# CLAUDE.md This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository. ## Project Overview Triple-C (Claude-Code-Container) is a Tauri v2 desktop application that sandboxes Claude Code inside Docker containers. It has two main parts: a React/TypeScript frontend, a Rust backend, and a Docker container image definition. ## Build & Development Commands All frontend/tauri commands run from the `app/` directory: ```bash cd app npm ci # Install dependencies (required first time) npx tauri dev # Launch app in dev mode with hot reload (Vite on port 1420) npx tauri build # Production build (outputs to src-tauri/target/release/bundle/) npm run build # Frontend-only build (tsc + vite) npm run test # Run Vitest once npm run test:watch # Run Vitest in watch mode ``` Rust backend is compiled automatically by `tauri dev`/`tauri build`. To check Rust independently: ```bash cd app/src-tauri cargo check # Type-check without full build cargo build # Build Rust backend only ``` Container image: ```bash docker build -t triple-c-sandbox ./container ``` ### Linux Build Dependencies (Ubuntu/Debian) ```bash sudo apt-get install -y libgtk-3-dev libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev librsvg2-dev libsoup-3.0-dev patchelf libssl-dev pkg-config build-essential ``` ## Architecture ### Two-Process Model (Tauri IPC) - **React frontend** (`app/src/`) renders UI in the OS webview - **Rust backend** (`app/src-tauri/src/`) handles Docker API, credential storage, and terminal I/O - Communication uses two patterns: - `invoke()` — request/response for discrete operations (CRUD, start/stop containers) - `emit()`/`listen()` — event streaming for continuous data (terminal I/O) ### Terminal I/O Flow ``` User keystroke → xterm.js onData() → invoke("terminal_input") → mpsc channel → docker exec stdin docker exec stdout → tokio task → emit("terminal-output-{sessionId}") → listen() → xterm.js write() ``` ### Frontend Structure (`app/src/`) - **`store/appState.ts`** — Single Zustand store for all app state (projects, sessions, UI). The main area is a single ordered tab strip holding two tab kinds, keyed `term:` and `home:`; `activeSessionId` is *derived* from `activeTabKey` so exactly one thing is current. `tabOrder` is user-reorderable (drag, or `Ctrl+Shift+←/→` via `moveActiveTab`) — so **never treat a tab's position as identity**: address tabs by key, and index only through `tabOrder`. `moveTab` deliberately does not activate what it moves. - **The tab drag is pointer events, not HTML5 drag-and-drop, and must stay that way.** Tauri's `dragDropEnabled` blocks HTML5 drag inside the webview on Windows, and it cannot simply be turned off: `TerminalView` needs Tauri's native drag-drop event because it is the only one that carries dropped *file paths*. An HTML5 drag also carries a `DataTransfer`, which the default handler types into any text field the drag is released over. - **A new app-level shortcut must not swallow a text-editing chord.** `useKeyboardShortcuts` binds on `document` in the capture phase, so `inTextField()` guards the arrow bindings — excluding xterm's helper textarea, which is an input-method shim rather than a field. - **`hooks/`** — All Tauri IPC calls are encapsulated in hooks (`useTerminal`, `useProjects`, `useDocker`, `useSettings`) - **`lib/tauri-commands.ts`** — Typed `invoke()` wrappers; TypeScript types in `lib/types.ts` must match Rust models - **`components/terminal/TerminalView.tsx`** — xterm.js integration with WebGL rendering, URL detection for OAuth flow - **`components/layout/`** — TopBar, MainTabs (the unified tab strip), Sidebar, StatusBar - **`components/projects/`** — `ProjectRow` (select-only list row), `ProjectList`, `AddProjectDialog`, and the editors reused by Project Home - **`components/projects/home/`** — **Project Home**, the main-area view for a project: Overview / Sessions / Automation / Config / Files. Per-project configuration lives here, not in modals — see "UI conventions" below. - **`components/settings/`** — Host-level settings: Docker, AWS, Web Terminal, STT, shared auth - **`components/ui/`** — Shared primitives. **Use these; do not hand-roll replacements.** `Modal` (the only correct way to build a dialog — it supplies `role="dialog"`, `aria-modal`, focus trap and restore), `Button`, `Toggle`, `Field`, `SegmentedControl`, `StatusIndicator`, `SaveIndicator`, `OverflowMenu`, `ToastHost`, `Tooltip` ### UI conventions - **Project config belongs in Project Home's Config tab, not a modal.