WIP: Ship a pia-vpn skill with the VPN support toggle #29

Draft
jknapp wants to merge 5 commits from feat/vpn-skill into feat/vpn-tooling
7 changed files with 407 additions and 0 deletions
Showing only changes of commit 3bd3caa101 - Show all commits
+8
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@@ -341,6 +341,14 @@ container is created once by a very long function where a dropped capability is
breaks split tunnels too; `openresolv` has no candidate on noble and `resolvconf` drags in breaks split tunnels too; `openresolv` has no candidate on noble and `resolvconf` drags in
systemd-resolved, so that one is documented rather than fixed. Driving `wg` and `ip route` systemd-resolved, so that one is documented rather than fixed. Driving `wg` and `ip route`
directly avoids both, which is what the skill does. directly avoids both, which is what the skill does.
- **The `pia-vpn` skill is installed *and removed* from `VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED`.** `container/skills/`
is baked to `/opt/triple-c-skills` and `install_feature_skill()` in `entrypoint.sh` copies it into
`~/.claude/skills/` on every start — refreshed each time, so a fix reaches existing projects, and
`rm -rf`'d first, so files dropped from a later version do not linger. The removal branch matters
as much as the install: `~/.claude` is a persisted volume, so a skill left behind after the toggle
goes off would keep instructing an agent to use a capability the container no longer has. Which is
also why the variable is sent as `0` rather than omitted, and why it is in `RESERVED_ENV_EXACT` —
a custom env var of that name could otherwise claim the skill without the capability behind it.
### Container Lifecycle ### Container Lifecycle
+7
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@@ -488,6 +488,13 @@ redirected, and no tunnel is configured or started on your behalf. Enabling it a
container's traffic to start leaving through a VPN is the most common misreading of what it does — container's traffic to start leaving through a VPN is the most common misreading of what it does —
configuring a tunnel and routing traffic into it remains yours to do. configuring a tunnel and routing traffic into it remains yours to do.
To make that second half easier, enabling this also installs a **`pia-vpn` skill** into the
container's `~/.claude/skills/`, so Claude Code can bring up a Private Internet Access tunnel over
WireGuard for you — ask it to connect the VPN and it will. The skill carries the parts that are
easy to get wrong (see the DNS note below), and it is removed again when you turn the setting off.
It needs your PIA credentials in `~/pia-creds`, two lines, username then password. If you use a
different provider, ignore it and set up your own client; nothing else depends on it.
With the setting **off**, a client such as PIA or OpenVPN installs and its daemon starts normally, With the setting **off**, a client such as PIA or OpenVPN installs and its daemon starts normally,
but the connection attempt **hangs until it times out** — a default container has no tun device to open but the connection attempt **hangs until it times out** — a default container has no tun device to open
and no permission to add an interface or a route, and most clients report that as a generic timeout and no permission to add an interface or a route, and most clients report that as a generic timeout
+27
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@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ const RESERVED_ENV_EXACT: &[&str] = &[
"MCP_SERVERS_JSON", "MCP_SERVERS_JSON",
"CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON", "CLAUDE_CODE_SETTINGS_JSON",
"MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED", "MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED",
"VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED",
"TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE", "TRIPLE_C_PERMISSION_MODE",
CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV, CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN_ENV,
// The model-alias vars are already covered by the `ANTHROPIC_` prefix // The model-alias vars are already covered by the `ANTHROPIC_` prefix
@@ -1275,6 +1276,15 @@ pub async fn create_container(
env_vars.push("MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED=1".to_string()); env_vars.push("MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED=1".to_string());
} }
// Drives the pia-vpn skill install in entrypoint.sh. Sent as 0 rather than
// omitted when off, because ~/.claude is a persisted volume: entrypoint has
// to be told to *remove* a skill left there by an earlier run with the
// toggle on, and an absent variable cannot say that.
env_vars.push(format!(
"VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED={}",
u8::from(project.vpn_support_enabled)
));
// Permission mode — read by triple-c-task-runner for scheduled (headless) // Permission mode — read by triple-c-task-runner for scheduled (headless)
// Claude Code runs. Interactive terminals get the flags directly instead. // Claude Code runs. Interactive terminals get the flags directly instead.
