177 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d6f065a2b6	Fix HIGH and MEDIUM frontend defects ... Files pane - F16: a drag-out released back inside the app no longer re-imports its own staged copy over the container original. An in-flight flag (cleared from the drag plugin's `onEvent` channel, with a watchdog) suppresses the drop and the "Drop files into …" hint, and an exact staged-path filter is the second line of defence — the `path|size|modified` cache could otherwise write a minutes-old snapshot over a file an agent had since rewritten. - F17: a slow upload/rename no longer yanks the user back to the directory the operation started in. Every operation captures its target path and re-lists only if the user is still there; failures go to the toast host either way. - The grid keeps keyboard focus. Roving tabindex (one tab stop, not one per row) plus focus restore after navigation, rename commit/cancel and Escape. - Transient failures now surface in `ToastHost` (z-[60], persistent aria-live) instead of a `role="alert"` 300 rows down a scroller or behind a modal overlay. The inline error is kept only for the listing failure. - `navigate` is sequenced by generation; "Save to host…" sets `busy`. - Grid a11y: column headers, a text affordance for folder vs file, a live region that is mounted empty and announces completion, Label-in-Name fixed. - FileViewerModal: the blob URL is released only once its replacement exists; the preview is a focusable, named, scrollable region. Native drop routing - New `lib/dropTarget.ts`: the hit test now refuses a drop while any `[aria-modal="true"]` dialog or `[data-blocks-drop]` overlay is up, and checks z-order where the environment can answer it. Shared by FilesTab and TerminalView; App's shutdown overlay opts in. Disk - A partially failed reclaim says so in words ("… — 2 of 5 failed"), not by hue alone. - The scan/reclaim race is closed: every mutation retires an in-flight scan, so a scan can no longer repaint a pre-reclaim report plus a clickable plan of objects that are gone. Scan is disabled while working; the status is a live region; a failed destructive action keeps its dialog open and reports there. - The "unknown" layer count gets a screen-reader fallback; `--text-disabled` no longer carries live information. Terminal / OAuth - After the toast is dismissed, a truncated heuristic guess can no longer fill the slot that an exact OSC 8 or relay URL occupied — the detector remembers every exact URL and drops any candidate that is a strict prefix of one. - The prompt is reachable by keyboard: Ctrl+Shift+O jumps to the default action, Escape dismisses, focus returns to the terminal, and auto-dismiss holds off while focus is inside. It deliberately does not steal focus. - UrlToast renders through `ui/Button` and `--shadow-overlay`. Elsewhere - AuthBridgeRow: a pushed `auth-bridge-changed` status always outranks an older awaited toggle result. - The last two ad-hoc byte formatters route through `lib/formatBytes`. Contract for the backend agent: `upload_file_to_container` refusing to overwrite must satisfy `isFileExistsError` in `src/lib/uploadErrors.ts` (marker `FILE_EXISTS`) and accept an `overwrite` argument; the frontend turns that into an `ui/Modal` Replace/Skip prompt rather than a raw error string. Tests: 536 -> 627 passing. `npm run build` and `npx tsc --noEmit` green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 11:11:43 -07:00
shadow-test	0003793abb	Merge branch 'feat/disk-ui' into integration/round-1	2026-08-23 09:51:44 -07:00
shadow-test	2b9bf56f25	Merge branch 'feat/drag-out' into integration/round-1	2026-08-23 09:51:44 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	611f67cca7	Fix what review found in the Disk section ... Safety: - `destroy`'s rollback-pin arm took a tag over IPC and interpolated it straight into an image reference it then removed. `tag: "latest"` named the project's live snapshot, deleted under a dialog saying "rollback pin". It is the one destructive variant carrying a free-form string, so it now goes through `parse_rollback_tag`. - The compaction's scratch container was named `triple-c-scrub-*`, which is what the scrub reclaim bucket hunts and force-removes. A reclaim from a second window would have destroyed the container a running compaction was about to commit. It gets `triple-c-compact-*`, swept at the start of the next compaction rather than from a bucket anything else can fire. - Deleting a home or config volume only refused a *running* container, but a stopped one still pins its volumes — the resting state of every project ever started — so the user typed the project name and met a raw 409. The container is now removed first and `loses` says so. Correctness: - The compaction Dockerfile emitted no `LABEL`, so the flattened intermediate could never match the sweep's `dangling` + `triple-c.managed` filter that three cleanup paths rely on. Verified on Docker 29.7.2 that the label lands on the final stage, the build still yields one layer, and untagging the staging tag after the commit leaves the committed snapshot intact and startable. - `snapshot_commit_layers` silently meant something else when `triple-c.base-image-id` was absent — the normal case for a pre-label project — counting the base's own layers and letting a never-recreated project qualify for compaction. `base_lineage_known` now carries that, the column says "unknown", and the plan does not offer the rewrite. - `destroy` returned a `ReclaimResult` wearing a `ReclaimTarget` that named work it had not done (a home-volume deletion came back as `OrphanVolume`). Split into `target` / `destroyed`, exactly one set. - `formatBytes` ran `toFixed` after the divide loop, so 999,999 rendered as "1000.0 KB" — in the app's only byte formatter, in a panel full of near-boundary sizes. - `is_base_image_reference` split on the first colon, so a registry port ate the repo name. UI: - `snapshot_above_base_bytes: null` — deliberately unmeasurable — rendered as "0 B", the one guessed number in the table. - Layer count was flagged by colour alone; it now says "stacked". - The tick list survived a reclaim, so the same call could be re-fired at objects that no longer existed. The plan is dropped after any action and the panel says the totals predate it. - `setReport` landed before the plan call was awaited, so a plan failure rendered fresh totals above the previous scan's rows. - Both confirmation modals unmounted before awaiting, making the entire busy path dead code during multi-second work. - `buildx du` failures silently showed `docker system df`'s under-reported build-cache figure with no explanation. - Tooltip text reached no assistive tech, so two headers announced as "Help"; hardcoded input id; error-toned glyph in warning-toned panels; `sweepOrphanedSnapshots` and `clearOutcome` had no callers. - Four docstrings claimed things the code did not do, and two tests were named for behaviour they did not assert. Tests: 513 frontend (was 502), 370 Rust (was 365). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 09:51:09 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	77ef2291d7	Add a Disk section: see where the bytes went, and get them back ... Every recreation runs `docker commit`, which stacks a layer and never rewrites one, and 24 conditions in `container_needs_recreation` trigger a recreation. Prevention landed earlier on this branch; this is the half a user can act on. The per-project table leads with the two numbers that explain the mechanism rather than just the total: how many commit layers a snapshot has stacked above its base, and what the container's writable layer will add at the next commit. Backend (`docker/disk.rs`, commands in `docker_commands.rs`): - `get_docker_disk_usage` — one `df()` joined against the project store, behind an explicit Scan button because it walks the whole daemon. - `list_reclaimable` / `reclaim` — classified buckets with measured bytes, planned off the existing report so re-planning costs no second scan. - `destroy_project_disk_object` — one object, typed confirmation. - `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` — exposed, so its report is finally visible. Safety is structural: `reclaim` takes `ReclaimTarget`, which has no variant that can name a live project's data. Destructive work is a separate type reached only through `destroy`. No unfiltered prune is called anywhere, and nothing outside a `triple-c*` name or `triple-c.*` label is touched. Orphan detection subtracts ids from the project store and consults nothing else. From the daemon's side an idle live project and a deleted one are indistinguishable — volumes present, no container, no image — so inferring from container or image absence would offer a live project's credentials and transcripts for deletion. A store that loaded empty from an existing `projects.json` is treated as a failed load, not as "no projects", because `ProjectsStore::new()` recovers from a corrupt file by starting empty. Three things verified against a live Docker 29.7.2 rather than assumed: - Compaction is a two-stage build (`FROM scratch` + `COPY --from`), which keeps every byte inside the daemon; bollard's import buffers a whole image into memory. uid/gid and setuid survive; a 192.6 MB/4-layer synthetic came out 45.7 MB/1 layer. Image config does not survive, so it is replayed via create+commit, which round-trips a multi-line env var that a Dockerfile `ENV` could not. - Flattening breaks base-layer sharing, so the result carries its own copy of the base. Eight of ten real projects had a 0.10–1.32 GB delta over a 4.72 GB shared base — compacting those costs ~4 GB. The bound now subtracts that penalty, such projects are not offered at all, and the run compares unique bytes and abandons a rewrite that would grow. - `docker builder prune` reports `Total:`, not `Total reclaimed space:`, so the first parser scored every prune as freeing nothing. The Windows/WSL2 note is mandatory and its copy lives in Rust beside the tests that pin it: pruning frees space inside `ext4.vhdx`, which never shrinks on its own, so C: does not change until the disk is compacted. Also adds `lib/formatBytes.ts` — the app had four disagreeing copies, and `projects/home/format.ts` and `migrationCopy.ts` now delegate to it with byte-identical output. Base 1000 by default, matching what Docker prints. Tests: 502 frontend (was 453), 365 Rust (was 322). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 09:39:54 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	1c834a0b08	Drag a file out of the Files tab onto the host desktop ... The Files tab could accept a drop but never produce one: getting a file out meant "Save to host…" and a file picker. This adds the other direction. Two constraints shape it. `dragDropEnabled` is on — TerminalView needs it, since the native drag-drop event is the only one carrying dropped file paths — and it blocks HTML5 drag inside the webview, so `draggable` plus `DataTransfer.setData("DownloadURL", …)` was never available. The gesture is therefore pointer events into `tauri-plugin-drag`, the same shape and the same reason as the tab strip's drag. And the file being dragged does not exist on the host at all: it lives in a container, and the OS can only drag a real host path. So a drag-out is a copy first and a drag second. `stage_container_file_for_drag` materialises the file into `<os-temp>/triple-c-drag-out/<session>/<slot>/<name>` through the same `fetch_container_file` the download and the viewer use, keeps the original filename (a dropped `tmp1234` is not a file anyone wants), and caps at the 256 MiB an upload already caps at, naming "Save to host…" in the refusal. The path comes from Tauri's path API rather than `/tmp`, because on Windows it is neither. The staging directory has a lifecycle, because whole files accumulating in the host temp dir would be the disk problem this project just fixed, in a new place: cleared on exit inside the existing teardown (still guarded on the main window), and reaped at startup for whatever a crash left behind. The copy is also an async gap in the middle of a gesture that feels instantaneous, and the OS only adopts a drag while the button is still down. Small files beat the pointer; large ones do not — so the staged path is cached per entry (keyed on size and mtime, so an edited file re-stages) and the pane says the copy is ready and to drag again, which is an instruction rather than an apology because the retry is immediate. A per-file slot keeps `a/notes.txt` and `b/notes.txt` from becoming the same host path. "Save to host…" stays exactly as it was. Drag-out is the enhancement; a platform that refuses `startDrag` says so and points back at it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 09:12:59 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	0a022dfcf0	Let a project turn a globally-enabled Claude Code setting back off ... The six boolean settings were plain `bool`s merged with `if p.x { true } else { g.x }`, so a project could only ever add to the global set. There was no project value that produced `false` — turning a switch off at project level simply fell through to the global value and the control did nothing. Widen them to `Option<bool>`. `None` means "not set at this level": inherit the global on a project, leave Claude Code's own default alone globally. `Some(false)` is a deliberate off and wins outright. The fingerprint now formats with `{:?