it. * `verify_opened_path` failed open on a readlink error (`if let Ok(actual)`). A check that cannot see is not a check that saw nothing wrong; the macOS compile-time no-op is now spelled out too. * A trailing slash on a write path resolved to the directory itself. Nine new tests, all mutation-checked against the pre-fix behaviour. Two more cases added to the ignored live-Docker test: a FIFO and a dangling symlink, both timed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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ed91423666 |
Hold back the Disk panel and OS drag-out from the ship branch
This is a scope reduction, not an abandonment. Both subsystems are
preserved in full on `hold/disk-and-dragout` and are intended to come
back once they have been hardened separately. Nothing here is a
judgement that the features are unwanted — three successive
audit-and-fix cycles each closed a critical defect in these two areas
and each opened a new one, so the rest of the round ships now and these
two get their own cycle rather than holding it up.
Removed: the Disk settings panel and its whole reclaim / destroy /
compaction surface — `DiskSettings`, `DiskProjectTable`, `useDiskUsage`,
`docker/disk.rs`, `disk_tests.rs`, the disk commands in
`docker_commands.rs`, and their `generate_handler!` entries. Dropping
the IPC entries is the point: a UI-only removal would have left five
commands callable by a compromised webview, one of them a verified
arbitrary-DELETE primitive. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots`'s *command* goes
with them (the panel was its only caller); the sweep itself stays.
Removed: OS drag-out from the Files tab — `stage_container_file_for_drag`
and its host staging lifecycle, the pointer gesture and `dragPreview`,
`stageForDrag` / `isStagedHostPath`, the `tauri-plugin-drag` and
`@crabnebula/tauri-plugin-drag` dependencies, and the
`drag:allow-start-drag` capability grant, which could not be scoped.
The capability test's expected list is updated; its `*:default` and
`store:*` assertions are untouched.
Kept, deliberately: drag-and-drop *into* the app (Files pane and
terminal) and "Save to host…", which is now the only route out of a
container. The prevention work is untouched — the pre-commit scrub and
`SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS`, capped container logs, the `triple-c.base` /
`triple-c.managed` labels, `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` and the startup
housekeeping, the migration pin/probe reapers, scheduler log pruning,
`formatBytes.ts`, and `project_lock.rs` in full with every acquisition
site outside `disk.rs`.
Entanglements, resolved rather than deleted blind:
* `container.rs`'s `a_compaction_runs_this_module_s_scrub_script_byte_for_byte`
pinned the compaction Dockerfile against `snapshot_scrub_script()`.
Dropped — it existed only for compaction. `snapshot_scrub_script` and
its containment tests are untouched.
* `lib.rs`'s startup reap of `:compacting` tags and `triple-c-compact-*`
containers is dropped: nothing on this branch creates them.
* `project_lock`'s `Compaction` / `CacheClear` variants and
`any_held_excluding`, `migration_commands::is_migrating`, and
`formatBytes{Delta,Ceiling}` lose their last production caller but are
kept and still tested, annotated with why.
* `projects_store::corrupt_since` and `migration_store::peek_ownerless_since`
were read only by the disk survey and are removed. The corrupt-load
marker and `.bak` are still written.
Verified: `npm run test` 611 passing, `npx tsc --noEmit` clean,
`npm run build` green; `cargo test` 419 passed / 2 ignored,
`cargo build` 0 warnings. Every test removed belongs to a removed
feature — no kept-behaviour test was weakened or deleted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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6a8972980d |
Stop an untouched secret field from deleting the stored credential
Making `null` actually clear a secret — which it had to, since a blanked
token was previously never revoked — turned the config editors into a
credential shredder. Secrets are `#[serde(skip_serializing)]`, so the
inputs always render empty whether or not one is stored, and the blur
handlers sent `value || null` unconditionally. Focusing the Git token
field and tabbing away deleted it, with nothing shown and no undo.
`useSecretField` encodes the rule: only a field the user typed in may
speak about a secret. Untouched, `patch()` contributes no key at all, and
Rust already distinguishes an absent key from an explicit null.
`withoutUntouchedSecrets` covers the structural half. `saveBedrock`
spreads `{ ...bedrock, ...patch }`, and when that falls back to
DEFAULT_BEDROCK_CONFIG the literal spells every secret out as `null` — so
editing the AWS region would have wiped the credentials as a side effect.
Also here: `WorkspaceSection` no longer saves a half-filled folder row,
which `update_project`'s new validation would refuse on every keystroke
between the two inputs; `snapshots_skipped` is declared on the wire type
rather than widened locally; and `#[must_use]` on `ProjectGuard` and
`ScrubOutcome` — which immediately caught the migration path discarding
its scrub outcome, the one scrub whose silence is expensive because the
layer it declined to clean is about to be committed.
The capability test reads the real file and is mutation-verified: adding
`core:default` back makes it fail. That grant pulls in an unscoped
`std::fs::read` of any host path and went unnoticed for months, because
nothing in the suite read the file at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-test
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5df3e7996d | Merge branch 'r2/files' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-test
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5d4d5d37df | Merge branch 'r2/disk' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-test
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bb1c7696f9 | Merge branch 'r2/scrub' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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f2a84c18f9 |
Judge a host path by where it leads, not by how it is spelled
`validate_host_path` was a string test. Nothing in the module called
`canonicalize`, `read_link` or `O_NOFOLLOW`, so a path whose components are
all visible could still land somewhere hidden: with `~/Downloads/pub` a
symlink to `~/.ssh`, a `host_path` of `~/Downloads/pub/authorized_keys` has no
hidden component, no `..` and no system root — and writes into `~/.ssh`. The
container end is not hypothetical: `/proc/self/mountinfo` inside a Triple-C
container spells the host's project paths out verbatim, so code in there knows
both where to plant the link and what host path to ask for. The same bypass
read host files back the other way.
So the policy now runs twice: once on the string, and once on what the OS says
the string resolves to. A write resolves the parent and keeps the caller's
leaf, because the leaf is never followed — the partial file is created with
`O_EXCL` and the download finishes with a rename, which replaces a link rather
than writing through it. A read resolves the whole path, because the whole
path is opened. On Linux the descriptor is then checked against the path that
was validated (`/proc/self/fd`), which is what closes the window between
resolving and opening; elsewhere that window stays open and the comment says so.
Also here:
* The upload's overwrite guard is a guard again. `noOverwriteDirNonDir`
refuses only dir-over-non-dir and the reverse — file-over-file extraction
proceeds, which is exactly the `.credentials.json` case (verified against a
live daemon). The probe and the write are now one `set -C` exclusive
create, with the path travelling as `$0` rather than as script. The
`FILE_EXISTS: <path> already exists` contract with the frontend is
unchanged, and now pinned by a test — as is the claim the old comment made.
* Windows normalisation stopped being a string swap: `\\?\`, `\\?\UNC\` and
administrative shares all reach the same places and are compared as such,
and the rules are pure functions over a string, so the Windows entries are
exercised on any platform. The old test passed on Linux only because
`Path::is_absolute` was false for a Windows path.
* Container write roots are resolved inside the container too, and the
comment no longer claims more than the check does.
* A failed download can no longer delete a pre-existing file that happened to
collide with the partial's name.
* One-shot exec output is buffered as bytes and decoded once, so a filename
split across two Docker frames survives; stdout and stderr are tellable
apart, so `find`'s diagnostics stay out of the listing parser; and a
directory too big to buffer is described as one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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Claude
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b49dddab45 |
Make a blanked project credential actually clear
Handoff from the credential change on `r2/sec`, which landed `secure::store_or_clear_project_secret` and left a `TODO` naming this call site. `store_secrets_for_project` could only ever write: a token blanked in the UI stayed in the keychain, `load_secrets_for_project` read it straight back onto the project, and the container went on receiving a credential the user had revoked. **Not the mechanical switch the handoff describes, deliberately.** Every secret field is `#[serde(skip_serializing)]`, so the project object the frontend holds carries no `git_token` key at all — a save from the Workspace, Runtime or Model section sends the field *absent*, while the editor that owns it sends `git_token: null` when the user blanks it. `Option<String>` maps both to `None`, so clearing on `None` would delete every project secret each time an unrelated setting was changed. `update_project` therefore takes the raw payload, records which secret fields arrived as an explicit `null`, and clears exactly those; absent still means "not mine to touch". **This commit does not build on `r2/scrub` alone** — it calls `secure::store_or_clear_project_secret`, which exists only on `r2/sec`. Verified green against that file: 464 tests pass with `r2/sec`'s `storage/secure.rs` in place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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dcd2dfe5a3 |
Stop a project id from steering a Docker API DELETE, and stop trusting a store that lost its list
C-2 (critical). `destroy_ownerless_rollback_pin` validated its tag and not its
project id, then interpolated both into `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:{tag}` and handed
the result to bollard. bollard does not percent-encode: `Uri::parse` joins an
absolute path onto the base URL, which replaces the path outright and applies RFC
3986 dot-segment removal. An id of `a/../../v1.47/volumes/<name>?` turns a
"remove image tag" into `DELETE /v1.47/volumes/<name>`. That arm is reached
*because* `find_project` failed, so the id is unconstrained IPC input, and the
typed confirmation is no barrier — it compares the caller's own two strings.
