3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shadow-test	97e58db3c1	Close gateway-secret desync, TOCTOU, and undisclosed custom-image gaps ... Round 4 review findings: - Disclose and warn on a custom Docker image the import would set (HIGH): it's the image every project container is created from, so an undisclosed change here was a sharper version of the redirected-base-URL problem round 3 already flagged for the model backends. - Recreate a running gateway container when an import restores a new secret with the shape unchanged (MEDIUM): reconcile_gateway's shape comparison can't see a secret-only change, so the container would otherwise keep serving old key material indefinitely. - Report keychain write failures back to the caller instead of only logging them (MEDIUM): apply_settings_import now returns SettingsImportOutcome with secret_restore_warnings so a partial restore can't read as unqualified success. - Pin a hash of the previewed file's ciphertext and refuse to apply if it changed on disk (MEDIUM): closes a TOCTOU between preview and apply. - Sanitize and cap every free-form string a preview surfaces, and move the warning boxes above the replace list in the UI (MEDIUM): an unbounded base URL or image name could otherwise push the security warnings below the scroll fold. - Validate the Docker socket path on import the same as the SSH key and CA cert paths (LOW): it was the one mounted host path validate_settings_update didn't cover. - Fix ExportedSecrets::is_empty() to treat whitespace-only as blank, like every other secret-presence check in this feature (LOW). - Authenticate the file header as AEAD associated data (LOW, defense in depth) and correct two doc comments that overstated the password not being cached.	2026-08-27 14:24:06 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Sonnet 5	925e51e435	Fix a real credential-leak vector a review found, plus four smaller issues ... The headline finding: WebTerminalSettings::access_token is a live bearer credential for a server that binds every interface, stored as a plain field on AppSettings — which this feature was exporting and importing wholesale as if it were as inert as a port number. A crafted export file could set web_terminal.enabled and access_token together, and importing it (with no more warning than any other setting change) would silently stand up a LAN-listening terminal server with an attacker-known token on the victim's next launch. Fixed by carving the token out into ExportedSecrets, same as the other three global secrets, with the same "only overwrite what the import actually has" treatment — except that has to be done by hand here, since this one lives inside the AppSettings blob that gets replaced wholesale rather than in the keychain. Added SettingsImportPreview:: enables_web_terminal so "this turns on a listening service" gets its own visible warning in the confirmation modal rather than hiding inside a generic "settings replaced" bullet list. Also fixed: - read_and_decrypt checked format_version only after attempting to parse the full payload, so a future version bump that isn't deserialize-compatible would fail on the shape mismatch before the version check ever ran — and serde's type-mismatch errors quote the offending value inline, which is a real leak path since the plaintext here can hold a live credential. Now probes just the version field first, and neither error path interpolates the underlying serde message into what the user sees. - apply_settings_import cleared the pending-import path before it could fail, so a rejected import (an invalid host path, anything update_settings validates) dead-ended the modal with no way back except cancelling and reopening the file picker. The path is now only cleared on success. - Secrets are restored before the settings replace runs, not after — replacing settings is what triggers reconcile_gateway, and restoring secrets afterward left a real window where a gateway recreation happened against the destination's stale keys. - The 8-character password minimum was frontend-only; export_settings now enforces it too, since that's the actual boundary a weak password has to cross. The derived key and decrypted plaintext are wrapped in zeroize::Zeroizing (already in the tree via aes-gcm). Added test coverage the review named as missing: format-version ordering, the generic-error-message guarantee, non_blank's blank-vs- absent handling, and the new web-terminal preview/warning behavior on both sides of the IPC boundary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FGjXq6fqtAFHdbhk4f3PfZ	2026-08-27 12:16:43 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Sonnet 5	722d9aeff1	Add password-encrypted settings export/import ... Closes #35. Exports the host environment — global AppSettings (already the non-secret shape persisted to settings.json) plus the global secrets that live in the OS keychain instead (the shared Claude Code OAuth login, the model gateway's provider API key and master key) — to one password-encrypted file, and restores it on another machine. Per-project settings, per-project secrets, and Docker volumes are deliberately out of scope; this is not a project backup. Designed with the user in issue #35's comments: global settings only, no docker volumes, the password is the lock/key, and the export is portable as one file. Crypto (storage/settings_crypto.rs): Argon2id derives a 256-bit key from the password (memory-hard, meaningfully resistant to GPU/ASIC brute-forcing in a way PBKDF2 at any reasonable iteration count is not), AES-256-GCM does the actual encryption. A wrong password fails GCM's authentication tag rather than producing silent garbage. Salt and nonce are random per export and stored in the clear in the file header — their job is uniqueness, not secrecy. The save/open dialogs are opened from Rust, matching the boundary file_commands.rs's pick_save_path/pick_files_to_upload already establish: a frontend-driven dialog handing Rust a host path is the exact shape of bug that produced this app's past criticals. preview_settings_import resolves the chosen import path itself and remembers it (AppState::pending_settings_import) so apply_settings_import re-reads the same file without a path crossing back over IPC. The password is re-entered rather than cached between preview and apply, so nothing here holds decrypted plaintext in memory for longer than one command's execution; the preview returned to the frontend carries counts and presence flags only, never a secret value. Import replaces settings wholesale (an import is "restore this environment"), but only writes secrets actually present in the file — an absent secret means "the source machine never had this configured," not "delete this on import." Added storage::secure::store_gateway_master_key and get_gateway_master_key (read-only, unlike get_or_create_gateway_master_key which mints one as a side effect) since neither existed and import needs to restore an exact captured value rather than mint a new random one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FGjXq6fqtAFHdbhk4f3PfZ	2026-08-27 11:57:16 -07:00