65a3d4eb2902a22f619da3b38dbfec7c74b70626
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Commits
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65a3d4eb29 |
Let a project's container run a VPN client
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m39s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 6m33s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 4s
A VPN client installed in a container today starts, runs, and then hangs
until its connection times out. Nothing reports an error: a default
container has no /dev/net/tun to open and no CAP_NET_ADMIN to add an
interface or a route with, and clients surface that as a generic timeout
rather than a permissions failure.
Add an opt-in per-project "VPN support" switch granting the three things
a tunnel needs. They are useless individually, which is why
vpn_host_config() defines the set in one place and the tests assert all
of it:
* CAP_NET_ADMIN — Docker's default bounding set has net_raw but not
net_admin, so a client can ping but never connect.
* /dev/net/tun — passed through from the host so the kernel's tun
module backs it, rather than mknod-ed inside.
* net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark — WireGuard's wg-quick sets this and
cannot from inside a container, /proc/sys being read-only, so its
handshakes are dropped by reverse-path filtering.
Off by default and deliberately opt-in: NET_ADMIN lets anything in the
container reconfigure that container's network stack. It is namespaced —
no authority over the host's interfaces or any other container.
Capabilities and devices are fixed when a container is created, so this
is container state and takes the label-and-compare treatment.
triple-c.vpn-support is written unconditionally, false included, for the
usual docker commit reason: a true stamped once would ride the snapshot
image into every future container and make the switch impossible to turn
back off. A missing label reads as false and off is byte-identical to
today, so no existing project is churned.
Requesting the device fails at creation when the host kernel has no tun
module, which would otherwise surface as a project that simply refuses to
start. explain_create_failure() rewrites that one error to name the
switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-versus-your-machine distinction, and
leaves every other failure untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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01a2f6aec8 |
Add Project Home, Auth Bridge, shared auth token, and Tier-1 polish
Project Home (DESIGN-REVIEW §B2): the project is promoted from a 280px
sidebar card to a first-class main-area view. ProjectCard.tsx (1,257
lines) is replaced by a select-only ProjectRow plus tabs for Overview,
Sessions, Automation, Config and Files. The PortMappings, FileManager
and ContainerProgress modals are absorbed rather than reimplemented.
Config gains a Saved/Saving/Failed indicator — save-on-blur failures
previously reached only console.error.
Tier-1 polish (DESIGN-REVIEW §A): new elevation, muted-accent, disabled
and focus-ring tokens; a global :focus-visible ring with every
focus:outline-none removed; filled buttons moved to --accent-emphasis
and white-on-success toggles retired, fixing three WCAG AA failures
(2.1:1, 2.5:1, 2.4:1); a shared Modal primitive with role="dialog",
focus trap and restore, adopted by all remaining modals; status
indicators that carry a glyph and word rather than colour alone.
Ctrl+Shift+W closes a tab, deliberately not Ctrl+W — that is readline's
kill-word, used constantly in the terminal this app is built around.
Auth Bridge: a general loopback-callback bridge so browser logins run
inside a container (aws sso login, Concourse fly login, claude login)
can complete against the host browser. Listeners are discovered from
/proc/net/tcp{,6} — ss/netstat/lsof are absent from the image — bound on
host 127.0.0.1 only, and tunnelled in over the Docker API via socat,
which keeps working on Docker Desktop where container IPs are not
routable. Falls back to [::1] because Node resolves localhost to IPv6
first, so claude login often binds ::1 alone. Opt-in per project.
This extracts create_attached_exec() and moves the existing terminal
session path onto it, so there is one attached-exec implementation
rather than two.
Shared auth token: `claude setup-token` is run in a container, the token
is stored in the OS keychain and injected as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
into Anthropic-backend projects. Contrary to the initial design note,
setup-token uses an Anthropic-hosted redirect and blocks on a stdin
paste prompt rather than a loopback callback, so a stdin command is
required for the flow to complete.
The token is never logged, never returned to the frontend, and is
redacted from the streamed output with a stateful matcher that withholds
any tail that could still grow into a secret. Change detection uses a
random rotation id rather than a hash, since a hash in a docker-inspect
readable label would be an offline verification oracle.
Frontend 33 -> 51 tests; Rust 34 tests. Both builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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