env_vars.push(format!( env_vars.push(format!(
@@ -2789,6 +2799,23 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(cap_add.unwrap(), vec!["NET_ADMIN"]); assert_eq!(cap_add.unwrap(), vec!["NET_ADMIN"]);
} }
#[test]
fn the_vpn_skill_flag_is_reserved_from_custom_env() {
// entrypoint.sh installs and removes the pia-vpn skill from this
// variable. A custom env var of the same name would let a project claim
// the skill without the capability behind it — or keep it after the
// toggle is off — so it has to be unsettable like the others.
assert!(is_reserved_env_key("VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED"));
assert!(is_reserved_env_key("vpn_support_enabled"));
assert_eq!(
compute_env_fingerprint(&[EnvVar {
key: "VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED".to_string(),
value: "1".to_string(),
}]),
""
);
}
/// What bollard actually hands us when a tun-less host rejects the device. /// What bollard actually hands us when a tun-less host rejects the device.
/// ///
/// Captured verbatim from Docker 29.7: `docker create` with a missing /// Captured verbatim from Docker 29.7: `docker create` with a missing
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@@ -394,6 +394,15 @@ RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/triple-c-sso-refresh
COPY mission-control /opt/mission-control COPY mission-control /opt/mission-control
# Skills that ship with a Triple-C feature rather than with Mission Control.
# entrypoint.sh installs them into ~/.claude/skills/ when the feature that owns
# them is enabled, and removes them when it is not — a skill telling an agent to
# build a tunnel in a container that no longer has CAP_NET_ADMIN is worse than
# no skill at all. Staged in /opt because ~/.claude is a volume mount: an image
# copy underneath it would be masked from the project's first start onward.
COPY skills /opt/triple-c-skills
RUN chmod +x /opt/triple-c-skills/*/*.sh
COPY entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh COPY entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
COPY triple-c-scheduler /usr/local/bin/triple-c-scheduler COPY triple-c-scheduler /usr/local/bin/triple-c-scheduler
+29
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@@ -338,6 +338,35 @@ if [ "$MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED" = "1" ]; then
unset MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED unset MISSION_CONTROL_ENABLED
fi fi
# ── Feature skills ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Skills owned by a Triple-C feature rather than by Mission Control. Installed
# when the feature is on, removed when it is off: ~/.claude is a persisted
# volume, so a skill left behind after its feature is disabled would keep
# telling an agent to use a capability the container no longer has.
#
# Copied on every start rather than only when absent, so a fix to a skill
# reaches projects that already have the old copy. Local edits under these
# directories do not survive — treat /opt/triple-c-skills as the source.
install_feature_skill() {
_name=$1
_enabled=$2
_dest="/home/claude/.claude/skills/$_name"
if [ "$_enabled" = "1" ]; then
[ -d "/opt/triple-c-skills/$_name" ] || return 0
mkdir -p /home/claude/.claude/skills
rm -rf "$_dest"
cp -r "/opt/triple-c-skills/$_name" "$_dest"
chown -R claude:claude "$_dest"
echo "entrypoint: $_name skill installed to ~/.claude/skills/"
elif [ -d "$_dest" ]; then
rm -rf "$_dest"
echo "entrypoint: $_name skill removed (feature disabled)"
fi
}
install_feature_skill pia-vpn "${VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED:-0}"
unset VPN_SUPPORT_ENABLED
# ── Claude Code settings ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ── Claude Code settings ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Merge Claude Code settings into ~/.claude/settings.json (preserves existing # Merge Claude Code settings into ~/.claude/settings.json (preserves existing
# keys). Creates the file if it doesn't exist. These control TUI mode, effort # keys). Creates the file if it doesn't exist. These control TUI mode, effort
+149
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@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
---
name: pia-vpn
description: Connect this container's traffic through a PIA VPN tunnel over WireGuard, or diagnose one that is not working. Use when asked to enable, route through, check, or tear down a VPN, when traffic needs to leave from a different location, or when DNS or connectivity broke after a VPN was brought up.
---
# PIA VPN
Bring this container's traffic out through Private Internet Access over
WireGuard, using the API PIA documents for headless use.
Run `sudo ~/.claude/skills/pia-vpn/pia-wg.sh` with `up`, `up --full`, `down` or
`status`. Read the rest of this page before the first `up --full` — two of the
behaviours below are actively misleading if you meet them without warning.
