The 21 marketplace commands, registered and granted; marketplace fields
kept store-owned in update_settings/update_project; a background refresh
of every marketplace at app start.
- apply_marketplace_now emits marketplace-sync-finished per project (F4).
- Settings export carries marketplace account tokens in ExportedSecrets
(account id -> token) and import restores them; imported accounts,
marketplaces and global installs are validated with the commands' own
rules before anything is written. The import preview discloses the
marketplace count, token count and global hook installs, and warns on
the latter (F10).
- refresh_pins and cache removal hold the repo lock (F11).
- ops::validate_host/validate_branch delegate to auth::valid_host and
git::valid_branch (F13).
- A finished gh container login frees only its own cancel slot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clicking a file path in Claude's terminal output now opens the file in its own window with a CodeMirror 6 editor. The editor highlights the target line, live-reloads while the file changes, and saves explicitly with hash-based conflict detection. The viewer commands are gated by window label.
Every app command is now ACL-gated per window through a Tauri AppManifest. build.rs checks the handler list against the capability files and fails the build on any mismatch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This is a scope reduction, not an abandonment. Both subsystems are
preserved in full on `hold/disk-and-dragout` and are intended to come
back once they have been hardened separately. Nothing here is a
judgement that the features are unwanted — three successive
audit-and-fix cycles each closed a critical defect in these two areas
and each opened a new one, so the rest of the round ships now and these
two get their own cycle rather than holding it up.
Removed: the Disk settings panel and its whole reclaim / destroy /
compaction surface — `DiskSettings`, `DiskProjectTable`, `useDiskUsage`,
`docker/disk.rs`, `disk_tests.rs`, the disk commands in
`docker_commands.rs`, and their `generate_handler!` entries. Dropping
the IPC entries is the point: a UI-only removal would have left five
commands callable by a compromised webview, one of them a verified
arbitrary-DELETE primitive. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots`'s *command* goes
with them (the panel was its only caller); the sweep itself stays.
Removed: OS drag-out from the Files tab — `stage_container_file_for_drag`
and its host staging lifecycle, the pointer gesture and `dragPreview`,
`stageForDrag` / `isStagedHostPath`, the `tauri-plugin-drag` and
`@crabnebula/tauri-plugin-drag` dependencies, and the
`drag:allow-start-drag` capability grant, which could not be scoped.
The capability test's expected list is updated; its `*:default` and
`store:*` assertions are untouched.
Kept, deliberately: drag-and-drop *into* the app (Files pane and
terminal) and "Save to host…", which is now the only route out of a
container. The prevention work is untouched — the pre-commit scrub and
`SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS`, capped container logs, the `triple-c.base` /
`triple-c.managed` labels, `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` and the startup
housekeeping, the migration pin/probe reapers, scheduler log pruning,
`formatBytes.ts`, and `project_lock.rs` in full with every acquisition
site outside `disk.rs`.
Entanglements, resolved rather than deleted blind:
* `container.rs`'s `a_compaction_runs_this_module_s_scrub_script_byte_for_byte`
pinned the compaction Dockerfile against `snapshot_scrub_script()`.
Dropped — it existed only for compaction. `snapshot_scrub_script` and
its containment tests are untouched.
* `lib.rs`'s startup reap of `:compacting` tags and `triple-c-compact-*`
containers is dropped: nothing on this branch creates them.
* `project_lock`'s `Compaction` / `CacheClear` variants and
`any_held_excluding`, `migration_commands::is_migrating`, and
`formatBytes{Delta,Ceiling}` lose their last production caller but are
kept and still tested, annotated with why.
* `projects_store::corrupt_since` and `migration_store::peek_ownerless_since`
were read only by the disk survey and are removed. The corrupt-load
marker and `.bak` are still written.
Verified: `npm run test` 611 passing, `npx tsc --noEmit` clean,
`npm run build` green; `cargo test` 419 passed / 2 ignored,
`cargo build` 0 warnings. Every test removed belongs to a removed
feature — no kept-behaviour test was weakened or deleted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
Three items each of which fell between two agents' file lists.