Reproduced against the live daemon, and now a test: with the check removed the
volume is gone and the test fails; with it, the volume survives and a legitimate
ownerless pin still deletes. The reference that reaches `remove_image` is now the
daemon's own repo_tag, matched on the parsed pair, so nothing built from IPC
input addresses the API at all. The same id check now guards the owned arms of
`destroy` and `compact_snapshot`, which build volume names and image references
from a `projects.json` field.
H-1. The ownerless arm decided ownership from the in-memory list alone and then
called `sweep_orphaned_snapshots()`, which deletes the freshly dangling image on
the same pass — so a corrupt `projects.json` could reap a pin whose migration is
still awaiting confirmation, the one thing `pin_is_reapable` orders its
conditions to prevent. It now re-reads the store from disk, runs
`project_store_trust`, refuses an id the store knows, takes the project lock
before reading anything a decision rests on, and checks `has_record`.
H-3. The corrupt-store guard keyed on "empty list + file exists", and
`ProjectsStore::new()` swallows a corrupt file without rewriting it — so the
first `save()`, as little as starting a project, wrote `[{new}]` over it and the
guard passed with every other project's volumes unclaimed. A corrupt load is now
recorded in a sticky `projects.json.corrupt` marker beside the file, and the
existing `.bak` is no longer clobbered by a second corruption. A missing
`projects.json` is refused too: it cannot be told from a moved or partially
restored data directory, and the genuinely fresh case has nothing to find.
Also: the three migration commands surface the lock's real refusal instead of
substituting "a migration is already running"; `note_ownerless_since` re-checks
`has_record` after writing a tombstone, closing the window that could plant one
behind a valid record and reap the pin with zero grace; corrupt migration-record
copies are capped at four; `reconcile_migration` yields to any lock holder, not
only a migration; and a 22-space run in a refusal string is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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Claude
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6d27f924ff |
Stop the scrub emptying a mount that is itself a glob match
The parent checks in `snapshot_scrub_script` validate the directory a
pattern is anchored to, and `rm --one-file-system` compares against its
own command-line argument's device — so with the mount planted *at* the
match there was nothing between the scrub and the mounted filesystem.
Verified against a live daemon with the byte-identical generated script:
mounted at the parent (`/var/log/apt`) refused, mounted one level below
(`/tmp/claude-x/inner`) refused, mounted as the match (`/tmp/claude-x`)
came back with the volume empty. The same run against a host directory
bound at `/workspace/../tmp/claude-x` — the target the daemon builds from
a mount name of `../tmp/claude-x`, confirmed through the API bollard uses
— emptied the host directory.
Each match is now checked against the root's device too, which for a
directory whose parent has already been validated is exactly a
"not a mount point" test. A symlinked match still reports the link's own
device, so `rm -rf -- link` goes on unlinking it and stopping.
The tools are also named absolutely and `PATH` is reset. The image's
`PATH` starts with three directories inside the container's persisted
home volume, and a three-line `stat` shim planted in the first of them
made the previously-refused `/var/log/apt` mount delete its contents.
"Missing `stat` fails closed" was true and beside the point.
`update_project` validated nothing while `add_project` validated its
folder list, so the mount name that reaches all of this was one
save-on-blur away from anything at all. Both now share
`validate_project_paths`, which also refuses `..`, a filesystem root as a
host path, and a half-filled row; `container_id`, `status` and
`created_at` are no longer writable through a project save.
`remove_project` was the only writer of a container, a snapshot image or
a volume that took no project claim (H-2), so removing a project during
a compaction let `restore_image_config` commit a flat image back over
`triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest` for a project that no longer exists —
invisible to every reclaim path. It takes `ProjectOp::Destroy` for the
whole removal; the sidebar row survives a refusal because it is only
dropped after the command resolves.
Finally, a commit whose scrub was skipped no longer logs "0.00 MB
dropped", which every migration did.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
e70a40507c |
Stop granting an unscoped host-file read, and make a refused credential scrub recoverable
`core:default` was an alias for nine core plugins' default sets, and one of them — `core:image:default` — carries `allow-from-path`, whose handler is a bare `std::fs::read(path)` with no scope mechanism at all. Nothing imports `@tauri-apps/api/image`, so the plugin is dropped rather than scoped; there is nothing to scope it with. The capability file now enumerates what `app/src` actually invokes, which is `core:event`'s listen/unlisten and nothing else from core — every emit in this app originates in Rust. `core:menu`, `core:tray`, `core:window`, `core:path`, `core:resources` and the three dead `dialog:` grants go with it. `core:webview:allow-internal-toggle-devtools` stays because Tauri's own injected debug script calls it; both it and the command behind it are `cfg(any(debug_assertions, feature = "devtools"))`, so it is absent from a release bundle. Verified empirically: an unknown identifier fails the build, so every identifier kept is real and the regenerated `gen/schemas/capabilities.json` carries the opener scope verbatim rather than silently dropping it. `opener:allow-open-url` cannot be host-narrowed — the terminal opens links Claude printed inside the container — so what it does and does not buy is recorded instead, including the verified fact that each scope entry's `app` defaults to `Application::Default`, which matches only `with == None` and therefore refuses `openUrl(url, "/bin/sh")`. `clear_claude_token` deleted the keychain entry first and swept the snapshot images second. The sweep runs once and skips a project another operation holds, the deleted entry made `has_claude_token` false, and Revoke rendered only while a token was stored — so a project that happened to be starting during a revoke kept a live ~1-year OAuth token in its snapshot's `Config.Env` permanently, with Reset (which destroys both volumes) as the only remaining remedy. The sweep now runs first, so a crash mid-revoke leaves the app still saying "authenticated" with the same button still able to finish; a busy project is reported as `snapshots_skipped` rather than folded in with images that genuinely cannot be rewritten; and the panel keeps a retry visible independent of token status, plus offers the sweep outright when nothing is stored, because a snapshot committed by an older build carries the token either way. The retry is the same command — it is idempotent, and the images are the durable record. Also: `openai-compatible-api-key` was written but never deleted, so it outlived its project. The key list is now the single definition and an unlisted key is refused outright, so the writer cannot get ahead of the deleter again. `store_or_clear_project_secret` lands here unused on purpose: the editors send a blanked field as `null` and `store_secrets_for_project` skips `None`, so clearing a secret through the UI is impossible today. Its one call site is in `commands/project_commands.rs`, which belongs to another change in this round. No `devCsp` was added. `tauri dev` loads the main document straight from Vite, and Tauri only attaches a CSP to documents it serves itself — the dev server is proxied through `tauri://` only when `PROXY_DEV_SERVER`, which is `cfg!(all(dev, mobile))`. A `devCsp` here would be inert config that reads as protection. The reasoning, and the one place that could set one, are recorded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
4f6c012071 |
Make a rollback pin outliving its project visible and deletable
`survey_rollback_pins` walks images, not projects, and deliberately tolerates an absent project by falling back to the raw id as the display name. Two things then dropped it on the floor: `destroy` called `find_project` before the confirmation check, so it refused such a pin every time, and the per-project table joins destructive items to rows by project_id, where rows come only from projects in the store. The result was a multi-GB `pre-migration-*` image that the scan measured, the panel never rendered, and nothing could remove — in the one screen built to find exactly that. `destroy` takes the same early return `OrphanVolume` already takes, and still validates the tag: `latest` names the project's live snapshot, so the ownerless path must not be a way around that check. The UI grows a bucket for destructive items matching no row, rather than filtering them away. The typed gate already compared against the id via `project_name`; the dialog now says "project id" instead of asking for a project name that no longer exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
a76f2c0a17 |
Close the cross-stream gaps the parallel fix round left open
Three items each of which fell between two agents' file lists.
`scrub_secrets_from_snapshots` was the third unsynchronised writer of
`triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest`, after a recreate's commit and a
compaction. It has the same read-modify-write shape — create a scratch
container from the snapshot, commit back over the same tag — and loses
the same race, which here means re-baking the very credential it exists
to remove. It now takes the project's claim, under a new
`ProjectOp::SecretScrub`, and reports a snapshot it had to skip rather
than rewriting it unsafely.
Its scratch container also now carries `triple-c.scrub=true`, so the
Disk panel's reclaim bucket discriminates by label and by the live claim
rather than by a clock. The 15-minute age gate stays as the backstop for
the cross-process case the claim cannot see.
The store plugin is unregistered and its dependency dropped. Its
capability grants were removed as a host-file-write primitive; the
registration without a grant was unreachable but dead.