}` rather than `{}` — `None` and `Some(false)` mean different things, and conflating them would leave the container un-recreated when a project switched from inherit to off. The project editor grows a third "Global" state per switch; the global editor has nothing to inherit from, so it stays a plain toggle and keeps collapsing to null at the default. Its three existing tests passed unchanged and caught a first attempt that rendered unset as off, which would have told every user their session recap was disabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 09:05:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	bb41275cea	Keep the managed settings payload safe for un-migrated projects ... The null-means-delete convention is only understood by the entrypoint.sh shipped alongside this code. An existing project recreates from its own snapshot image, which carries whatever entrypoint it was built with, and an older one merges with a plain `.[0] * .[1]` — so the literal nulls would land in the user's settings.json rather than clearing the keys. Verified against jq: that produces `"tui": null, "effortLevel": null, "viewMode": null, "awaySummaryEnabled": null`, risking the whole file being rejected and taking the user's own `model` and `statusLine` with it. Split the payload instead. CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON now carries only keys that have a value and is safe under either merge; the new CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_CLEAR carries the key names to delete and is ignored by an entrypoint that predates it. Such a project keeps the old sticky behaviour until it is migrated or Reset, which is the pre-existing state rather than a regression. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 08:40:27 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	2ca86bb5d8	Scrub the writable layer on the migration path too, and de-duplicate CLAUDE_JSON ... Two integration fixes after merging the three feature branches. `scrub_writable_layer` is a `docker exec`, so it only works while the container runs. `migrate_project_to_base` stops its container one line before the pre-swap commit, which meant the single largest snapshot Triple-C ever takes was the one path that committed unscrubbed. Call the scrub explicitly before the stop instead of relying on the call inside `commit_container_snapshot`. Also drop a duplicate `CLAUDE_JSON=` assignment in entrypoint.sh. The Shift+Enter block re-declared it defensively to avoid a merge conflict with the awsAuthRefresh block; the conflict did not materialise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 08:38:01 -07:00
shadow-test	df6d2f1ca4	Merge branch 'feat/file-manager' into integration/round-1	2026-08-23 08:35:51 -07:00
shadow-test	dacc1157ec	Merge branch 'feat/disk-and-settings' into integration/round-1	2026-08-23 08:35:51 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	dd2894cc60	Stop Docker disk growth, and fix the Claude Code settings that never worked ... Two independent sets of fixes. ## Disk: stop the growth, no UI this round The dangling-snapshot sweep was already correct and was never the leak. The leak is that every `docker commit` **stacks** a layer and nothing compacts one: a file deleted after it has been committed becomes a whiteout, not free bytes. 24 conditions trigger recreation+commit, so changing one settings field costs a multi-gigabyte layer for the life of the project. One project was measured with 14 stacked commit layers, ~5.1 GB above its base. * **Scrub the writable layer before every commit** (`docker/container.rs`, `SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS` / `scrub_writable_layer`). The one moment those bytes are still free to drop is before the commit that captures them. Measured on one container's 4.48 GB pending layer: 3.0 GB of agent scratchpad under `/tmp/claude-*`, the terminal drag-drop staging area (256 MiB per file, with no `rm` for it anywhere in the repo), a PNG per pasted image, and the apt lists/cache/logs that `browser_view/install.rs` and `triple-c-playwright-heal` leave behind with no `apt-get clean`. A hardcoded list, never a heuristic: `/workspace/{mount_name}` is a host bind mount and nothing here may reach one, and the three `/tmp` globs cannot select the read-only `.host-ca`/`.host-aws` mounts. Failure is a log line — a scrub must never block a snapshot. * **Cap container logs** (`capped_log_config`). There was no `LogConfig` anywhere, so containers ran on the daemon's unbounded `json-file` default. Deliberately *not* wired into `container_needs_recreation`: participating would recreate every project once, and a recreation costs a commit, which is the thing being fixed. Picked up on the next natural recreation. * **Make superseded base images sweepable** (`container/Dockerfile`). It carried no `LABEL` at all, so `orphan_sweep_filters`' `dangling` + `triple-c.managed` pair provably could not match one — ~11.9 GB observed stranded. Stamping `triple-c.managed=true` is the whole fix; the sweep needed no change. `create_container` writes the new `triple-c.base` key explicitly empty, or Docker's label inheritance plus `docker commit` would make every snapshot claim to be a base image. `force: false` stays, and now says why. * **Sweep at startup** (`lib.rs`), not only after recreation: probes first (a probe pins an image the unforced sweep then refuses), pins second, sweep last. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots_logged` exists because all three callers threw the report away — `reclaimed_bytes`, `failed` and `unavailable` included. * **Reap migration leftovers.** `rollback_migration` retagged and orphaned the migrated snapshot with no sweep. Stale `pre-migration-*` pins are now age-reaped by scanning the tag pattern rather than trusting the state file — `migration_store::load` reports an unparseable record as absent, which stranded a 4-12 GB pin nothing could name again; `load` now moves a corrupt record aside so `has_record` is trustworthy. A pin whose migration is still awaiting confirmation is never reaped at any age. The probe container's removal was a plain statement after an await, so a dropped future (an app quit mid-migration) leaked a container pinning a multi-gigabyte image; it is a `Drop` guard now, with `reap_probe_containers` for the case where the process itself dies. * **Prune scheduler logs.** `remove` deleted a task's JSON but never its log directory, and the task runner appended uncapped `claude -p` output. * **Fix the delete copy.** It said "the container, config volume, and stored credentials"; it removes *both* volumes and the snapshot image. No prune UI, and no unfiltered `prune_images`/`prune_volumes` anywhere — the daemon is shared with the user's unrelated work. ## Claude Code settings: two invented keys, one inverted default, one sticky bug Verified against code.claude.com/docs/en/settings-reference.md and env-vars.md. * `effort` -> **`effortLevel`**, the key Claude Code actually reads; the old one was written and silently ignored. `xhigh` added to the dropdown. * `focusMode` -> **`viewMode: "focus"`**. `focusMode` was invented. The real key does exactly what the existing UI hint already described. * **Session recap was inverted.** Claude Code's recap is on by default, so `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY=1`-when-enabled was a no-op and the control could never turn the recap *off*. The field is renamed to `session_recap_disabled` rather than reused: reusing the name with the opposite meaning would have read every stored `enable_session_recap: false` — which is every project that never touched the control — as "the user turned this off". * **The stickiness, which is the important one.** Keys were emitted only when non-default, and the entrypoint *merges* into a settings.json on a persisted volume, so switching a setting off omitted its key, the merge preserved the stale on-value, and the setting stayed on until a destructive Reset. The fix already existed in the same file — the sandbox block is emitted unconditionally for exactly this reason — and is now applied to all five keys. A key whose neutral state is *unset* (`tui`, `effortLevel`, `viewMode`, `awaySummaryEnabled`) is emitted as JSON `null` and the entrypoint deletes it, because a stand-in value is not neutral: `tui: "default"` pins the classic renderer where unset lets Claude Code choose, and `viewMode: "default"` overrides the user's own sticky `/focus` choice. * The same stickiness existed, unnoticed, in the **env vars**: `docker commit` bakes container env into the snapshot image, so a `=1` written once rode it forever. All four are now emitted on every create, extracted into `claude_code_env_vars` and unit tested. Two use an empty value for "off" rather than `0`, because they outrank a setting the user can change from inside their own container and Triple-C's default must not overrule a `/config` choice it never asked about. * TUI mode is now a genuine three-way choice (automatic / classic / fullscreen), which the always-emitted key makes both necessary and possible. `merge_claude_code_settings` is untouched by choice: a project-level OFF still cannot override a globally-ON setting. Tests: 364 frontend (+5), 308 Rust (+23), covering the scrub path list and script, log rotation, pin reaping, and that toggling a setting off actually clears a previously-set ON value. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 08:35:10 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	22d142c70d	Shift+Enter newline, OAuth URL truncation, and the auth bridge toggle ... Three fixes that all land on the same journey: sign in, paste a prompt, and have the terminal behave the way every other Claude Code host does. Shift+Enter inserts a newline ----------------------------- xterm.js does not consult `shiftKey` for Enter (`Keyboard.ts`, case 13), so Shift+Enter was byte-identical to Enter and submitted the prompt. Both terminals now send `\x1b\r` (ESC+CR) instead, which Claude Code parses as return+meta — the same bytes its own `/terminal-setup` writes into the VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed keymaps, so this is in-band rather than a guess. Not `\n`: Claude Code accepts it, but a shell would run the line, so the two session types would diverge. Bound in Claude sessions only for that reason. `entrypoint.sh` sets `shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled` in `~/.claude.json` so the CLI stops printing its "run /terminal-setup" tip. Purely cosmetic — the decoding is unconditional either way. Alt+Enter has always done the same thing (xterm ESC-prefixes on altKey) and was simply never documented. It is now, along with the rest. OAuth login URL truncation -------------------------- Two producers wrote one toast slot, last-writer-wins. The OSC 7777 relay delivers the URL base64-encoded and therefore exact; ~300 ms later the screen-scraper's debounce fired and overwrote it with a truncated guess at the same link — a URL that parses, points at the right host, and authorises nothing. The user is the one who has to notice. Why the scraper truncated: `ANSI_RE` strips OSC sequences wholesale, including the OSC 8 hyperlink whose parameter carries the complete URL. Claude Code slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the terminal width while every emission carries the whole URL in its parameter. The backend already knew this (`commands/auth_token_commands.rs`); the frontend did not. - `urlDetector` now reads OSC 8 targets out of the raw buffer before stripping, filtered by a port of `usable_sign_in_link`, and tags every candidate with its provenance. - The prompt slot gained `supersedes`: better provenance always wins, worse never does, and between equals only a candidate that *extends* what is showing may replace it. That last rule is `extendsUrl`, factored out of `pickSignInUrl` rather than copied — same rule, same reason, one implementation. - `flatten` splits on a bare `\r` as well as on `\r?