`scrub_secrets_from_snapshots` was the third unsynchronised writer of
`triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest`, after a recreate's commit and a
compaction. It has the same read-modify-write shape — create a scratch
container from the snapshot, commit back over the same tag — and loses
the same race, which here means re-baking the very credential it exists
to remove. It now takes the project's claim, under a new
`ProjectOp::SecretScrub`, and reports a snapshot it had to skip rather
than rewriting it unsafely.
Its scratch container also now carries `triple-c.scrub=true`, so the
Disk panel's reclaim bucket discriminates by label and by the live claim
rather than by a clock. The 15-minute age gate stays as the backstop for
the cross-process case the claim cannot see.
The store plugin is unregistered and its dependency dropped. Its
capability grants were removed as a host-file-write primitive; the
registration without a grant was unreachable but dead.
Finally, container.rs's fold test was pinning a fold that no longer
exists — disk.rs now emits the JSON exec form. It asserts the stronger
property instead: the script a compaction runs is byte-for-byte the one
snapshot_scrub_script() produces, so the two files cannot drift silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
The Files tab could accept a drop but never produce one: getting a file
out meant "Save to host…" and a file picker. This adds the other
direction.
Two constraints shape it. `dragDropEnabled` is on — TerminalView needs
it, since the native drag-drop event is the only one carrying dropped
file paths — and it blocks HTML5 drag inside the webview, so `draggable`
plus `DataTransfer.setData("DownloadURL", …)` was never available. The
gesture is therefore pointer events into `tauri-plugin-drag`, the same
shape and the same reason as the tab strip's drag. And the file being
dragged does not exist on the host at all: it lives in a container, and
the OS can only drag a real host path.
So a drag-out is a copy first and a drag second.
`stage_container_file_for_drag` materialises the file into
`<os-temp>/triple-c-drag-out/<session>/<slot>/<name>` through the same
`fetch_container_file` the download and the viewer use, keeps the
original filename (a dropped `tmp1234` is not a file anyone wants), and
caps at the 256 MiB an upload already caps at, naming "Save to host…" in
the refusal. The path comes from Tauri's path API rather than `/tmp`,
because on Windows it is neither.
The staging directory has a lifecycle, because whole files accumulating
in the host temp dir would be the disk problem this project just fixed,
in a new place: cleared on exit inside the existing teardown (still
guarded on the main window), and reaped at startup for whatever a crash
left behind.
The copy is also an async gap in the middle of a gesture that feels
instantaneous, and the OS only adopts a drag while the button is still
down. Small files beat the pointer; large ones do not — so the staged
path is cached per entry (keyed on size and mtime, so an edited file
re-stages) and the pane says the copy is ready and to drag again, which
is an instruction rather than an apology because the retry is immediate.
A per-file slot keeps `a/notes.txt` and `b/notes.txt` from becoming the
same host path.
"Save to host…" stays exactly as it was. Drag-out is the enhancement;
a platform that refuses `startDrag` says so and points back at it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
CI's pre-build version check failed: tauri (2.10.2) vs @tauri-apps/api
(2.11.0). Both the Cargo.toml and package.json caret-pin to 2, so this is
purely a lockfile resolution fix — `cargo update -p tauri --precise
2.11.0` brings the Rust side up to match. Schema regeneration is included
since the gen/schemas/ output is keyed to the Tauri version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Picks up the deprecation notes on dialog `ask`/`confirm` permissions
(now aliased to `allow-message`/`deny-message` and slated for removal
in Tauri v3). No behavior change — generated artifacts only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tauri v2 desktop app (React/TypeScript + Rust) for managing
containerized Claude Code environments. Includes Gitea Actions
workflow for building and pushing the sandbox container image,
and a BUILDING.md guide for manual app builds on Linux and Windows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5
jknappandClaude Opus 5.5
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5