## Before anything else: what the toggle does not do
Triple-C's **VPN support** setting grants three things — `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, the
`/dev/net/tun` device, and the `net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark` sysctl — and
stops there. It starts no client, builds no tunnel and changes no route.
So "the VPN is enabled but traffic isn't going through it" is normally not a
fault. It means the capability is present and nothing has used it yet. Check
with `status` before assuming something is broken.
If the toggle is off, the script says so and names the setting. It cannot be
turned on from inside the container; the user changes it in Config → Runtime,
and it recreates the container on the next start (home and `.claude` volumes
are preserved — it is not a Reset).
## Two modes
| | routes | use when |
|---|---|---|
| `up` | only `1.1.1.1/32` | verifying the tunnel works without disturbing anything |
| `up --full` | all public traffic | you actually want traffic leaving via PIA |
Prefer `up` first. It proves the handshake, credentials and region are good
while your own connectivity is untouched, so a failure is cheap.
**`up --full` routes Claude Code's own API traffic through PIA.** If the tunnel
drops, that traffic stops until it recovers or you run `down`. Say so before
running it — the user may be mid-session, and they will experience the failure
as Claude going away, not as a VPN problem.
## Trap 1: a full tunnel takes DNS with it
The container resolves through an address on the Docker network — under Docker
Desktop, `192.168.65.7` — which sits **outside** the container's own subnet. A
default route of `0.0.0.0/0`, or the `0.0.0.0/1` + `128.0.0.0/1` pair, captures
it and posts every lookup into a tunnel that cannot carry private traffic.
Nothing resolves after that. The visible symptom is Claude Code reporting it
cannot connect, because `api.anthropic.com` no longer resolves:
```
$ curl https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages
* Could not resolve host: api.anthropic.com (rc=6)
```
`pia-wg.sh` already handles this: it routes `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`,
`192.168.0.0/16` and `169.254.0.0/16` back via the original gateway, then pins
PIA's own resolvers through the tunnel with `/32` routes that outrank the
`10/8` exclusion. If you ever route traffic by hand, you owe both halves — the
exclusions *and* a resolver reachable from wherever you pointed the default.
## Trap 2: an IP-literal health check cannot see a dead resolver
`curl https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace` needs no DNS, so it returns a cheerful
PIA exit address while name resolution is entirely broken. A tunnel verified
that way looks perfect and works for nothing.
`status` resolves a real name for this reason. Trust its `DNS:` line, and if
you check by hand, resolve a name rather than fetching an address.
## Trap 3: no tunnel survives a restart, and it fails open
The network namespace is rebuilt every time the container starts, and nothing
inside reconnects anything. After a stop/start, Reset or any config change that
recreates the container, the interface and its routes are gone.
State under `/run/pia-wg` rides the snapshot and persists, so leftover files
make it look as though the tunnel is still configured. It is not. Traffic goes
out the real address with no error and nothing visibly different.
Never infer from `/run/pia-wg` that a tunnel is up. Run `status` — if the
handshake line is missing, there is no tunnel. Re-run `up` after every start.
## Credentials
Two lines in `~/pia-creds` — username, then password:
```
p1234567
your-password
```
Set `PIA_CREDS` to use a different path. Treat the contents as secret: never
print the file, never echo the values, and never include them in a commit, a
log or a message. The script reads it directly and does not echo it.
## Regions
Defaults to `us_chicago`. Override with `PIA_REGION`:
```bash
sudo PIA_REGION=uk_london ~/.claude/skills/pia-vpn/pia-wg.sh up --full
```
List the ids:
```bash
curl -s https://serverlist.piaservers.net/vpninfo/servers/v6 \
| head -1 | jq -r '.regions[].id'
```
## Verifying
`status` prints three things — handshake, DNS, and the public address:
```
latest handshake: 2 seconds ago
transfer: 92 B received, 180 B sent
DNS: ok (via 10.0.0.243 10.0.0.242)
public IP: 64.113.5.244
```
All three matter. A handshake with `DNS: BROKEN` is trap 1. A handshake with an
unchanged public address means routing did not take — you are probably in `up`
rather than `up --full`.
## Tearing down
`down` restores `resolv.conf` from its backup and removes exactly the routes
that were added, in reverse order, then deletes the interface. It is safe to
run when nothing is up. Confirm afterwards that the public address is back to
the container's own.
