Merge pull request #18: Inject the corporate CA certificate into containers

# Conflicts:
#	app/src/lib/tauri-commands.ts

CLAUDE.md

@@ -201,6 +201,36 @@ ruff, the OAuth login, `~/.claude.json`, skills, transcripts, scheduler tasks an
 re-attach for free when a container is recreated from a *different* image — which is what makes
 base-image migration cheap.
 
+### Corporate CA certificates (`docker/ca_certs.rs`, `entrypoint.sh`)
+
+A global `AppSettings::ca_cert_path` with a per-project `Project::ca_cert_path` override, accepting
+a single certificate file **or** a directory. Follows the SSH/AWS host-mount pattern: read-only
+bind mount at `/tmp/.host-ca`, applied by the entrypoint on every start, so it survives recreation,
+migration and Reset. Four things here are not obvious:
+
+- **`update-ca-certificates` globs `*.crt`, case-sensitively.** A `.pem` that is merely copied into
+  `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` is ignored in total silence. Certificates are *renamed* —
+  `container_cert_name()` in Rust, mirrored in a few lines of shell in `entrypoint.sh` (the Rust
+  side carries the unit tests). A single-file mount lands at `/tmp/.host-ca/<name>.crt` so the
+  entrypoint only ever sees a directory and the file keeps a recognisable name.
+- **The system store is not enough.** Only curl/git/apt read it. Node — and therefore Claude Code
+  itself — needs `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`; Python/requests need `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`/`SSL_CERT_FILE`;
+  Chrome/Chromium read neither and want their own NSS database at `~/.pki/nssdb`, seeded with
+  `certutil` (`libnss3-tools`, added to the image for this). The NSS step warns and continues if
+  `certutil` is missing rather than failing the start.
+- **Those env vars are set from Rust at creation, never exported by the entrypoint.** A terminal
+  session is a `docker exec`, which inherits the container's configured env and sees nothing the
+  entrypoint exported — the same lesson that made `$BROWSER` an image-level `ENV`. The bundle path
+  is deterministic (`/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`), so Rust can set them up front. They are
+  emitted **empty** when no CA is configured, for the `MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS` reason: `docker commit`
+  bakes env into the snapshot image. Empty is safe — verified on Ubuntu 24.04 that curl, `openssl
+  s_client` and Python's `ssl` behave exactly as with the vars unset.
+- **`triple-c.ca-fingerprint` covers the certificate *bytes*, not just the path.** Replacing a
+  rotated CA at the same location must recreate the container; the copy inside is made once, at
+  start, so nothing else would notice. The entrypoint is stamped/idempotent on restart, and
+  actively **removes** `triple-c-*.crt` when the setting is cleared — `/usr/local/share` rides the
+  project's snapshot image, so turning the feature off has to undo, not merely stop.
+
 ### Container Lifecycle
 
 Containers use a **stop/start** model (not create/destroy). Installed packages persist across stops. The `.claude` config dir uses a named Docker volume (`triple-c-claude-config-{projectId}`), nested inside the home volume (`triple-c-home-{projectId}`), so OAuth tokens and Claude Code config survive container stop/start *and* container recreation.

HOW-TO-USE.md

@@ -509,6 +509,10 @@ This lives in the sidebar under **Settings → Claude Authentication**.
    code to copy — this flow finishes on an Anthropic-hosted page, not a local callback.
 4. Paste the code back into Triple-C. The token is captured and written straight to the keychain.
 
+The code is long and easy to truncate. If Anthropic refuses it, the dialog says so and lets you
+paste another one without restarting the sign-in — the CLI is still waiting. After a few refusals
+the flow gives up and reports it rather than sitting there.
+
 Only one sign-in can run at a time, and the whole flow times out after 15 minutes. A long-lived
 token requires a Claude subscription; without one, `setup-token` finishes without printing a token
 and nothing is stored.
@@ -824,8 +828,8 @@ Notes:
 ## Settings
 
 Access global settings via the **Settings** tab in the sidebar. The panel is a set of collapsible
-sections: **General**, **Claude Authentication**, **Backends**, **Container**, **Git / SSH**,
+sections: **General**, **Claude Authentication**, **Backends**, **Container**, **Certificates**,
-**Tools** and **Updates**.
+**Git / SSH**, **Tools** and **Updates**.
 
 ### Claude Authentication
 
@@ -855,6 +859,36 @@ Environment variables applied to **all** project containers. Per-project variabl
 
 Path to your SSH key directory (typically `~/.ssh`). This is mounted into **all** containers that don't have a per-project SSH path set. Per-project SSH paths take precedence.
 
+### Corporate CA Certificate
+
+If your organisation's network inspects TLS (a corporate proxy, a VPN that terminates HTTPS at the
+edge), containers need your organisation's root certificate or **every** HTTPS call inside them
+fails — `npm install`, `pip`, `git clone` over HTTPS, `curl`, the browser-view pane, and Claude
+Code's own calls to the API.
+
+Point this at either a **single certificate file** or a **folder** of them. It is mounted read-only
+into every container and applied on every start, so it survives container recreation, base-image
+migration and Reset — unlike a certificate you install by hand inside a running container, which is
+lost the first time any of those happens.
+
+The status line under the field tells you how many certificates were found and the names they will
+be installed as inside the container. That rename matters: the container's trust store only reads
+files ending in `.crt`, so a `.pem` is renamed rather than merely copied, which is the step that is
+easiest to get wrong by hand.
+
+Inside the container the certificate is trusted by:
+
+| Consumer | How |
+|---|---|
+| curl, git, apt, wget | the system trust store (`update-ca-certificates`) |
+| Node, npm, **Claude Code itself** | `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` |
+| Python, pip, requests | `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE` and `SSL_CERT_FILE` |
+| Chrome / Chromium (browser view) | its own NSS database at `~/.pki/nssdb` |
+
+A per-project override lives in **Project Home → Config → Access**; leave it blank to use this
+global setting. Changing either recreates the project's container on its next start — replacing the
+certificate file in place counts as a change, so a rotated CA is picked up too.
+
 ### Default Git Name / Email
 
 Sets `git user.name` and `git user.email` inside all containers. Per-project Git Name / Email settings take precedence. This is useful so you don't have to set the same name and email on every project.

TECHNICAL.md

@@ -245,9 +245,31 @@ minutes.
 
 - **Storage** — the OS keychain, under a dedicated service name; the token is never returned to the
   frontend, never written to a log, and no command accepts or returns it.
+- **The sign-in URL comes from the OSC 8 parameter, not the screen.** The CLI emits the URL as a
+  hyperlink and slices the *visible* text of it to the terminal width — measured against 2.1.226, a
+  346-character URL arrives at 80 columns as five separate hyperlink emissions, each carrying the
+  whole URL in its parameter and 80 characters of it on screen. Scraping the visible text yields a
+  URL that parses, points at `claude.com`, and cannot authorise anything, so the ANSI stripper
+  surfaces the hyperlink target and `claude-token-link` carries it to the UI. The frontend applies
+  the `ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS` allowlist to it before display and again before `openUrl` — an OSC 8
+  parameter is container output that is never rendered, which makes it the *easier* place to hide a
+  hostile host, not a trusted one. `stty cols 400` (up from 200, which the URL still overflowed)
+  removes wrapping as a variable elsewhere, but it is not the fix: that line fails silently.
+- **A rejected code is recoverable, not a hang.** On a bad paste the CLI prints
+  `OAuth error: Invalid code…` / `Press Enter to retry.` and blocks on stdin rather than exiting.
+  The streamed output is scanned for that, `claude-token-code-rejected` reopens the input with an
+  explanation, and the Enter is sent so the next code has a prompt to land in — bounded by
+  `MAX_CODE_ATTEMPTS`, after which the flow reports a failure. Without this the exec sat until the
+  15-minute timeout with the UI still saying "Finishing sign-in".
 - **Redaction** — streamed output is stripped of ANSI sequences and passed through a stateful
   redactor that masks anything matching `sk-ant-` with a plausible body, withholding any tail that
-  could still grow into a secret across a chunk boundary.
+  could still grow into a secret across a chunk boundary. A credential split across a hard line
+  wrap is reassembled by both the parser and the redactor from the same `scan_credential_body`, so
+  the two cannot disagree about where a credential ends — previously a wrapped token was rejected
+  as too short *and* its second line, which carries no `sk-ant-` marker, was printed to the UI in
+  clear. A run is only joined across a break that sits at a plausible terminal margin and is not
+  already long enough to be a whole credential; otherwise a repainting TUI would weld one frame's
+  token onto the next frame's first word.
 - **Injection** — `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is set only when the backend is Anthropic, the project
   has not opted out (`use_shared_auth_token`, default `true`), and a non-blank token is stored. When
   those conditions do not hold, the variable is explicitly set to empty rather than omitted, so a

app/src-tauri/src/commands/project_commands.rs

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn create_container_for_project(
         settings.timezone.as_deref(),
         settings.global_claude_code_settings.as_ref(),
         settings.default_ssh_key_path.as_deref(),
+        settings.ca_cert_path.as_deref(),
         settings.default_git_user_name.as_deref(),
         settings.default_git_user_email.as_deref(),
     )
@@ -406,6 +407,7 @@ pub async fn start_project_container(
                 settings.timezone.as_deref(),
                 settings.global_claude_code_settings.as_ref(),
                 settings.default_ssh_key_path.as_deref(),
+                settings.ca_cert_path.as_deref(),
                 settings.default_git_user_name.as_deref(),
                 settings.default_git_user_email.as_deref(),
             ).await.unwrap_or(false);

app/src-tauri/src/commands/settings_commands.rs

@@ -155,6 +155,78 @@ pub async fn detect_aws_config() -> Result<Option<String>, String> {
     Ok(None)
 }
 