\n`, so a `\r`-repainted TUI frame no longer inflates a line past the width and suppresses a join that should have happened; and the width is now sampled at `feed()` rather than read at `scan()`, so a resize inside the 300 ms debounce cannot reassemble 80-column text against a 120-column rule. Also corrects the comment claiming `acquire_claude_token` enables the auth bridge. It deliberately does not, and the module comment in `auth_token_commands.rs` explains at length why not. The auth bridge toggle ---------------------- `setAuthBridgeEnabled` and `getAuthBridgeStatus` had zero call sites: the Rust was complete, the IPC wrapper shipped, and there was nowhere to click — so the docs told users to "enable the Auth Bridge" for a switch that did not exist. `AuthBridgeRow` is that switch, in Config → Runtime. It deliberately does not go through the tab's stopped-only save: the dedicated command exists so the bridge can be flipped while a login is hanging in a running container, which is the only moment anyone reaches for it. It also subscribes to `auth-bridge-changed`, which the poller has been emitting to nobody — so a host port the bridge could not take was a completely silent failure, indistinguishable from a login that hung. `tunnel.rs` promotes the best-effort `::1` bind failure from debug to a warning recorded on the port. Half-bound is the failure mode that looks like success: the status says bridged, and a client that resolves `localhost` to `::1` without falling back is still refused. Finally, for a recognised Anthropic sign-in URL the toast now leads with "In container" and demotes the host "Open". The callback listener is inside the container, so the container-side browser closes the loop with no host round trip and no auth bridge; the host button stays as the fallback. Ordinary URLs are unchanged. Tests: 402 frontend (was 359), 285 Rust (unchanged). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 08:31:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	15e05e2197	Turn the Files tab into a real file manager ... Rename, an in-app viewer for text and images, host-to-container drag and drop, New folder, keyboard operation — plus the pre-existing bugs the new surface would otherwise have been built on top of. New Tauri commands (file_commands.rs, registered in lib.rs): * rename_container_path — `mv -n -- <from> <parent>/<name>` through exec_oneshot_as, so the *exit code* is checked. exec_oneshot discards the status and interleaves stderr into stdout, which would have made a permission failure look like a success. `mv -n` on its own is not enough either: GNU coreutils makes its refusal to clobber silent and exits 0, so an explicit `test -e` on the destination is what turns a name clash into an error the user sees. `mv`'s own words are surfaced, since renames outside /workspace legitimately fail on permissions. The new name is validated in Rust (no `/`, no NUL, not "." / ".." / empty, ≤255 bytes) — it is user text going into argv, and a name with a separator would be a move rather than a rename. * read_container_file — exact bytes via Docker's archive endpoint, returned as base64. Deliberately not exec_oneshot, which runs every chunk through String::from_utf8_lossy and merges stderr, so it would corrupt any non-UTF-8 file and could splice diagnostics into content. Base64 rather than Vec<u8> because Tauri serialises a byte vec as a JSON number array. Capped and truncation-reporting; the caller picks the cap (images get 5 MiB against text's 1 MiB, being the kind that blows a text-sized budget) and Rust clamps it to 8 MiB regardless. * create_container_directory — `mkdir` without -p, so a clash is an error rather than a silent success. Named for its siblings rather than the bare `create_directory` in the brief. The tar-extraction half of download_container_file is now the shared fetch_container_file() both commands use, and it abandons the transfer once a capped read has what it needs. Frontend: * Single click selects, double click opens. Directory navigation moved onto double click too — a single click used to navigate, which made it impossible to select a directory in order to rename it. Rows are now focusable and the table is a real `grid`: Enter opens, F2 renames, arrows walk the rows. No outline suppression; the global :focus-visible ring is what shows focus. * FileViewerModal (built on ui/Modal, the only correct dialog) renders text in a <pre> and images from a revocable blob: URL. tauri.conf.json's img-src had neither `data:` nor `blob:`, so an in-app image was blocked by CSP; `blob:` is added — revocable, and no megabytes of base64 in the DOM. The asset protocol stays disabled. Anything else gets a "Save to host" state instead of a broken preview, decided by extension and then by sniffing the bytes for NUL. * Host drag-and-drop uses Tauri's native onDragDropEvent, mirroring TerminalView: HTML5 ondrop carries no paths and is blocked in the webview on Windows by dragDropEnabled, which the terminal needs. The listener is window-wide, so it routes by hit-testing the payload position (physical pixels, hence the devicePixelRatio divide) against the pane's rect — a hidden pane has a zero-size rect and never matches, which is what keeps this and the terminal's listener apart. enter/over/leave drive a drop highlight. * Per-row Download is now "Save to host…"; directories no longer offer it. Pre-existing bugs fixed: * Uploaded files landed root:root with a 1970 mtime. tar::Header::new_gnu() zeroes uid/gid/mtime and Docker honours the header verbatim, so uploads were not writable by `claude`. All four single-file tar builds now go through build_single_file_tar() with the container user's ids, read from the container because entrypoint.sh remaps them to the host user on Unix and deliberately does not on Windows. * Symlinked directories could not be opened: `find -printf '%y'` reports `l`. The listing now prints `%Y` as well, so is_directory dereferences and a new is_symlink carries what `%y` used to say. The row labels the link. * upload_file_to_container had no size cap and did a synchronous fs::read on an async worker. Now 256 MiB (matching the terminal drop path) with the read and tar build in spawn_blocking, and the host mtime preserved. * A directory passed to upload reached fs::read and produced an opaque "Is a directory". Rejected with an explanation instead — recursive upload is a larger feature than this panel needs. * download_container_file wrote the *first tar entry*, so downloading a directory silently produced a garbage file. Non-regular entries are now an explicit error. Tests: 46 new (33 frontend across FilesTab, useFileManager and filePreview; 12 Rust covering the find-output parser and the rename validator, neither of which had any). 405 frontend / 297 Rust, both green. No drag-out dependency was added — tauri-plugin-drag is not introduced and OS drag-out is not attempted; that stays deferred, with "Save to host…" as the way files leave the container. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc	2026-08-23 08:30:48 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	dcb13d23ea	Fix what review found in the skill: five real defects ... Adversarial review of #29 found bugs I confirmed by reproducing each one. **Every hand-written error message was unreachable.** `tok=$(curl ...)` is a plain assignment, so `set -e` acts on the command substitution before the following `|| die` can run. A wrong password produced exit 22 and no output at all — the most likely way this gets used wrongly, and the least explained. All four captures now go through a `run` helper that takes a *description* rather than echoing the command, because one of them carries the account password in `-u`. **`up` was not idempotent, and the second run destroyed DNS.** The resolv.conf backup was copied unconditionally, so `up --full` twice overwrote the good backup with PIA's own resolvers; the later `down` then "restored" those and left the container with no working DNS and no way back. `up` now runs `down` first. Verified: two `up --full` runs, then `down`, and the backup still holds the original 192.168.65.7. **An empty gateway produced total connectivity loss, reported as healthy.** `$gw` was never validated and `add_route` swallowed every failure to /dev/null. The two half-routes need no gateway and would succeed, so the tunnel captured everything while the exclusions keeping DNS and the Docker host reachable silently did not exist — and `status` still printed "full tunnel". Routes are now fatal on failure, and a via-less default (`$3` is the literal "eth0") is rejected. **The PIA session token was in the process arguments** — confirmed in `ps` and /proc/*/cmdline, a ~24h bearer credential for the account readable by anything in the container. It now goes to curl on stdin as a config. Verified: 60 polls across a full `up`, zero sightings. **The preflight diagnosed the wrong kernel module.** It checked /dev/net/tun and blamed the tun module, but kernel WireGuard is a netlink interface and does not use it — verified by creating one with NET_ADMIN and no tun device. The check is dropped (the container could not have started without the device anyway) and `ip link add` now reports the real dependency. Also: a full tunnel with no DNS servers from PIA used to warn and carry on, which is a tunnel leaking every lookup while reporting itself healthy — now fatal. `down` validates the backup before restoring it, so a truncated one cannot leave the container with no resolver at all. `wg.priv` is shredded on teardown and created under umask 077, because /run rides `docker commit` into the snapshot image. A mistyped `up --ful` is rejected instead of silently giving a test route. entrypoint: `install_feature_skill` gets `local`, a blank-name guard (the disabled branch would otherwise `rm -rf` the whole skills directory under a persisted volume), `-e`/`-L` so a leftover *file* at the destination is cleaned up, and a chown of the parent so `claude` can still add skills of their own when Mission Control is off. When the base image predates the skill it now says so instead of returning silently — and `/opt/triple-c-skills` joins FEATURE_PROBES so the migration pre-flight reports it. Docs corrected to match: neither half reaches an existing project without a migration. `vpn_env_var` extracted and tested, pinning the property the whole removal path rests on — that the variable is emitted as 0 rather than omitted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 17:11:50 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	3bd3caa101	Ship a pia-vpn skill with the VPN support toggle ... The toggle grants CAP_NET_ADMIN and /dev/net/tun and stops there, which users reasonably read as "turn the VPN on" — the gap between the two is the reported bug that the default network does not route through a VPN. Close it by giving the container an agent-usable way to build the tunnel, rather than leaving each project to rediscover it. container/skills/ is baked to /opt/triple-c-skills and installed into ~/.claude/skills/ by entrypoint.sh from VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED, mirroring how Mission Control installs its own. Staged under /opt because ~/.claude is a volume mount that would mask an image copy from first start. Three details that are not incidental: - The variable is sent as 0 rather than omitted when off, because ~/.claude persists: entrypoint has to be *told* to remove a skill left by an earlier run with the toggle on, and an absent variable cannot say that. A stale skill is worse than none, since it instructs an agent to use a capability the container no longer has. - It is reserved in RESERVED_ENV_EXACT alongside MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED, or a custom env var of the same name could claim the skill without the capability behind it. Covered by a test. - The skill is re-copied on every start, rm -rf'd first, so fixes reach existing projects and files dropped from a later version do not linger. The skill itself carries the three things that are easy to get wrong: that a full tunnel captures the Docker resolver and takes DNS down with it, that an IP-literal health check cannot see a dead resolver, and that no tunnel survives a restart while /run state riding the snapshot makes it look as though one did. It also states what it deliberately does not do — no killswitch, no autostart — so an agent proposes those as decisions rather than improvising them. pia-wg.sh preflights CAP_NET_ADMIN by capability bit rather than letting the first `ip` call fail with a bare EPERM that points nowhere near the setting that needs changing. Credentials stay in a file (~/pia-creds, PIA_CREDS to override) rather than the environment, where docker inspect and every process in the container would see them. Tested: install/refresh/remove/no-op paths of install_feature_skill against the real function; preflight with and without the capability; and a full up --full / down round trip, confirming DNS via PIA's resolvers, api.anthropic.com reachable through the exit, and routes and resolv.conf restored on teardown. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 17:11:23 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	5dd1ab5217	Stop resting the iptables case on a kernel config I cannot verify ... Round 3 argued the macOS rationale is stale: that Docker Desktop no longer builds from linuxkit/linuxkit and has enabled nft_fib_ipv4 since 4.35. I could not confirm or refute that from a Linux host — searching turned up no version matrix either way. But the decision does not depend on it, and the comment should not have implied it did. `xt_CONNMARK`, which the iptables path needs, was present in every kernel config examined. `nft_fib_ipv4`, which the nft path needs, was absent from the config read here and may be present in current Docker Desktop. That asymmetry is the actual argument: nftables' viability varies by Docker Desktop version in a way nobody here can pin down, iptables' requirement did not vary anywhere it was checked. If nft_fib_ipv4 is present this costs 1.6 MB and nothing else; if it is absent it is the difference between a working full tunnel and none. Rewritten to say that, and to say plainly what is verified versus assumed — this is the third round in which the previous round's central premise did not survive, and a confidently-worded paragraph is what the next round inherits. Also from review: - CLAUDE.md still said "`iptables` is deliberately absent", the opposite of what this PR now does, contradicting the Dockerfile and both other docs. - The Dockerfile referenced "the pia-vpn skill", which does not exist on this branch — the third forward reference of that kind, now gone. - "full tunnels work on native Linux, Mac and WSL2 6.6" was unconditional and contradicted ten lines later by the `DNS =` concession, which stops them on every platform. Reordered so the DNS hurdle is named as the first one. - The WSL2 gap was written as a permanent platform limitation. It is a stale install: `wsl --update` moves the host to a current kernel that has the symbol. That remedy was missing from the user-facing doc. - The migration probe label carried an internal comma, which `joinFeatures` renders into a comma-joined list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 17:11:17 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	92d64cf252	Ship iptables, not nftables — nftables forfeits macOS ... Re-review overturned the previous commit's package choice, and verifying it proved the reviewer right. `wg-quick` picks nft *unconditionally* when it is present (`type -p nft`, line 241), so installing nftables makes the iptables path unreachable. Its nft ruleset then needs a third expression family the iptables path does not. Isolating the rules on this host, the two connmark rules install fine and this is what fails: nft add rule ... fib saddr type != local drop Error: Could not process rule: No such file or directory That decides it, because of how the hosts differ. LinuxKit's kernel config — Docker Desktop for Mac, identical on x86_64 and aarch64: CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_CONNMARK=y <- the iptables path works # CONFIG_NFT_FIB_IPV4 is not set <- the nft path does not So nftables would have broken the platform it was added to fix. With iptables, full tunnels work on native Linux, Docker Desktop for Mac, and WSL2 from 6.6. Costs 7,203 kB rather than 5,614 kB on amd64. That also means the mechanism the previous commit documented was wrong: with nftables installed `xt_CONNMARK` is never consulted, and the real blocker on that path is `nft_fib_ipv4`. Rewritten around what actually fails. A second failure neither round had found: `wireguard-tools` only *Suggests* `openresolv | resolvconf`, so neither is installed, and every provider's stock config has a `DNS =` line. That fails in `set_dns()` — before any routing — so it takes split tunnels down too, contradicting what this PR previously claimed: [#] resolvconf -a sp -m 0 -x /usr/bin/wg-quick: line 32: resolvconf: command not found EXIT=127 Not fixed, deliberately: `openresolv` has no installation candidate on noble, and `resolvconf` resolves only by pulling in systemd-resolved — a resolver daemon and systemd units, into a container with no systemd. Documented instead. Smaller corrections from the same review: - the size caveat blamed ~209 kB of libelf1t64; for this package set the real over-count is libelf1t64 + netbase. Restated, and arm64 now given against the real base rather than left as a bare-ubuntu figure. - the manual-install fallback omitted `iproute2`, so it left the user without `ip` — the command the tunnel needs most. - "Without it" had been orphaned from its antecedent by inserted paragraphs and read as referring to configuring a tunnel. - the migration probe said "VPN support", presenting VPN as a feature gained to users who never enabled it. Now names the tools and the toggle. - "What's Inside the Container" gains a row; the key-material-in-snapshot hazard was in CLAUDE.md only, and is the one genuinely user-facing warning here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 16:24:07 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	ab2c75d0b2	Ship a firewall backend, and correct three claims review disproved ... Review of #28 found the iptables exclusion was justified by a false premise, and I confirmed it: `wireguard-tools` declares `Recommends: nftables | iptables`, `--no-install-recommends` strips it, and `wg-quick`'s add_default() shells out to a firewall backend with no `type -p` guard. Measured on the image as this PR shipped it: [#] iptables-restore -n /usr/bin/wg-quick: line 32: iptables-restore: command not found wg-quick EXIT=127 That fires for `AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0` — every stock full-tunnel config from every provider — not for a desktop client's killswitch as the comment claimed. Split tunnels are unaffected. Ship `nftables` rather than `iptables`: wg-quick prefers it (`type -p nft`, so with both installed iptables is dead weight), it is first in the package's own Recommends, and it is half the size. The review's proposed fix stopped there; it does not hold. Adding nftables does not make wg-quick work on this host, and neither does iptables: Warning: Extension CONNMARK revision 0 not supported, missing kernel module? `Table=auto` routes by fwmark and needs xt_CONNMARK from the *host* kernel. WSL2 has none and containers have no /lib/modules to load one from. So this fixes native Linux and Docker Desktop for Mac — which other WHP users are on — and cannot fix Docker Desktop for Windows, where the answer is to add routes with `ip route` directly. Documented rather than left to be rediscovered. Also from review: - "`ip` and `wg` are always present" was false. A project keeps the base image it was first built from, so this reaches new projects only. Reworded to match the wording already used for the Playwright libraries, and `/usr/bin/wg` added to FEATURE_PROBES so an existing project is *told* it is missing VPN tooling and prompted to migrate, rather than finding out via `wg: command not found`. - "no client is installed" contradicted shipping `wg` four lines earlier. The true claim is that no tunnel is configured or started. - The size figure measured against bare ubuntu:24.04, which over-counts by the ~209 kB of libelf1t64 the real base already has, and covered one arch. Now measured against the current base on amd64 and stated for arm64 too, per the standard CLAUDE.md sets for the Playwright layer. - `/run` persistence conflated two mechanisms: same-container files on a stop/start, `docker commit` on a recreation. Both stated, plus the corollary that key material written to /run ends up inside a snapshot image — observed, a `wg.priv` was already sitting in one. - The DNS bullet presented a Docker Desktop address as the general case. Now leads with the mechanism, notes 127.0.0.11 on a user-defined network is unaffected, and adds the two things the advice omitted: a resolver the tunnel can reach (or it leaks every query), and pinning the endpoint via the old gateway (or the tunnel routes through itself). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-17 13:55:44 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	2b35aa8c16	Explain a missing tun device where the failure actually happens ... Review caught that the device guard was wired to the wrong call. The daemon does not resolve `--device` at create: verified against Docker 29.7, `docker create --device /dev/does-not-exist` succeeds and prints an id, and runc only resolves the device — and validates sysctls — when it builds the container. So on a host with no tun module the create returns fine and `start` fails, which means the explanation never ran and the user saw the raw daemon string naming a path they would go looking for on the wrong machine. The unit tests fed the create-side string straight in, so they confirmed a function no real failure could reach. Move the guard onto `start_container`, covering create as well in case a future daemon checks earlier. It no longer takes `vpn_support_enabled` — `start_container` has a container id and no project, and nothing else in Triple-C ever requests a device, so an error naming /dev/net/tun is unambiguous on its own. The test now uses the daemon's verbatim message via bollard's real Display format. Also from review: * Soften the security claim. Docker does not enable user-namespace remapping by default, so this is a real CAP_NET_ADMIN in the initial user namespace with only the network namespace confining it. It cannot touch host interfaces, but "confers no authority outside the container" was too strong: within its namespace it can set promiscuous mode and add addresses, routes and NAT on the shared docker0 segment, which puts sibling containers — the LiteLLM gateway among them — within ARP-spoofing reach, and it can flush netfilter rules sandbox mode may rely on. Said plainly in the code, CLAUDE.md and HOW-TO-USE. * Drop Tailscale from the list of clients needing this. Its --tun=userspace-networking mode needs neither the capability nor the device, and listing it invites granting NET_ADMIN for nothing. * Say in the toggle's own hint that changing it recreates the container, matching how every other recreation-triggering setting is labelled. The tab's generic "stop the container first" chip does not tell the user what is about to happen. * Add RuntimeSection tests: saves on, saves off explicitly rather than dropping the key, reflects state, is disabled while running, and carries the recreation warning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-14 08:15:05 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	65a3d4eb29	Let a project's container run a VPN client ... A VPN client installed in a container today starts, runs, and then hangs until its connection times out. Nothing reports an error: a default container has no /dev/net/tun to open and no CAP_NET_ADMIN to add an interface or a route with, and clients surface that as a generic timeout rather than a permissions failure. Add an opt-in per-project "VPN support" switch granting the three things a tunnel needs. They are useless individually, which is why vpn_host_config() defines the set in one place and the tests assert all of it: * CAP_NET_ADMIN — Docker's default bounding set has net_raw but not net_admin, so a client can ping but never connect. * /dev/net/tun — passed through from the host so the kernel's tun module backs it, rather than mknod-ed inside. * net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark — WireGuard's wg-quick sets this and cannot from inside a container, /proc/sys being read-only, so its handshakes are dropped by reverse-path filtering. Off by default and deliberately opt-in: NET_ADMIN lets anything in the container reconfigure that container's network stack. It is namespaced — no authority over the host's interfaces or any other container. Capabilities and devices are fixed when a container is created, so this is container state and takes the label-and-compare treatment. triple-c.vpn-support is written unconditionally, false included, for the usual docker commit reason: a true stamped once would ride the snapshot image into every future container and make the switch impossible to turn back off. A missing label reads as false and off is byte-identical to today, so no existing project is churned. Requesting the device fails at creation when the host kernel has no tun module, which would otherwise surface as a project that simply refuses to start. explain_create_failure() rewrites that one error to name the switch and the Docker-Desktop-VM-versus-your-machine distinction, and leaves every other failure untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-14 08:06:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	84a67fcd0d	Stop an empty base-image label from silencing the migration notice ... A project can be out of date and say nothing about it, in two ways that compound: the lineage lookup treats "unknown" as an answer, and the fallback that exists for unknown lineage disappears when its probe fails. `create_container` always writes triple-c.base-image-id, even when the value is unknown — deliberately, so an inherited image label cannot ride a snapshot forever. That makes Some("") the ordinary reading from a container whose lineage was never established. The lookup filtered for emptiness only on the final result, so that empty string satisfied the container branch and skipped the snapshot entirely: a snapshot that had recorded a real lineage was never consulted, and the project reported "unknown" with the answer one lookup away. Each source is now filtered before it can answer, in pick_recorded_lineage, which is a plain function so the case has a test that fails against the old logic. A genuinely pre-label project stays unknown, and should: its ancestor is not knowable, and inventing one would make it look permanently current. The probe is the intended signal for those — but if the probe failed, get_container_staleness