Finally, container.rs's fold test was pinning a fold that no longer
exists — disk.rs now emits the JSON exec form. It asserts the stronger
property instead: the script a compaction runs is byte-for-byte the one
snapshot_scrub_script() produces, so the two files cannot drift silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-test
|
17f031a5d7 | Merge branch 'fix/disk' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-test
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433afa5a49 | Merge branch 'fix/sec' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-test
|
fcea506dce | Merge branch 'fix/files' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
6abc7f27a4 |
Fix disk/migration defects and add a real per-project lock
The compaction panel's headline action had never worked, three reclaim paths could delete data with no confirmation and no grace period, and the app's only mutual-exclusion primitive was one-way. **A per-project lock (`project_lock.rs`).** `ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS` was the app's only exclusion and everything but migration merely *polled* it once at entry. Compaction, start/stop/recreate, Reset and destroy now **acquire** a `ProjectGuard` and hold it for the whole operation; `is_migrating` is a view onto the same registry. Closes the three verified interleavings where a compaction commits `flat(A)` over a `:latest` that a migration, a recreate or a Reset had already moved. In-process only — the two-instance case is documented in the module, not solved, and the daemon-wide reapers gained age gates to bound it. **H1: compaction never ran.** `fold_shell_script` joined the scrub script's lines with a space, so every build died on `syntax error: unexpected "do"`. Replaced with the JSON exec form, which carries any script verbatim; `sh -n` and a real end-to-end build now cover it (159.5 MB / 9 layers -> 33.7 MB / 1 layer, setuid and multi-line env preserved). **H2/H4:** `reclaim_migration_pins` and `survey_rollback_pins` apply `parse_rollback_tag` and `pin_is_reapable` like every other path, and stop double-counting an image with two pin tags. The 14-day grace period is re-anchored from the tag's timestamp (when the migration *started*) to a tombstone recording when the record went missing, with clock skew handled in both directions. **H3:** `migration_store::load` no longer renames a corrupt record aside — that destroyed the `has_record` signal both pin reapers depend on. `save` fsyncs the file and the directory, and corruption backups are timestamped. **H2b/M2:** a crashed compaction's `:compacting` tag and `triple-c-compact-*` container are reaped at startup; the stale-container sweep moved from the end of a compaction to the start, where its doc always claimed it was. **M5/M6:** orphan-volume deletion moved from a `Safety::Safe` tick to the destructive path with a typed volume name; `project_store_trust` reads the real `projects.json` so a second instance's project is not offered as an orphan. Numbers: `images_total_bytes` uses `df()`'s deduplicated `layers_size`; the Total column is derived from the same figure the Snapshot column shows; partial container/staging reclaims report their failure count; `human()` no longer prints "1000.0 KB"; `docker_cli` has a timeout; blocking `fs` calls moved to `spawn_blocking`. Also fixes `ProbeContainerGuard::remove_now`, which disarmed before the await and so did nothing on the cancellation path it exists for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
2b6501d8e5 |
Give the exit-status poll room now that it fails closed
`wait_for_exec_exit` returning `None` used to mean "call it 0"; it now fails the call, so a busy daemon that has not settled within ~1s would turn into a spurious "the rename failed". The loop exits on the first poll that reports finished, so a wider window costs nothing when things are normal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
3329e07d3d |
Fix the file command surface: argument injection, unbounded reads, unchecked paths
`list_container_files` could delete the user's files. It builds `["find", path, "-mindepth", …]`, and GNU find ends its starting-point list at the first argument beginning with `-`, so a `path` of `-delete` gave it zero starting points (defaulting to `.`, which for an exec that sets no working_dir is the container's WorkingDir — the bind-mounted project) and an expression starting with `-delete`. Verified against a live container on findutils 4.10.0: files and empty directories went out of the host bind mount, and because `exec_oneshot` discards the exit code the panel then reported an empty folder. The rest of the module had the same shape of hole: * Every path parameter — `path`, `from_path`, `parent_path`, `container_dir`, `container_path`, `host_path` — arrived over IPC unchecked. There is now one validator for container paths (absolute, no `..`, no NUL, length-capped), a second for the ones that *change* something (contained in /workspace, /home/claude or /tmp), and one for host paths, which refuses traversal, system locations and hidden components. The `save()`/`open()` dialog in front of these commands is a UI convention, not a boundary. * `download_container_file` passed `None` for the fetch cap, so the cap was inert: the whole transfer was buffered in host RAM twice, and the directory refusal came *after* the buffer, so `/` meant buffering the container's filesystem before erroring. Downloads now stream through a bounded channel into the tar reader, which refuses a non-regular entry and an oversize one before the host file is created at all. Verified against a real container: a 300 MiB download peaks at 10 MiB RSS, a 9 GiB sparse file is refused in 0.01s with nothing written. * Both download paths (file and backup) used to create — i.e. truncate — the user's destination up front and delete it on a stream error, which is precisely the wrong order for a path that already holds something. They now write beside it and rename on success. * `upload_file_to_container` silently clobbered: no existence check anywhere in the stack. It now refuses by default with a FILE_EXISTS marker the frontend turns into a Replace/Skip prompt, and takes an `overwrite` flag for the retry. * `exec_oneshot_inner` read an undeterminable exit status as 0, so rename and mkdir reported success for an exec nobody could read the outcome of. It fails closed now. * A tab in a filename forged the type/size/permission columns of a listing row, and a newline forged a whole row. `find` now prints the name last with NUL-terminated records. While verifying the size ceiling against a real container, the tar header's size field turned out to be unusable past ustar's 8 GiB octal limit — Docker's Go writer puts the real size in a PAX record — so both readers take it from `entry.size()` instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
092972fe92 |
security: close capability, CSP and auth-bridge holes
capabilities/default.json - Drop every `store:*` grant. `@tauri-apps/plugin-store` has no caller in `app/src`, and the plugin's `resolve_store_path` is a `PathBuf::push` against AppData — `push` discards the base for an absolute path, so the grant was an arbitrary host read/write from the webview. - Replace `opener:default` with a scoped `opener:allow-open-url` (http/https only). That drops `reveal_item_in_dir`, which the plugin does not scope-check and nothing here calls, and the unused mailto:/tel: scope. - Record the unscopable `drag:allow-start-drag` residual risk in `description`. tauri.conf.json - Add `form-action 'none'`, `base-uri 'none'`, `object-src 'none'`. `form-action` has no `default-src` fallback, so an injected auto-submitting form was unblocked even though `script-src 'self'` blocks XSS. - Remove the dead `asset:` / `https://asset.localhost` img-src and `data:` font-src grants; `blob:` stays (the file viewer uses it). auth_bridge - The reserved-port set covered only this project's mappings and the two browser-view ranges. It now also covers the gateway, STT and web-terminal host ports (configured value and shipped default, read off the settings models) and every other project's published host port. A container binding container-loopback 4000 / 9876 / 7681 while those services were stopped had that port mirrored onto the host, unauthenticated, within one poll. - Gate the host listener on fetch metadata: refuse a request that is a cross-site sub-resource, allow navigations (the OAuth redirect) and anything without `Sec-Fetch-*`. Non-HTTP connections are classified from their first line and forwarded verbatim. Residual risk is spelled out in the module docs. - Bound the forwards: max concurrent connections per port, a first-byte deadline enforced before any `docker exec` is created, and an idle timeout. browser_view/mod.rs - `pick_viewer_port` reads procfs with `/usr/bin/cat`, not a bare `cat` the container can shim via its writable PATH entry. - Treat port choice as check-then-bind: walk to the next free candidate when the viewer does not come up, instead of failing the start. BrowserTab.tsx - Sandbox the viewer iframe. Container-controlled content could `top.location` the app's webview away. `allow-top-navigation*` and `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` are deliberately absent. HelpDialog.tsx - Escape the quote characters in the entity pass and escape captured attribute values. `href="$2"` with `$2` = `[^)]+` let remote GitHub markdown close the attribute and open another, in a document rendered with `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`. web_terminal/terminal.html - SRI hashes plus `crossorigin` on the three jsdelivr bundles and the stylesheet, and a CSP for the page — it is served 0.0.0.0 behind a permissive CORS layer and nothing else gives it one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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|
Claude
|
ae3ca8cda4 |
Fix root scrub deleting host files through symlinked parents (C1)
SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS is expanded by /bin/sh inside the container as root. For an entry ending `/*` the parent is a path *component*, resolved by both the glob expansion and the `rm -rf`. The agent has passwordless sudo, so `ln -s /workspace/myproject /var/log/apt` turned the next commit into a recursive delete of the user's real files on the host — reproduced end to end against a live container. snapshot_scrub_script now routes every deletion through one `scrub_in` function that validates the parent before touching anything inside it: `cd -P` for a TOCTOU-free handle, `pwd -P` equality to reject a symlinked component, a hardcoded containment allowlist that is deliberately not derived from the path list, and an st_dev comparison against `/` so a bind mount or a volume is refused even though it is not a symlink. It fails closed when `stat` is missing. Also: - /tmp/triple-c-drops/* and /tmp/clipboard_*.png are age-limited to 14 days instead of scrubbed unconditionally. They hold the user's own files, and scrubbing them meant "drop a file, change a setting, lose it silently"; removing them from the list would restore unbounded growth instead. - M11: scrub_writable_layer returns a ScrubOutcome and skips cleanly when the container is not running, so a migration no longer logs "could not run … committing anyway" on every run. - M12: the scrub exec is bounded by a 120s timeout; on expiry it logs and lets the commit proceed. - The script is now fold-safe (self-terminating lines, no `#` comments). disk.rs folds it onto one `RUN` line and the previous form was a `"do" unexpected` syntax error there, so compaction had been scrubbing nothing at all. Tests: the substring check on the script text is replaced by a behavioural test that runs the real generated script with a real symlink planted in a throwaway tree, plus structural tests over each containment construct and a `sh -n` check of the folded form. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-test
|
0003793abb | Merge branch 'feat/disk-ui' into integration/round-1 | ||
|
shadow-test
|
2b9bf56f25 | Merge branch 'feat/drag-out' into integration/round-1 | ||
|
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
611f67cca7 |
Fix what review found in the Disk section
Safety: - `destroy`'s rollback-pin arm took a tag over IPC and interpolated it straight into an image reference it then removed. `tag: "latest"` named the project's live snapshot, deleted under a dialog saying "rollback pin". It is the one destructive variant carrying a free-form string, so it now goes through `parse_rollback_tag`. - The compaction's scratch container was named `triple-c-scrub-*`, which is what the scrub reclaim bucket hunts and force-removes. A reclaim from a second window would have destroyed the container a running compaction was about to commit. It gets `triple-c-compact-*`, swept at the start of the next compaction rather than from a bucket anything else can fire. - Deleting a home or config volume only refused a *running* container, but a stopped one still pins its volumes — the resting state of every project ever started — so the user typed the project name and met a raw 409. The container is now removed first and `loses` says so. Correctness: - The compaction Dockerfile emitted no `LABEL`, so the flattened intermediate could never match the sweep's `dangling` + `triple-c.managed` filter that three cleanup paths rely on. Verified on Docker 29.7.2 that the label lands on the final stage, the build still yields one layer, and untagging the staging tag after the commit leaves the committed snapshot intact and startable. - `snapshot_commit_layers` silently meant something else when `triple-c.base-image-id` was absent — the normal case for a pre-label project — counting the base's own layers and letting a never-recreated project qualify for compaction. `base_lineage_known` now carries that, the column says "unknown", and the plan does not offer the rewrite. - `destroy` returned a `ReclaimResult` wearing a `ReclaimTarget` that named work it had not done (a home-volume deletion came back as `OrphanVolume`). Split into `target` / `destroyed`, exactly one set. - `formatBytes` ran `toFixed` after the divide loop, so 999,999 rendered as "1000.0 KB" — in the app's only byte formatter, in a panel full of near-boundary sizes. - `is_base_image_reference` split on the first colon, so a registry port ate the repo name. UI: - `snapshot_above_base_bytes: null` — deliberately unmeasurable — rendered as "0 B", the one guessed number in the table. - Layer count was flagged by colour alone; it now says "stacked". - The tick list survived a reclaim, so the same call could be re-fired at objects that no longer existed. The plan is dropped after any action and the panel says the totals predate it. - `setReport` landed before the plan call was awaited, so a plan failure rendered fresh totals above the previous scan's rows. - Both confirmation modals unmounted before awaiting, making the entire busy path dead code during multi-second work. - `buildx du` failures silently showed `docker system df`'s under-reported build-cache figure with no explanation. - Tooltip text reached no assistive tech, so two headers announced as "Help"; hardcoded input id; error-toned glyph in warning-toned panels; `sweepOrphanedSnapshots` and `clearOutcome` had no callers. - Four docstrings claimed things the code did not do, and two tests were named for behaviour they did not assert. Tests: 513 frontend (was 502), 370 Rust (was 365). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
77ef2291d7 |
Add a Disk section: see where the bytes went, and get them back
Every recreation runs `docker commit`, which stacks a layer and never rewrites one, and 24 conditions in `container_needs_recreation` trigger a recreation. Prevention landed earlier on this branch; this is the half a user can act on. The per-project table leads with the two numbers that explain the mechanism rather than just the total: how many commit layers a snapshot has stacked above its base, and what the container's writable layer will add at the next commit. Backend (`docker/disk.rs`, commands in `docker_commands.rs`): - `get_docker_disk_usage` — one `df()` joined against the project store, behind an explicit Scan button because it walks the whole daemon. - `list_reclaimable` / `reclaim` — classified buckets with measured bytes, planned off the existing report so re-planning costs no second scan. - `destroy_project_disk_object` — one object, typed confirmation. - `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` — exposed, so its report is finally visible. Safety is structural: `reclaim` takes `ReclaimTarget`, which has no variant that can name a live project's data. Destructive work is a separate type reached only through `destroy`. No unfiltered prune is called anywhere, and nothing outside a `triple-c*` name or `triple-c.*` label is touched. Orphan detection subtracts ids from the project store and consults nothing else. From the daemon's side an idle live project and a deleted one are indistinguishable — volumes present, no container, no image — so inferring from container or image absence would offer a live project's credentials and transcripts for deletion. A store that loaded empty from an existing `projects.json` is treated as a failed load, not as "no projects", because `ProjectsStore::new()` recovers from a corrupt file by starting empty. Three things verified against a live Docker 29.7.2 rather than assumed: - Compaction is a two-stage build (`FROM scratch` + `COPY --from`), which keeps every byte inside the daemon; bollard's import buffers a whole image into memory. uid/gid and setuid survive; a 192.6 MB/4-layer synthetic came out 45.7 MB/1 layer. Image config does not survive, so it is replayed via create+commit, which round-trips a multi-line env var that a Dockerfile `ENV` could not. - Flattening breaks base-layer sharing, so the result carries its own copy of the base. Eight of ten real projects had a 0.10–1.32 GB delta over a 4.72 GB shared base — compacting those costs ~4 GB. The bound now subtracts that penalty, such projects are not offered at all, and the run compares unique bytes and abandons a rewrite that would grow. - `docker builder prune` reports `Total:`, not `Total reclaimed space:`, so the first parser scored every prune as freeing nothing. The Windows/WSL2 note is mandatory and its copy lives in Rust beside the tests that pin it: pruning frees space inside `ext4.vhdx`, which never shrinks on its own, so C: does not change until the disk is compacted. Also adds `lib/formatBytes.ts` — the app had four disagreeing copies, and `projects/home/format.ts` and `migrationCopy.ts` now delegate to it with byte-identical output. Base 1000 by default, matching what Docker prints. Tests: 502 frontend (was 453), 365 Rust (was 322). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
1c834a0b08 |
Drag a file out of the Files tab onto the host desktop
The Files tab could accept a drop but never produce one: getting a file
out meant "Save to host…" and a file picker. This adds the other
direction.
Two constraints shape it. `dragDropEnabled` is on — TerminalView needs
it, since the native drag-drop event is the only one carrying dropped
file paths — and it blocks HTML5 drag inside the webview, so `draggable`
plus `DataTransfer.setData("DownloadURL", …)` was never available. The
gesture is therefore pointer events into `tauri-plugin-drag`, the same
shape and the same reason as the tab strip's drag. And the file being
dragged does not exist on the host at all: it lives in a container, and
the OS can only drag a real host path.
So a drag-out is a copy first and a drag second.
`stage_container_file_for_drag` materialises the file into
`<os-temp>/triple-c-drag-out/<session>/<slot>/<name>` through the same
`fetch_container_file` the download and the viewer use, keeps the
original filename (a dropped `tmp1234` is not a file anyone wants), and
caps at the 256 MiB an upload already caps at, naming "Save to host…" in
the refusal. The path comes from Tauri's path API rather than `/tmp`,
because on Windows it is neither.
The staging directory has a lifecycle, because whole files accumulating
in the host temp dir would be the disk problem this project just fixed,
in a new place: cleared on exit inside the existing teardown (still
guarded on the main window), and reaped at startup for whatever a crash
left behind.
The copy is also an async gap in the middle of a gesture that feels
instantaneous, and the OS only adopts a drag while the button is still
down. Small files beat the pointer; large ones do not — so the staged
path is cached per entry (keyed on size and mtime, so an edited file
re-stages) and the pane says the copy is ready and to drag again, which
is an instruction rather than an apology because the retry is immediate.
A per-file slot keeps `a/notes.txt` and `b/notes.txt` from becoming the
same host path.
"Save to host…" stays exactly as it was. Drag-out is the enhancement;
a platform that refuses `startDrag` says so and points back at it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
0a022dfcf0 |
Let a project turn a globally-enabled Claude Code setting back off
The six boolean settings were plain `bool`s merged with
`if p.x { true } else { g.x }`, so a project could only ever add to the
global set. There was no project value that produced `false` — turning a
switch off at project level simply fell through to the global value and
the control did nothing.
Widen them to `Option<bool>`. `None` means "not set at this level":
inherit the global on a project, leave Claude Code's own default alone
globally. `Some(false)` is a deliberate off and wins outright.
