Commit Graph
26 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 5e8e67a0a4 fix(aws): say why a task stopped, and bound every AWS call
- classify_stop is wired into the death watch: stopped_among returns
  each task's StopKind, the tunnel registry keeps it, and ContainerExited
  carries a StopNote. Spot -> 'Spot interruption'; TaskFailedToStart ->
  Error with the reason; the entrypoint's idle exit (75, read from the
  workspace container's exit code) -> 'stopped after being idle'; a user
  stop is applied silently (P8). is_quota_error, dead, moved to tests.
- The SDK config has a TimeoutConfig (30 s operation / 10 s attempt); the
  watch's per-group poll and StopTask also have tokio bounds.
- Watcher tests cover silent sessions, unsaved work with the WIP push on
  and off, a failing push and the idle exit status; docs updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 12:31:28 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 95b68ed068 fix(container): idle stop ignores silent sessions and never loses work
- The agent marks requests with X-Triple-C-Background: 1 (and the
  attach/tunnel sessions they open) as not activity (R11).
- triple-c-idle-watch no longer requires zero open execs/tunnels: idle is
  last_activity older than N minutes, no claude, no scheduler job, no
  running clone, and no unsaved git work. With the WIP push on, it pushes
  as claude before signalling and stays up (backing off) when the push
  fails; with it off, dirty repos keep the workspace up.
- An idle stop exits 75 so ECS reports it distinctly from a crash; the
  TERM trap no longer pushes again after the watcher's push.
- start_clone_repos writes done from an EXIT trap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 12:31:19 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Sonnet 5.5 595897a5fd docs(aws): phase 5 Fargate workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 11:58:42 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 1700cc7985 fix(aws): leave task definitions to admins on removal
Ruling R8. ECS authorizes ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition against * only,
with no tag condition (verified live), so the workspace tier's
RetireOwnTaskDefinitions could never match, and allowing it on * would
let any user deregister any revision in the account. DeleteTaskDefinitions
is resource-level but deletes only INACTIVE revisions, so it goes too.

Removing an AWS project now stops the task, schedules the secret and
(with discard) deletes the access point, and leaves the task definition
revisions registered, saying so in the log: they hold no secret values,
cost nothing, and RunOwnTasks still needs the owner tag. aws/README.md
tells admins how to deregister them. The policy statement, its checks and
owner-scoped rows, the RuntimeApi methods, the fakes, the removal UI copy
and the live test's final assertion follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 11:34:52 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 e901a08ab6 test(aws): live Fargate workspace lifecycle
aws::live_tests::environment::a_fargate_workspace_round_trips (ignored):
a public environment deployed by the environment admin, a role holding
only the workspace-user files onboarded to it and driving ProjectHost::Aws
through a profile connection: start (Hybrid, 1 vCPU / 2 GB, one public
repo), exec, background clone, ~/.claude persistence across stop/start,
attach without a second RunTask, the stop guard's dry run, the SIGTERM
WIP path, idle stop at 5 minutes, bubblewrap, denials on another owner's
revision and secret, and project removal. TRIPLEC_E2E_IMAGE names the
image; a private ECR image gets a test-only pull policy on the exec role.
A guard stops tasks, retires revisions, deletes access points and the
secret before the fixture destroys the modules.

aws/README.md gains the phase 5 results; the spec's To verify items are
answered. Open: DeregisterTaskDefinition is authorized against * only,
so the workspace tier cannot retire revisions (the test's last assertion
fails until that is decided).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 11:30:33 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 074cb28848 docs(aws): correct the 0.25 vCPU Fargate memory sizes in the phase 5 plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 10:31:06 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 a674f6f196 docs(aws): phase 5 plan — Fargate workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 07:47:15 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 6911b9de27 fix(aws): final review round for the environment stacks
Critical
- Owner key is sha256("<region>:<aws:userid>") (12 hex): IAM role names are
  account-global and environments regional, so the same user and env name
  in two regions no longer collide. Every caller, the onboarding module's
  owner_key validation, docs and a two-region test.