+/// What the UI shows next to a corporate CA certificate path.
+///
+/// Errors are returned *inside* the payload rather than as `Err` so the field
+/// can render its own inline message while the user is still typing — a toast
+/// per keystroke would be unusable. The same check runs again, as a hard error,
+/// when the container is created.
+#[derive(Debug, serde::Serialize)]
+pub struct CaCertInfo {
+    pub exists: bool,
+    pub is_directory: bool,
+    /// How many certificate files were found.
+    pub cert_count: usize,
+    /// The names they will be installed as inside the container. Surfacing
+    /// these makes the silent `.pem` → `.crt` rename visible, which is the one
+    /// step users most often do by hand and get wrong.
+    pub installed_names: Vec<String>,
+    /// Why the path is unusable, if it is.
+    pub error: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[tauri::command]
+pub async fn inspect_ca_cert_path(path: String) -> Result<CaCertInfo, String> {
+    use crate::docker::ca_certs;
+
+    let trimmed = path.trim();
+    if trimmed.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(CaCertInfo {
+            exists: false,
+            is_directory: false,
+            cert_count: 0,
+            installed_names: Vec::new(),
+            error: None,
+        });
+    }
+
+    let p = std::path::Path::new(trimmed);
+    let exists = p.exists();
+    let is_directory = p.is_dir();
+
+    match ca_certs::resolve(Some(trimmed)) {
+        Ok(Some(resolved)) => Ok(CaCertInfo {
+            exists,
+            is_directory,
+            cert_count: resolved.cert_files.len(),
+            installed_names: resolved
+                .cert_files
+                .iter()
+                .map(|f| {
+                    ca_certs::container_cert_name(
+                        &f.file_name().unwrap_or_default().to_string_lossy(),
+                    )
+                })
+                .collect(),
+            error: None,
+        }),
+        Ok(None) => Ok(CaCertInfo {
+            exists,
+            is_directory,
+            cert_count: 0,
+            installed_names: Vec::new(),
+            error: None,
+        }),
+        Err(e) => Ok(CaCertInfo {
+            exists,
+            is_directory,
+            cert_count: 0,
+            installed_names: Vec::new(),
+            error: Some(e),
+        }),
+    }
+}
+
 #[tauri::command]
 pub async fn list_aws_profiles() -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
     let mut profiles = Vec::new();