The fingerprint now formats with `{:?}` rather than `{}` — `None` and
`Some(false)` mean different things, and conflating them would leave the
container un-recreated when a project switched from inherit to off.
The project editor grows a third "Global" state per switch; the global
editor has nothing to inherit from, so it stays a plain toggle and keeps
collapsing to null at the default. Its three existing tests passed
unchanged and caught a first attempt that rendered unset as off, which
would have told every user their session recap was disabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
|
bb41275cea |
Keep the managed settings payload safe for un-migrated projects
The null-means-delete convention is only understood by the entrypoint.sh shipped alongside this code. An existing project recreates from its own snapshot image, which carries whatever entrypoint it was built with, and an older one merges with a plain `.[0] * .[1]` — so the literal nulls would land in the user's settings.json rather than clearing the keys. Verified against jq: that produces `"tui": null, "effortLevel": null, "viewMode": null, "awaySummaryEnabled": null`, risking the whole file being rejected and taking the user's own `model` and `statusLine` with it. Split the payload instead. CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON now carries only keys that have a value and is safe under either merge; the new CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_CLEAR carries the key names to delete and is ignored by an entrypoint that predates it. Such a project keeps the old sticky behaviour until it is migrated or Reset, which is the pre-existing state rather than a regression. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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2ca86bb5d8 |
Scrub the writable layer on the migration path too, and de-duplicate CLAUDE_JSON
Two integration fixes after merging the three feature branches. `scrub_writable_layer` is a `docker exec`, so it only works while the container runs. `migrate_project_to_base` stops its container one line before the pre-swap commit, which meant the single largest snapshot Triple-C ever takes was the one path that committed unscrubbed. Call the scrub explicitly before the stop instead of relying on the call inside `commit_container_snapshot`. Also drop a duplicate `CLAUDE_JSON=` assignment in entrypoint.sh. The Shift+Enter block re-declared it defensively to avoid a merge conflict with the awsAuthRefresh block; the conflict did not materialise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-test
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df6d2f1ca4 | Merge branch 'feat/file-manager' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-test
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dacc1157ec | Merge branch 'feat/disk-and-settings' into integration/round-1 | ||
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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dd2894cc60 |
Stop Docker disk growth, and fix the Claude Code settings that never worked
Two independent sets of fixes.
## Disk: stop the growth, no UI this round
The dangling-snapshot sweep was already correct and was never the leak. The
leak is that every `docker commit` **stacks** a layer and nothing compacts one:
a file deleted after it has been committed becomes a whiteout, not free bytes.
24 conditions trigger recreation+commit, so changing one settings field costs a
multi-gigabyte layer for the life of the project. One project was measured with
14 stacked commit layers, ~5.1 GB above its base.
* **Scrub the writable layer before every commit** (`docker/container.rs`,
`SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS` / `scrub_writable_layer`). The one moment those bytes
are still free to drop is before the commit that captures them. Measured on
one container's 4.48 GB pending layer: 3.0 GB of agent scratchpad under
`/tmp/claude-*`, the terminal drag-drop staging area (256 MiB per file, with
no `rm` for it anywhere in the repo), a PNG per pasted image, and the apt
lists/cache/logs that `browser_view/install.rs` and `triple-c-playwright-heal`
leave behind with no `apt-get clean`. A hardcoded list, never a heuristic:
`/workspace/{mount_name}` is a host bind mount and nothing here may reach one,
and the three `/tmp` globs cannot select the read-only `.host-ca`/`.host-aws`
mounts. Failure is a log line — a scrub must never block a snapshot.
* **Cap container logs** (`capped_log_config`). There was no `LogConfig`
anywhere, so containers ran on the daemon's unbounded `json-file` default.
Deliberately *not* wired into `container_needs_recreation`: participating
would recreate every project once, and a recreation costs a commit, which is
the thing being fixed. Picked up on the next natural recreation.
* **Make superseded base images sweepable** (`container/Dockerfile`). It carried
no `LABEL` at all, so `orphan_sweep_filters`' `dangling` + `triple-c.managed`
pair provably could not match one — ~11.9 GB observed stranded. Stamping
`triple-c.managed=true` is the whole fix; the sweep needed no change.
`create_container` writes the new `triple-c.base` key explicitly empty, or
Docker's label inheritance plus `docker commit` would make every snapshot
claim to be a base image. `force: false` stays, and now says why.
* **Sweep at startup** (`lib.rs`), not only after recreation: probes first
(a probe pins an image the unforced sweep then refuses), pins second, sweep
last. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots_logged` exists because all three callers threw
the report away — `reclaimed_bytes`, `failed` and `unavailable` included.
* **Reap migration leftovers.** `rollback_migration` retagged and orphaned the
migrated snapshot with no sweep. Stale `pre-migration-*` pins are now
age-reaped by scanning the tag pattern rather than trusting the state file —
`migration_store::load` reports an unparseable record as absent, which
stranded a 4-12 GB pin nothing could name again; `load` now moves a corrupt
record aside so `has_record` is trustworthy. A pin whose migration is still
awaiting confirmation is never reaped at any age. The probe container's
removal was a plain statement after an await, so a dropped future (an app quit
mid-migration) leaked a container pinning a multi-gigabyte image; it is a
`Drop` guard now, with `reap_probe_containers` for the case where the process
itself dies.
* **Prune scheduler logs.** `remove` deleted a task's JSON but never its log
directory, and the task runner appended uncapped `claude -p` output.
* **Fix the delete copy.** It said "the container, config volume, and stored
credentials"; it removes *both* volumes and the snapshot image.
No prune UI, and no unfiltered `prune_images`/`prune_volumes` anywhere — the
daemon is shared with the user's unrelated work.
## Claude Code settings: two invented keys, one inverted default, one sticky bug
Verified against code.claude.com/docs/en/settings-reference.md and env-vars.md.
* `effort` -> **`effortLevel`**, the key Claude Code actually reads; the old one
was written and silently ignored. `xhigh` added to the dropdown.
* `focusMode` -> **`viewMode: "focus"`**. `focusMode` was invented. The real key
does exactly what the existing UI hint already described.
* **Session recap was inverted.** Claude Code's recap is on by default, so
`CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY=1`-when-enabled was a no-op and the control
could never turn the recap *off*. The field is renamed to
`session_recap_disabled` rather than reused: reusing the name with the
opposite meaning would have read every stored `enable_session_recap: false` —
which is every project that never touched the control — as "the user turned
this off".
* **The stickiness, which is the important one.** Keys were emitted only when
non-default, and the entrypoint *merges* into a settings.json on a persisted
volume, so switching a setting off omitted its key, the merge preserved the
stale on-value, and the setting stayed on until a destructive Reset. The fix
already existed in the same file — the sandbox block is emitted
unconditionally for exactly this reason — and is now applied to all five keys.
A key whose neutral state is *unset* (`tui`, `effortLevel`, `viewMode`,
`awaySummaryEnabled`) is emitted as JSON `null` and the entrypoint deletes it,
because a stand-in value is not neutral: `tui: "default"` pins the classic
renderer where unset lets Claude Code choose, and `viewMode: "default"`
overrides the user's own sticky `/focus` choice.
* The same stickiness existed, unnoticed, in the **env vars**: `docker commit`
bakes container env into the snapshot image, so a `=1` written once rode it
forever. All four are now emitted on every create, extracted into
`claude_code_env_vars` and unit tested. Two use an empty value for "off"
rather than `0`, because they outrank a setting the user can change from
inside their own container and Triple-C's default must not overrule a
`/config` choice it never asked about.
* TUI mode is now a genuine three-way choice (automatic / classic / fullscreen),
which the always-emitted key makes both necessary and possible.
`merge_claude_code_settings` is untouched by choice: a project-level OFF still
cannot override a globally-ON setting.