Important
- A failed onboarding is Incomplete, not Joined: Joined needs the task role
  and, where the bucket is readable, the state's new onboarding_complete
  output (depends_on every resource); a failed or errored local run or a
  stale lock is Incomplete. Join stays as the retry; Follow, Unlock (own
  key only, stale, conditional delete) and Push saved state work on the
  caller's own onboarding.
- errored.tfstate: the runner logs an Error line naming it, follow's
  summary says so, materialize refuses while it exists, and the new
  push_aws_saved_state command runs `tofu state push errored.tfstate`
  through the same runner (file set aside once pushed); UI on the row.
- Bundle README: the bucket is created with the component tag in
  --create-bucket-configuration (the policy's RequestTag condition), plus
  the TLS-only bucket policy; the boundary bundle names an account admin
  WITHOUT the environment-admin files.
- Destroy-incomplete refuses while any users/<env>/ state remains.
- existing network: data.aws_subnet lookups and a precondition (same VPC,
  different AZs) on the task security group.

Minor
- The TLS statement is added to an existing bucket policy, never put over it.
- Deploy progress is emitted to the main window only.
- materialize checks and writes under start.lock.
- UI: managed-elsewhere label and explanation, Incomplete explained,
  Repair/Destroy disabled under a held lock ("Unlock first").
- Cargo.toml libc comment; README: Cancel unavailable on Windows, session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-15 00:01:32 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 0b3b100a91 fix(aws): review round for the live environment tests and detection
- Live tests never delete a boundary or bucket they did not create: the
  boundary goes only through its module's destroy (no direct-delete
  fallback), ownership is taken only on NoSuchEntity, and the bucket is
  deleted only if this run created it.
- Detection reads at most 200 state objects of up to 2 KiB to find empty
  ones, and a failed read keeps the entry instead of failing the scan.
- Docs: DisassociateAddress on a live association is expected-denied, not
  verified (probe listed); the e2e admin role carries no boundary, and
  why; the spec's tenancy text follows D2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 23:38:21 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 ba88323feb test(aws): live environment lifecycle with OpenTofu as an environment admin; docs
The environment live tests apply the real modules through the real
detached runner (the built app binary) as a role holding only the admin
files: state bucket, public deploy, scan, self-onboard, update with no
changes, destroy; the conditional lock delete (412 on a stale ETag); and
a private-nat deploy. A guard destroys what is left as the account admin
and deletes the throwaway bucket. CLAUDE.md and the spec describe the
OpenTofu design (D2-D10) in place of CloudFormation; phase 4 is done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 23:31:49 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 fe7642ee2c docs: phase 4 plan switches to OpenTofu with S3 state
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 20:43:51 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 f924040f9e docs: phase 4 plan (environment + onboarding stacks)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 20:34:00 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 4694ae60c2 fix(aws): narrow principal inspection to SSO and triple-c roles (R18)
InspectOwnPrincipal allowed iam:GetRole and iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy on
role/*, letting any workspace user enumerate and simulate every role. IAM
refuses ${aws:PrincipalArn} as a Resource and has no role-name variable, so
the role part is now SSO permission-set roles
(role/aws-reserved/sso.amazonaws.com/*) and triple-c-* roles; IAM users stay
limited to themselves. Callers on other roles are probed and reported
Insufficient; the README says how an admin can add their sign-in roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 18:04:28 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 b527c82400 test(aws): live IAM verification of the tier policies; docs
Real IAM contradicted the policies in five places, now fixed:
- IAM refuses ${aws:PrincipalArn} as a Resource, so neither tier policy
  could be attached. Self-inspection is user/${aws:username} for IAM users
  and role/* for role sessions (no role-name variable exists).
- ecs:ExecuteCommand is authorized against the cluster as well as the task;
  added an unconditioned cluster statement (the owner rule stays on the task).
- Secrets Manager needs kms:Decrypt with GenerateDataKey on a customer key.
- elasticfilesystem:CreateFileSystem has no resource type (Resource "*").
- ssmmessages:OpenDataChannel on the caller's own sessions (AWS docs).

The permission check now uses adaptive retries for IAM (SimulatePrincipalPolicy
throttled a full check), and the UI no longer says the simulator ignores
permission boundaries (it applies the principal's own; verified).