app/src-tauri/src/docker/ca_certs.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
+//! Corporate CA certificate injection.
+//!
+//! Users behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy need their organisation's
+//! root CA inside every container, or **every** HTTPS call fails — npm, pip,
+//! git, curl, the Playwright browser, and Claude Code's own API calls.
+//!
+//! The mechanism follows the SSH/AWS host-mount pattern in [`super::container`]:
+//! a host path is bind-mounted **read-only** into the container and
+//! `entrypoint.sh` applies it on every start. That is what makes it durable
+//! across container recreation, base-image migration and Reset — a certificate
+//! installed by hand inside a running container is lost the first time any of
+//! those happen.
+//!
+//! ## Two things that are easy to get wrong
+//!
+//! 1. **`update-ca-certificates` only reads `*.crt`.** It globs
+//!    `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/*.crt` case-sensitively, so a `.pem`
+//!    (the far more common export format) that is merely *copied* in is
+//!    silently ignored — no warning, no error, just a container that still
+//!    cannot speak HTTPS. Certificates must be **renamed**, which is what
+//!    [`container_cert_name`] does.
+//!
+//! 2. **The system trust store is not enough.** Only curl/git/apt read it.
+//!    Node — and therefore Claude Code itself — needs `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`,
+//!    Python/requests need `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`/`SSL_CERT_FILE`, and
+//!    Chrome/Chromium read neither: they have their own NSS database at
+//!    `~/.pki/nssdb`, seeded by `certutil` in the entrypoint.
+//!
+//! ## Why the env vars are set from Rust and not exported by the entrypoint
+//!
+//! An `export` in `entrypoint.sh` reaches only the entrypoint's own children.
+//! Every terminal session is a separate `docker exec`, which inherits the
+//! *container's* configured env and sees nothing the entrypoint exported —
+//! the same lesson that forced `$BROWSER` to become an image-level `ENV` for
+//! the URL relay shim. Since the bundle path written by
+//! `update-ca-certificates` is deterministic ([`CA_BUNDLE_PATH`]), Rust can set
+//! all three vars at container creation, where `docker exec` will see them.
+
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+/// Where the host's CA material is bind-mounted, read-only. Mirrors
+/// `/tmp/.host-ssh` and `/tmp/.host-aws`.
+///
+/// A *directory* on the host is mounted here as-is. A single *file* is mounted
+/// at `<CA_MOUNT_DIR>/<normalised name>` — Docker creates the parent — so the
+/// entrypoint only ever has to deal with a directory, and the certificate keeps
+/// a recognisable name instead of becoming the literal path `.host-ca`.
+pub const CA_MOUNT_DIR: &str = "/tmp/.host-ca";
+
+/// The concatenated PEM bundle `update-ca-certificates` writes on
+/// Debian/Ubuntu. Deterministic, which is what lets the env vars below be set
+/// at container-creation time, before the entrypoint has run.
+pub const CA_BUNDLE_PATH: &str = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt";
+
+/// Consulted by Node — and therefore by Claude Code itself, which is the whole
+/// reason this feature exists.
+pub const NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS: &str = "NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS";
+/// Consulted by `requests` (and so by pip's vendored copy).
+pub const REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE: &str = "REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE";
+/// Consulted by OpenSSL, and so by Python's `ssl` module.
+pub const SSL_CERT_FILE: &str = "SSL_CERT_FILE";
+
+/// Every env var this module owns, in a fixed order.
+///
+/// Also the list that must be *cleared* when no CA is configured: `docker
+/// commit` bakes a container's env into the project's snapshot image, and
+/// create-time env replaces image `ENV` per key — so without an explicit empty
+/// value, removing the setting would leave the vars live in every future
+/// container. Empty is safe for all three (verified on Ubuntu 24.04: curl,
+/// `openssl s_client` and Python's `ssl` all behave exactly as they do with the
+/// variable unset).
+pub const CA_ENV_KEYS: &[&str] = &[NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, SSL_CERT_FILE];
+
+/// Extensions treated as certificates when the configured path is a directory.
+/// Matched case-insensitively. DER is deliberately absent — the system store
+/// and every consumer here want PEM.
+const CERT_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] = &["crt", "pem", "cer", "cert", "ca-bundle"];
+
+/// A configured CA path that has been checked and resolved into everything the
+/// container creation path needs.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ResolvedCa {
+    /// The host path, as configured.
+    pub host_path: String,
+    /// Whether the host path is a directory (as opposed to a single file).
+    pub is_dir: bool,
+    /// The bind-mount target inside the container.
+    pub mount_target: String,
+    /// The certificate files found, sorted.
+    pub cert_files: Vec<PathBuf>,
+}
+
+fn sha256_hex(input: &str) -> String {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(input.as_bytes());
+    format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())
+}
+
+/// The file name a certificate is installed as under
+/// `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/`.
+///
+/// `update-ca-certificates` globs `*.crt` **case-sensitively**, so `.pem`,
+/// `.cer`, `.CRT` and extension-less files all have to end up as a lowercase
+/// `.crt` or they are ignored without a word. Characters outside
+/// `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` are replaced so that whitespace cannot break the shell
+/// loops that walk the store, and leading dots are stripped so a hidden file
+/// does not stay hidden.
+///
+/// `entrypoint.sh` reimplements exactly this in a few lines of shell (it has to
+/// rename the files inside the container); the two must agree, which is what
+/// the unit tests below pin down.
+pub fn container_cert_name(file_name: &str) -> String {
+    let sanitized: String = file_name
+        .chars()
+        .map(|c| {
+            if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '-' {
+                c
+            } else {
+                '_'
+            }
+        })
+        .collect();
+    let sanitized = sanitized.trim_start_matches('.');
+    // Strip one trailing extension, whatever it is, then force `.crt`. A name
+    // with no dot keeps its whole self as the stem.
+    let stem = match sanitized.rfind('.') {
+        Some(i) => &sanitized[..i],
+        None => sanitized,
+    };
+    let stem = if stem.is_empty() { "corporate-ca" } else { stem };
+    format!("{}.crt", stem)
+}
+
+/// Whether a directory entry looks like a certificate worth installing.
+fn is_cert_file(path: &Path) -> bool {
+    let Some(ext) = path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let ext = ext.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    CERT_EXTENSIONS.contains(&ext.as_str())
+}
+
+/// The certificate files a configured path contributes.
+///
+/// A file is taken at face value — the user pointed at it explicitly, so its
+/// extension is not second-guessed. A directory is scanned one level deep
+/// (matching the entrypoint's `find -maxdepth 1`) and filtered by extension,
+/// so an `openssl.cnf` or a README sitting next to the certs is skipped.
+/// The result is sorted, so the fingerprint is stable across filesystem
+/// enumeration order.
+pub fn collect_cert_files(path: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    if path.is_file() {
+        return vec![path.to_path_buf()];
+    }
+    if !path.is_dir() {
+        return Vec::new();
+    }
+    let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(path) else {
+        return Vec::new();
+    };
+    let mut files: Vec<PathBuf> = entries
+        .filter_map(|e| e.ok())
+        .map(|e| e.path())
+        .filter(|p| p.is_file() && is_cert_file(p))
+        .collect();
+    files.sort();
+    files
+}
+
+/// Resolve the configured CA path, or explain why it cannot be used.
+///
+/// `Ok(None)` means "no CA configured", which is the overwhelmingly common
+/// case and must stay free. An `Err` aborts the container start: behind a
+/// TLS-intercepting proxy a container without the CA is broken in a dozen
+/// confusing ways, so naming the bad path once is far kinder than letting npm,
+/// pip and Claude Code each fail their own way.
+pub fn resolve(path: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<ResolvedCa>, String> {
+    let Some(raw) = path.map(str::trim).filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let root = Path::new(raw);
+    if !root.exists() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "Corporate CA certificate path '{}' does not exist. Update it in \
+             Settings → Certificates, or clear this project's override in \
+             Project Home → Config → Access.",
+            raw
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let is_dir = root.is_dir();
+    if !is_dir && !root.is_file() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "Corporate CA certificate path '{}' is neither a file nor a directory.",
+            raw
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let cert_files = collect_cert_files(root);
+    if cert_files.is_empty() {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "Corporate CA certificate directory '{}' contains no certificate files \
+             (looked for {} one level deep).",
+            raw,
+            CERT_EXTENSIONS
+                .iter()
+                .map(|e| format!(".{}", e))
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                .join(", ")
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let mount_target = if is_dir {
+        CA_MOUNT_DIR.to_string()
+    } else {
+        let name = root
+            .file_name()
+            .map(|n| container_cert_name(&n.to_string_lossy()))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "corporate-ca.crt".to_string());
+        format!("{}/{}", CA_MOUNT_DIR, name)
+    };
+
+    Ok(Some(ResolvedCa {
+        host_path: raw.to_string(),
+        is_dir,
+        mount_target,
+        cert_files,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// Fingerprint of the CA configuration, for the `triple-c.ca-fingerprint`
+/// label.
+///
+/// `container_needs_recreation` is label-based and never diffs env or mounts,
+/// so without this, changing the CA path would silently do nothing until some
+/// unrelated setting forced a rebuild.
+///
+/// It covers **both** the resolved path *and the bytes of every certificate*,
+/// because replacing a rotated CA at the same path is at least as common as
+/// moving it — and the container's copy is made once, at start, so nothing else
+/// would notice.
+///
+/// Never returns an error: a path that has gone missing hashes differently from
+/// one that is present, which is exactly the "something changed, recreate"
+/// signal wanted here. Reporting the problem is [`resolve`]'s job.
+pub fn compute_ca_fingerprint(path: Option<&str>) -> String {
+    let Some(raw) = path.map(str::trim).filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) else {
+        return String::new();
+    };
+    let mut parts: Vec<String> = vec![raw.to_string()];
+    let root = Path::new(raw);
+    if !root.exists() {
+        parts.push("<missing>".to_string());
+    } else {
+        for file in collect_cert_files(root) {
+            let name = file
+                .file_name()
+                .map(|n| container_cert_name(&n.to_string_lossy()))
+                .unwrap_or_default();
+            let digest = match std::fs::read(&file) {
+                Ok(bytes) => {
+                    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+                    hasher.update(&bytes);
+                    format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize())
+                }
+                Err(_) => "<unreadable>".to_string(),
+            };
+            parts.push(format!("{}:{}", name, digest));
+        }
+    }
+    sha256_hex(&parts.join("|"))
+}
+
+/// The env vars to set on the container.
+///
+/// Always returns all of [`CA_ENV_KEYS`]: pointing at the bundle when a CA is
+/// configured, empty when it is not. The empty case is not cosmetic — see the
+/// note on [`CA_ENV_KEYS`].
+pub fn ca_env_vars(resolved: Option<&ResolvedCa>) -> Vec<(&'static str, String)> {
+    let value = if resolved.is_some() { CA_BUNDLE_PATH } else { "" };
+    CA_ENV_KEYS
+        .iter()
+        .map(|key| (*key, value.to_string()))
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::fs;
+
+    /// A scratch directory that cleans itself up. `tempfile` is not a
+    /// dependency of this crate and this is the only test that needs one.
+    struct TempDir(PathBuf);
+
+    impl TempDir {
+        fn new(tag: &str) -> Self {
+            let mut p = std::env::temp_dir();
+            p.push(format!(
+                "triple-c-ca-test-{}-{}-{:?}",
+                tag,
+                std::process::id(),
+                std::time::SystemTime::now()
+                    .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .as_nanos()
+            ));
+            fs::create_dir_all(&p).unwrap();
+            TempDir(p)
+        }
+        fn path(&self) -> &Path {
+            &self.0
+        }
+        fn write(&self, name: &str, contents: &str) -> PathBuf {
+            let p = self.0.join(name);
+            fs::write(&p, contents).unwrap();
+            p
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl Drop for TempDir {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&self.0);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── container_cert_name ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_pem_is_renamed_to_crt_not_merely_copied() {
+        // The whole point: update-ca-certificates globs *.crt and would
+        // silently ignore corp-root.pem.
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corp-root.pem"), "corp-root.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_crt_keeps_its_name() {
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corp-root.crt"), "corp-root.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn other_certificate_extensions_are_renamed_too() {
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("zscaler.cer"), "zscaler.crt");
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("zscaler.cert"), "zscaler.crt");
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("bundle.ca-bundle"), "bundle.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_uppercase_extension_is_lowercased() {
+        // `find -name '*.crt'` is case-sensitive, so CA.CRT would be ignored.
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("CA.CRT"), "CA.crt");
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("CA.PEM"), "CA.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_name_without_an_extension_gains_one() {
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corporate-root"), "corporate-root.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn only_the_last_extension_is_replaced() {
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("corp.root.ca.pem"), "corp.root.ca.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unsafe_characters_are_replaced() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            container_cert_name("Corp Root CA (2026).pem"),
+            "Corp_Root_CA__2026_.crt"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("a/b.pem"), "a_b.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn leading_dots_are_stripped_so_the_file_is_not_hidden() {
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name(".hidden.pem"), "hidden.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_degenerate_name_still_produces_a_usable_file() {
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name(".pem"), "pem.crt");
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name(""), "corporate-ca.crt");
+        assert_eq!(container_cert_name("..."), "corporate-ca.crt");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn every_produced_name_ends_in_lowercase_crt() {
+        for input in [
+            "a.pem", "b.CRT", "c", ".d.pem", "", "e f.cer", "...", "ç.pem",
+        ] {
+            let out = container_cert_name(input);
+            assert!(
+                out.ends_with(".crt"),
+                "{:?} produced {:?}, which update-ca-certificates would ignore",
+                input,
+                out
+            );
+            assert!(
+                out.chars()
+                    .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '-'),
+                "{:?} produced {:?}, which is not shell-safe",
+                input,
+                out
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── fingerprint ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_configured_path_fingerprints_as_empty() {
+        assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(None), "");
+        assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(Some("")), "");
+        assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(Some("   ")), "");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn changing_the_path_changes_the_fingerprint() {
+        let a = TempDir::new("path-a");
+        let b = TempDir::new("path-b");
+        // Identical *content* in both, so only the path differs.
+        a.write("corp.pem", "CERT-BODY");
+        b.write("corp.pem", "CERT-BODY");
+
+        let fp_a = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(a.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        let fp_b = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(b.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        assert_ne!(fp_a, "");
+        assert_ne!(
+            fp_a, fp_b,
+            "two different paths must not share a fingerprint"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn changing_the_certificate_content_at_the_same_path_changes_the_fingerprint() {
+        // The case a path-only fingerprint would miss: the corporate CA is
+        // rotated and the new one dropped in at exactly the same location.
+        let dir = TempDir::new("rotate");
+        dir.write("corp.pem", "OLD-CERT");
+        let before = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+
+        dir.write("corp.pem", "NEW-CERT");
+        let after = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+
+        assert_ne!(
+            before, after,
+            "replacing the certificate at the same path must force a recreation"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn adding_or_removing_a_certificate_changes_the_fingerprint() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("add");
+        dir.write("one.pem", "A");
+        let one = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        dir.write("two.pem", "B");
+        let two = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        assert_ne!(one, two);
+        fs::remove_file(dir.path().join("two.pem")).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())), one);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_unchanged_directory_fingerprints_identically() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("stable");
+        dir.write("corp.pem", "SAME");
+        let a = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        let b = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        assert_eq!(a, b, "the fingerprint must not churn on repeated reads");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_missing_path_fingerprints_differently_from_a_present_one() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("missing");
+        let present = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        let missing =
+            compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(&format!("{}-gone", dir.path().to_str().unwrap())));
+        assert_ne!(present, missing);
+        assert_ne!(missing, "");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn non_certificate_files_in_the_directory_are_ignored() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("noise");
+        dir.write("corp.pem", "CERT");
+        let before = compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()));
+        dir.write("README.md", "hello");
+        dir.write("openssl.cnf", "[req]");
+        assert_eq!(
+            compute_ca_fingerprint(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())),
+            before
+        );
+    }
+
+    // ── resolve ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_path_resolves_to_nothing() {
+        assert_eq!(resolve(None).unwrap(), None);
+        assert_eq!(resolve(Some("  ")).unwrap(), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_missing_path_is_an_actionable_error() {
+        let err = resolve(Some("/definitely/not/here/corp.pem")).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("/definitely/not/here/corp.pem"), "{}", err);
+        assert!(err.contains("Settings"), "{}", err);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_empty_directory_is_an_actionable_error() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("empty");
+        let err = resolve(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.contains("no certificate files"), "{}", err);
+        assert!(err.contains(".pem"), "{}", err);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_directory_mounts_at_the_shared_mount_point() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("dir");
+        dir.write("corp.pem", "CERT");
+        let resolved = resolve(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert!(resolved.is_dir);
+        assert_eq!(resolved.mount_target, CA_MOUNT_DIR);
+        assert_eq!(resolved.cert_files.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_single_file_mounts_under_the_mount_point_with_a_crt_name() {
+        // Mounting a file *at* /tmp/.host-ca would leave the entrypoint with no
+        // name to work from, and would make the mount point a file rather than
+        // the directory the entrypoint expects.
+        let dir = TempDir::new("file");
+        let file = dir.write("corp root.pem", "CERT");
+        let resolved = resolve(Some(file.to_str().unwrap())).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert!(!resolved.is_dir);
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolved.mount_target,
+            format!("{}/corp_root.crt", CA_MOUNT_DIR)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_file_is_accepted_whatever_its_extension() {
+        // The user pointed at it explicitly; don't second-guess.
+        let dir = TempDir::new("odd-ext");
+        let file = dir.write("corp.txt", "CERT");
+        let resolved = resolve(Some(file.to_str().unwrap())).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resolved.cert_files, vec![file]);
+    }
+
+    // ── env vars ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn configured_ca_points_every_consumer_at_the_bundle() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new("env");
+        dir.write("corp.pem", "CERT");
+        let resolved = resolve(Some(dir.path().to_str().unwrap())).unwrap();
+        let vars = ca_env_vars(resolved.as_ref());
+        assert_eq!(
+            vars,
+            vec![
+                (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, CA_BUNDLE_PATH.to_string()),
+                (REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, CA_BUNDLE_PATH.to_string()),
+                (SSL_CERT_FILE, CA_BUNDLE_PATH.to_string()),
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_ca_clears_every_var_rather_than_omitting_it() {
+        // Omitting them would let a value baked into the project's snapshot
+        // image survive the setting being turned off.
+        let vars = ca_env_vars(None);
+        assert_eq!(vars.len(), CA_ENV_KEYS.len());
+        assert!(vars.iter().all(|(_, v)| v.is_empty()));
+    }
+}

app/src-tauri/src/docker/container.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use bollard::models::{ContainerSummary, HostConfig, Mount, MountTypeEnum, PortBi
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
 
+use super::ca_certs;
 use super::client::get_docker;
 use crate::models::{Backend, BedrockAuthMethod, ClaudeCodeSettings, ContainerInfo, EnvVar, GlobalAwsSettings, GlobalLlamaCppSettings, GlobalOllamaSettings, GlobalOpenAiCompatibleSettings, PortMapping, Project, ProjectPath};
 
@@ -792,6 +793,7 @@ pub async fn create_container(
     timezone: Option<&str>,
     global_claude_code_settings: Option<&ClaudeCodeSettings>,
     default_ssh_key_path: Option<&str>,
+    default_ca_cert_path: Option<&str>,
     default_git_user_name: Option<&str>,
     default_git_user_email: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<String, String> {
@@ -1029,6 +1031,34 @@ pub async fn create_container(
         );
     }
 