Tests: 364 frontend (+5), 308 Rust (+23), covering the scrub path list and
script, log rotation, pin reaping, and that toggling a setting off actually
clears a previously-set ON value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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22d142c70d |
Shift+Enter newline, OAuth URL truncation, and the auth bridge toggle
Three fixes that all land on the same journey: sign in, paste a prompt, and have the terminal behave the way every other Claude Code host does. Shift+Enter inserts a newline ----------------------------- xterm.js does not consult `shiftKey` for Enter (`Keyboard.ts`, case 13), so Shift+Enter was byte-identical to Enter and submitted the prompt. Both terminals now send `\x1b\r` (ESC+CR) instead, which Claude Code parses as return+meta — the same bytes its own `/terminal-setup` writes into the VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed keymaps, so this is in-band rather than a guess. Not `\n`: Claude Code accepts it, but a shell would run the line, so the two session types would diverge. Bound in Claude sessions only for that reason. `entrypoint.sh` sets `shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled` in `~/.claude.json` so the CLI stops printing its "run /terminal-setup" tip. Purely cosmetic — the decoding is unconditional either way. Alt+Enter has always done the same thing (xterm ESC-prefixes on altKey) and was simply never documented. It is now, along with the rest. OAuth login URL truncation -------------------------- Two producers wrote one toast slot, last-writer-wins. The OSC 7777 relay delivers the URL base64-encoded and therefore exact; ~300 ms later the screen-scraper's debounce fired and overwrote it with a truncated guess at the same link — a URL that parses, points at the right host, and authorises nothing. The user is the one who has to notice. Why the scraper truncated: `ANSI_RE` strips OSC sequences wholesale, including the OSC 8 hyperlink whose parameter carries the complete URL. Claude Code slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the terminal width while every emission carries the whole URL in its parameter. The backend already knew this (`commands/auth_token_commands.rs`); the frontend did not. - `urlDetector` now reads OSC 8 targets out of the raw buffer before stripping, filtered by a port of `usable_sign_in_link`, and tags every candidate with its provenance. - The prompt slot gained `supersedes`: better provenance always wins, worse never does, and between equals only a candidate that *extends* what is showing may replace it. That last rule is `extendsUrl`, factored out of `pickSignInUrl` rather than copied — same rule, same reason, one implementation. - `flatten` splits on a bare `\r` as well as on `\r?\n`, so a `\r`-repainted TUI frame no longer inflates a line past the width and suppresses a join that should have happened; and the width is now sampled at `feed()` rather than read at `scan()`, so a resize inside the 300 ms debounce cannot reassemble 80-column text against a 120-column rule. Also corrects the comment claiming `acquire_claude_token` enables the auth bridge. It deliberately does not, and the module comment in `auth_token_commands.rs` explains at length why not. The auth bridge toggle ---------------------- `setAuthBridgeEnabled` and `getAuthBridgeStatus` had zero call sites: the Rust was complete, the IPC wrapper shipped, and there was nowhere to click — so the docs told users to "enable the Auth Bridge" for a switch that did not exist. `AuthBridgeRow` is that switch, in Config → Runtime. It deliberately does not go through the tab's stopped-only save: the dedicated command exists so the bridge can be flipped while a login is hanging in a running container, which is the only moment anyone reaches for it. It also subscribes to `auth-bridge-changed`, which the poller has been emitting to nobody — so a host port the bridge could not take was a completely silent failure, indistinguishable from a login that hung. `tunnel.rs` promotes the best-effort `::1` bind failure from debug to a warning recorded on the port. Half-bound is the failure mode that looks like success: the status says bridged, and a client that resolves `localhost` to `::1` without falling back is still refused. Finally, for a recognised Anthropic sign-in URL the toast now leads with "In container" and demotes the host "Open". The callback listener is inside the container, so the container-side browser closes the loop with no host round trip and no auth bridge; the host button stays as the fallback. Ordinary URLs are unchanged. Tests: 402 frontend (was 359), 285 Rust (unchanged). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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15e05e2197 |
Turn the Files tab into a real file manager
Rename, an in-app viewer for text and images, host-to-container drag and drop, New folder, keyboard operation — plus the pre-existing bugs the new surface would otherwise have been built on top of. New Tauri commands (file_commands.rs, registered in lib.rs): * rename_container_path — `mv -n -- <from> <parent>/<name>` through exec_oneshot_as, so the *exit code* is checked. exec_oneshot discards the status and interleaves stderr into stdout, which would have made a permission failure look like a success. `mv -n` on its own is not enough either: GNU coreutils makes its refusal to clobber silent and exits 0, so an explicit `test -e` on the destination is what turns a name clash into an error the user sees. `mv`'s own words are surfaced, since renames outside /workspace legitimately fail on permissions. The new name is validated in Rust (no `/`, no NUL, not "." / ".." / empty, ≤255 bytes) — it is user text going into argv, and a name with a separator would be a move rather than a rename. * read_container_file — exact bytes via Docker's archive endpoint, returned as base64. Deliberately not exec_oneshot, which runs every chunk through String::from_utf8_lossy and merges stderr, so it would corrupt any non-UTF-8 file and could splice diagnostics into content. Base64 rather than Vec<u8> because Tauri serialises a byte vec as a JSON number array. Capped and truncation-reporting; the caller picks the cap (images get 5 MiB against text's 1 MiB, being the kind that blows a text-sized budget) and Rust clamps it to 8 MiB regardless. * create_container_directory — `mkdir` without -p, so a clash is an error rather than a silent success. Named for its siblings rather than the bare `create_directory` in the brief. The tar-extraction half of download_container_file is now the shared fetch_container_file() both commands use, and it abandons the transfer once a capped read has what it needs. Frontend: * Single click selects, double click opens. Directory navigation moved onto double click too — a single click used to navigate, which made it impossible to select a directory in order to rename it. Rows are now focusable and the table is a real `grid`: Enter opens, F2 renames, arrows walk the rows. No outline suppression; the global :focus-visible ring is what shows focus. * FileViewerModal (built on ui/Modal, the only correct dialog) renders text in a <pre> and images from a revocable blob: URL. tauri.conf.json's img-src had neither `data:` nor `blob:`, so an in-app image was blocked by CSP; `blob:` is added — revocable, and no megabytes of base64 in the DOM. The asset protocol stays disabled. Anything else gets a "Save to host" state instead of a broken preview, decided by extension and then by sniffing the bytes for NUL. * Host drag-and-drop uses Tauri's native onDragDropEvent, mirroring TerminalView: HTML5 ondrop carries no paths and is blocked in the webview on Windows by dragDropEnabled, which the terminal needs. The listener is window-wide, so it routes by hit-testing the payload position (physical pixels, hence the devicePixelRatio divide) against the pane's rect — a hidden pane has a zero-size rect and never matches, which is what keeps this and the terminal's listener apart. enter/over/leave drive a drop highlight. * Per-row Download is now "Save to host…"; directories no longer offer it. Pre-existing bugs fixed: * Uploaded files landed root:root with a 1970 mtime. tar::Header::new_gnu() zeroes uid/gid/mtime and Docker honours the header verbatim, so uploads were not writable by `claude`. All four single-file tar builds now go through build_single_file_tar() with the container user's ids, read from the container because entrypoint.sh remaps them to the host user on Unix and deliberately does not on Windows. * Symlinked directories could not be opened: `find -printf '%y'` reports `l`. The listing now prints `%Y` as well, so is_directory dereferences and a new is_symlink carries what `%y` used to say. The row labels the link. * upload_file_to_container had no size cap and did a synchronous fs::read on an async worker. Now 256 MiB (matching the terminal drop path) with the read and tar build in spawn_blocking, and the host mtime preserved. * A directory passed to upload reached fs::read and produced an opaque "Is a directory". Rejected with an explanation instead — recursive upload is a larger feature than this panel needs. * download_container_file wrote the *first tar entry*, so downloading a directory silently produced a garbage file. Non-regular entries are now an explicit error. Tests: 46 new (33 frontend across FilesTab, useFileManager and filePreview; 12 Rust covering the find-output parser and the rename validator, neither of which had any). 405 frontend / 297 Rust, both green. No drag-out dependency was added — tauri-plugin-drag is not introduced and OS drag-out is not attempted; that stays deferred, with "Save to host…" as the way files leave the container. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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dcb13d23ea |
Fix what review found in the skill: five real defects
Adversarial review of #29 found bugs I confirmed by reproducing each one. **Every hand-written error message was unreachable.** `tok=$(curl ...)` is a plain assignment, so `set -e` acts on the command substitution before the following `|| die` can run. A wrong password produced exit 22 and no output at all — the most likely way this gets used wrongly, and the least explained. All four captures now go through a `run` helper that takes a *description* rather than echoing the command, because one of them carries the account password in `-u`. **`up` was not idempotent, and the second run destroyed DNS.** The resolv.conf backup was copied unconditionally, so `up --full` twice overwrote the good backup with PIA's own resolvers; the later `down` then "restored" those and left the container with no working DNS and no way back. `up` now runs `down` first. Verified: two `up --full` runs, then `down`, and the backup still holds the original 192.168.65.7. **An empty gateway produced total connectivity loss, reported as healthy.** `$gw` was never validated and `add_route` swallowed every failure to /dev/null. The two half-routes need no gateway and would succeed, so the tunnel captured everything while the exclusions keeping DNS and the Docker host reachable silently did not exist — and `status` still printed "full tunnel". Routes are now fatal on failure, and a via-less default (`$3` is the literal "eth0") is rejected. **The PIA session token was in the process arguments** — confirmed in `ps` and /proc/*/cmdline, a ~24h bearer credential for the account readable by anything in the container. It now goes to curl on stdin as a config. Verified: 60 polls across a full `up`, zero sightings. **The preflight diagnosed the wrong kernel module.** It checked /dev/net/tun and blamed the tun module, but kernel WireGuard is a netlink interface and does not use it — verified by creating one with NET_ADMIN and no tun device. The check is dropped (the container could not have started without the device anyway) and `ip link add` now reports the real dependency. Also: a full tunnel with no DNS servers from PIA used to warn and carry on, which is a tunnel leaking every lookup while reporting itself healthy — now fatal. `down` validates the backup before restoring it, so a truncated one cannot leave the container with no resolver at all. `wg.priv` is shredded on teardown and created under umask 077, because /run rides `docker commit` into the snapshot image. A mistyped `up --ful` is rejected instead of silently giving a test route. entrypoint: `install_feature_skill` gets `local`, a blank-name guard (the disabled branch would otherwise `rm -rf` the whole skills directory under a persisted volume), `-e`/`-L` so a leftover *file* at the destination is cleaned up, and a chown of the parent so `claude` can still add skills of their own when Mission Control is off. When the base image predates the skill it now says so instead of returning silently — and `/opt/triple-c-skills` joins FEATURE_PROBES so the migration pre-flight reports it. Docs corrected to match: neither half reaches an existing project without a migration. `vpn_env_var` extracted and tested, pinning the property the whole removal path rests on — that the variable is emitted as 0 rather than omitted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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3bd3caa101 |