aws::live_tests (ignored, env-gated) repeats the verification with throwaway
triple-c-e2e-* roles, secrets and keys. New drift tests: every Resource is an
ARN or *, and every policy fits a 6,144-character managed policy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 17:45:42 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 7e2800989f Plan: AWS host phase 3, connection and permission check
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 15:27:15 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 7462cb05ec AWS spec: phase 2b measurements (SSM, Fargate start, health, re-attach)
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 7s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 10s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Build Container / build-container (pull_request) Successful in 2m25s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 4m36s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 9m15s
Build App (Preview) / test (pull_request) Successful in 10m59s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 15m27s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Session stability, idle timeout and the keepalive that defeats it, Fargate
pull and start times with the chown fix, the ECS health check against the
agent, and what survives the app quitting. The SSM supervisor's drop reason
now carries the plugin's exit status as well as its last output line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-14 12:08:12 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 0f638c7c4e Wire triple-c-agent into the image, harden it, and prove Docker parity
- Crate moves to container/triple-c-agent (inside the image build context);
  the Dockerfile's agent-build stage cross-compiles it on $BUILDPLATFORM for
  $TARGETARCH (verified: buildx arm64 and the classic builder with the app's
  build args both produce static binaries). The app's local build context
  embeds the crate's Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock and src/ only.
- entrypoint.sh starts the agent from an env/cwd snapshot taken before the
  script exports or cd's anything (minus bash's own PWD/SHLVL/_), so execs
  see what `docker exec` would.
- Agent: no TRIPLEC_AGENT_* setting reaches an exec; a token file others can
  read is refused (security review); upload symlink handling documented as
  deliberate parity (claude has passwordless sudo, so no boundary).
- New ignored live test host::agent::live_tests runs every operation through
  ContainerTarget::Docker and ::Agent on the same real container and requires
  identical results. It caught a real divergence, now fixed in agent and
  spec: docker exec sets only HOME, never USER/LOGNAME.
- CI runs the agent crate's tests in the preview test job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 12:19:26 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 ebaafd8cfc Agent protocol spec: correct the exit-poll budget, document nested upload names
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 12:03:00 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 086abd5713 Add the triple-c-agent wire protocol spec (phase 2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 11:53:03 -08:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5.5 1118cfa458 Add design spec for running projects on AWS ECS / Fargate
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 12s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 10s
Per-project host selection (Local Docker or AWS), AWS-CLI-style login,
tiered permission check, detect-then-join-or-deploy environments,
strict per-user tenancy by default, Secrets Manager delivery, Hybrid
EFS/ephemeral storage, in-container agent over SSM port forwarding,
and a phased plan starting with a ProjectHost abstraction refactor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 10:17:19 -08:00
jknapp ee1bb691e6 Triple-C marketplace: agents, skills, commands, hooks and plugins for all or individual containers (#65)
Build App / compute-version (push) Successful in 4s
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 4s
Build App / build-macos (push) Successful in 3m55s
Build App / build-windows (push) Successful in 7m11s
Build App / build-linux (push) Successful in 9m53s
Build App / create-tag (push) Successful in 5s
Build App / sync-to-github (push) Successful in 56s
2026-09-27 23:43:27 +00:00
jknappandClaude Opus 5.5 85901d8a80 CI: run vitest and cargo test on every PR (#61)
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 6s
The PR check now runs vitest and `cargo test --locked` in a `test` job that runs alongside the platform builds. That job is the merge-time guard for the app-command ACL census.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 17:17:14 +00:00
jknappandClaude Opus 5.5 8305c96e20 Terminal file viewer/editor + per-window app-command lockdown (#60)
Build App / compute-version (push) Successful in 7s
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 8s
Build App / build-macos (push) Successful in 2m53s
Build App / build-linux (push) Successful in 5m12s
Build App / build-windows (push) Successful in 5m15s
Build App / create-tag (push) Successful in 3s
Build App / sync-to-github (push) Successful in 1m5s
Clicking a file path in Claude's terminal output now opens the file in its own window with a CodeMirror 6 editor. The editor highlights the target line, live-reloads while the file changes, and saves explicitly with hash-based conflict detection. The viewer commands are gated by window label.

Every app command is now ACL-gated per window through a Tauri AppManifest. build.rs checks the handler list against the capability files and fails the build on any mismatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 17:05:50 +00:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 436b6dd470 Send a lone CR through the newline transform, and say what pinned is
`toClaudePayload` matched `/\r?\n/`, so a bare CR that is not part of a
CRLF went through verbatim — and a bare CR *submits* in a Claude prompt
and *runs* the line in a shell, which is the terminator the function's
own contract says it never appends. A `<textarea>` cannot produce one,
but `load_in` returns whatever a hand-edited or externally written notes
file holds, so the guarantee has to cover that rather than only what the
editor can type.