+    // ── Corporate CA certificates ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    // Resolved here (rather than down with the mounts) so the env vars land
+    // *before* the neutralization pass below and are seen as already-set.
+    //
+    // A bad path is a hard error, not a warning: behind a TLS-terminating
+    // proxy a container without the CA fails every HTTPS call — npm, pip, git,
+    // and Claude Code's own API requests — each in its own confusing way. One
+    // message naming the path is far kinder.
+    //
+    // The values are set here rather than exported by the entrypoint because a
+    // terminal session is a `docker exec`, which sees the container's
+    // configured env and nothing the entrypoint exported. Same lesson as
+    // `$BROWSER` and the URL relay shim.
+    let effective_ca_path =
+        resolve_with_global(project.ca_cert_path.as_deref(), default_ca_cert_path);
+    let resolved_ca = ca_certs::resolve(effective_ca_path)?;
+    if let Some(ref ca) = resolved_ca {
+        log::info!(
+            "Mounting {} corporate CA certificate(s) from {} into project {}",
+            ca.cert_files.len(),
+            ca.host_path,
+            project.id
+        );
+    }
+    for (key, value) in ca_certs::ca_env_vars(resolved_ca.as_ref()) {
+        env_vars.push(format!("{}={}", key, value));
+    }
+
     // ── Neutralize stale backend auth env vars ──────────────────────────────
     // When a project switches backends (e.g. Bedrock → Anthropic) the container
     // is recreated *from a snapshot image* committed off the previous container,
@@ -1073,11 +1103,19 @@ pub async fn create_container(
         // authenticating the container with a credential the user removed.
         CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV,
     ];
+    // Same reasoning for the CA vars — `ca_env_vars` already emits them empty
+    // when no CA is configured, so this list is belt-and-braces for a snapshot
+    // committed by a build that predates the feature.
+    let managed_keys: Vec<&str> = MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS
+        .iter()
+        .copied()
+        .chain(ca_certs::CA_ENV_KEYS.iter().copied())
+        .collect();
     let already_set: std::collections::HashSet<String> = env_vars
         .iter()
         .filter_map(|e| e.split('=').next().map(|k| k.to_string()))
         .collect();
-    for key in MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS {
+    for key in &managed_keys {
         if !already_set.contains(*key) {
             env_vars.push(format!("{}=", key));
         }
@@ -1209,6 +1247,23 @@ pub async fn create_container(
         });
     }
 
+    // Corporate CA certificates mount (read-only staging; the entrypoint copies
+    // them into /usr/local/share/ca-certificates with a `.crt` name and runs
+    // update-ca-certificates). Mirrors /tmp/.host-ssh and /tmp/.host-aws.
+    //
+    // A directory mounts at /tmp/.host-ca; a single file mounts at
+    // /tmp/.host-ca/<name>.crt so the entrypoint always sees a directory and
+    // the certificate keeps a recognisable name. Docker creates the parent.
+    if let Some(ref ca) = resolved_ca {
+        mounts.push(Mount {
+            target: Some(ca.mount_target.clone()),
+            source: Some(ca.host_path.clone()),
+            typ: Some(MountTypeEnum::BIND),
+            read_only: Some(true),
+            ..Default::default()
+        });
+    }
+
     // AWS config mount (read-only)
     // Mount if: Bedrock profile auth needs it, OR a global aws_config_path is set
     let should_mount_aws = if project.backend == Backend::Bedrock {
@@ -1306,6 +1361,13 @@ pub async fn create_container(
         compute_claude_code_settings_fingerprint(merged_cc_settings.as_ref(), project.sandbox_mode_enabled));
     labels.insert("triple-c.instructions-fingerprint".to_string(),
         combined_instructions.as_ref().map(|s| sha256_hex(s)).unwrap_or_default());
+    // Written unconditionally, even when empty — `container_needs_recreation`
+    // is label-based and never diffs env or mounts, so without this a changed
+    // CA path would silently do nothing until some unrelated setting forced a
+    // rebuild. The fingerprint covers the certificate *bytes* as well as the
+    // path, so swapping a rotated CA in at the same location is caught too.
+    labels.insert("triple-c.ca-fingerprint".to_string(),
+        ca_certs::compute_ca_fingerprint(effective_ca_path));
     labels.insert("triple-c.git-user-name".to_string(), effective_git_name.unwrap_or_default().to_string());
     labels.insert("triple-c.git-user-email".to_string(), effective_git_email.unwrap_or_default().to_string());
     labels.insert("triple-c.git-token-hash".to_string(),
@@ -1911,6 +1973,7 @@ pub async fn container_needs_recreation(
     timezone: Option<&str>,
     global_claude_code_settings: Option<&ClaudeCodeSettings>,
     default_ssh_key_path: Option<&str>,
+    default_ca_cert_path: Option<&str>,
     default_git_user_name: Option<&str>,
     default_git_user_email: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<bool, String> {
@@ -2078,6 +2141,28 @@ pub async fn container_needs_recreation(
         return Ok(true);
     }
 
+    // ── Corporate CA certificates ────────────────────────────────────────
+    // Both the resolved path and the certificate contents, so replacing a
+    // rotated CA at the same path recreates the container — the copy inside
+    // the container is made once, at start, and nothing else would notice.
+    //
+    // A container predating this feature has no label, i.e. "", which is also
+    // what an unconfigured CA fingerprints as — so existing installs are not
+    // churned until a CA is actually set.
+    let expected_ca_fp = ca_certs::compute_ca_fingerprint(resolve_with_global(
+        project.ca_cert_path.as_deref(),
+        default_ca_cert_path,
+    ));
+    let container_ca_fp = get_label("triple-c.ca-fingerprint").unwrap_or_default();
+    if container_ca_fp != expected_ca_fp {
+        log::info!(
+            "Corporate CA certificate mismatch (container={:?}, expected={:?})",
+            container_ca_fp,
+            expected_ca_fp
+        );
+        return Ok(true);
+    }
+
     // ── Git settings (label-based to avoid stale snapshot env vars) ─────
     let expected_git_name = project.git_user_name.as_deref()
         .or(default_git_user_name)

app/src-tauri/src/docker/mod.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+pub mod ca_certs;
 pub mod client;
 pub mod container;
 pub mod image;
@@ -23,3 +24,6 @@ pub use exec::*;
 pub use legacy_cleanup::*;
 #[allow(unused_imports)]
 pub use migration::*;
+// Deliberately *not* re-exported flat: `ca_certs::resolve` and
+// `ca_certs::CA_MOUNT_DIR` are far clearer than bare `resolve` in a module that
+// already re-exports five other namespaces.

app/src-tauri/src/lib.rs

@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ pub fn run() {
             commands::settings_commands::update_settings,
             commands::settings_commands::pull_image,
             commands::settings_commands::detect_aws_config,
+            commands::settings_commands::inspect_ca_cert_path,
             commands::settings_commands::list_aws_profiles,
             commands::settings_commands::detect_host_timezone,
             // Terminal

app/src-tauri/src/models/app_settings.rs

@@ -87,6 +87,14 @@ pub struct GlobalOpenAiCompatibleSettings {
 pub struct AppSettings {
     #[serde(default)]
     pub default_ssh_key_path: Option<String>,
+    /// Path to the organisation's root CA — a single certificate file or a
+    /// directory of them. Mounted read-only into every container, which then
+    /// installs it into the system trust store, Node's `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`,
+    /// Python's `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`/`SSL_CERT_FILE` and Chrome's NSS database.
+    /// Required when the host sits behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy.
+    /// Overridden per project by `Project::ca_cert_path`.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub ca_cert_path: Option<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub default_git_user_name: Option<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
@@ -197,6 +205,7 @@ impl Default for AppSettings {
     fn default() -> Self {
         Self {
             default_ssh_key_path: None,
+            ca_cert_path: None,
             default_git_user_name: None,
             default_git_user_email: None,
             docker_socket_path: None,

app/src-tauri/src/models/project.rs

@@ -166,6 +166,13 @@ pub struct Project {
     #[serde(default)]
     pub permission_mode: Option<PermissionMode>,
     pub ssh_key_path: Option<String>,
+    /// Per-project override for the corporate CA certificate path (file or
+    /// directory). Blank falls back to `AppSettings::ca_cert_path`.
+    ///
+    /// `#[serde(default)]` rather than a required field: every project stored
+    /// before this existed must keep loading.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub ca_cert_path: Option<String>,
     #[serde(skip_serializing, default)]
     pub git_token: Option<String>,
     pub git_user_name: Option<String>,
@@ -363,6 +370,7 @@ impl Project {
             full_permissions: false,
             permission_mode: None,
             ssh_key_path: None,
+            ca_cert_path: None,
             git_token: None,
             git_user_name: None,
             git_user_email: None,

app/src/components/projects/home/config/AccessSection.tsx

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { open } from "@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog";
 import type { Project } from "../../../../lib/types";
 import Button from "../../../ui/Button";
 import Field, { ConfigGroup, inputClass } from "../../../ui/Field";
+import CaCertPathInput from "../../../settings/CaCertPathInput";
 import EnvVarsEditor from "../../EnvVarsEditor";
 import PortMappingsEditor from "../../PortMappingsEditor";
 
@@ -20,12 +21,14 @@ export default function AccessSection({
   disabledReason,
 }: Props) {
   const [sshKeyPath, setSshKeyPath] = useState(project.ssh_key_path ?? "");
+  const [caCertPath, setCaCertPath] = useState(project.ca_cert_path ?? "");
   const [gitName, setGitName] = useState(project.git_user_name ?? "");
   const [gitEmail, setGitEmail] = useState(project.git_user_email ?? "");
   const [gitToken, setGitToken] = useState(project.git_token ?? "");
 
   useEffect(() => {
     setSshKeyPath(project.ssh_key_path ?? "");
+    setCaCertPath(project.ca_cert_path ?? "");
     setGitName(project.git_user_name ?? "");
     setGitEmail(project.git_user_email ?? "");
     setGitToken(project.git_token ?? "");
@@ -114,6 +117,24 @@ export default function AccessSection({
         )}
       </Field>
 
+      <Field
+        label="Corporate CA certificate"
+        hint="Overrides the global certificate for this project only. A certificate file, or a folder of them, trusted inside the container by curl, git, npm, pip, Chromium and Claude Code."
+      >
+        {(id) => (
+          <CaCertPathInput
+            id={id}
+            value={caCertPath}
+            onChange={setCaCertPath}
+            onCommit={(value) => save({ ca_cert_path: value.trim() || null })}
+            disabled={disabled}
+            placeholder="/etc/ssl/certs/corp-root.pem"
+            emptyHint="Using the global certificate from Settings → Certificates."
+            inputClassName={`${inputClass} min-w-0`}
+          />
+        )}
+      </Field>
+
       <div className="pt-2 border-t border-[var(--border-color)]">
         <span className="block text-[13px] font-medium text-[var(--text-primary)]">
           Environment variables

app/src/components/settings/CaCertPathInput.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
+import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import CaCertPathInput from "./CaCertPathInput";
+import type { CaCertInfo } from "../../lib/types";
+
+const inspectCaCertPath = vi.fn();
+vi.mock("../../lib/tauri-commands", () => ({
+  inspectCaCertPath: (path: string) => inspectCaCertPath(path),
+}));
+
+const openDialog = vi.fn();
+vi.mock("@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog", () => ({
+  open: (opts: unknown) => openDialog(opts),
+}));
+
+const info = (over: Partial<CaCertInfo> = {}): CaCertInfo => ({
+  exists: true,
+  is_directory: false,
+  cert_count: 1,
+  installed_names: ["corp-root.crt"],
+  error: null,
+  ...over,
+});
+
+function renderInput(value = "", over: Partial<Parameters<typeof CaCertPathInput>[0]> = {}) {
+  const onChange = vi.fn();
+  const onCommit = vi.fn();
+  const utils = render(
+    <CaCertPathInput
+      value={value}
+      onChange={onChange}
+      onCommit={onCommit}
+      inputClassName="input"
+      {...over}
+    />,
+  );
+  return { onChange, onCommit, ...utils };
+}
+
+describe("CaCertPathInput", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+    inspectCaCertPath.mockResolvedValue(info());
+  });
+
+  it("does not inspect anything while the path is empty", async () => {
+    renderInput("");
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 350));
+    expect(inspectCaCertPath).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("shows the empty hint instead of a status when unset", () => {
+    renderInput("", { emptyHint: "Using the global certificate." });
+    expect(screen.getByText("Using the global certificate.")).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it("reports the certificate count and the names they are installed as", async () => {
+    // The rename is the whole point: update-ca-certificates ignores a .pem.
+    inspectCaCertPath.mockResolvedValue(
+      info({ cert_count: 2, installed_names: ["corp-root.crt", "corp-intermediate.crt"] }),
+    );
+    renderInput("/certs");
+    await waitFor(() => expect(screen.getByText(/Found 2 certificates/)).toBeTruthy());
+    expect(screen.getByText(/corp-root\.crt, corp-intermediate\.crt/)).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it("uses the singular for one certificate", async () => {
+    renderInput("/certs/corp.pem");
+    await waitFor(() => expect(screen.getByText(/Found 1 certificate$|Found 1 certificate/)).toBeTruthy());
+    expect(screen.queryByText(/Found 1 certificates/)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("surfaces an unusable path inline rather than silently accepting it", async () => {
+    inspectCaCertPath.mockResolvedValue(
+      info({ exists: false, cert_count: 0, installed_names: [], error: "path does not exist" }),
+    );
+    renderInput("/gone");
+    await waitFor(() => expect(screen.getByText(/path does not exist/)).toBeTruthy());
+  });
+
+  it("commits on blur", () => {
+    const { onCommit } = renderInput("/certs");
+    fireEvent.blur(screen.getByRole("textbox"));
+    expect(onCommit).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/certs");
+  });
+
+  it("offers both a file and a folder picker, because the setting accepts either", async () => {
+    openDialog.mockResolvedValue("/picked/corp.pem");
+    const { onChange, onCommit } = renderInput("");
+
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByText("File…"));
+    await waitFor(() => expect(onCommit).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/picked/corp.pem"));
+    expect(openDialog).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ directory: false, multiple: false });
+
+    openDialog.mockResolvedValue("/picked/certs");
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByText("Folder…"));
+    await waitFor(() => expect(openDialog).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith({ directory: true, multiple: false }));
+    expect(onChange).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/picked/certs");
+  });
+
+  it("does not commit when the picker is dismissed", async () => {
+    openDialog.mockResolvedValue(null);
+    const { onCommit } = renderInput("");
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByText("Folder…"));
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 0));
+    expect(onCommit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("disables the inputs when the container is running", () => {
+    renderInput("/certs", { disabled: true });
+    expect((screen.getByRole("textbox") as HTMLInputElement).disabled).toBe(true);
+    for (const label of ["File…", "Folder…"]) {
+      expect((screen.getByText(label) as HTMLButtonElement).disabled).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+});

app/src/components/settings/CaCertPathInput.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
+import { open } from "@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog";
+import Button from "../ui/Button";
+import { inspectCaCertPath } from "../../lib/tauri-commands";
+import type { CaCertInfo } from "../../lib/types";
+
+interface Props {
+  /** Wired to the calling `Field`'s label, where there is one. */
+  id?: string;
+  value: string;
+  onChange: (value: string) => void;
+  /** Persist the value — called on blur and immediately after a Browse. */
+  onCommit: (value: string) => void;
+  disabled?: boolean;
+  placeholder?: string;
+  /** Shown in place of the status line while the field is empty. */
+  emptyHint?: string;
+  /** Tailwind classes for the text input, so each caller keeps its local
+   *  convention (the host settings panel and the project Config tab do not
+   *  style their inputs the same way). */
+  inputClassName: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Path field for a corporate CA certificate — a single file *or* a directory
+ * of them — shared by the global setting and the per-project override.
+ *
+ * Two Browse buttons rather than one: the platform file dialog cannot offer
+ * "a file or a folder" in a single call, and which one the user wants is not
+ * guessable (a lone `corp-root.pem` is as common as a folder of chained certs).
+ *
+ * The status line is what makes the feature debuggable. It reports the
+ * certificate count and, crucially, the `.crt` names each file is installed
+ * as: `update-ca-certificates` matches `*.crt` case-sensitively and ignores a
+ * `.pem` in complete silence, so seeing `corp-root.pem → corp-root.crt` is the
+ * difference between trusting the setting and guessing at it.
+ */
+export default function CaCertPathInput({
+  id,
+  value,
+  onChange,
+  onCommit,
+  disabled = false,
+  placeholder,
+  emptyHint,
+  inputClassName,
+}: Props) {
+  const [info, setInfo] = useState<CaCertInfo | null>(null);
+  // Guards against a slow inspect for an earlier value landing after a newer
+  // one and describing the wrong path.
+  const requestId = useRef(0);
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const trimmed = value.trim();
+    if (!trimmed) {
+      setInfo(null);
+      return;
+    }
+    const id = ++requestId.current;
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      inspectCaCertPath(trimmed)
+        .then((result) => {
+          if (requestId.current === id) setInfo(result);
+        })
+        .catch(() => {
+          if (requestId.current === id) setInfo(null);
+        });
+    }, 250);
+    return () => clearTimeout(timer);
+  }, [value]);
+
+  const browse = async (directory: boolean) => {
+    const selected = await open({ directory, multiple: false });
+    if (typeof selected === "string") {
+      onChange(selected);
+      onCommit(selected);
+    }
+  };
+
+  return (
+    <div className="space-y-1.5">
+      <div className="flex gap-1.5">
+        <input
+          id={id}
+          type="text"
+          value={value}
+          onChange={(e) => onChange(e.target.value)}
+          onBlur={() => onCommit(value)}
+          placeholder={placeholder}
+          disabled={disabled}
+          className={inputClassName}
+        />
+        <Button size="md" disabled={disabled} onClick={() => browse(false)}>
+          File…
+        </Button>
+        <Button size="md" disabled={disabled} onClick={() => browse(true)}>
+          Folder…
+        </Button>
+      </div>
+      <CaCertStatus value={value} info={info} emptyHint={emptyHint} />
+    </div>
+  );
+}
+
+function CaCertStatus({
+  value,
+  info,
+  emptyHint,
+}: {
+  value: string;
+  info: CaCertInfo | null;
+  emptyHint?: string;
+}) {
+  if (!value.trim()) {
+    return emptyHint ? (
+      <p className="text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)]">{emptyHint}</p>
+    ) : null;
+  }
+  if (!info) return null;
+
+  if (info.error) {
+    // Glyph + word, never colour alone.
+    return (
+      <p className="text-xs text-[var(--error)]" role="status">
+        <span aria-hidden="true">✕ </span>
+        Problem: {info.error}
+      </p>
+    );
+  }
+  if (info.cert_count === 0) return null;
+
+  return (
+    <p className="text-xs text-[var(--success)]" role="status">
+      <span aria-hidden="true">✓ </span>
+      Found {info.cert_count} certificate{info.cert_count === 1 ? "" : "s"}
+      {info.installed_names.length > 0 && (
+        <span className="text-[var(--text-secondary)]">
+          {" "}
+          — installed as {info.installed_names.slice(0, 4).join(", ")}
+          {info.installed_names.length > 4
+            ? ` and ${info.installed_names.length - 4} more`
+            : ""}
+        </span>
+      )}
+    </p>
+  );
+}

app/src/components/settings/CertificateSettings.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
+import { useSettings } from "../../hooks/useSettings";
+import CaCertPathInput from "./CaCertPathInput";
+
+const INPUT_CLASS =
+  "flex-1 min-w-0 px-2 py-1 text-sm bg-[var(--bg-primary)] border border-[var(--border-color)] rounded focus:border-[var(--accent)]";
+
+/**
+ * Global corporate CA certificate setting.
+ *
+ * Applies to every project unless one overrides it in Project Home → Config →
+ * Access. Changing it recreates each container on its next start — the
+ * certificate is copied into the container's trust store once, at start, so
+ * there is nowhere else for a change to land.
+ */
+export default function CertificateSettings() {
+  const { appSettings, saveSettings } = useSettings();
+  const [path, setPath] = useState(appSettings?.ca_cert_path ?? "");
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    setPath(appSettings?.ca_cert_path ?? "");
+  }, [appSettings?.ca_cert_path]);
+
+  const commit = async (value: string) => {
+    if (!appSettings) return;
+    const next = value.trim() || null;
+    if (next === appSettings.ca_cert_path) return;
+    await saveSettings({ ...appSettings, ca_cert_path: next });
+  };
+
+  return (
+    <div>
+      <label
+        className="block text-sm font-medium mb-1"
+        htmlFor="global-ca-cert-path"
+      >
+        Corporate CA Certificate
+      </label>
+      <p className="text-xs text-[var(--text-secondary)] mb-1.5">
+        A certificate file, or a folder of them, for organisations whose network
+        inspects TLS. Mounted read-only into every container and trusted by
+        curl, git, npm, pip, Chromium and Claude Code itself. Per-project
+        settings override this; changing it recreates containers on next start.
+      </p>
+      <CaCertPathInput
+        id="global-ca-cert-path"
+        value={path}
+        onChange={setPath}
+        onCommit={commit}
+        placeholder="/etc/ssl/certs/corp-root.pem"
+        emptyHint="Not set — containers trust only the public CAs shipped with the image."
+        inputClassName={INPUT_CLASS}
+      />
+    </div>
+  );
+}

app/src/components/settings/ClaudeAuthModal.test.tsx

@@ -31,6 +31,22 @@ vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/event", () => ({
   }),
 }));
 