## What this deliberately does not do
- **No killswitch.** Blocking non-tunnel egress needs `iptables`, which is not
in the image, and would cut Claude Code's API traffic whenever the tunnel is
down. If the user needs guaranteed egress rather than convenient egress, say
so plainly rather than improvising one — it is a real design decision.
- **No autostart.** There is no service manager in the container and Triple-C
has no start hook, so nothing can re-establish the tunnel automatically.
- **Not PIA's desktop client.** `pia-daemon` and `piactl` are installable but
cannot work headless: the daemon never accepts a client connection without
the GUI, and `piactl --help` states that connecting requires it. If you find
one installed, it is not a working alternative to this script.
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@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# PIA over WireGuard, headless.
#
# PIA's desktop client (pia-daemon + piactl) cannot work here: its daemon never
# accepts a client connection without the GUI running, and `piactl --help` says
# as much. This talks to PIA's public API directly instead, which is the path
# PIA themselves document for headless use.
#
# sudo pia-wg.sh up tunnel up, only 1.1.1.1 routed through it (safe test)
# sudo pia-wg.sh up --full tunnel up, all *public* traffic exits via PIA
# sudo pia-wg.sh down tear down, restoring DNS and routes
# sudo pia-wg.sh status handshake, DNS and current public IP
#
# Requires the project's "VPN support" setting (Config -> Runtime) to be on.
#
# PIA_CREDS credentials file, two lines: username, then password
# (default ~/pia-creds; never echoed by this script)
# PIA_REGION region id (default us_chicago). List them with:
# curl -s https://serverlist.piaservers.net/vpninfo/servers/v6 \
# | head -1 | jq -r '.regions[].id'
set -euo pipefail
CREDS=${PIA_CREDS:-/home/claude/pia-creds}
REGION=${PIA_REGION:-us_chicago}
IFACE=pia0
STATE=/run/pia-wg
# Kept off the tunnel in --full mode. The container's DNS resolver, the Docker
# host network (host.docker.internal, any host-side Ollama), sibling containers
# and the LAN all live in here. PIA cannot route any of it, so without these
# exclusions the container reaches the public internet and nothing else --
# including, fatally, its own resolver.
PRIVATE_NETS="10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 169.254.0.0/16"
# Args are joined with spaces so a long message can be written as several
# source lines without the indentation ending up in the output.
die() { echo "pia-wg: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
preflight() {
[ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || die "run with sudo"
# CAP_NET_ADMIN is bit 12. Checking it by name gives a usable error; without
# it the first `ip` call fails with a bare "Operation not permitted" that
# points nowhere near the setting that actually needs changing.
local caps
caps=$(awk '/^CapEff:/{print $2}' /proc/self/status)
if [ $(( 0x$caps & 0x1000 )) -eq 0 ]; then
die "this container has no CAP_NET_ADMIN." \
"Turn on \"VPN support\" in Config -> Runtime and start the project" \
"again. That recreates the container; the home and .claude volumes" \
"are preserved, so nothing in them is lost."
fi
[ -e /dev/net/tun ] || \
die "/dev/net/tun is missing." \
"Same fix: turn on \"VPN support\" in Config -> Runtime. If it is" \
"already on, the Docker host's kernel is missing the tun module."
command -v wg >/dev/null || die "wireguard-tools is not installed."
[ -r "$CREDS" ] || \
die "no credentials at $CREDS." \
"Two lines are expected: username, then password." \
"Set PIA_CREDS to read them from somewhere else."
}
# Record every route we add so teardown removes exactly those and nothing else.
add_route() { ip route add $1 2>/dev/null && echo "$1" >> "$STATE/routes" || true; }
up() {
preflight
mkdir -p "$STATE"; cd "$STATE"
[ -f ca.rsa.4096.crt ] || curl -sf -m 20 -o ca.rsa.4096.crt \
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pia-foss/manual-connections/master/ca.rsa.4096.crt \
|| die "could not fetch PIA's CA certificate"
local u p tok srv sip scn priv pub resp ep gw dns
u=$(sed -n 1p "$CREDS"); p=$(sed -n 2p "$CREDS")
tok=$(curl -sf -m 25 -u "$u:$p" \
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/gtoken/generateToken | jq -r .token)
[ -n "$tok" ] && [ "$tok" != null ] || die "PIA authentication failed - check $CREDS"
curl -sf -m 30 https://serverlist.piaservers.net/vpninfo/servers/v6 | head -1 > servers.json
srv=$(jq -r --arg r "$REGION" '.regions[] | select(.id==$r) | .servers.wg[0]' servers.json)
sip=$(echo "$srv" | jq -r .ip); scn=$(echo "$srv" | jq -r .cn)
[ -n "$sip" ] && [ "$sip" != null ] || die "no WireGuard server for region $REGION"
priv=$(wg genkey); pub=$(echo "$priv" | wg pubkey)