Ship a pia-vpn skill with the VPN support toggle
The toggle grants CAP_NET_ADMIN and /dev/net/tun and stops there, which users reasonably read as "turn the VPN on" — the gap between the two is the reported bug that the default network does not route through a VPN. Close it by giving the container an agent-usable way to build the tunnel, rather than leaving each project to rediscover it. container/skills/ is baked to /opt/triple-c-skills and installed into ~/.claude/skills/ by entrypoint.sh from VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED, mirroring how Mission Control installs its own. Staged under /opt because ~/.claude is a volume mount that would mask an image copy from first start. Three details that are not incidental: - The variable is sent as 0 rather than omitted when off, because ~/.claude persists: entrypoint has to be *told* to remove a skill left by an earlier run with the toggle on, and an absent variable cannot say that. A stale skill is worse than none, since it instructs an agent to use a capability the container no longer has. - It is reserved in RESERVED_ENV_EXACT alongside MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED, or a custom env var of the same name could claim the skill without the capability behind it. Covered by a test. - The skill is re-copied on every start, rm -rf'd first, so fixes reach existing projects and files dropped from a later version do not linger. The skill itself carries the three things that are easy to get wrong: that a full tunnel captures the Docker resolver and takes DNS down with it, that an IP-literal health check cannot see a dead resolver, and that no tunnel survives a restart while /run state riding the snapshot makes it look as though one did. It also states what it deliberately does not do — no killswitch, no autostart — so an agent proposes those as decisions rather than improvising them. pia-wg.sh preflights CAP_NET_ADMIN by capability bit rather than letting the first `ip` call fail with a bare EPERM that points nowhere near the setting that needs changing. Credentials stay in a file (~/pia-creds, PIA_CREDS to override) rather than the environment, where docker inspect and every process in the container would see them. Tested: install/refresh/remove/no-op paths of install_feature_skill against the real function; preflight with and without the capability; and a full up --full / down round trip, confirming DNS via PIA's resolvers, api.anthropic.com reachable through the exit, and routes and resolv.conf restored on teardown. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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5dd1ab5217 |
Stop resting the iptables case on a kernel config I cannot verify
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 6s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Build Container / build-container (pull_request) Successful in 29s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m39s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 5m46s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 5m59s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Round 3 argued the macOS rationale is stale: that Docker Desktop no longer builds from linuxkit/linuxkit and has enabled nft_fib_ipv4 since 4.35. I could not confirm or refute that from a Linux host — searching turned up no version matrix either way. But the decision does not depend on it, and the comment should not have implied it did. `xt_CONNMARK`, which the iptables path needs, was present in every kernel config examined. `nft_fib_ipv4`, which the nft path needs, was absent from the config read here and may be present in current Docker Desktop. That asymmetry is the actual argument: nftables' viability varies by Docker Desktop version in a way nobody here can pin down, iptables' requirement did not vary anywhere it was checked. If nft_fib_ipv4 is present this costs 1.6 MB and nothing else; if it is absent it is the difference between a working full tunnel and none. Rewritten to say that, and to say plainly what is verified versus assumed — this is the third round in which the previous round's central premise did not survive, and a confidently-worded paragraph is what the next round inherits. Also from review: - CLAUDE.md still said "`iptables` is deliberately absent", the opposite of what this PR now does, contradicting the Dockerfile and both other docs. - The Dockerfile referenced "the pia-vpn skill", which does not exist on this branch — the third forward reference of that kind, now gone. - "full tunnels work on native Linux, Mac and WSL2 6.6" was unconditional and contradicted ten lines later by the `DNS =` concession, which stops them on every platform. Reordered so the DNS hurdle is named as the first one. - The WSL2 gap was written as a permanent platform limitation. It is a stale install: `wsl --update` moves the host to a current kernel that has the symbol. That remedy was missing from the user-facing doc. - The migration probe label carried an internal comma, which `joinFeatures` renders into a comma-joined list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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92d64cf252 |
Ship iptables, not nftables — nftables forfeits macOS
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 6s
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Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 6m29s
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Re-review overturned the previous commit's package choice, and verifying it
proved the reviewer right.
`wg-quick` picks nft *unconditionally* when it is present (`type -p nft`, line
241), so installing nftables makes the iptables path unreachable. Its nft
ruleset then needs a third expression family the iptables path does not.
Isolating the rules on this host, the two connmark rules install fine and this
is what fails:
nft add rule ... fib saddr type != local drop
Error: Could not process rule: No such file or directory
That decides it, because of how the hosts differ. LinuxKit's kernel config —
Docker Desktop for Mac, identical on x86_64 and aarch64:
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_CONNMARK=y <- the iptables path works
# CONFIG_NFT_FIB_IPV4 is not set <- the nft path does not
So nftables would have broken the platform it was added to fix. With iptables,
full tunnels work on native Linux, Docker Desktop for Mac, and WSL2 from 6.6.
Costs 7,203 kB rather than 5,614 kB on amd64.
That also means the mechanism the previous commit documented was wrong: with
nftables installed `xt_CONNMARK` is never consulted, and the real blocker on
that path is `nft_fib_ipv4`. Rewritten around what actually fails.
A second failure neither round had found: `wireguard-tools` only *Suggests*
`openresolv | resolvconf`, so neither is installed, and every provider's stock
config has a `DNS =` line. That fails in `set_dns()` — before any routing — so
it takes split tunnels down too, contradicting what this PR previously claimed:
[#] resolvconf -a sp -m 0 -x
/usr/bin/wg-quick: line 32: resolvconf: command not found EXIT=127
Not fixed, deliberately: `openresolv` has no installation candidate on noble,
and `resolvconf` resolves only by pulling in systemd-resolved — a resolver
daemon and systemd units, into a container with no systemd. Documented instead.
Smaller corrections from the same review:
- the size caveat blamed ~209 kB of libelf1t64; for this package set the real
over-count is libelf1t64 + netbase. Restated, and arm64 now given against the
real base rather than left as a bare-ubuntu figure.
- the manual-install fallback omitted `iproute2`, so it left the user without
`ip` — the command the tunnel needs most.
- "Without it" had been orphaned from its antecedent by inserted paragraphs and
read as referring to configuring a tunnel.
- the migration probe said "VPN support", presenting VPN as a feature gained to
users who never enabled it. Now names the tools and the toggle.
- "What's Inside the Container" gains a row; the key-material-in-snapshot
hazard was in CLAUDE.md only, and is the one genuinely user-facing warning
here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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ab2c75d0b2 |
Ship a firewall backend, and correct three claims review disproved
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Review of #28 found the iptables exclusion was justified by a false premise, and I confirmed it: `wireguard-tools` declares `Recommends: nftables | iptables`, `--no-install-recommends` strips it, and `wg-quick`'s add_default() shells out to a firewall backend with no `type -p` guard. Measured on the image as this PR shipped it: [#] iptables-restore -n /usr/bin/wg-quick: line 32: iptables-restore: command not found wg-quick EXIT=127 That fires for `AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0` — every stock full-tunnel config from every provider — not for a desktop client's killswitch as the comment claimed. Split tunnels are unaffected. Ship `nftables` rather than `iptables`: wg-quick prefers it (`type -p nft`, so with both installed iptables is dead weight), it is first in the package's own Recommends, and it is half the size. The review's proposed fix stopped there; it does not hold. Adding nftables does not make wg-quick work on this host, and neither does iptables: Warning: Extension CONNMARK revision 0 not supported, missing kernel module? `Table=auto` routes by fwmark and needs xt_CONNMARK from the *host* kernel. WSL2 has none and containers have no /lib/modules to load one from. So this fixes native Linux and Docker Desktop for Mac — which other WHP users are on — and cannot fix Docker Desktop for Windows, where the answer is to add routes with `ip route` directly. Documented rather than left to be rediscovered. Also from review: - "`ip` and `wg` are always present" was false. A project keeps the base image it was first built from, so this reaches new projects only. Reworded to match the wording already used for the Playwright libraries, and `/usr/bin/wg` added to FEATURE_PROBES so an existing project is *told* it is missing VPN tooling and prompted to migrate, rather than finding out via `wg: command not found`. - "no client is installed" contradicted shipping `wg` four lines earlier. The true claim is that no tunnel is configured or started. - The size figure measured against bare ubuntu:24.04, which over-counts by the ~209 kB of libelf1t64 the real base already has, and covered one arch. Now measured against the current base on amd64 and stated for arm64 too, per the standard CLAUDE.md sets for the Playwright layer. - `/run` persistence conflated two mechanisms: same-container files on a stop/start, `docker commit` on a recreation. Both stated, plus the corollary that key material written to /run ends up inside a snapshot image — observed, a `wg.priv` was already sitting in one. - The DNS bullet presented a Docker Desktop address as the general case. Now leads with the mechanism, notes 127.0.0.11 on a user-defined network is unaffected, and adds the two things the advice omitted: a resolver the tunnel can reach (or it leaks every query), and pinning the endpoint via the old gateway (or the tunnel routes through itself). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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2b35aa8c16 |
Explain a missing tun device where the failure actually happens
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Review caught that the device guard was wired to the wrong call. The
daemon does not resolve `--device` at create: verified against Docker
29.7, `docker create --device /dev/does-not-exist` succeeds and prints an
id, and runc only resolves the device — and validates sysctls — when it
builds the container. So on a host with no tun module the create returns
fine and `start` fails, which means the explanation never ran and the
user saw the raw daemon string naming a path they would go looking for on
the wrong machine. The unit tests fed the create-side string straight in,
so they confirmed a function no real failure could reach.
