2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5	7a5c0c1f13	Retire the Arch package, document AppImage desktop integration ... The `triple-c-bin` package was never on the AUR, so installing it meant downloading a file and running `pacman -U` — the same gesture as making an AppImage executable, for a second artifact to keep building. And being `workflow_dispatch`-only it reached 1 release in 28 (only v0.4.16 has a `.pkg.tar.zst`), while HOW-TO-USE.md told Arch and CachyOS users to download it from every release. A distribution channel that is absent 27 times out of 28 is worse than not promising one. `packaging/arch/` and `.gitea/workflows/publish-arch-package.yml` are preserved whole on `hold/arch-packaging`, the same way the disk panel and drag-out work were held rather than deleted. What would make an Arch package worth having is an AUR account and its SSH key as a repo secret — both one-time manual steps that never happened; the workflow's own header already said as much about its AUR push step. This also closes the gap that prompted the review: nothing validated the PKGBUILD until someone manually dispatched the workflow, making it the only packaging path with no CI coverage. Removing it removes the untested surface rather than adding a job to test something nobody installs. In its place, `scripts/install-appimage.sh` does what a package manager's install hooks would. An AppImage carries a `.desktop` entry and icons inside itself, but nothing on the host reads them, so it never appears in the app launcher. The script extracts the bundled icons into the user's icon theme and writes a launcher entry — no sudo, nothing outside `~/.local/share`, and the AppImage itself is never copied or moved. Two details it gets right on purpose: * The `Exec` line is rewritten, not copied. The bundled entry says `Exec=triple-c`, which resolves only inside the running AppImage's own mount — a verbatim copy gives a launcher entry that starts nothing. * Extraction uses `--appimage-extract`, which needs no FUSE, so the script works on a machine where *running* the AppImage would first need `fuse2` installed. That requirement is now documented too: Arch and CachyOS do not ship FUSE 2 by default. Verified against the real artifact — the AppImage from this repo's own preview-3a49a67 release: 4 icon sizes install, `desktop-file-validate` passes with no warnings, `--uninstall` leaves nothing behind, and shellcheck is clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ApLYH6ybHwQFkMCtKuHrrV	2026-08-28 13:11:26 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	68b73a9102	Refuse a commit that adds something shaped like a credential ... The companion to the fixture removal. A site-admin token sat in a test file for 92 commits and fourteen days on a public mirror, past five audit rounds and two independent reviews, because all of them read the code under change and this was not under change. A grep would have caught it the first day. `scripts/scan-secrets.sh` is that grep, in three rules: * vendor-prefixed credentials — `ghp_`, `github_pat_`, `glpat-`, `xox*-`, `sk-`, `AKIA`/`ASIA`, `ya29.`, `AIza`, `npm_`, `dckr_pat_`. Shape alone identifies these, so there is no context to get wrong. * `BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY` blocks. * an opaque literal assigned to a secret-shaped name — the rule that would have caught this one. The third rule needs **both** halves, and that is what makes it usable rather than another disabled check. Measured before writing it: an entropy-only rule flags 317 literals in this tree, and name-proximity alone flags four, three of which are `secure::get_project_secret(&id, "aws-secret-access-key")` — a keychain *key name* sitting next to the word `secret`. Requiring the literal itself to be hex or base64 with no word structure is what excludes those. Validated rather than asserted: * **0 false positives** across every tracked file. * **Catches the real incident** — `--range 9b2f4fe~1..9b2f4fe` is refused. * Twelve shaped cases pass and fail as intended, including a sha256 in an `assert_eq!`, a git sha in a comment and the new dummy fixture, none of which trip it. * The hook was proved to block an actual `git commit`, not just to exist. Two halves, because each covers the other's gap: * `.githooks/pre-commit`, enabled per clone by `npm run hooks`. Git will not let a repository set its own hooks path — cloning would then be enough to run its code — so this is opt-in everywhere and `--no-verify` skips it. * `Secret Scan`, which nobody can bypass. It carries **no `paths:` filter** on purpose: the leak lived in `app/**` and `build.yml` only runs for `container/**`, so a path-filtered scan would have missed the very thing it exists for. It scans the whole tracked tree rather than a range, because a wrong range fails *open* and the full pass takes 0.5s. Also fixed while here: `core.hooksPath` in this clone pointed at `/workspace/.git/hooks`, a directory that does not exist — so git hooks were disabled outright and anything dropped in `.git/hooks` would have been ignored in silence. A hook that never runs is worse than no hook, because the checklist says it is there. `--tracked` skips binaries. Feeding a blob to grep gets "binary file matches" instead of the line, so a genuine finding inside one would arrive as a sentence nobody can act on. A line ending `pragma: allowlist secret` is skipped — wordy on purpose, so it reads as a claim and leaves something greppable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LHL9ty7arp8FHwvE77ne7y	2026-08-25 11:51:04 -07:00