returned early with nothing populated, the banner found no gaps and rendered null, and the probe_error it already knew how to display sat behind a gate that returned before reaching it. Silence there is indistinguishable from "up to date", and it is likeliest for the oldest and largest projects, whose manifests are the ones apt to exceed the inspection limit — one real project measured 6.93 MB against an 8 MB cap. An unknown-lineage container whose probe failed now says the check could not be completed, with the reason, under the tone that means unresolved rather than the one that means something is wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-13 21:24:51 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	f3cc1c4c17	Stop Playwright setup from deleting the package it just installed ... Setting up the browser view failed on every container, and re-running it reproduced the same broken state, because the setup destroyed its own work. `install_packages` ran two `npm install --no-save` commands into /workspace, which has no package.json. With no manifest, npm treats the command line as the whole statement of what the tree should contain and prunes the rest, so installing `playwright` second removed the `@playwright/cli` installed first: "removed 3 packages", leaving an empty node_modules/@playwright/ behind playwright and playwright-core. That empty directory is exactly what the pane then reported as missing. The second install now names both specs; the first one is already present, so it costs nothing and is only there to stop npm pruning it. Two failures were waiting behind that one: Nothing in the tree ever configured the browser, so playwright-cli fell back to channel `chrome` — system Google Chrome — with the Chromium sandbox on. These containers forbid unprivileged user namespaces, so it aborted with "Failed to move to new namespace ... Operation not permitted"; on a base image without Google Chrome the same default failed as "Chromium distribution 'chrome' is not found". entrypoint.sh now seeds ~/.playwright/cli.config.json on every start, which is the only way to reach existing projects: ~/.playwright is inside the home volume, so an image copy would reach new projects only. The launch check passed for a configuration the viewer never uses. It launched bundled chromium with no channel, which resolves to chromium-headless-shell, while the viewer's config pins chrome-for-testing — the full chromium build, a separate download. A container could pass every check and still fail in the pane with 'Browser "chrome-for-testing" is not installed', which is what a stale chromium-1217 against a wanted chromium-1237 did. Chromium is now verified on both channels, the sandbox setting is stated rather than inherited from a default, and a failure names the channel. triple-c-playwright-heal repairs all of it on a container that is already broken, including the missing socat that makes the pane report "127.0.0.1 sent an invalid response" while the container side is perfectly healthy. It verifies by launching a browser rather than trusting the preceding steps — which is how the stale-revision case was found — and lives in /usr/local/bin so a fix to it can still reach an existing project. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-13 21:24:37 -07:00
jknapp	88f2e73474	Merge branch 'main' into fix/scheduler-home-clobber	2026-08-12 13:55:37 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	fa4940dd7d	Say when a scheduled task is running ... A run is detached — cron has no terminal, and the app fires it as a detached exec — so triggering one and watching the log was indistinguishable from triggering one that died. Worse, `claude -p` writes its answer in a single burst at the end, so a healthy run shows nothing but its log header for as long as it is thinking. The honest reading of the old UI was "it stalled". triple-c-task-runner now publishes a state file per run (pid, start time, log path) and removes it from an EXIT trap. flock remains what actually prevents overlapping runs; this is purely observability, so every reader verifies the pid rather than trusting the file — a container stopped mid-run cannot fire a trap, and a task stuck on "running" forever would be a worse lie than no indicator at all. Stale files are cleared on read. On top of that: - `list` grows a status column: "running 4m12s" or "idle". - `status [--id] [--watch]` answers "is it still going?" directly, with elapsed time and the tail of the log when there is any output yet. - `run` streams the log instead of blocking silently, and refuses to start a task that is already running. - The Automation tab marks a running task, disables its Run now button, and polls while anything is in flight — including the second or two between firing a run and the runner registering it, which is the exact window that used to read as dead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-12 06:33:49 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	5f990dd28b	Sweep the snapshot commits recreation leaves behind ... Every recreation commits the container to triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest and moves that tag; the image it pointed at keeps its layers and loses its name. Nothing deleted those, so they accumulate — measured on one real host, 7 orphans holding 7.4 GB, three of them from a single day's work. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` removes them, under two conditions that are the whole safety argument. Untagged: every image the app depends on carries a tag, so a project's live `:latest` and a migration's `pre-migration-*` rollback pin cannot match the filter at all. And labelled `triple-c.managed=true`, which `docker commit` copies from the container onto the image — the user's own dangling images are not ours to delete. Removal is unforced on top of that, so Docker refuses while any container is still built from the image, including the stopped containers of projects that are not running; those are counted and left for the next sweep. It runs after a recreation, which is when the orphan it just made becomes removable, and after a migration is accepted, which is the moment dropping the pin turns the pre-migration snapshot into an orphan. Both detached: this is housekeeping, and a full disk beats a project that will not start. Each sweep clears every orphan it finds, so recreations that predate it are cleaned up too. The label string is now a constant rather than four literals, and a test pins both filter conditions in place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 19:01:20 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	9b2f4fe79f	Give the env var its value box back, and stop labelling the secret ... Two separate faults, both reachable from one screenshot of the Global Environment Variables editor. The value input was collapsed to a sliver, so a variable looked like it had lost its value. `inputClass` carries `w-full`, and the `w-2/5` on the key input did not beat it — class-attribute order is not what resolves that conflict, stylesheet order is. The key therefore asked for the whole row, and the value input, whose `flex-1` gives it a basis of 0 and only the leftover space, got almost nothing. Widths now live on wrapper divs, where nothing competes with them. The fingerprint that detects custom-env changes was a plaintext `KEY=VALUE` join, and it is written as the `triple-c.custom-env-fingerprint` label. Labels are readable by anything on the host via `docker inspect`, `docker commit` copies them onto the project's snapshot image, and the recreation check logs both sides on a mismatch — so an API token set as a custom variable was published to all three. It is hashed now, exactly as `triple-c.git-token-hash` already was. Empty stays empty, so "nothing configured" still reads as an empty label. Changing the fingerprint format means every project's label mismatches once: expect a single container recreation per project on next start. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 15:27:19 -07:00
shadow-test	d15faa923b	Give the app a mark that survives being 16 pixels tall ... The icon is now a container with its right wall opened, so the enclosure itself is the letter C, holding a >_ prompt: the two things the app is, in one closed shape. It carries no type, so nothing goes illegible when the shell draws it small, and it uses the app's own accent tokens rather than a saturated orange field that fights the chrome behind it. icon.ico contained a single 16x16 image, which Windows was upscaling into the taskbar and every other slot — the likely cause of the artefact in screenshot_for_fix/. It now carries 16, 24, 32, 48, 64, 128 and 256, each rendered from vector rather than downsampled from one bitmap, and the entries at 32 and below come from a separate optical source: at that size the cursor bar closes up against the chevron, so the small variant drops it, widens the mouth and thickens the strokes. A test asserts the .ico keeps its small sizes so this cannot regress silently. Also adds the icon.icns that macOS bundles have been building without, points the favicon at our own mark instead of the missing /vite.svg, and puts the SVG sources, the lockups and the regeneration script in branding/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 12:01:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	ab747ce53d	Say what "open in container" is doing, and land on the pane doing it ... Opening a page is a container probe, a browser launch, a page load and often a viewer start — several seconds during which the only feedback was the click itself. Worse from a terminal, where the result appears in a pane the user is not looking at. So: the backend emits progress on the existing `container-progress` channel at each step, the Browser tab renders that line whenever it is set — the progress belongs to the project, not to whoever pressed the button, which is what lets a terminal-initiated open report anywhere at all — and the terminal's "In container" now selects the project's Browser tab before starting, so the line has somewhere to appear. Selecting a sub-tab from outside needed a route: `ProjectHome` keeps it in local state, so `openProjectHomeTab` parks a request in the store and the pane consumes it once. Consumed once, so it cannot fight the user's own clicking afterwards. Preview releases now prune themselves to the newest KEEP_PREVIEWS (2), in a job that runs only if all three platforms published — a half-finished run must not evict a good older build. The cleanup workflow's manual sweep stays as the backstop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 11:13:21 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	85ea3956e8	Stop the drag from selecting the tab's text ... A pointer-driven drag is still a mouse drag as far as the browser is concerned, so moving a tab highlighted its label blue — something the OS drag image never did, and the last visible difference between this and a real drag. `select-none` on the tab. The rename field gets `select-text` back: `user-select` inherits, and selecting text is exactly what that field is for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 11:00:06 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	f239fa1c82	Fix three things found by actually using it ... **The drag showed no tab.** Moving to pointer events lost the drag image the OS used to supply, leaving a dimmed source tab and a 2px line — which reads as "some setting changed", not "I am holding this tab". A copy of the tab now follows the cursor, carrying its glyph and its real label, grabbed at the offset it was picked up by so it sits where the tab was. **The URL relay opened a different URL than the one on screen.** Observed: `repo.anhonesthost.net/…/tag/preview-63f3c54` arrived as `repo.anhonsthost.nt/…/preview-63f3c54Butitprovesyournitpick…`. The detector deleted *every* line break to undo PTY hard-wrapping, but a terminal that wraps at a space emits the break **instead of** the space — so deleting breaks also deletes the separators, gluing the following paragraph onto the link and running the match past the host. Only breaks the terminal inserted may be deleted, and those are exactly the ones at the column width. The detector now takes a live column getter and rejoins a line only when it is exactly that wide; every other break becomes a space, which is also what stops a URL match. Lines *longer* than the width are left alone — the stream had no break there, so the one that follows is the application's own. One case stays ambiguous: a URL whose length is an exact multiple of the width is indistinguishable from one that was cut. That is pinned in a test as known behaviour rather than papered over — the candidate is shown in full and nothing opens without the user pressing Open. **"In container" opened a page nobody could see.