+/** Every event the hook subscribes to, so the unmount test counts the right
+ *  number of teardowns instead of a magic number that drifts. */
+const EVENT_NAMES = [
+  "claude-token-progress",
+  "claude-token-output",
+  "claude-token-link",
+  "claude-token-code-rejected",
+];
+
+/** The sign-in URL at its real length (346 characters, measured against
+ *  Claude Code 2.1.226) and the 80-column slice of it that is all the visible
+ *  transcript ever contains. */
+const FULL_URL =
+  "https://claude.com/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true&client_id=9d1c250a-e61b-44d9-88ed-5944d1962f5e&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fplatform.claude.com%2Foauth%2Fcode%2Fcallback&scope=user%3Ainference&code_challenge=RUX5MlWvwld1dmpvF_aPIJQWMBmffuJt4dOdL13zWAg&code_challenge_method=S256&state=su-x9PgZzvkBd3-um6G1llLNDgxptyO6HERvvCSrTbg";
+const TRUNCATED_URL = FULL_URL.slice(0, 80);
+
 function emitOutput(chunk: string, projectId = "p1") {
   act(() => {
     handlers.get("claude-token-output")?.({
@@ -39,6 +55,26 @@ function emitOutput(chunk: string, projectId = "p1") {
   });
 }
 
+function emitLink(url: string, projectId = "p1") {
+  act(() => {
+    handlers.get("claude-token-link")?.({
+      payload: { project_id: projectId, url },
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function emitCodeRejected(message: string, attemptsRemaining: number) {
+  act(() => {
+    handlers.get("claude-token-code-rejected")?.({
+      payload: {
+        project_id: "p1",
+        message,
+        attempts_remaining: attemptsRemaining,
+      },
+    });
+  });
+}
+
 function renderModal(
   overrides: { onClose?: () => void; onAuthenticated?: () => void } = {},
 ) {
@@ -200,6 +236,93 @@ describe("ClaudeAuthModal", () => {
     const { unmount } = renderModal();
     await flowStarted();
     unmount();
-    await waitFor(() => expect(unlisten).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2));
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(unlisten).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(EVENT_NAMES.length),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── The hyperlink target, not the wrapped display text ────────────────
+  //
+  // `claude setup-token` slices the *visible* text of its OSC 8 hyperlink to
+  // the terminal width, so the transcript holds five 80-character pieces of a
+  // 346-character URL. The backend lifts the whole thing out of the hyperlink
+  // parameter and sends it on `claude-token-link`.
+
+  it("prefers the hyperlink target over the wrapped copy in the transcript", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    // What the transcript holds: the first slice only.
+    emitOutput(`Browser didn't open? Use the url below to sign in\n${TRUNCATED_URL}\n`);
+    // What the hyperlink parameter holds: all of it.
+    emitLink(FULL_URL);
+
+    const link = await screen.findByRole("link", { name: FULL_URL });
+    fireEvent.click(link);
+    await waitFor(() => expect(openUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith(FULL_URL));
+    expect(openUrl).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(TRUNCATED_URL);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a hyperlink target that is not an Anthropic sign-in address", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    emitLink("https://evil.tld/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true");
+
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("link")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(openUrl).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("ignores a hyperlink belonging to a different project", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    emitLink(FULL_URL, "p2");
+    expect(screen.queryByRole("link")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+
+  // ── A refused code is recoverable, not a hang ─────────────────────────
+
+  it("reports a rejected code and lets another one be submitted", async () => {
+    renderModal();
+    await flowStarted();
+
+    const input = screen.getByLabelText("Authentication code");
+    fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "truncated" } });
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Submit code" }));
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(submitClaudeTokenCode).toHaveBeenCalledWith("truncated"),
+    );
+    // Before the rejection arrives the UI claims the sign-in is completing.
+    expect(screen.getByText("Finishing sign-in")).toBeInTheDocument();
+
+    emitCodeRejected(
+      "That code was rejected — `claude setup-token` reports the full code was not copied. Copy it again from the Anthropic page and submit it; 2 attempts left.",
+      2,
+    );
+
+    // Reported, not waited out — and the flow is still live.
+    await screen.findByText(/That code was rejected/);
+    expect(screen.getByText("Code rejected — try again")).toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(screen.queryByText("Finishing sign-in")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+    expect(screen.queryByTestId("claude-auth-error")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
+
+    // A second code goes through without restarting the whole flow.
+    fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "the-whole-code" } });
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Submit code" }));
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(submitClaudeTokenCode).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith("the-whole-code"),
+    );
+    expect(acquireClaudeToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("ends with a reported failure when the retries run out", async () => {
+    acquireClaudeToken.mockRejectedValue(
+      "`claude setup-token` rejected the code 3 times, so the sign-in was abandoned. No token was stored.",
+    );
+    renderModal();
+
+    const banner = await screen.findByTestId("claude-auth-error");
+    expect(banner).toHaveTextContent(/rejected the code 3 times/);
   });
 });

app/src/components/settings/ClaudeAuthModal.tsx

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ interface Props {
 const PHASE_STATUS: Record<string, { tone: StatusTone; label: string }> = {
   waiting: { tone: "busy", label: "Waiting for sign-in" },
   finishing: { tone: "busy", label: "Finishing sign-in" },
+  // The CLI refused a code and is back at its prompt. Distinct from "failed":
+  // the flow is still live and another code will be accepted.
+  rejected: { tone: "error", label: "Code rejected — try again" },
   succeeded: { tone: "ok", label: "Token stored" },
   failed: { tone: "error", label: "Authentication failed" },
 };
@@ -88,7 +91,9 @@ export default function ClaudeAuthModal({
         ? PHASE_STATUS.failed
         : flow.codeSubmitted
           ? PHASE_STATUS.finishing
-          : PHASE_STATUS.waiting;
+          : flow.codeRejections > 0
+            ? PHASE_STATUS.rejected
+            : PHASE_STATUS.waiting;
 
   // Split for display only. `flow.signInUrl` has already passed the host
   // allowlist; this decides which half of it an ellipsis is allowed to eat.

app/src/components/settings/SettingsPanel.tsx

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import Toggle from "../ui/Toggle";
 import WebTerminalSettings from "./WebTerminalSettings";
 import SttSettings from "./SttSettings";
 import SharedAuthSettings from "./SharedAuthSettings";
+import CertificateSettings from "./CertificateSettings";
 
 export default function SettingsPanel() {
   const { appSettings, saveSettings } = useSettings();
@@ -172,6 +173,10 @@ export default function SettingsPanel() {
         <DockerSettings />
       </AccordionSection>
 
+      <AccordionSection id="certificates" title="Certificates" defaultOpen={false}>
+        <CertificateSettings />
+      </AccordionSection>
+
       <AccordionSection id="git-ssh" title="Git / SSH" defaultOpen={false}>
         {/* Default SSH Key Directory */}
         <div>

app/src/hooks/useClaudeAuth.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
-import { authErrorMessage, extractSignInUrl } from "./useClaudeAuth";
+import {
+  authErrorMessage,
+  extractSignInUrl,
+  pickSignInUrl,
+} from "./useClaudeAuth";
 
 describe("extractSignInUrl", () => {
   it("finds the authorize URL in realistic setup-token output", () => {
@@ -79,6 +83,64 @@ describe("extractSignInUrl", () => {
     const second = "https://platform.claude.com/oauth/authorize?code=true&more=1";
     expect(extractSignInUrl(`${first}\n${second}\n`)).toBe(first);
   });
+
+  // ── Why the scraper is only the fallback ─────────────────────────────────
+  // `claude setup-token` emits the URL as an OSC 8 hyperlink and slices the
+  // *visible* text of it to the terminal width, so the transcript holds five
+  // 80-character pieces of a 346-character URL. Each piece is a valid,
+  // Anthropic-hosted, oauth-looking URL — and none of them authorises
+  // anything.
+
+  it("cannot recover a URL the CLI sliced across lines, which is why the hyperlink wins", () => {
+    const slices = [
+      FULL_URL.slice(0, 80),
+      FULL_URL.slice(80, 160),
+      FULL_URL.slice(160, 240),
+      FULL_URL.slice(240, 320),
+      FULL_URL.slice(320),
+    ];
+    const scraped = extractSignInUrl(slices.join("\n"));
+
+    // Documenting the limit, not endorsing it: the pieces share no prefix, so
+    // the "extends the current pick" rule cannot join them, and guessing at
+    // line joins on an untrusted stream is not on the table.
+    expect(scraped).toBe(slices[0]);
+    expect(scraped).not.toBe(FULL_URL);
+
+    // The hyperlink parameter carries the whole thing, and that is what the
+    // hook prefers.
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([FULL_URL])).toBe(FULL_URL);
+  });
+});
+
+/** The real sign-in URL, at its measured length (346 characters, Claude Code
+ *  2.1.226). */
+const FULL_URL =
+  "https://claude.com/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true&client_id=9d1c250a-e61b-44d9-88ed-5944d1962f5e&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fplatform.claude.com%2Foauth%2Fcode%2Fcallback&scope=user%3Ainference&code_challenge=RUX5MlWvwld1dmpvF_aPIJQWMBmffuJt4dOdL13zWAg&code_challenge_method=S256&state=su-x9PgZzvkBd3-um6G1llLNDgxptyO6HERvvCSrTbg";
+
+describe("pickSignInUrl", () => {
+  it("keeps a 346-character authorize URL intact", () => {
+    expect(FULL_URL).toHaveLength(346);
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([FULL_URL])).toBe(FULL_URL);
+  });
+
+  it("applies the same host allowlist to a hyperlink target", () => {
+    // An OSC 8 parameter is container output like anything else, and it is
+    // never displayed — so it is the *easier* place to hide a hostile host.
+    expect(pickSignInUrl(["https://evil.tld/cai/oauth/authorize"])).toBeNull();
+    expect(
+      pickSignInUrl(["https://claude.ai@evil.tld/oauth/authorize"]),
+    ).toBeNull();
+    expect(pickSignInUrl(["javascript:alert(1)"])).toBeNull();
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([])).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("does not let a later hyperlink displace the one already shown", () => {
+    const real = `${FULL_URL}`;
+    const spoof = "https://claude.com.evil.tld/cai/oauth/authorize?code=true";
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([real, spoof])).toBe(real);
+    expect(pickSignInUrl([spoof, real])).toBe(real);
+  });
 });
 
 describe("authErrorMessage", () => {

app/src/hooks/useClaudeAuth.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import { listen, type UnlistenFn } from "@tauri-apps/api/event";
 import * as commands from "../lib/tauri-commands";
 import { ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS, sanitizeRelayUrl } from "../lib/urlRelay";
 import type {
+  ClaudeTokenCodeRejectedEvent,
+  ClaudeTokenLinkEvent,
   ClaudeTokenOutputEvent,
   ClaudeTokenProgressEvent,
 } from "../lib/types";
@@ -19,10 +21,17 @@ import type {
 /** Emitted by `auth_token_commands.rs`; payload shapes live in `lib/types.ts`. */
 const PROGRESS_EVENT = "claude-token-progress";
 const OUTPUT_EVENT = "claude-token-output";
+const LINK_EVENT = "claude-token-link";
+const CODE_REJECTED_EVENT = "claude-token-code-rejected";
 