printf '%s' "$priv" > wg.priv; chmod 600 wg.priv
# PIA pins its certificate to the server's common name, which is why this
# connects by CN and lets --connect-to point that name at the real address.
resp=$(curl -sf -m 25 -G --connect-to "$scn::$sip:" --cacert ca.rsa.4096.crt \
--data-urlencode "pt=$tok" --data-urlencode "pubkey=$pub" \
"https://$scn:1337/addKey")
[ "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .status)" = OK ] || die "key registration failed: $resp"
: > "$STATE/routes"
ip link del "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null || true
ip link add "$IFACE" type wireguard
wg set "$IFACE" private-key wg.priv \
peer "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_key)" \
endpoint "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_ip):$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_port)" \
allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0 persistent-keepalive 25
ip addr add "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .peer_ip)/32" dev "$IFACE"
ip link set "$IFACE" up
if [ "${1:-}" = "--full" ]; then
# Pin the endpoint to the pre-existing gateway first, so the tunnel's own
# packets do not try to route through the tunnel. Then beat the default
# route with two half-routes rather than replacing it -- nothing to restore
# on teardown, and the container keeps working if this script dies midway.
ep=$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_ip)
gw=$(ip route show default | awk '{print $3; exit}')
add_route "$ep/32 via $gw"
add_route "0.0.0.0/1 dev $IFACE"
add_route "128.0.0.0/1 dev $IFACE"
# Keep container, host and LAN traffic off the tunnel. Longer prefixes than
# the two halves above, so these win.
for n in $PRIVATE_NETS; do add_route "$n via $gw"; done
# PIA's resolver lives inside 10/8, so pin it back through the tunnel with a
# /32 -- longer still, so it beats the 10.0.0.0/8 exclusion just added.
# Using PIA's resolver rather than the container's keeps DNS from leaking,
# and the container's own resolver is unreachable from inside the tunnel.
dns=$(echo "$resp" | jq -r '.dns_servers[]? // empty' | head -2)
if [ -n "$dns" ]; then
cp /etc/resolv.conf "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak"
for d in $dns; do add_route "$d/32 dev $IFACE"; done
# resolv.conf is a bind mount: write through it, never replace it.
for d in $dns; do echo "nameserver $d"; done > /etc/resolv.conf
else
echo "pia-wg: warning - PIA returned no DNS servers; leaving resolv.conf alone" >&2
fi
echo "full tunnel: public traffic exits via PIA; private ranges stay local"
else
add_route "1.1.1.1/32 dev $IFACE"
echo "test route only: 1.1.1.1 goes via PIA, everything else unchanged"
fi
sleep 2
status
}
down() {
[ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || die "run with sudo"
if [ -f "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak" ]; then
cat "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak" > /etc/resolv.conf
rm -f "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak"
fi
if [ -f "$STATE/routes" ]; then
# Reverse order: the specific overrides go before the ranges they sit in.
tac "$STATE/routes" | while read -r r; do
[ -n "$r" ] && ip route del $r 2>/dev/null || true
done
rm -f "$STATE/routes"
fi
ip link del "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "tunnel down"
}
status() {
wg show "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null | grep -E "latest handshake|transfer" || echo "no tunnel up"
# Resolve a name, not an IP literal. A curl to 1.1.1.1 succeeds while DNS is
# completely broken, which is exactly how a dead resolver goes unnoticed.
printf 'DNS: '
if timeout 10 getent hosts api.anthropic.com >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "ok (via $(sed -n 's/^nameserver //p' /etc/resolv.conf | tr '\n' ' '))"
else
echo "BROKEN - cannot resolve api.anthropic.com"
fi
echo -n "public IP: "
curl -s -m 20 https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace | sed -n 's/^ip=//p'
}
case "${1:-}" in
up) shift; up "${1:-}" ;;
down) down ;;
status) status ;;
*) sed -n '2,20p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; exit 1 ;;
esac