** It bound the browser and stopped, leaving the user to find the Browser tab and press Start, with nothing saying so — and from a terminal, no pane on screen at all. Opening a page now starts the viewer if it isn't running, and the terminal's prompt raises the pop-out window, because that caller has nowhere else to put it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 10:36:30 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	5b18ce804f	Start the 0.4 line, and give previews the version they are previewing ... Two version problems, one of them mine. **Previews claimed x.y.0.** The preview workflow hard-coded the patch number, so every preview installer reported 0.3.0 whatever it contained, while the real build computes the patch from tags. It now runs the same computation, so a preview is labelled with the version the release it previews would carry. **A new minor line started at the wrong number.** `compute-version`'s fallback for "no tag matches this line yet" counted every commit in the repository — fine as a bootstrap, wrong the moment a minor version is bumped: the first 0.4 build would have been 0.4.234. A line nobody has tagged is a new line, and a new line starts at .0. With those fixed, VERSION moves to 0.4 — tab reordering, the browser pop-out, opening pages in the container's browser and the Playwright install fix are more than a patch bump. The next release is v0.4.0; today's HEAD would have been 0.3.90 on the old line. `app/package.json`, `package-lock.json`, `tauri.conf.json` and `Cargo.toml` follow to 0.4.0. CI patches all four per build, so they are the dev-time defaults rather than the source of truth — but a local `tauri dev` shows them, so they should not still say 0.3. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 10:06:00 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	f68d9c5788	Open a page in the container's browser, at a viewport you choose ... The pane could only ever watch a browser something else had published. This opens one: a URL and a viewport, launched inside the container and bound so the pane picks it up. Two uses, one action — a sign-in page, where the callback listener is *in* the container and the loop closes with no host round trip and no auth bridge, and a dev server on container loopback, which is how you watch a UI Claude is building. Reachable from both places the question comes up: "Open a page…" in the Browser tab, and an "In container" button on the terminal's URL prompt. Verified first, because it decided the design: a second client cannot join a bound browser. `chromium.connect()` against the published endpoint times out in every URL form (`ws+unix://…`, with and without the trailing path) — that socket speaks the dashboard's own transport, not the public connect protocol. Whoever launches is therefore the only process that can drive, so the helper is resident and holds the handle, and live resize applies to pages we opened and never to `@playwright/mcp`'s. Those take `--viewport-size` / `PLAYWRIGHT_MCP_VIEWPORT_SIZE` at launch, which the docs now say. The viewport is the interesting half. Resizing the *window* does nothing to the page — the viewer is a CDP screencast, so a bigger window is the same pixels drawn larger, which is why pages have been looking like they were rendered small. `page.setViewportSize()` genuinely reflows: measured against a `@media (max-width: 900px)` rule, it fires at 800×600 and clears at 1440×900. Match-window mode pushes the pop-out's settled size into it, debounced by generation counter because a drag emits `Resized` continuously and each one costs a container exec. Control is a polled JSON file in /tmp: no port, no second listener, nothing added to the proxy's surface, and URLs travel as argv to `node` so no shell ever parses one. A re-open with a helper already up navigates instead of relaunching — otherwise the second page would throw away the session the first one just signed into. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 09:15:12 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	bd72781482	Install one Playwright tree, and notice when a container has two ... Setup installed `playwright@latest` and `@playwright/cli@latest` together. Verified on a real container, that produces a tree that looks right and is broken: `@playwright/cli@0.1.18` pins `playwright-core@1.63.0-alpha`, npm hoists it, and `playwright@latest` (1.62.1) nests its own `playwright-core@1.62.1` beside it. The two cores want different browser revisions. The browser step runs the *resolved* — hoisted — CLI, so it downloads chromium-1237. Every script Claude writes says `require("playwright")`, gets the nested 1.62.1, and dies with: Executable doesn't exist at …/chromium_headless_shell-1234/… while the pane reports a browser installed, because one is. This is deterministic, not bad luck: every container set up through the pane lands in it. So the viewer package is installed first, and the `playwright` version installed after it is the one that package pins — read from the manifest npm just wrote, falling back to `@latest` only if it cannot be read. One core, one browser revision, both halves agreeing. Re-running "Set up Playwright" repairs an already-split tree. Detection now asks the question directly rather than listing a cache: it asks each resolved copy for `chromium.executablePath()` and whether that file exists — the viewer's copy *and* the one `require("playwright")` returns, since those are routinely different. `needs_browser()` covers "installed but not launchable", and the pane names both halves instead of saying "install a browser" over a cache that visibly has one. An absent field is "the probe didn't answer", never "skewed": containers predating these fields must not be told their browsers are wrong. The Rust side gets that from Option; the TypeScript mirror needed `!= null`, which an existing test caught. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 09:04:06 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	a41d93ea46	Fix the review's findings: drag on pointer events, read the window back ... Ten findings from the review of the previous commit, all applied. **The tab drag is now pointer events, not HTML5 drag-and-drop.** Two independent reasons, either one fatal. Tauri's `dragDropEnabled` blocks HTML5 drag inside the webview on Windows, and it cannot just be turned off — `TerminalView` needs Tauri's native drag-drop event, which is the only one that carries dropped *file paths*. And an HTML5 drag carries a `DataTransfer`: released over any text field in the app, the default handler types `term:<uuid>` into it, and in Config that is then saved with the project. Pointer events have neither problem, and the drag is measured from the tabs on screen rather than from the event target, so the marker and the drop agree even over the marker itself. Escape abandons a drag; a press under 4px stays a click; the click that ends a drag does not select. **`Ctrl+Shift+←/→` no longer swallows word-wise selection.** It is bound on `document` in the capture phase, so in any input — the rename field, Config, Settings — it was taking the OS's extend-selection chord *and* silently reordering the strip. Guarded by `inTextField()`, which excludes xterm's helper textarea: that is an input-method shim, and the terminal is where the shortcut matters most. **The pop-out's state is read from the window, never remembered.** The pane is unmounted whenever another Project Home sub-tab is selected, so "Keep on top" came back Off over a window still floating on top. `get_browser_view_popout_state` returns both facts from the window itself, and the change event carries them. `poppedOut` is tri-state: until the answer arrives the iframe is not mounted, because guessing "not popped out" is what flashes a second viewer onto the browser. Also: `popout::close` and the off-status emit in the supervisor are behind the same epoch guard as the deregistration above them, so a supervisor whose teardown outlives a restart can no longer destroy the *new* session's window; `close()` returns its `destroy()` error instead of logging it and reporting success, since the pane restores its iframe on success; the drop marker is `pointer-events-none` and is placed before the first *visible* tab at or past the slot, so it neither refuses a drop nor vanishes when a `tabOrder` entry renders nothing; and the "Keep on top" Toggle's accessible name now matches its visible text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 07:40:51 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d73096c937	Reorder tabs by dragging, and pop the browser view into its own window ... Two things the UI couldn't do: rearrange the tab strip, and watch the browser while working somewhere else. **Drag to reorder.** `moveTab`/`moveActiveTab` on the store, HTML5 drag on the strip with a marker showing where the drop lands, `Ctrl+Shift+←/→` for the same thing without a mouse. Reordering deliberately does not select what it moves, so a drag aimed at a background tab doesn't yank the main area away from a terminal mid-run. A tab being renamed is not draggable — a draggable ancestor swallows the mouse-drag that selects text in its input. **Pop the browser view out.** `browser_view/popout.rs` opens the view's existing token-bearing loopback URL as a second OS window, with a "Keep on top" toggle so it can float above the app. Window-only: the viewer, the proxy and the container are untouched, so popping out and back interrupts nothing. Three things it rests on: - No capability lists that window, so it has no IPC surface — right for a page served out of a container, and it must stay that way. - The app CSP is irrelevant to it: `frame-src` constrains what the app's document may *embed*, and this is a top-level document. The port range and the token gate are what actually protect it, unchanged. - The window is owned by the session, so the supervisor's teardown closes it. A window onto a viewer that no longer exists is worse than none. The pane drops its iframe while popped out — two viewers can both *drive* the browser, and two cursors on one page is not a feature. `lib.rs`'s `on_window_event` is now guarded on `label() == "main"`. It fires for every window and its body stops every container and exits, so without the guard closing a pop-out would quit the app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-11 06:50:40 -07:00
shadow-test	77567ac2ae	Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feature/corporate-ca ... # Conflicts: # app/src/lib/tauri-commands.ts	2026-08-10 11:20:23 -07:00
jknapp	247f03b48c	Merge pull request #17: Browser view — find every Playwright, set one up in two clicks, bake the runtime libraries	2026-08-10 18:19:25 +00:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	4fdfed7955	Bake the browser's runtime libraries into the base image ... `npx playwright install chromium` downloaded ~150 MB of browser that then died with "error while loading shared libraries: libglib-2.0.so.0" — verified, not inferred, against the current image. The image shipped none of Chromium's shared libraries, which is why `apt install google-chrome-stable` looked like the cure: apt was quietly installing the same set as Chrome's own dependencies. Installing them at runtime instead converges on the worst possible state. The libraries land in the container's writable layer, so they are re-paid after every Reset and *lost* on base-image migration, which replays apt from a manifest. The browsers ride in ~/.cache/ms-playwright, inside the home volume, and survive both — leaving a 400 MB browser present with its libraries gone. So the libraries are baked and the browsers are not: each half now lives where it already persists. The layer runs `npx --yes playwright@latest install-deps chromium` rather than a hand-written apt list. Ubuntu 24.04's 64-bit-time_t transition renamed a swathe of these packages (libasound2t64, libatk1.0-0t64, libglib2.0-0t64, …) and a new Chromium dependency would drift straight back into the launch failure this exists to prevent; letting Playwright name its own dependencies is self-maintaining. It sits immediately after Node — npx is its only prerequisite — and well above the shim COPYs, so editing a shim does not re-run it. The `--dry-run` that follows is a build-time assertion, not decoration: on a platform Playwright has no list for, `install-deps` prints a warning and returns having installed **nothing, with exit status 0**. Without the assertion that ships a broken image behind a clean build log. Measured, on a build of this file with the layer applied over an otherwise identical image: +99 packages, +334 MiB unpacked and +119 MiB compressed (2950 → 3284 MiB, 759 → 878 MiB). Two thirds of that is not reachable by trimming — libgbm1, which Chromium needs, pulls mesa-libgallium, which pulls libllvm20. A chromium-only apt list measures 247 MiB against install-deps' 341 MiB; the ~94 MiB difference is xvfb and the CJK/emoji fonts, kept because the base ships no fonts at all and every page this feature exists to display would otherwise render as tofu. Verified on real builds, both architectures: a `--platform linux/arm64` build of this file installs the same 99 packages and passes the same assertion. On the new amd64 image, `playwright install chromium` with no `--with-deps` and no `install-deps` launches headless Chromium 151.0.7922.34 and loads a page; on the old image the identical script fails on libglib-2.0.so.0. `install.rs` no longer runs `install-deps` unconditionally — that would be a minutes-long apt run for nothing on a current image. It asks `install-deps --dry-run` first and skips the install when everything is present, saying which of the two happened on the progress stream. The check is Playwright's rather than a probe of our own for library names, so check and fix cannot disagree about what the dependency set is. Note that `--dry-run` exits 0 both when everything is installed and when Playwright has no list for the platform, so the verdict is read from its output. Containers on older images stay the normal case until people migrate, and they still work: on such an image the simulation cannot even resolve the package names (the index is cleaned in every base image), which reports as "couldn't tell" and installs — the right answer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:57:21 -07:00
Claude	7a5823cb2b	Inject the corporate CA certificate into containers ... Behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy every HTTPS call inside a container fails — npm, pip, git, curl, the browser-view pane, and Claude Code's own API requests. There was no mechanism at all: installing the certificate by hand inside a container is lost on Reset and had to be repeated per project. A global CA path in AppSettings with a per-project override on Project, taking either a single certificate file or a directory. It is bind-mounted read-only at /tmp/.host-ca (mirroring /tmp/.host-ssh and /tmp/.host-aws) and applied by entrypoint.sh on every start, so it survives recreation, migration and Reset. Four things this gets right that are easy to get wrong: * update-ca-certificates globs *.crt case-sensitively, so a .pem that is merely copied in is ignored in silence. Certificates are renamed, by container_cert_name() in Rust and a mirrored few lines of shell. * The system store only serves curl/git/apt. Node — and so Claude Code itself — needs NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, Python needs REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE/SSL_CERT_FILE, and Chromium reads neither: it wants ~/.pki/nssdb, seeded with certutil (libnss3-tools, added to the image). * Those vars are set from Rust at creation, never exported by the entrypoint — a terminal is a docker exec and sees nothing the entrypoint exported. They are emitted empty when no CA is configured, since docker commit bakes env into the snapshot image. * triple-c.ca-fingerprint hashes the certificate bytes as well as the path, so a CA rotated in at the same location still forces a recreation. Verified end to end against a real container and a self-signed CA: curl, node, python and git all complete a TLS handshake against a server signed by it and all three fail in the same container without it; the env vars are visible from a docker exec session; the store is cleaned when the setting is cleared. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:40:21 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	a5bcc462a7	Browser view: find every Playwright, and set one up in two clicks ... Detection missed the npx cache, so a Playwright installed through Claude Code's MCP setup (`npx @playwright/mcp@latest`, which unpacks into ~/.npm/_npx/<hash>/node_modules and no node_modules at all) was invisible. The probe now globs that cache alongside the existing roots and reports every root it consulted. It also read `has_bind` off whichever manifest resolved first. Verified that npm does not hoist for global installs and that the `playwright` wrapper ships no types/types.d.ts, so `npm i -g playwright` made the pane call a current build "predates browser.bind()". The probe now hops from the wrapper to its nested playwright-core. The messages no longer offer `@playwright/mcp` as a way through setup: it bundles a playwright-core that binds but never `@playwright/cli`, so that route could not have worked. It is named only for what it does do. New `install.rs` + two commands do the setup, streaming on the existing `container-progress` event and re-probing on success: * playwright + @playwright/cli into /workspace as `claude`, --no-save. /workspace is not a bind mount (projects mount at /workspace/{mount_name}), so nothing of the user's is touched, no sudo is needed, and Node resolves it from scripts in the project. * A browser, as its own action with the size stated first: apt libraries as root, then the download, then a real headless launch to prove it works. The base image ships none of Chromium's shared libraries, which is why a download could succeed and the browser still not start. Chromium and the Chrome channel are both offered — @playwright/mcp asks for `chrome` specifically. A certificate failure is reported as a container trust-store problem rather than a broken install. Installing is always user-initiated; opening the tab only probes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 10:15:02 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	c3f92674b1	Fix the shared Claude auth flow: whole sign-in URL, recoverable rejected code ... Two compounding bugs made `claude setup-token` unusable, both measured against 2.1.226 under a pty rather than reasoned about. **The sign-in URL was truncated.** The CLI emits it as an OSC 8 hyperlink and slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the terminal width: a 346 character URL arrives at 80 columns as five separate hyperlink emissions, each carrying the whole URL in its parameter and 80 characters of it on screen. The transcript scraper picked up the first slice — a URL that parses, points at claude.com, and cannot authorise anything. The ANSI stripper now surfaces the OSC 8 target and `claude-token-link` carries it to the UI, which prefers it over the scraped text. It still goes through `sanitizeRelayUrl` with the ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS allowlist before display and again before `openUrl` — an OSC 8 parameter is never rendered, which makes it the easier place to hide a hostile host, not a trusted one. The wrapped-display fallback is kept for CLI versions that print a bare URL. **A rejected code hung the flow.** On a bad paste the CLI prints `OAuth error: Invalid code…` / `Press Enter to retry.` and blocks on stdin instead of exiting; nothing recognised that, so the exec sat until the 15-minute timeout with the UI still saying "Finishing sign-in". Given the first bug handed the user a truncated URL, an invalid code was the likely first outcome. The streamed output is now scanned for that message, `claude-token-code-rejected` reopens the input with an explanation, and the Enter is sent so the next code has a prompt to land in — bounded by MAX_CODE_ATTEMPTS, after which the flow reports a failure. An undeterminable exec exit status is logged rather than silently read as success. **A wrapped token was rejected *and* leaked.** `stty cols` fails silently, and an 80-column fallback splits the ~103 character token across two lines: the parser saw a too-short fragment and failed, while the redactor masked the first line — which carries the `sk-ant-` marker — and printed the second, the tail of a live credential, to the UI in clear. `scan_credential_body` now reassembles a run across hard wraps and both the parser and the redactor use it, so they cannot disagree about where a credential ends. A join only happens across a break at a plausible terminal margin (>= 40 columns) and only for a run not already long enough to be a whole credential — without that second guard a repainting TUI welds one frame's token onto the next frame's first word. The length floor is applied to the reassembled body, so a fragment is still never accepted. Also: `stty cols` raised 200 -> 400 (the URL alone needs ~350), and `ESC ( B` is handled as the three-byte charset designation it is — it prefixes every repaint frame, and treating it as two bytes emitted a stray `B` that could glue itself onto a token and make the parser refuse it. `submit_claude_token_code`'s single-write behaviour is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSP2KNPhuWKQ4DL5TZEn3k	2026-08-10 09:57:16 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	2de00b3c55	Fix review findings: secrets in snapshots, URL spoofing, migration data loss ... Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas. This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment. Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly when a tag could not be rewritten. The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken, with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume. URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler). The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as "claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and clicked another. Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the "safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative; data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded while a migration is live. Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion. Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it already conditionally installs Rust and Node. 192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 19:35:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	eb1324cb16	Fix pre-auth bypass in the browser-view proxy ... read_head computed the head terminator index and discarded it, returning the whole receive buffer. authorize() then split that buffer on CRLF and treated every colon-bearing line as a header, last occurrence winning — so any bytes a client sent after the head were promoted to headers. A cross-site fetch with a text/plain body is CORS-safelisted and not preflighted, so a body of a=x\r\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\r\n overwrote the real cross-site value and the gate returned Allow. The same trick overrode Host, defeating the anti-rebinding check too. The result was unauthenticated mouse, keyboard and CDP control of a browser running inside a container that has passwordless sudo — reachable from any page the user happened to visit, with the port range being a fixed 8-wide window that is trivially scanned. read_head now returns the terminator index and the caller authorizes against that slice only, while still replaying the full buffer into the tunnel so pipelined bodies are not lost. Duplicate Host, Origin and Sec-Fetch-Site headers are now refused outright rather than resolved last-wins, since that resolution is what turns any smuggling primitive into a full bypass and no legitimate client sends two. Three regression tests, including a guard assertion that the untruncated buffer really was accepted before, so the test cannot quietly stop testing the bypass. Found by adversarial review, verified by extracting the real authorize() and running the attack against it. 148 Rust tests, frontend build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 18:53:58 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d42b741337	Migrate a project onto a new base image without losing its volumes ... Projects were pinned to the image they were first created from. Both create paths preferred triple-c-snapshot-<id>:latest whenever it existed, and container_needs_recreation compared the container's live image against the triple-c.image label — which create_container wrote from the same image it created from. A tautology that could never fire. The only escape was Reset, which calls remove_project_volumes and destroys the login, skills and transcripts. Measured consequences on this host: real projects are missing socat (so the auth bridge cannot tunnel) and bubblewrap (so sandbox mode does not work), plus Mission Control and triple-c-sso-refresh, and sit 61 packages behind the base including ca-certificates, openssl and curl. Detection. create_container now writes triple-c.base-image-id (the image ID, not RepoDigests, which local-built and custom images do not have) and triple-c.create-image. container_needs_recreation takes the expected create-image and compares against the latter, so the check means something. base-image-id is deliberately NOT compared: a base bump would otherwise silently recreate from the snapshot, consuming the "you should migrate" signal without migrating. Staleness is surfaced, never acted on automatically. Migration keeps the volumes. /home/claude and ~/.claude are volumes and the image's copy is seed-only — permanently masked after first mount — so the login, ~/.claude.json, skills, transcripts, scheduler tasks, SSH keys, cargo, uv, ruff and Claude Code itself re-attach untouched. Only root-level state is rebuilt: apt packages are replayed against the new base rather than copied, so no stale libc is dragged forward, and /usr/local, /opt and the non-bind-mounted parts of /workspace are copied verbatim with tar --skip-old-files so they can never clobber a newer base binary. docker diff is not used: on a snapshot-derived container it reports only changes since the last commit. Raw image-vs-image diffing is filtered through dpkg ownership because it otherwise lies — 8,677 raw path differences on a real project reduced to 2 genuinely user-authored files, both loose /workspace-root files. Crash safety. snapshot:latest keeps pointing at the old image until the final commit, so any crash before it self-heals on next start. Later crashes are caught by reconcile_project_statuses. The rollback pin is a docker tag: 0.057s and 0 bytes. Rollback restores the system layer only — volumes are never touched — and the UI says so rather than implying a time machine. Fixes an infinite recreation loop shipped with the MCP removal. docker commit propagates labels to the image, so a container created from a snapshot inherited its non-empty triple-c.mcp-fingerprint and the one-shot shim recreated it again on every start, forever. Lineage labels are now always written explicitly. Documents the second, separate bug this uncovered: Dockerfile changes under /home/claude never reach an existing project, migration or not, because the volume masks them. Anything that must stay upgradable belongs in /usr/local/bin or /opt, or must be seeded by entrypoint.sh. 145 Rust tests, 227 frontend tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 18:19:12 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	cc5f691677	Add llama.cpp backend, model gateway, URL relay and browser view ... Four features, plus a latent bug fix. llama.cpp backend. Claude Code only ever speaks the Anthropic Messages API — confirmed empirically by pointing it at a logging server, which received POST /v1/messages?beta=true. llama-server implements that natively (verified in its README, alongside --port default 8080), so this is a plain base-URL backend with no translation shim, the same shape as Ollama. Its --api-key defaults to none, so the auth token is a placeholder Claude Code requires and llama-server ignores. Model alias fix. ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL is documented as "also used for background functionality", and Triple-C set none of the alias vars. So on every custom-endpoint backend, Claude Code resolved `haiku` to an Anthropic model id and sent it to a local server that does not have it — background features failed silently. All four ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_{OPUS,SONNET,HAIKU,FABLE}_MODEL vars are now pinned to the backend's configured model, with an optional Haiku override, and blanked for Anthropic and Bedrock so those keep Claude Code's defaults. The deprecated ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL is never emitted. Existing Ollama and OpenAI-Compatible containers are recreated once so the new env reaches them; the snapshot is preserved. Model gateway. Optional LiteLLM sibling container, off by default, mirroring stt.rs — this is what makes real OpenAI usable, since api.openai.com has no /v1/messages. Pinned to v1.96.0 by tag and digest: the 1.82.7/1.82.8 malware was PyPI-only and never affected the official images, which is precisely why this builds FROM the image rather than pip-installing, but 1.84.0 is still the floor for proxy CVEs (API-key SQLi, Host-header auth bypass, MCP auth bypass). Binds 0.0.0.0 because project containers consume it, and therefore always sets a master_key — LiteLLM without one accepts any key. The provider key lives in the OS keychain and is uploaded into a volume, never an image layer or label. URL relay. A container-side xdg-open/BROWSER shim opens URLs in the host's browser. Uses an OSC sequence to /dev/tty rather than a printed sentinel, because the shim usually runs as a grandchild of a process capturing its children's output. Degrades to printing the URL when no terminal is attached, so scheduled tasks do not hang. Only http/https, with control characters rejected before new URL() — which strips newlines, so java\nscript: would otherwise parse as javascript:. Nothing auto-opens; the user confirms. The web terminal shows a tap-to-open banner instead, since that browser may be a phone across a tunnel. Browser view. A Project Home tab that watches and takes over the browser Claude drives with Playwright, using Playwright's own dashboard. Zero image cost — Playwright stays user-installed. It does not reuse the auth bridge's PortForward, which binds an unauthenticated port: correct for a throwaway OAuth listener, wrong for mouse and keyboard control of a browser in a passwordless-sudo container. Instead a token-gated loopback proxy checks Host, then token or a forbidden-header origin signal, before a byte reaches the container. Host ports are confined to 47820..=47827 so CSP frame-src can enumerate them rather than widening to a wildcard, with a test asserting the two agree. 188 frontend tests, 107 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 16:55:28 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	7d00390e1f	Add scheduled task creation, and stop a bad cron unscheduling everything ... Completes the Automation tab: it could list, toggle, run, log and remove tasks but not create them, so task creation still meant dropping to the CLI. Adds add_scheduled_task and update_scheduled_task, plus a task editor with cron presets and a plain-English reading of the expression. Every field is free user text, so all of it goes to the scheduler as a bare argv vector through bollard — no shell, no quoting. Validation is shape-only rather than metacharacter scrubbing: length caps, no control characters in single-line fields, no leading-dash name, absolute working_dir. Verified by round-tripping a prompt containing `; rm -rf /`, `$(id)`, backticks and newlines: it landed byte-for-byte in the task JSON with nothing executed. The scheduler CLI has no `edit`, so update is add-then-remove with the add first — a rejected edit leaves the original intact. The new id is surfaced in the editor rather than hidden. Root-cause fix, and the more serious half of this commit: triple-c-scheduler never validated --schedule, and rebuild_crontab regenerates the entire crontab and pipes it to `crontab`, which rejects the whole file if any line is malformed — with the error thrown away by `2>/dev/null || true`. A single bad schedule therefore silently unscheduled every other task in the container while reporting success. Reproduced directly. It matters because the global CLAUDE.md tells Claude to drive this CLI, so Claude could trigger it unprompted. `add` now validates the expression and exits non-zero, and rebuild_crontab reports a rejected crontab instead of swallowing it, keeping the offending file for inspection. Verified against the real CLI in this container: a bad schedule is refused without disturbing an existing task's crontab entry, and `0 9 * * 1-5`, `*/30 * * * *`, `0,30 8-17 * * *` and `0 0 1 1 *` are all still accepted. The Rust layer validates independently, agreeing with vixie cron on 23 probed expressions including `1/2` and `*/0` being invalid. 121 frontend tests, 44 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 12:20:52 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	cf3b021c72	Confirm before Reset, and rewrite the docs for the new UI ... Reset is destructive in a way its name does not advertise: rebuild_project_container deletes both project volumes, so it wipes the claude login, anything installed in the container, and every saved session transcript. It was a single unconfirmed click in the overflow menu, while the comparably destructive Remove already confirmed. Adds ConfirmResetModal, which names each loss and says explicitly that the host-side mounted folders are untouched. Docs: the user guides still described the pre-Project-Home UI. Sixteen factually wrong statements corrected, including "expand the Config panel" (six sites), the actions table (Reset and Remove are in an overflow menu, Files is a tab), a progress modal that no longer exists, a double-click-to-rename gesture ProjectRow never had, the Full Permissions boolean, an incomplete reserved-env list, and the claim in TECHNICAL.md that OAuth tokens survive a Reset. Both layout diagrams and the project tree were rebuilt from the filesystem. New sections cover permission modes with the exact CLI mapping, Project Home, Sessions, capability tiles, Automation, shared authentication, the Auth Bridge and its security posture, and keyboard shortcuts. Known gap recorded rather than papered over: the Automation tab manages existing scheduled tasks but cannot create them — no add command is registered — so task creation remains `triple-c-scheduler add` in the terminal. 87 frontend tests, 34 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 12:02:35 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	d95ba54a69	Add shared-auth-token UI and make cancelling actually cancel ... UI for the shared Claude token: a Settings section showing token state with Authenticate and Revoke, an acquisition modal built on the shared Modal (sign-in link handed to the host browser via the opener plugin, plus the code input that answers `setup-token`'s stdin prompt — the flow cannot complete without it), and a per-project opt-out toggle shown only for the Anthropic backend. Cancellation: acquire_claude_token previously had only two exits, completion and a 15-minute timeout, and held the single-flight guard for the whole time. Closing the dialog therefore locked the user out of retrying for up to 15 minutes. Adds cancel_claude_token, backed by a oneshot claimed and released in lockstep with the input guard, selected on in the run loop so it wins the race and tears the exec down. The dialog's Cancel now calls it and closes either way. Also refreshes CLAUDE.md, which had drifted: it documented the deleted ProjectCard, and asserted that new IPC commands need permission grants in capabilities/default.json — they do not, that file covers plugin commands only. Adds the conventions that would otherwise bite: container_needs_recreation() is purely label-based and never diffs env, so container-affecting state needs its own label; and #[serde(default)] on a bool yields false regardless of intent. Corrects the claim that Reset preserves credentials. Reset calls remove_project_volumes, which deletes both the home and claude-config volumes, so it wipes ~/.claude, the OAuth token, installed skills and session transcripts. 84 frontend tests, 34 Rust tests, both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 11:49:03 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5	01a2f6aec8	Add Project Home, Auth Bridge, shared auth token, and Tier-1 polish ... Project Home (DESIGN-REVIEW §B2): the project is promoted from a 280px sidebar card to a first-class main-area view. ProjectCard.tsx (1,257 lines) is replaced by a select-only ProjectRow plus tabs for Overview, Sessions, Automation, Config and Files. The PortMappings, FileManager and ContainerProgress modals are absorbed rather than reimplemented. Config gains a Saved/Saving/Failed indicator — save-on-blur failures previously reached only console.error. Tier-1 polish (DESIGN-REVIEW §A): new elevation, muted-accent, disabled and focus-ring tokens; a global :focus-visible ring with every focus:outline-none removed; filled buttons moved to --accent-emphasis and white-on-success toggles retired, fixing three WCAG AA failures (2.1:1, 2.5:1, 2.4:1); a shared Modal primitive with role="dialog", focus trap and restore, adopted by all remaining modals; status indicators that carry a glyph and word rather than colour alone. Ctrl+Shift+W closes a tab, deliberately not Ctrl+W — that is readline's kill-word, used constantly in the terminal this app is built around. Auth Bridge: a general loopback-callback bridge so browser logins run inside a container (aws sso login, Concourse fly login, claude login) can complete against the host browser. Listeners are discovered from /proc/net/tcp{,6} — ss/netstat/lsof are absent from the image — bound on host 127.0.0.1 only, and tunnelled in over the Docker API via socat, which keeps working on Docker Desktop where container IPs are not routable. Falls back to [::1] because Node resolves localhost to IPv6 first, so claude login often binds ::1 alone. Opt-in per project. This extracts create_attached_exec() and moves the existing terminal session path onto it, so there is one attached-exec implementation rather than two. Shared auth token: `claude setup-token` is run in a container, the token is stored in the OS keychain and injected as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN into Anthropic-backend projects. Contrary to the initial design note, setup-token uses an Anthropic-hosted redirect and blocks on a stdin paste prompt rather than a loopback callback, so a stdin command is required for the flow to complete. The token is never logged, never returned to the frontend, and is redacted from the streamed output with a stateful matcher that withholds any tail that could still grow into a secret. Change detection uses a random rotation id rather than a hash, since a hash in a docker-inspect readable label would be an offline verification oracle. Frontend 33 -> 51 tests; Rust 34 tests. Both builds clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 11:35:42 -07:00