 /** Bound on the retained transcript. The tail is the interesting part. */
 const MAX_OUTPUT = 64 * 1024;
 
+/** Bound on retained sign-in candidates. The backend already deduplicates
+ *  consecutive repeats; this stops a container that prints a fresh hyperlink
+ *  every frame from growing state without limit. */
+const MAX_LINKS = 16;
+
 /**
  * Tauri rejects an `invoke` with the Rust `Err(String)` itself, and this
  * backend writes its errors as complete, actionable sentences ("The container
@@ -38,13 +47,13 @@ export function authErrorMessage(e: unknown, fallback: string): string {
 }
 
 /**
- * Pick the sign-in URL out of `claude setup-token`'s transcript.
+ * Choose one sign-in URL from a list of candidates.
  *
- * **The transcript is container output, so every candidate here is
+ * **Every candidate is container output, so all of them are
- * attacker-controlled if the sandboxed agent misbehaves.** It is then rendered
+ * attacker-controlled if the sandboxed agent misbehaves.** The winner is
- * under a heading that says "Sign in with Anthropic" and handed to the host
+ * rendered under a heading that says "Sign in with Anthropic" and handed to the
- * browser, which makes this the highest-value URL in the app to spoof: a user
+ * host browser, which makes this the highest-value URL in the app to spoof: a
- * who follows it types their real Anthropic credentials into whatever it
+ * user who follows it types their real Anthropic credentials into whatever it
  * resolves to. Three rules follow, and none of them are optional:
  *
  *  - Every candidate goes through the shared {@link sanitizeRelayUrl}, with a
@@ -60,14 +69,8 @@ export function authErrorMessage(e: unknown, fallback: string): string {
  *    the complete one — and it cannot swap the origin, because a longer string
  *    with the same prefix has the same host.
  */
-export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
+export function pickSignInUrl(candidates: readonly string[]): string | null {
-  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const cleaned = candidates
-  const matches = text.match(/https?:\/\/[^\s"'`<>\x00-\x20\x7f]+/g);
-  if (!matches) return null;
-
-  const cleaned = matches
-    // Trailing punctuation belongs to the prose, not the URL.
-    .map((url) => url.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]}>'"]+$/, ""))
     .map((url) => sanitizeRelayUrl(url, { allowHosts: ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS }))
     .filter((url): url is string => url !== null);
 
@@ -81,6 +84,33 @@ export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
   return best;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Scrape a sign-in URL out of `claude setup-token`'s visible transcript.
+ *
+ * **This is the fallback, not the primary route.** The CLI emits the URL as an
+ * OSC 8 hyperlink and slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the
+ * terminal width — measured at 80 columns, a 346-character URL arrives as five
+ * 80-character pieces on five lines. Nothing scraping the visible text can put
+ * those back together: the pieces share no prefix, so the "extends the current
+ * pick" rule cannot join them, and joining adjacent lines by guesswork on an
+ * untrusted stream is exactly the sort of thing the rules above exist to
+ * forbid. What comes out is the first 80 characters — a URL that parses, that
+ * points at claude.com, and that cannot authorise anything.
+ *
+ * So the backend lifts the whole URL out of the hyperlink parameter and sends
+ * it on `claude-token-link`, and {@link useClaudeTokenAcquisition} prefers that.
+ * This remains for CLI versions that print a bare URL with no hyperlink at all,
+ * where a URL narrow enough not to wrap is recovered correctly.
+ */
+export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const matches = text.match(/https?:\/\/[^\s"'`<>\x00-\x20\x7f]+/g);
+  if (!matches) return null;
+
+  // Trailing punctuation belongs to the prose, not the URL.
+  return pickSignInUrl(matches.map((url) => url.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]}>'"]+$/, "")));
+}
+
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // Token presence
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -133,6 +163,12 @@ export interface ClaudeTokenAcquisition {
   submitting: boolean;
   codeSubmitted: boolean;
   submitError: string | null;
+  /**
+   * How many codes `claude setup-token` has refused. Non-zero means the CLI is
+   * still alive and waiting for another one — a recoverable state, not the end
+   * of the flow.
+   */
+  codeRejections: number;
   submitCode: (code: string) => Promise<boolean>;
 }
 
@@ -154,6 +190,13 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
   const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false);
   const [codeSubmitted, setCodeSubmitted] = useState(false);
   const [submitError, setSubmitError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+  const [codeRejections, setCodeRejections] = useState(0);
+  // Candidates from `claude-token-link`, in arrival order. Kept as a list
+  // rather than a single value so `pickSignInUrl` applies the same first-wins
+  // rule here as it does to the scraped transcript — the CLI reprints the same
+  // hyperlink after every retry, and a *different* one arriving later must not
+  // be able to displace the one the user was already shown.
+  const [links, setLinks] = useState<string[]>([]);
 
   // Held in a ref so a fresh callback identity cannot restart the flow.
   const succeededRef = useRef(onSucceeded);
@@ -193,6 +236,26 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
               : next;
           });
         });
+        await register<ClaudeTokenLinkEvent>(LINK_EVENT, (payload) => {
+          if (payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
+          setLinks((prev) =>
+            prev.includes(payload.url) || prev.length >= MAX_LINKS
+              ? prev
+              : [...prev, payload.url],
+          );
+        });
+        await register<ClaudeTokenCodeRejectedEvent>(
+          CODE_REJECTED_EVENT,
+          (payload) => {
+            if (payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
+            // The CLI is alive and back at its prompt, so this is a correction
+            // the user can act on — not a failure. Re-open the input and say
+            // why, rather than leaving "Finishing sign-in" on screen forever.
+            setCodeRejections((n) => n + 1);
+            setCodeSubmitted(false);
+            setSubmitError(payload.message);
+          },
+        );
       } catch (e) {
         if (cancelled) return;
         setPhase("failed");
@@ -261,7 +324,13 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
     }
   }, []);
 
-  const signInUrl = useMemo(() => extractSignInUrl(output), [output]);
+  // The hyperlink parameter wins whenever there is one: it is the only place
+  // the CLI emits the URL contiguously. Scraping the visible text is the
+  // fallback for versions that print a bare URL — see `extractSignInUrl`.
+  const signInUrl = useMemo(
+    () => pickSignInUrl(links) ?? extractSignInUrl(output),
+    [links, output],
+  );
 
   return {
     phase,
@@ -272,6 +341,7 @@ export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
     submitting,
     codeSubmitted,
     submitError,
+    codeRejections,
     submitCode,
   };
 }

app/src/lib/tauri-commands.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { invoke } from "@tauri-apps/api/core";
-import type { Project, ProjectPath, ContainerInfo, SiblingContainer, AppSettings, UpdateInfo, ImageUpdateInfo, FileEntry, WebTerminalInfo, SttStatus, GatewayStatus, InstallOptions, ClaudeSession, ContainerCapabilities, ScheduledTask, ScheduledTaskInput, SchedulerNotification, AuthBridgeStatus, BrowserViewStatus, PlaywrightDetection, BrowserSetupOutcome, BrowserInstallTarget, ContainerStaleness, MigrationOptions, MigrationReport, MigrationState, ClearTokenOutcome } from "./types";
+import type { Project, ProjectPath, ContainerInfo, SiblingContainer, AppSettings, UpdateInfo, ImageUpdateInfo, FileEntry, WebTerminalInfo, SttStatus, GatewayStatus, InstallOptions, ClaudeSession, ContainerCapabilities, ScheduledTask, ScheduledTaskInput, SchedulerNotification, AuthBridgeStatus, BrowserViewStatus, PlaywrightDetection, BrowserSetupOutcome, BrowserInstallTarget, ContainerStaleness, MigrationOptions, MigrationReport, MigrationState, ClearTokenOutcome, CaCertInfo } from "./types";
 
 // Docker
 export const checkDocker = () => invoke<boolean>("check_docker");
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ export const detectAwsConfig = () =>
   invoke<string | null>("detect_aws_config");
 export const listAwsProfiles = () =>
   invoke<string[]>("list_aws_profiles");
+/** Check a corporate CA path and report what would be installed. Never
+ *  rejects for a bad path — the reason comes back in `error`. */
+export const inspectCaCertPath = (path: string) =>
+  invoke<CaCertInfo>("inspect_ca_cert_path", { path });
 export const detectHostTimezone = () =>
   invoke<string>("detect_host_timezone");
 

app/src/lib/types.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ export interface Project {
   /** null = not set → falls back to `full_permissions` (true → "bypass"). */
   permission_mode: PermissionMode | null;
   ssh_key_path: string | null;
+  /** Per-project override for the corporate CA certificate path (a single
+   *  certificate file or a directory of them). null falls back to
+   *  `AppSettings.ca_cert_path`. Changing it recreates the container. */
+  ca_cert_path: string | null;
   git_token: string | null;
   git_user_name: string | null;
   git_user_email: string | null;
@@ -190,6 +194,12 @@ export interface GlobalOpenAiCompatibleSettings {
 
 export interface AppSettings {
   default_ssh_key_path: string | null;
+  /** Corporate root CA — a single certificate file or a directory of them —
+   *  mounted read-only into every container and installed into the system
+   *  trust store, Node's `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, Python's
+   *  `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`/`SSL_CERT_FILE` and Chrome's NSS database.
+   *  Needed when the host is behind a TLS-terminating corporate proxy. */
+  ca_cert_path: string | null;
   default_git_user_name: string | null;
   default_git_user_email: string | null;
   docker_socket_path: string | null;
@@ -212,6 +222,20 @@ export interface AppSettings {
   global_claude_code_settings: ClaudeCodeSettings | null;
 }
 
+/** What `inspect_ca_cert_path` reports about a corporate CA path. Errors ride
+ *  in the payload rather than rejecting, so the field can render them inline
+ *  while the user is still typing. */
+export interface CaCertInfo {
+  exists: boolean;
+  is_directory: boolean;
+  cert_count: number;
+  /** The `.crt` names the certificates are installed as inside the container —
+   *  surfacing the silent `.pem` → `.crt` rename that
+   *  `update-ca-certificates` requires. */
+  installed_names: string[];
+  error: string | null;
+}
+
 export interface SttSettings {
   enabled: boolean;
   model: string;
@@ -528,6 +552,26 @@ export interface ClaudeTokenOutputEvent {
   chunk: string;
 }
 