Move the guard onto `start_container`, covering create as well in case a
future daemon checks earlier. It no longer takes `vpn_support_enabled` —
`start_container` has a container id and no project, and nothing else in
Triple-C ever requests a device, so an error naming /dev/net/tun is
unambiguous on its own. The test now uses the daemon's verbatim message
via bollard's real Display format.
Also from review:
* Soften the security claim. Docker does not enable user-namespace
remapping by default, so this is a real CAP_NET_ADMIN in the initial
user namespace with only the network namespace confining it. It
cannot touch host interfaces, but "confers no authority outside the
container" was too strong: within its namespace it can set
promiscuous mode and add addresses, routes and NAT on the shared
docker0 segment, which puts sibling containers — the LiteLLM gateway
among them — within ARP-spoofing reach, and it can flush netfilter
rules sandbox mode may rely on. Said plainly in the code, CLAUDE.md
and HOW-TO-USE.
* Drop Tailscale from the list of clients needing this. Its
--tun=userspace-networking mode needs neither the capability nor the
device, and listing it invites granting NET_ADMIN for nothing.
* Say in the toggle's own hint that changing it recreates the
container, matching how every other recreation-triggering setting is
labelled. The tab's generic "stop the container first" chip does not
tell the user what is about to happen.
* Add RuntimeSection tests: saves on, saves off explicitly rather than
dropping the key, reflects state, is disabled while running, and
carries the recreation warning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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65a3d4eb29 |
Let a project's container run a VPN client
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A VPN client installed in a container today starts, runs, and then hangs
until its connection times out. Nothing reports an error: a default
container has no /dev/net/tun to open and no CAP_NET_ADMIN to add an
interface or a route with, and clients surface that as a generic timeout
rather than a permissions failure.
Add an opt-in per-project "VPN support" switch granting the three things
a tunnel needs. They are useless individually, which is why
vpn_host_config() defines the set in one place and the tests assert all
of it:
* CAP_NET_ADMIN — Docker's default bounding set has net_raw but not
net_admin, so a client can ping but never connect.
* /dev/net/tun — passed through from the host so the kernel's tun
module backs it, rather than mknod-ed inside.
* net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark — WireGuard's wg-quick sets this and
cannot from inside a container, /proc/sys being read-only, so its
handshakes are dropped by reverse-path filtering.
Off by default and deliberately opt-in: NET_ADMIN lets anything in the
container reconfigure that container's network stack. It is namespaced —
no authority over the host's interfaces or any other container.
Capabilities and devices are fixed when a container is created, so this
is container state and takes the label-and-compare treatment.
triple-c.vpn-support is written unconditionally, false included, for the
usual docker commit reason: a true stamped once would ride the snapshot
image into every future container and make the switch impossible to turn
back off. A missing label reads as false and off is byte-identical to
today, so no existing project is churned.
Requesting the device fails at creation when the host kernel has no tun
module, which would otherwise surface as a project that simply refuses to
start. explain_create_failure() rewrites that one error to name the
switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-versus-your-machine distinction, and
leaves every other failure untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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84a67fcd0d |
Stop an empty base-image label from silencing the migration notice
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A project can be out of date and say nothing about it, in two ways that
compound: the lineage lookup treats "unknown" as an answer, and the
fallback that exists for unknown lineage disappears when its probe fails.
`create_container` always writes triple-c.base-image-id, even when the
value is unknown — deliberately, so an inherited image label cannot ride
a snapshot forever. That makes Some("") the ordinary reading from a
container whose lineage was never established. The lookup filtered for
emptiness only on the final result, so that empty string satisfied the
container branch and skipped the snapshot entirely: a snapshot that had
recorded a real lineage was never consulted, and the project reported
"unknown" with the answer one lookup away. Each source is now filtered
before it can answer, in pick_recorded_lineage, which is a plain function
so the case has a test that fails against the old logic.
A genuinely pre-label project stays unknown, and should: its ancestor is
not knowable, and inventing one would make it look permanently current.
The probe is the intended signal for those — but if the probe failed,
get_container_staleness returned early with nothing populated, the banner
found no gaps and rendered null, and the probe_error it already knew how
to display sat behind a gate that returned before reaching it. Silence
there is indistinguishable from "up to date", and it is likeliest for the
oldest and largest projects, whose manifests are the ones apt to exceed
the inspection limit — one real project measured 6.93 MB against an 8 MB
cap. An unknown-lineage container whose probe failed now says the check
could not be completed, with the reason, under the tone that means
unresolved rather than the one that means something is wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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f3cc1c4c17 |
Stop Playwright setup from deleting the package it just installed
Setting up the browser view failed on every container, and re-running it reproduced the same broken state, because the setup destroyed its own work. `install_packages` ran two `npm install --no-save` commands into /workspace, which has no package.json. With no manifest, npm treats the command line as the whole statement of what the tree should contain and prunes the rest, so installing `playwright` second removed the `@playwright/cli` installed first: "removed 3 packages", leaving an empty node_modules/@playwright/ behind playwright and playwright-core. That empty directory is exactly what the pane then reported as missing. The second install now names both specs; the first one is already present, so it costs nothing and is only there to stop npm pruning it. Two failures were waiting behind that one: Nothing in the tree ever configured the browser, so playwright-cli fell back to channel `chrome` — system Google Chrome — with the Chromium sandbox on. These containers forbid unprivileged user namespaces, so it aborted with "Failed to move to new namespace ... Operation not permitted"; on a base image without Google Chrome the same default failed as "Chromium distribution 'chrome' is not found". entrypoint.sh now seeds ~/.playwright/cli.config.json on every start, which is the only way to reach existing projects: ~/.playwright is inside the home volume, so an image copy would reach new projects only. The launch check passed for a configuration the viewer never uses. It launched bundled chromium with no channel, which resolves to chromium-headless-shell, while the viewer's config pins chrome-for-testing — the full chromium build, a separate download. A container could pass every check and still fail in the pane with 'Browser "chrome-for-testing" is not installed', which is what a stale chromium-1217 against a wanted chromium-1237 did. Chromium is now verified on both channels, the sandbox setting is stated rather than inherited from a default, and a failure names the channel. triple-c-playwright-heal repairs all of it on a container that is already broken, including the missing socat that makes the pane report "127.0.0.1 sent an invalid response" while the container side is perfectly healthy. It verifies by launching a browser rather than trusting the preceding steps — which is how the stale-revision case was found — and lives in /usr/local/bin so a fix to it can still reach an existing project. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 jknapp
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88f2e73474 |
Merge branch 'main' into fix/scheduler-home-clobber
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shadow-testandClaude Opus 5
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fa4940dd7d |
Say when a scheduled task is running
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A run is detached — cron has no terminal, and the app fires it as a detached exec — so triggering one and watching the log was indistinguishable from triggering one that died. Worse, `claude -p` writes its answer in a single burst at the end, so a healthy run shows nothing but its log header for as long as it is thinking. The honest reading of the old UI was "it stalled". triple-c-task-runner now publishes a state file per run (pid, start time, log path) and removes it from an EXIT trap. flock remains what actually prevents overlapping runs; this is purely observability, so every reader verifies the pid rather than trusting the file — a container stopped mid-run cannot fire a trap, and a task stuck on "running" forever would be a worse lie than no indicator at all. Stale files are cleared on read. On top of that: - `list` grows a status column: "running 4m12s" or "idle". - `status [--id] [--watch]` answers "is it still going?" directly, with elapsed time and the tail of the log when there is any output yet. - `run` streams the log instead of blocking silently, and refuses to start a task that is already running. - The Automation tab marks a running task, disables its Run now button, and polls while anything is in flight — including the second or two between firing a run and the runner registering it, which is the exact window that used to read as dead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |