Commit Graph
16 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 f662ed04ce fix: a reading nobody consults must not destroy the report
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 11s
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 11s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 8s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 8s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m44s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 5m35s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 7m17s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Review of this branch found the first cut made every probe error fatal,
including one that is usually irrelevant. `snapshot_exists` is consulted
only when there is no container, or when a stopped container coincides with
a busy project -- `pick_probe_source` discards it outright for a running
one. So a daemon hiccup between the four sequential readings turned a full
report into a bare "could not be checked" with Update disabled, in a change
whose whole purpose is handling exactly that hiccup better.

It is now carried as a `Result` to the points that consult it and surfaced
only there. `stopped_probe_policy` carries its own message, because
"try again once it finishes" claims waiting is the only obstacle, which a
failed `image_exists` has not established.

`base_image_id` stays fatal, deliberately: it is the right-hand side of the
comparison, and `image_id` already distinguishes "not pulled locally"
(`Ok(None)`, a legitimate not-stale) from "could not ask". Letting an `Err`
through as `None` would report a project up to date on a reading nobody
got -- #56 one field over.

The message no longer blames the daemon. Three of the four callees can
`Err` from a daemon that answered perfectly: `image_id` maps only 404 to
`Ok(None)`, and the base image name is user-supplied, so a malformed
reference told the user to go fix a daemon that was running fine. That is
the same category of error as #56 itself.

`ContainerState` makes "running is known but no container was found"
unrepresentable rather than merely unreached, so the downstream match has
no impossible arm and the invariant is enforced where it is established.

Finally, the tests covered the new function but not the line the bug was
on: a partial revert to `.unwrap_or(None)` kept them all green. The
readings now travel as a named struct of `Result`s, so that revert is a
compile error -- verified by performing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 19:38:31 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 84a5757c74 fix: do not read an unreachable Docker daemon as an absent container (#56)
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 5s
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m41s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 4m59s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 4m56s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 6s
`get_container_staleness` collected four probes through `unwrap_or`, so a
transient daemon fault landed on the same arm as a genuine absence and the
banner said, confidently and wrongly, that the project has no container or
snapshot image to compare against.

The four readings are now taken as `Result`s and funnelled through a pure
`collect_probe_inputs`, following `pick_probe_source` and
`stopped_probe_policy` in the same file, so the rule is unit-testable
without touching Docker. The first error in call order wins and becomes
`probe_error`; the command still returns `Ok`, because the hook's `catch`
sets `staleness` to null and the banner returns early on null -- an `Err`
here would hide the fault instead of reporting it.

One of the issue's premises did not hold. `is_container_running` does not
distinguish absent from unreachable: its body flattens every
`inspect_container` failure to `Ok(false)`, so only a `get_docker` failure
can surface as `Err`. Its `Result` is threaded through anyway, since that
one case is a real daemon-unreachable signal and this layer no longer adds
a second swallow on top, and the remaining gap is documented where the
decision is made rather than patched in `docker/container.rs`, which the
issue puts out of scope and whose doc comment says the swallow is
deliberate. In practice `find_existing_container` runs immediately before
and would already have errored if the daemon were down.

No frontend change: `probeUnavailable` in ContainerMigrationBanner already
routes a set `probe_error` to "Some checks did not complete".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 06:04:41 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 95a78fe9a3 Take the review: cache the stopped probe, and never let it cost an answer
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 6s
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m58s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 4m43s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 5m9s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Six findings, all real. The one that mattered: `getContainerStaleness` is
called from a `useEffect` that fires whenever the container settles, so
merely opening a stopped project's Overview now committed its whole writable
layer — 44 s on a real project, against ~3 s for the snapshot probe it
replaced. Shipping that would have traded one bad banner for a bad page.

A stopped container's writable layer cannot change, so the probe is exactly
cacheable: `STOPPED_MANIFEST_CACHE` keys on the container's `FinishedAt`,
which moves on every stop. Cold 2967 ms, warm 1 ms, measured. A live test
asserts the restart case as well as the hit, because a cache that failed to
invalidate would plan a migration against a filesystem the project no longer
has — verified by breaking the token and watching that assertion fail.

Skipping the probe for projects that are not stale looked like the cheaper
fix and is unsafe: the deltas would be empty while `probeSettled` stayed
true, and the migrate action in the project menu is not gated on the banner,
so the pre-flight would report nothing to copy while the backend was told to
copy nothing. That is the hazard `canMigrate`'s comment already warns about.
Not done, and written down so it is not tried again.

Also from the review:

- A failed commit no longer costs an answer the snapshot could have given.
  Before this feature a stopped project read its snapshot directly, so
  surfacing this error would have made the banner worse than it was — and
  the failure modes are where the fallback earns its keep: a full disk (the
  commit allocates the whole layer, the snapshot probe allocates nothing)
  and a 409 from a concurrent claim.
- The probe no longer commits while the project is claimed. The collision is
  not symmetric: the probe losing is a retryable `probe_error`, but
  `start_project_container` removes the old container with a hard `?`, so a
  remove that raced a commit would fail the user's Start with an opaque
  error. `stopped_probe_policy` reads `project_lock::held` and probes the
  snapshot instead, or defers with a message that says so.
- The cleanup-failure warning claimed the next probe of the same container
  would reclaim the leftover. Unique names made that false the moment they
  landed; it is `reap_probe_images` that collects it.
- The TS binding still called the command read-only, which is how the
  auto-refresh got added in the first place.
- CLAUDE.md still documented the stable `triple-c-probe-{cid}:latest` name
  this PR removed as unsafe.

548 unit tests, 752 frontend tests, 4 live-Docker tests. Clippy unchanged at
44 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019RSaoDLovVV2wmH4H8VVxz
2026-09-10 20:48:10 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 307ea07409 Read a stopped container instead of claiming there is nothing to read
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 4s
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 6s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m55s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 4m56s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 5m53s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A project that was merely stopped reported "This project has no container
or snapshot image yet, so there is nothing to compare against the base
image" — with its container sitting right there — and Update stayed
disabled. Start it and the checks passed, which is the tell: the staleness
probe had only two sources, a *running* container via `docker exec` or the
project's snapshot image.

The snapshot is not a checkpoint. `commit_container_snapshot` runs only
before a container is destroyed (a config-change recreate) or inside a
migration, never on stop, so a project in daily use for a year can have no
snapshot at all — and five of the six projects on the box that reported
this had none. Absence of a snapshot was being read as absence of anything
to inspect.

So probe the stopped container directly: commit its writable layer to a
throwaway image, probe that, drop it. A stopped container now also outranks
the snapshot, for the same reason a running one already did — the snapshot
lags it by everything installed since the last commit. `pick_probe_source`
is the whole decision and is unit-tested; the message it used to emit now
describes only the case it is true of, no container and no snapshot.

Two things found on the way, both documented in CLAUDE.md:

`bollard` never hands back the image id from a commit — its `Commit` model
deserialises "ID" while the daemon sends "Id" — so the probe image has to be
tagged, and a tagged image is dangling-proof and therefore invisible to
`sweep_orphaned_snapshots`, `reap_stale_migration_pins` and
`scrub_secrets_from_snapshots` alike. Without a reaper of its own a crashed
probe would leak a multi-gigabyte image that nothing could ever reclaim, so
`reap_probe_images` runs at startup beside `reap_probe_containers`, age-gated
for the same reason that one is: `reference=` is daemon-wide and a second
instance's live probe matches the glob.

It removes by tag, never by image id: a force removal by id untags an image
everywhere, which is how a first draft of the reaper test deleted an
unrelated `alpine:latest`. Names are unique per call rather than stable per
container, because container ids do not survive a recreate and two
overlapping probes would otherwise fight over one tag.

Verified against the container that reported the bug: 13,365 paths and an
apt delta of cmake, ffmpeg, libobs-dev, qt6-base-dev and nine more — the
migration payload the Update flow could not see. 546 unit tests plus three
live-Docker tests pass; no new clippy warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019RSaoDLovVV2wmH4H8VVxz
2026-09-10 19:24:05 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 913aa85805 Stop the pre-commit scrub running with its guards silently absent
Two fail-open gaps, both latent on the shipped image and both live on an
ImageSource::Custom one.

`--one-file-system` is the only bound on the scrub's `rm -rf`, and it was
probed into `$rmopt` with `rm --one-file-system --help`. BusyBox answers
that with `unrecognized option` and exits 1, so on any busybox- or
toybox-derived image the variable was empty and the delete ran as root
across mount boundaries — reported as a completed `Reclaimed(n)`.
Measured in `busybox:latest` with a named volume one level below the
match at /tmp/claude-x/inner: emptied, `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUBBED 102423`. It
is a prerequisite now, probed by `rm --one-file-system -f -- ''` — the
code path that matters, with the one operand no filesystem can name — and
an image without it prints `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUB-UNAVAILABLE` and deletes
nothing. That costs Alpine and busybox images their scrub, which is the
cheaper half of the trade: declining costs disk, proceeding costs the
mount.

The second is that resetting `PATH` was never the whole of command
lookup. `bash` builds functions out of `BASH_FUNC_<name>%%` environment
variables, function lookup precedes `PATH` entirely, and `command -v`
reports a function as found — so a planted `stat` passed the prerequisite
probe and then answered the containment checks. Every in-shell answer is
itself importable: `unset`, `command`, and — the point that settles it —
`[`, `pwd` and `cd`, which are checks 0 to 2 rather than merely the
tools. So the script is no longer run by the shell that read the
environment. The exec's argv is a bootstrap using only reserved words,
parameter expansions and command words containing a `/` (which `bash`
refuses to import a function for), and it hands the script as `$1` to a
second `/bin/sh` started by `env -i`. Measured on `/bin/sh -> bash` with
`BASH_FUNC_stat%%` set on the container and a volume mounted at the
match: the old invocation emptied it and printed 306565, the bootstrap
left it intact and printed 65536. `/usr/bin/env` then `/bin/env`, because
H3's lesson about hardcoded coreutils locations applies to `env` too.

The comment claiming the `PATH` reset "defeats it just as completely as
spelling /usr/bin/stat out" is corrected, as is the one claiming a
sudo-written /usr/bin/stat does not survive a container restart — it
lands in the writable layer, which is exactly what the commit this runs
in front of captures.

Also here: a stored project path row with an empty host_path or
mount_name no longer becomes a mount. The first sends `field Source must
not be empty` back for the whole create, so the project cannot start at
all until the row is gone, and no amount of save-time validation reaches
a record already on disk; the second mounts over /workspace itself and
the daemon then creates the other rows' mount points inside the user's
real folder.

And in migration_commands, the deferred-reconcile claim is RAII rather
than a trailing statement — a panic inside `reconcile_migration_now`
stranded it for the rest of the process — and `await_release` looks
before it sleeps, so a project released a moment later no longer costs a
full twenty seconds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 17:09:47 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 00128f9b1a Make the scrub work off /usr/bin, and stop a log level deciding whether it runs
H3 — the pre-commit scrub was a silent no-op on any base image whose coreutils
are not under /usr/bin. Hardening against a PATH-planted `stat` shim by naming
every tool absolutely bought nothing the `PATH` reset on the first line had not
already bought — the shim lives in the persisted home volume, and uid 1000
cannot write /usr/bin or /bin — and it cost the whole feature on Alpine, which
Settings -> Docker -> Custom accepts. Measured on one seeded tree in a real
container: the absolute-path script printed `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUBBED 0` and left
every planted file in place; the PATH-resolved one reclaims 77824 bytes. The
default image is unchanged at 521038.

It was silent three times over, and all three are fixed:

* The script now probes for all six things it needs (`command -v` for the five
  tools, plus the root device id reading back as a number) and, if any is
  missing, prints `###TRIPLE-C-SCRUB-UNAVAILABLE <what>` and no total at all.
* `scrub_writable_layer` reads that marker first and returns a new
  `ScrubOutcome::Unavailable`, warning with what the image is missing; a
  genuine `Reclaimed(0)` now leaves a debug line rather than nothing.
* `commit_log_suffix` renders `Reclaimed(0)` as "ran and found nothing to drop"
  rather than "0.00 MB dropped", which is what a scrub that could not run used
  to look like.

Verified in real containers: the mount-at-the-match defence still holds with a
home-volume `stat` shim first on PATH (the volume survives; deleting the PATH
reset from the same script empties it, so the harness can tell the difference).

H2 — the pre-migration scrub had been folded into `log::info!`'s argument list
to satisfy `#[must_use]`. `log::info!` expands to `if Info <= max_level() { … }`,
so the awaited scrub lived inside the level check, and `logging::init`
tolerates `dispatch.apply()` failing — which returns before `set_max_level` and
leaves the process at `Off`. In that state the scrub never ran and the layer
was committed into the longest-lived snapshot the app takes. The outcome is
bound first now, `logging::init` restores the level on failure and says so on
stderr, and a test scans all four files for an `.await` inside any `log::*!`
argument list.

Also:

* `reconcile_migration` deferred a held project instead of dropping it. Its
  only caller fires once per "Docker became available", so a project held at
  that instant was never revisited for the session — phase un-normalised, no
  resume or rollback offered, pin left `Claimed`. It now waits for the holder
  to let go (20s x 90, one waiter per project) and reconciles then.
* The scrub's byte total counts what a partly failed `rm` removed, by
  re-measuring rather than dropping the whole subtree on a non-zero exit —
  which was exactly the `--one-file-system` case.
* The scrub exec blanks `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_AUDIT` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`.
  `LD_PRELOAD` is in none of the reserved env families, so a project's custom
  env var reached a root exec and injected code into every tool the scrub runs,
  `PATH` reset or not. Verified against Engine 29.7 that `docker exec -e` wins.
* The device test is described honestly: it is a mount test under `overlay2`
  and not under `vfs`, where checks 1 and 2 are what still hold.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 15:47:36 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 ed91423666 Hold back the Disk panel and OS drag-out from the ship branch
This is a scope reduction, not an abandonment. Both subsystems are
preserved in full on `hold/disk-and-dragout` and are intended to come
back once they have been hardened separately. Nothing here is a
judgement that the features are unwanted — three successive
audit-and-fix cycles each closed a critical defect in these two areas
and each opened a new one, so the rest of the round ships now and these
two get their own cycle rather than holding it up.

Removed: the Disk settings panel and its whole reclaim / destroy /
compaction surface — `DiskSettings`, `DiskProjectTable`, `useDiskUsage`,
`docker/disk.rs`, `disk_tests.rs`, the disk commands in
`docker_commands.rs`, and their `generate_handler!` entries. Dropping
the IPC entries is the point: a UI-only removal would have left five
commands callable by a compromised webview, one of them a verified
arbitrary-DELETE primitive. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots`'s *command* goes
with them (the panel was its only caller); the sweep itself stays.

Removed: OS drag-out from the Files tab — `stage_container_file_for_drag`
and its host staging lifecycle, the pointer gesture and `dragPreview`,
`stageForDrag` / `isStagedHostPath`, the `tauri-plugin-drag` and
`@crabnebula/tauri-plugin-drag` dependencies, and the
`drag:allow-start-drag` capability grant, which could not be scoped.
The capability test's expected list is updated; its `*:default` and
`store:*` assertions are untouched.

Kept, deliberately: drag-and-drop *into* the app (Files pane and
terminal) and "Save to host…", which is now the only route out of a
container. The prevention work is untouched — the pre-commit scrub and
`SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS`, capped container logs, the `triple-c.base` /
`triple-c.managed` labels, `sweep_orphaned_snapshots` and the startup
housekeeping, the migration pin/probe reapers, scheduler log pruning,
`formatBytes.ts`, and `project_lock.rs` in full with every acquisition
site outside `disk.rs`.

Entanglements, resolved rather than deleted blind:
* `container.rs`'s `a_compaction_runs_this_module_s_scrub_script_byte_for_byte`
  pinned the compaction Dockerfile against `snapshot_scrub_script()`.
  Dropped — it existed only for compaction. `snapshot_scrub_script` and
  its containment tests are untouched.
* `lib.rs`'s startup reap of `:compacting` tags and `triple-c-compact-*`
  containers is dropped: nothing on this branch creates them.
* `project_lock`'s `Compaction` / `CacheClear` variants and
  `any_held_excluding`, `migration_commands::is_migrating`, and
  `formatBytes{Delta,Ceiling}` lose their last production caller but are
  kept and still tested, annotated with why.
* `projects_store::corrupt_since` and `migration_store::peek_ownerless_since`
  were read only by the disk survey and are removed. The corrupt-load
  marker and `.bak` are still written.

Verified: `npm run test` 611 passing, `npx tsc --noEmit` clean,
`npm run build` green; `cargo test` 419 passed / 2 ignored,
`cargo build` 0 warnings. Every test removed belongs to a removed
feature — no kept-behaviour test was weakened or deleted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 15:20:22 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 6a8972980d Stop an untouched secret field from deleting the stored credential
Making `null` actually clear a secret — which it had to, since a blanked
token was previously never revoked — turned the config editors into a
credential shredder. Secrets are `#[serde(skip_serializing)]`, so the
inputs always render empty whether or not one is stored, and the blur
handlers sent `value || null` unconditionally. Focusing the Git token
field and tabbing away deleted it, with nothing shown and no undo.

`useSecretField` encodes the rule: only a field the user typed in may
speak about a secret. Untouched, `patch()` contributes no key at all, and
Rust already distinguishes an absent key from an explicit null.

`withoutUntouchedSecrets` covers the structural half. `saveBedrock`
spreads `{ ...bedrock, ...patch }`, and when that falls back to
DEFAULT_BEDROCK_CONFIG the literal spells every secret out as `null` — so
editing the AWS region would have wiped the credentials as a side effect.

Also here: `WorkspaceSection` no longer saves a half-filled folder row,
which `update_project`'s new validation would refuse on every keystroke
between the two inputs; `snapshots_skipped` is declared on the wire type
rather than widened locally; and `#[must_use]` on `ProjectGuard` and
`ScrubOutcome` — which immediately caught the migration path discarding
its scrub outcome, the one scrub whose silence is expensive because the
layer it declined to clean is about to be committed.

The capability test reads the real file and is mutation-verified: adding
`core:default` back makes it fail. That grant pulls in an unscoped
`std::fs::read` of any host path and went unnoticed for months, because
nothing in the suite read the file at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 13:23:00 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 dcd2dfe5a3 Stop a project id from steering a Docker API DELETE, and stop trusting a store that lost its list
C-2 (critical). `destroy_ownerless_rollback_pin` validated its tag and not its
project id, then interpolated both into `triple-c-snapshot-{id}:{tag}` and handed
the result to bollard. bollard does not percent-encode: `Uri::parse` joins an
absolute path onto the base URL, which replaces the path outright and applies RFC
3986 dot-segment removal. An id of `a/../../v1.47/volumes/<name>?` turns a
"remove image tag" into `DELETE /v1.47/volumes/<name>`. That arm is reached
*because* `find_project` failed, so the id is unconstrained IPC input, and the
typed confirmation is no barrier — it compares the caller's own two strings.

Reproduced against the live daemon, and now a test: with the check removed the
volume is gone and the test fails; with it, the volume survives and a legitimate
ownerless pin still deletes. The reference that reaches `remove_image` is now the
daemon's own repo_tag, matched on the parsed pair, so nothing built from IPC
input addresses the API at all. The same id check now guards the owned arms of
`destroy` and `compact_snapshot`, which build volume names and image references
from a `projects.json` field.

H-1. The ownerless arm decided ownership from the in-memory list alone and then
called `sweep_orphaned_snapshots()`, which deletes the freshly dangling image on
the same pass — so a corrupt `projects.json` could reap a pin whose migration is
still awaiting confirmation, the one thing `pin_is_reapable` orders its
conditions to prevent. It now re-reads the store from disk, runs
`project_store_trust`, refuses an id the store knows, takes the project lock
before reading anything a decision rests on, and checks `has_record`.

H-3. The corrupt-store guard keyed on "empty list + file exists", and
`ProjectsStore::new()` swallows a corrupt file without rewriting it — so the
first `save()`, as little as starting a project, wrote `[{new}]` over it and the
guard passed with every other project's volumes unclaimed. A corrupt load is now
recorded in a sticky `projects.json.corrupt` marker beside the file, and the
existing `.bak` is no longer clobbered by a second corruption. A missing
`projects.json` is refused too: it cannot be told from a moved or partially
restored data directory, and the genuinely fresh case has nothing to find.

Also: the three migration commands surface the lock's real refusal instead of
substituting "a migration is already running"; `note_ownerless_since` re-checks
`has_record` after writing a tombstone, closing the window that could plant one
behind a valid record and reap the pin with zero grace; corrupt migration-record
copies are capped at four; `reconcile_migration` yields to any lock holder, not
only a migration; and a 22-space run in a refusal string is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 13:11:42 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 6abc7f27a4 Fix disk/migration defects and add a real per-project lock
The compaction panel's headline action had never worked, three reclaim
paths could delete data with no confirmation and no grace period, and the
app's only mutual-exclusion primitive was one-way.

**A per-project lock (`project_lock.rs`).** `ACTIVE_MIGRATIONS` was the
app's only exclusion and everything but migration merely *polled* it once
at entry. Compaction, start/stop/recreate, Reset and destroy now
**acquire** a `ProjectGuard` and hold it for the whole operation;
`is_migrating` is a view onto the same registry. Closes the three verified
interleavings where a compaction commits `flat(A)` over a `:latest` that a
migration, a recreate or a Reset had already moved. In-process only — the
two-instance case is documented in the module, not solved, and the
daemon-wide reapers gained age gates to bound it.

**H1: compaction never ran.** `fold_shell_script` joined the scrub script's
lines with a space, so every build died on `syntax error: unexpected "do"`.
Replaced with the JSON exec form, which carries any script verbatim;
`sh -n` and a real end-to-end build now cover it (159.5 MB / 9 layers ->
33.7 MB / 1 layer, setuid and multi-line env preserved).

**H2/H4:** `reclaim_migration_pins` and `survey_rollback_pins` apply
`parse_rollback_tag` and `pin_is_reapable` like every other path, and stop
double-counting an image with two pin tags. The 14-day grace period is
re-anchored from the tag's timestamp (when the migration *started*) to a
tombstone recording when the record went missing, with clock skew handled
in both directions.

**H3:** `migration_store::load` no longer renames a corrupt record aside —
that destroyed the `has_record` signal both pin reapers depend on. `save`
fsyncs the file and the directory, and corruption backups are timestamped.

**H2b/M2:** a crashed compaction's `:compacting` tag and `triple-c-compact-*`
container are reaped at startup; the stale-container sweep moved from the
end of a compaction to the start, where its doc always claimed it was.

**M5/M6:** orphan-volume deletion moved from a `Safety::Safe` tick to the
destructive path with a typed volume name; `project_store_trust` reads the
real `projects.json` so a second instance's project is not offered as an
orphan.

Numbers: `images_total_bytes` uses `df()`'s deduplicated `layers_size`; the
Total column is derived from the same figure the Snapshot column shows;
partial container/staging reclaims report their failure count; `human()`
no longer prints "1000.0 KB"; `docker_cli` has a timeout; blocking `fs`
calls moved to `spawn_blocking`.

Also fixes `ProbeContainerGuard::remove_now`, which disarmed before the
await and so did nothing on the cancellation path it exists for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 11:45:28 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 2ca86bb5d8 Scrub the writable layer on the migration path too, and de-duplicate CLAUDE_JSON
Two integration fixes after merging the three feature branches.

`scrub_writable_layer` is a `docker exec`, so it only works while the
container runs. `migrate_project_to_base` stops its container one line
before the pre-swap commit, which meant the single largest snapshot
Triple-C ever takes was the one path that committed unscrubbed. Call the
scrub explicitly before the stop instead of relying on the call inside
`commit_container_snapshot`.

Also drop a duplicate `CLAUDE_JSON=` assignment in entrypoint.sh. The
Shift+Enter block re-declared it defensively to avoid a merge conflict
with the awsAuthRefresh block; the conflict did not materialise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 08:38:01 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 dd2894cc60 Stop Docker disk growth, and fix the Claude Code settings that never worked
Two independent sets of fixes.

## Disk: stop the growth, no UI this round

The dangling-snapshot sweep was already correct and was never the leak. The
leak is that every `docker commit` **stacks** a layer and nothing compacts one:
a file deleted after it has been committed becomes a whiteout, not free bytes.
24 conditions trigger recreation+commit, so changing one settings field costs a
multi-gigabyte layer for the life of the project. One project was measured with
14 stacked commit layers, ~5.1 GB above its base.

* **Scrub the writable layer before every commit** (`docker/container.rs`,
  `SNAPSHOT_SCRUB_PATHS` / `scrub_writable_layer`). The one moment those bytes
  are still free to drop is before the commit that captures them. Measured on
  one container's 4.48 GB pending layer: 3.0 GB of agent scratchpad under
  `/tmp/claude-*`, the terminal drag-drop staging area (256 MiB per file, with
  no `rm` for it anywhere in the repo), a PNG per pasted image, and the apt
  lists/cache/logs that `browser_view/install.rs` and `triple-c-playwright-heal`
  leave behind with no `apt-get clean`. A hardcoded list, never a heuristic:
  `/workspace/{mount_name}` is a host bind mount and nothing here may reach one,
  and the three `/tmp` globs cannot select the read-only `.host-ca`/`.host-aws`
  mounts. Failure is a log line — a scrub must never block a snapshot.

* **Cap container logs** (`capped_log_config`). There was no `LogConfig`
  anywhere, so containers ran on the daemon's unbounded `json-file` default.
  Deliberately *not* wired into `container_needs_recreation`: participating
  would recreate every project once, and a recreation costs a commit, which is
  the thing being fixed. Picked up on the next natural recreation.

* **Make superseded base images sweepable** (`container/Dockerfile`). It carried
  no `LABEL` at all, so `orphan_sweep_filters`' `dangling` + `triple-c.managed`
  pair provably could not match one — ~11.9 GB observed stranded. Stamping
  `triple-c.managed=true` is the whole fix; the sweep needed no change.
  `create_container` writes the new `triple-c.base` key explicitly empty, or
  Docker's label inheritance plus `docker commit` would make every snapshot
  claim to be a base image. `force: false` stays, and now says why.

* **Sweep at startup** (`lib.rs`), not only after recreation: probes first
  (a probe pins an image the unforced sweep then refuses), pins second, sweep
  last. `sweep_orphaned_snapshots_logged` exists because all three callers threw
  the report away — `reclaimed_bytes`, `failed` and `unavailable` included.

* **Reap migration leftovers.** `rollback_migration` retagged and orphaned the
  migrated snapshot with no sweep. Stale `pre-migration-*` pins are now
  age-reaped by scanning the tag pattern rather than trusting the state file —
  `migration_store::load` reports an unparseable record as absent, which
  stranded a 4-12 GB pin nothing could name again; `load` now moves a corrupt
  record aside so `has_record` is trustworthy. A pin whose migration is still
  awaiting confirmation is never reaped at any age. The probe container's
  removal was a plain statement after an await, so a dropped future (an app quit
  mid-migration) leaked a container pinning a multi-gigabyte image; it is a
  `Drop` guard now, with `reap_probe_containers` for the case where the process
  itself dies.

* **Prune scheduler logs.** `remove` deleted a task's JSON but never its log
  directory, and the task runner appended uncapped `claude -p` output.

* **Fix the delete copy.** It said "the container, config volume, and stored
  credentials"; it removes *both* volumes and the snapshot image.

No prune UI, and no unfiltered `prune_images`/`prune_volumes` anywhere — the
daemon is shared with the user's unrelated work.

## Claude Code settings: two invented keys, one inverted default, one sticky bug

Verified against code.claude.com/docs/en/settings-reference.md and env-vars.md.

* `effort` -> **`effortLevel`**, the key Claude Code actually reads; the old one
  was written and silently ignored. `xhigh` added to the dropdown.
* `focusMode` -> **`viewMode: "focus"`**. `focusMode` was invented. The real key
  does exactly what the existing UI hint already described.
* **Session recap was inverted.** Claude Code's recap is on by default, so
  `CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_AWAY_SUMMARY=1`-when-enabled was a no-op and the control
  could never turn the recap *off*. The field is renamed to
  `session_recap_disabled` rather than reused: reusing the name with the
  opposite meaning would have read every stored `enable_session_recap: false` —
  which is every project that never touched the control — as "the user turned
  this off".
* **The stickiness, which is the important one.** Keys were emitted only when
  non-default, and the entrypoint *merges* into a settings.json on a persisted
  volume, so switching a setting off omitted its key, the merge preserved the
  stale on-value, and the setting stayed on until a destructive Reset. The fix
  already existed in the same file — the sandbox block is emitted
  unconditionally for exactly this reason — and is now applied to all five keys.
  A key whose neutral state is *unset* (`tui`, `effortLevel`, `viewMode`,
  `awaySummaryEnabled`) is emitted as JSON `null` and the entrypoint deletes it,
  because a stand-in value is not neutral: `tui: "default"` pins the classic
  renderer where unset lets Claude Code choose, and `viewMode: "default"`
  overrides the user's own sticky `/focus` choice.
* The same stickiness existed, unnoticed, in the **env vars**: `docker commit`
  bakes container env into the snapshot image, so a `=1` written once rode it
  forever. All four are now emitted on every create, extracted into
  `claude_code_env_vars` and unit tested. Two use an empty value for "off"
  rather than `0`, because they outrank a setting the user can change from
  inside their own container and Triple-C's default must not overrule a
  `/config` choice it never asked about.
* TUI mode is now a genuine three-way choice (automatic / classic / fullscreen),
  which the always-emitted key makes both necessary and possible.

`merge_claude_code_settings` is untouched by choice: a project-level OFF still
cannot override a globally-ON setting.

Tests: 364 frontend (+5), 308 Rust (+23), covering the scrub path list and
script, log rotation, pin reaping, and that toggling a setting off actually
clears a previously-set ON value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 08:35:10 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 84a67fcd0d Stop an empty base-image label from silencing the migration notice
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Build Container / build-container (pull_request) Successful in 1m5s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m41s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 5m31s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 6m24s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 8s
A project can be out of date and say nothing about it, in two ways that
compound: the lineage lookup treats "unknown" as an answer, and the
fallback that exists for unknown lineage disappears when its probe fails.

`create_container` always writes triple-c.base-image-id, even when the
value is unknown — deliberately, so an inherited image label cannot ride
a snapshot forever. That makes Some("") the ordinary reading from a
container whose lineage was never established. The lookup filtered for
emptiness only on the final result, so that empty string satisfied the
container branch and skipped the snapshot entirely: a snapshot that had
recorded a real lineage was never consulted, and the project reported
"unknown" with the answer one lookup away. Each source is now filtered
before it can answer, in pick_recorded_lineage, which is a plain function
so the case has a test that fails against the old logic.

A genuinely pre-label project stays unknown, and should: its ancestor is
not knowable, and inventing one would make it look permanently current.
The probe is the intended signal for those — but if the probe failed,
get_container_staleness returned early with nothing populated, the banner
found no gaps and rendered null, and the probe_error it already knew how
to display sat behind a gate that returned before reaching it. Silence
there is indistinguishable from "up to date", and it is likeliest for the
oldest and largest projects, whose manifests are the ones apt to exceed
the inspection limit — one real project measured 6.93 MB against an 8 MB
cap. An unknown-lineage container whose probe failed now says the check
could not be completed, with the reason, under the tone that means
unresolved rather than the one that means something is wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 21:24:51 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 5f990dd28b Sweep the snapshot commits recreation leaves behind
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m40s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 5m37s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 6m16s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Every recreation commits the container to triple-c-snapshot-{id}:latest
and moves that tag; the image it pointed at keeps its layers and loses
its name. Nothing deleted those, so they accumulate — measured on one
real host, 7 orphans holding 7.4 GB, three of them from a single day's
work.

`sweep_orphaned_snapshots` removes them, under two conditions that are
the whole safety argument. Untagged: every image the app depends on
carries a tag, so a project's live `:latest` and a migration's
`pre-migration-*` rollback pin cannot match the filter at all. And
labelled `triple-c.managed=true`, which `docker commit` copies from the
container onto the image — the user's own dangling images are not ours
to delete. Removal is unforced on top of that, so Docker refuses while
any container is still built from the image, including the stopped
containers of projects that are not running; those are counted and left
for the next sweep.

It runs after a recreation, which is when the orphan it just made
becomes removable, and after a migration is accepted, which is the
moment dropping the pin turns the pre-migration snapshot into an orphan.
Both detached: this is housekeeping, and a full disk beats a project
that will not start. Each sweep clears every orphan it finds, so
recreations that predate it are cleaned up too.

The label string is now a constant rather than four literals, and a test
pins both filter conditions in place.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 19:01:20 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 2de00b3c55 Fix review findings: secrets in snapshots, URL spoofing, migration data loss
Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas.
This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment.

Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into
the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS
keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were
readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit
body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but
can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token
additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly
when a tag could not be rewritten.

The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken,
with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no
file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what
is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the
token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume.

URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled
strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler).
The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match
tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as
"claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in
front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote
rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the
origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL
remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and
clicked another.

Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged
and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the
final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now
aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was
destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the
"safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative;
data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight
rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different
base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the
migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that
never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving
the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded
while a migration is live.

Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and
advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it
now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a
visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts
retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now
reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge
forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion.

Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe
not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed
a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and
fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now
installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it
already conditionally installs Rust and Node.

192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 19:35:39 -07:00
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 d42b741337 Migrate a project onto a new base image without losing its volumes
Projects were pinned to the image they were first created from. Both
create paths preferred triple-c-snapshot-<id>:latest whenever it
existed, and container_needs_recreation compared the container's live
image against the triple-c.image label — which create_container wrote
from the same image it created from. A tautology that could never fire.
The only escape was Reset, which calls remove_project_volumes and
destroys the login, skills and transcripts.

Measured consequences on this host: real projects are missing socat (so
the auth bridge cannot tunnel) and bubblewrap (so sandbox mode does not
work), plus Mission Control and triple-c-sso-refresh, and sit 61
packages behind the base including ca-certificates, openssl and curl.

Detection. create_container now writes triple-c.base-image-id (the image
ID, not RepoDigests, which local-built and custom images do not have)
and triple-c.create-image. container_needs_recreation takes the expected
create-image and compares against the latter, so the check means
something. base-image-id is deliberately NOT compared: a base bump would
otherwise silently recreate from the snapshot, consuming the "you should
migrate" signal without migrating. Staleness is surfaced, never acted on
automatically.

Migration keeps the volumes. /home/claude and ~/.claude are volumes and
the image's copy is seed-only — permanently masked after first mount —
so the login, ~/.claude.json, skills, transcripts, scheduler tasks, SSH
keys, cargo, uv, ruff and Claude Code itself re-attach untouched. Only
root-level state is rebuilt: apt packages are replayed against the new
base rather than copied, so no stale libc is dragged forward, and
/usr/local, /opt and the non-bind-mounted parts of /workspace are copied
verbatim with tar --skip-old-files so they can never clobber a newer
base binary.

docker diff is not used: on a snapshot-derived container it reports only
changes since the last commit. Raw image-vs-image diffing is filtered
through dpkg ownership because it otherwise lies — 8,677 raw path
differences on a real project reduced to 2 genuinely user-authored
files, both loose /workspace-root files.

Crash safety. snapshot:latest keeps pointing at the old image until the
final commit, so any crash before it self-heals on next start. Later
crashes are caught by reconcile_project_statuses. The rollback pin is a
docker tag: 0.057s and 0 bytes. Rollback restores the system layer only
— volumes are never touched — and the UI says so rather than implying a
time machine.

Fixes an infinite recreation loop shipped with the MCP removal. docker
commit propagates labels to the image, so a container created from a
snapshot inherited its non-empty triple-c.mcp-fingerprint and the
one-shot shim recreated it again on every start, forever. Lineage labels
are now always written explicitly.

Documents the second, separate bug this uncovered: Dockerfile changes
under /home/claude never reach an existing project, migration or not,
because the volume masks them. Anything that must stay upgradable
belongs in /usr/local/bin or /opt, or must be seeded by entrypoint.sh.

145 Rust tests, 227 frontend tests, both builds clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 18:19:12 -07:00