+/** Payload of the `claude-token-link`: a sign-in URL taken from an OSC 8
+ *  hyperlink parameter, which is the only place the CLI emits it whole — the
+ *  visible text is sliced to the terminal width. **Untrusted**: it is container
+ *  output, so it goes through `sanitizeRelayUrl` with the
+ *  `ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS` allowlist before it is shown or opened. */
+export interface ClaudeTokenLinkEvent {
+  project_id: string;
+  url: string;
+}
+
+/** Payload of `claude-token-code-rejected`: `claude setup-token` refused the
+ *  submitted code and is parked waiting for another one. The flow is still
+ *  alive, so this is recoverable — `attempts_remaining` is how many more codes
+ *  the backend will pass on before giving up. */
+export interface ClaudeTokenCodeRejectedEvent {
+  project_id: string;
+  message: string;
+  attempts_remaining: number;
+}
+
 // ── Container base-image migration ───────────────────────────────────────────
 //
 // A project's container is created from its own `triple-c-snapshot-<id>:latest`

container/Dockerfile

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ RUN for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do \
     jq \
     sudo \
     ca-certificates \
+    libnss3-tools \
     gnupg \
     locales \
     unzip \
@@ -35,6 +36,12 @@ RUN for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do \
     socat \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
+# `libnss3-tools` above provides `certutil`. Chrome/Chromium read neither
+# /etc/ssl/certs nor $SSL_CERT_FILE — they have their own NSS database at
+# ~/.pki/nssdb — so without it the browser-view pane cannot be made to trust a
+# corporate CA, no matter what the system trust store says. entrypoint.sh
+# degrades to a warning if it is ever missing.
+
 # Remove default ubuntu user to free UID 1000 for host-user remapping
 RUN if id ubuntu >/dev/null 2>&1; then userdel -r ubuntu 2>/dev/null || userdel ubuntu; fi \
     && if getent group ubuntu >/dev/null 2>&1; then groupdel ubuntu 2>/dev/null || true; fi

container/entrypoint.sh

@@ -58,6 +58,167 @@ remap_uid_gid
 # Fix ownership of home directory after UID/GID change
 chown -R claude:claude /home/claude
 
+# ── Corporate CA certificates ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+# The host's CA material is bind-mounted read-only at /tmp/.host-ca. Triple-C
+# mounts a *directory* as-is and a *single file* as /tmp/.host-ca/<name>.crt,
+# so this only ever has to deal with a directory (the file branch below is
+# defensive).
+#
+# Runs before everything that touches the network — the git credential helper,
+# ssh-keyscan, and especially the `claude update` at the bottom of this file,
+# which is itself an HTTPS call that fails behind a TLS-terminating proxy
+# without this.
+#
+# Two things are easy to get wrong here:
+#   1. `update-ca-certificates` globs /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/*.crt
+#      case-sensitively. A `.pem` that is merely copied in is ignored in total
+#      silence, so certificates are *renamed*, not copied.
+#   2. Chrome/Chromium read neither /etc/ssl nor $SSL_CERT_FILE; they have
+#      their own NSS database at ~/.pki/nssdb, seeded below with certutil.
+#
+# NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE / SSL_CERT_FILE are deliberately NOT
+# exported here. Every terminal is a separate `docker exec`, which inherits the
+# container's configured env and sees nothing this script exported — the same
+# reason $BROWSER had to become an image-level ENV. Triple-C sets them on the
+# container at creation time instead. (They are forwarded into the cron
+# environment file further down, because cron jobs start from a bare env.)
+CA_SRC="/tmp/.host-ca"
+CA_STORE="/usr/local/share/ca-certificates"
+CA_PREFIX="triple-c-"
+CA_BUNDLE="/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
+CA_STAMP="/var/lib/triple-c/ca.stamp"
+CA_NSSDB="/home/claude/.pki/nssdb"
+
+# Mirror of `container_cert_name()` in app/src-tauri/src/docker/ca_certs.rs.
+# The two must agree; the Rust side has the unit tests.
+ca_normalise_name() {
+    local name stem
+    name=$(printf '%s' "$1" | tr -c 'A-Za-z0-9._-' '_')
+    while [ "${name#.}" != "$name" ]; do name="${name#.}"; done
+    stem="${name%.*}"
+    [ -z "$stem" ] && stem="corporate-ca"
+    printf '%s.crt' "$stem"
+}
+
+ca_source_files() {
+    if [ -d "$CA_SRC" ]; then
+        find "$CA_SRC" -maxdepth 1 -type f \
+            \( -iname '*.crt' -o -iname '*.pem' -o -iname '*.cer' \
+               -o -iname '*.cert' -o -iname '*.ca-bundle' \) 2>/dev/null | sort
+    elif [ -f "$CA_SRC" ]; then
+        printf '%s\n' "$CA_SRC"
+    fi
+}
+
+# Seed Chrome/Chromium's NSS database. Tolerant by design: a missing certutil
+# or a broken profile must warn, never fail the container start.
+# ~/.pki lives in the home volume, so this persists once done; the system store
+# lives in the writable layer and is re-applied on every start.
+ca_seed_nssdb() {
+    if ! command -v certutil >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "entrypoint: warning — certutil not found (install libnss3-tools); Chrome/Chromium in this container will not trust the corporate CA"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    su -s /bin/bash claude -c '
+        db="$HOME/.pki/nssdb"
+        mkdir -p "$db" || exit 1
+        if [ ! -f "$db/cert9.db" ]; then
+            certutil -d "sql:$db" -N --empty-password >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1
+        fi
+        for f in /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/triple-c-*.crt; do
+            [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+            nick="triple-c:$(basename "$f" .crt)"
+            # Delete first so re-running replaces rather than duplicates.
+            certutil -d "sql:$db" -D -n "$nick" >/dev/null 2>&1
+            certutil -d "sql:$db" -A -t "C,," -n "$nick" -i "$f" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+                || echo "entrypoint: warning — certutil could not add $nick"
+        done
+    ' && echo "entrypoint: seeded Chrome/Chromium NSS database with the corporate CA" \
+      || echo "entrypoint: warning — NSS database seeding failed (continuing)"
+}
+
+install_corporate_ca() {
+    local files fp stamp f base name count installed
+
+    files=$(ca_source_files)
+
+    if [ -z "$files" ]; then
+        # Nothing configured — but /usr/local/share is in the writable layer and
+        # `docker commit` bakes it into the project's snapshot image, so a cert
+        # installed by a previous configuration would ride that snapshot into
+        # every future container. Turning the setting off has to actively undo.
+        if ls "$CA_STORE/$CA_PREFIX"*.crt >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            echo "entrypoint: removing previously installed corporate CA certificates"
+            rm -f "$CA_STORE/$CA_PREFIX"*.crt
+            update-ca-certificates --fresh >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+                || echo "entrypoint: warning — update-ca-certificates failed while removing certificates"
+            rm -f "$CA_STAMP"
+        fi
+        if [ -e "$CA_SRC" ]; then
+            echo "entrypoint: warning — $CA_SRC holds no certificate files"
+        fi
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    # Idempotent and cheap: the certs are already installed on a plain restart
+    # (the writable layer survives stop/start), so hash the sources and skip the
+    # work when nothing has moved. The NSS database is checked separately
+    # because it lives in the home volume and can be wiped independently.
+    fp=$(printf '%s\n' "$files" | xargs -d '\n' -r sha256sum 2>/dev/null | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
+    stamp=$(cat "$CA_STAMP" 2>/dev/null)
+    if [ -n "$fp" ] && [ "$fp" = "$stamp" ] && [ -s "$CA_BUNDLE" ]; then
+        if [ -f "$CA_NSSDB/cert9.db" ]; then
+            echo "entrypoint: corporate CA certificates already installed"
+            return 0
+        fi
+        ca_seed_nssdb
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    mkdir -p "$CA_STORE" "$(dirname "$CA_STAMP")"
+    rm -f "$CA_STORE/$CA_PREFIX"*.crt
+    installed=0
+
+    while IFS= read -r f; do
+        [ -n "$f" ] || continue
+        base=$(basename "$f")
+        name="$CA_PREFIX$(ca_normalise_name "$base")"
+        count=$(grep -c -- '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' "$f" 2>/dev/null || true)
+        [ -n "$count" ] || count=0
+        if [ "$count" -gt 1 ]; then
+            # A corporate trust chain is usually delivered as one PEM holding
+            # root + intermediates. update-ca-certificates handles exactly one
+            # certificate per file, so split it.
+            awk -v out="$CA_STORE/${name%.crt}" '
+                /-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/ { n++; f = out "-" n ".crt" }
+                n > 0 { print > f }
+            ' "$f" && installed=$((installed + count))
+        elif [ "$count" -eq 1 ]; then
+            cp -f "$f" "$CA_STORE/$name" && installed=$((installed + 1))
+        else
+            echo "entrypoint: warning — $f holds no PEM certificate (DER is not supported), skipping"
+        fi
+    done <<< "$files"
+
+    chmod 644 "$CA_STORE/$CA_PREFIX"*.crt 2>/dev/null
+
+    if [ "$installed" -eq 0 ]; then
+        echo "entrypoint: warning — no usable certificates found under $CA_SRC"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    if update-ca-certificates >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "entrypoint: installed $installed corporate CA certificate(s) into the system trust store"
+        printf '%s' "$fp" > "$CA_STAMP"
+    else
+        echo "entrypoint: warning — update-ca-certificates failed; corporate certificates may not be trusted"
+    fi
+
+    ca_seed_nssdb
+}
+
+install_corporate_ca
+
 # ── SSH key setup ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Host SSH dir is mounted read-only at /tmp/.host-ssh.
 # Copy to /home/claude/.ssh so we can fix permissions.
@@ -277,7 +438,7 @@ ENV_FILE="$SCHEDULER_DIR/.env"
 : > "$ENV_FILE"
 env | while IFS='=' read -r key value; do
     case "$key" in
-        ANTHROPIC_*|AWS_*|CLAUDE_CODE_*|TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE|PATH|HOME|LANG|TZ|COLORTERM|BROWSER)
+        ANTHROPIC_*|AWS_*|CLAUDE_CODE_*|TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE|PATH|HOME|LANG|TZ|COLORTERM|BROWSER|NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS|REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE|SSL_CERT_FILE)
             # Escape single quotes in value and write as KEY='VALUE'
             escaped_value=$(printf '%s' "$value" | sed "s/'/'\\\\''/g")
             printf "%s='%s'\n" "$key" "$escaped_value" >> "$ENV_FILE"