** Modals are reserved for short, genuinely modal tasks (add project, confirm removal, token acquisition). The app previously had ~12 hand-rolled modals; they were consolidated deliberately. - **Never bypass the design tokens.** All colour comes from CSS custom properties in `index.css`. Filled buttons use `--accent-emphasis` (not `--accent`, which fails WCAG AA against white). Use `--text-disabled` rather than `disabled:opacity-50`. - **Never write `focus:outline-none`.** A global `:focus-visible` ring is defined in `index.css`. - **Status must not be encoded in colour alone** — `StatusIndicator` pairs a glyph with a word. - Keyboard: `Ctrl+T` new terminal, `Ctrl+Shift+W` close tab, `Ctrl+Tab` cycle, `Ctrl+1..9` jump, `Ctrl+Shift+←/→` move the active tab. `Ctrl+W` is intentionally left alone — it is readline's `kill-word` inside the terminal, and plain `Ctrl+←/→` is its word-wise cursor motion, which is why tab-moving takes Shift. ### Backend Structure (`app/src-tauri/src/`) - **`commands/`** — Tauri command handlers. These are the IPC entry points called by `invoke()`. Beyond docker/project/settings/terminal: `inspect_commands.rs` (read-only views into a container — Claude sessions, installed capabilities, scheduler tasks), `auth_bridge_commands.rs`, `auth_token_commands.rs`. - **`auth_bridge/`** — Host-side loopback bridge so browser logins run *inside* a container can complete against the host browser. Discovers listeners by parsing `/proc/net/tcp{,6}` (the image has no `ss`/`netstat`/`lsof`), binds host `127.0.0.1` **only**, and tunnels in over the Docker API via `socat`. Opt-in per project. - **`browser_view/`** — Watch and take over the browser Claude drives with Playwright inside the container. Runs Playwright's own dashboard (`browser.bind()` + `playwright-cli show`) in the container and fronts it with a **token-gated** loopback proxy. Deliberately does **not** reuse the auth bridge's `PortForward`, which binds an unauthenticated port — fine for a throwaway OAuth listener, wrong for remote control of a browser. Host ports are confined to `47820..=47827` because CSP `frame-src` cannot express a port range and must enumerate them; a unit test asserts the Rust range matches `tauri.conf.json`. Opt-in per project. - **`popout.rs` puts the same URL in a second OS window** (`WebviewUrl::External`), so the view can be watched on another monitor or pinned on top while the main window is used for work. Three things it rests on: no capability lists that window, so it has **no IPC surface** — do not give it one; the app CSP does not apply, because it is a top-level document rather than a frame, and the token gate is what protects the port in both cases; and the window is owned by the *session*, so the supervisor's teardown closes it rather than leaving a window onto a viewer that no longer exists. It closes with `destroy()`, never `close()`, to stay clear of `CloseRequested`. The pane drops its iframe while popped out — two viewers can both *drive* the browser. - **`page.rs` opens a page, which is the one thing the pane could not do.** A URL plus a viewport: launch a browser in the container, `browser.bind()` it so the pane shows it, and keep the handle. Serves auth (the OAuth callback listener is *in* the container, so a container-side browser closes the loop with no host round trip and no auth bridge) and dev servers on container loopback. **Verified: a second client cannot join a bound browser** — `chromium.connect()` against the published endpoint times out in every URL form, because that socket speaks the dashboard's transport, not the public connect protocol. So whoever launches is the only process that can drive, which is why the helper is resident and why live resize applies to pages *we* opened and never to `@playwright/mcp`'s (those take `--viewport-size` / `PLAYWRIGHT_MCP_VIEWPORT_SIZE` at launch). Control is a polled JSON file in `/tmp` — no port, no second listener — and a re-open with a helper already up *navigates* rather than relaunching, so a session signed in on one page survives to the next. - **Resizing the window does not resize the page.