`Note.pinned` is persisted and sorted on, but nothing in the app sets
it: there is no pin control and no indicator. The spec stated the
ordering rule as though pinning existed and §8 did not list it, so the
spec is amended to say `pinned` is reserved and inert in v1, and pinning
is added to the out-of-scope list. No UI is added — a user-facing
affordance does not belong in a fix wave.

Also renamed NotesPanel.test.tsx's "deletes the selected note and falls
back to another": `useNotes` is mocked in that file and the mocked list
never changes, so the fallback was never exercised. A name that claims
coverage which is absent is worse than an absent test, because it makes
the gap invisible. The real assertion now lives against the real hook in
NotesPanel.shared.test.tsx.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HjL1E2JFNctUqCYotUwqqb
2026-09-01 13:47:01 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 221e7566c3 Plan the project Notes implementation
Seven tasks, each ending in a testable deliverable: the store, the IPC
surface, the hook, the two shared helpers, the send button, the tab, and
the dock.

Two extractions are folded in rather than left for later, both because
this feature would otherwise duplicate knowledge that is already written
down. `\x1b\r` becomes `lib/claudeInput.ts` so the hard-won comment in
`TerminalView` stays the single source of truth for a sequence that must
never be "simplified" to `\n`. The session display-name rule becomes
`lib/sessionName.ts`, which is a fix rather than a precaution: the rule is
currently written twice inside `MainTabs.tsx`, both copies local and
non-exported, and the send-target picker would have made three.

The spec is also corrected in three places against what the code actually
does. `migration_store` is a free-function module with no struct, so the
notes store is too, and the "read-modify-write under the store's Mutex"
line described a shape that file does not have — the upsert takes an
explicit process-wide write lock instead, and the read path takes none.
`useProjectSave` has no debounce; its only timer is a 2500 ms reset of the
"Saved" label. And the storage section now specifies the durable write
`migration_store` uses — fsync the file, rename, fsync the directory —
rather than `projects_store`'s bare rename, because notes are prose
nothing else holds a copy of.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HjL1E2JFNctUqCYotUwqqb
2026-09-01 12:00:52 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 e58e2cdaf7 Design a per-project Notes tab with a send-to-agent action
Notes are discrete, addressable items with a button that puts one into a
running Claude session's prompt. That is deliberately not what
`claude_instructions` does — that field is *ambient*, merged into the
container's CLAUDE.md on every start and always in context. Nor is it a
`NOTES.md` in the workspace, which the agent can read but the user cannot,
once the container is stopped. Discrete items, fired on demand, readable
with the container down, is the gap neither of those covers.

Storage is one file per project under the app data dir, following
`migration_store.rs` rather than living on the `Project` record: that record
is rewritten on every blur by the debounced save path, so notes there would
mean the whole project list is rewritten per keystroke-batch and a note edit
could clobber a Config edit. `migration_store.rs` already documents that
reasoning for itself.

Two findings are worth more than the design they support.

**Newlines already have a verified answer.** A note body has newlines; typed
as raw keystrokes each one submits a separate prompt, so a note would arrive
as N truncated messages. `TerminalView.tsx` already sends `\x1b\r` for
Shift+Enter and its comment states those are the in-band bytes, not a guess,
with an explicit warning against simplifying to `\n` because a shell would
run the line. Send-to-agent reuses that sequence through one shared helper,
and — from the same comment — only offers `claude` sessions as targets,
since bash's readline has no binding for it and merely bells.

**The dock cannot widen the OS window.** A throwaway Tauri app was built and
run on KDE Plasma to find out, because the app has no window-geometry code to
reason from. Under XWayland every test passed exactly. Under native Wayland
the same binary asked +420 and got +600, moved the height +276 without being
asked, compounded that offset on every call, and ended reporting 5400x2900 on
a 4800x2700 monitor. Worse, `outer_position()` did not fail — it returned
`Ok(0,0)` for a window that was not at 0,0, so a "cannot determine position,
do not grow" fallback never fires. A clean failure could have been handled; a
plausible wrong answer cannot be detected from the value itself.

AppImages get XWayland because linuxdeploy-plugin-gtk forces GDK_BACKEND=x11;
the .deb and .rpm do not. The split is therefore by *packaging*, not platform
— two users on identical hardware would see different behavior. So the dock
takes space inward on every backend, which also costs nothing: the
ResizeObserver in `TerminalView.tsx` already reflows xterm and resizes the
container PTY on width change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HjL1E2JFNctUqCYotUwqqb
2026-09-01 11:48:31 -07:00