** The viewer is a CDP screencast: a bigger window is the same pixels drawn larger. `page.setViewportSize()` is what reflows (measured against a `@media (max-width: 900px)` rule), and match-window mode pushes the pop-out's settled `Resized` size into it — debounced by generation counter, since a drag emits continuously and each one costs a container exec. - **`lib.rs`'s `on_window_event` fires for every window and must stay guarded on `label() == "main"`.** Without that guard, closing a pop-out runs the app's shutdown: every container stopped, process exited. - **Detection has to look past `node_modules`.** `claude mcp add … npx @playwright/mcp@latest` installs into `~/.npm/_npx//node_modules`, not any `node_modules`, so `detect.rs` globs that cache as well as `/workspace`, `$HOME/node_modules` and `npm root -g`. It also hops from a wrapper `playwright` to its **nested** `playwright-core`: verified that npm does not hoist for global installs, and the wrapper ships no `types/types.d.ts`, so reading the wrapper alone reports a current build as "predates `browser.bind()`". - **`@playwright/mcp` can never satisfy this pane.** It bundles a `playwright-core` that binds, but never `@playwright/cli`, which is the viewer. Never offer it as a setup route — only as what binds sessions automatically once Playwright is present. - **`install.rs` installs into `/workspace`, as `claude`, with `--no-save`.** `/workspace` is *not* a bind mount — project directories are mounted at `/workspace/{mount_name}` — so this touches nothing of the user's, needs no sudo (npm's prefix is `/usr`, which is root-owned), and is on the module resolution path for scripts in the project. Browsers go to `~/.cache/ms-playwright` as `claude`, i.e. the home volume. - **Current base images ship Chromium's shared libraries; older ones do not** — and a project keeps the base image it was first built from until it is migrated, so "older" is the normal case. Without them `playwright install chromium` downloads a browser that cannot launch, which is why installing Chrome via apt looks like a fix. `install.rs` asks `install-deps --dry-run` first and skips the apt step when the answer is "all present", *saying so* in the progress stream. Do not decide this by probing for library names: the dry-run simulates the same `apt-get install` the fix would run, so check and fix cannot disagree about what the dependency set is. Note that `--dry-run` exits **0** both when everything is installed and when Playwright has no list for the platform — match on its output, not its exit code. Either way the action ends by *actually launching* the browser to verify. `@playwright/mcp` wants the `chrome` **channel** specifically, so both browsers are offered. - **`docker/`** — Docker API layer using bollard: - `client.rs` — Singleton Docker connection via `OnceLock` - `container.rs` — Container lifecycle (create, start, stop, remove, inspect) - `exec.rs` — Attached exec streaming. `create_attached_exec()` is the **single** place an attached exec is opened; terminal sessions and the auth bridge both go through it. - `image.rs` — Image build/pull with progress streaming - `gateway.rs` — Optional LiteLLM sibling container giving Claude Code an Anthropic-format front end for providers that only speak OpenAI (see `gateway-container/`). Mirrors `stt.rs`. Its bind address is **detected, never `0.0.0.0`** — unlike STT, *project containers* consume it, so loopback alone is not always enough: Docker Desktop gets `127.0.0.1` (containers reach it via `host.docker.internal`), native Linux gets the default bridge gateway (`172.17.0.1`). `GatewayBinding` derives the bind address and the advertised `base_url` together so they cannot drift. A wildcard bind would be LAN-reachable — Docker's rules precede host firewalls — in front of a container config holding a billed provider key. It also **always** sets a LiteLLM `master_key`, since LiteLLM without one accepts any key. - `migration.rs` — Base-image migration: manifest capture via throwaway containers, the pure delta computation (dpkg-ownership filter, bind-mount exclusion, verbatim-copy set), and the crash-recovery state machine. See "Base-image migration" below. - `legacy_cleanup.rs` — One-release migration shim removing leftovers from the deleted MCP feature (containers labelled `triple-c.mcp-server`, `triple-c-net-*` networks). Deletable once users have migrated. - **`web_terminal/`** — Remote terminal access via axum HTTP+WebSocket server: - `server.rs` — Axum server lifecycle (start/stop), serves embedded HTML and handles WS upgrades - `ws_handler.rs` — Per-connection WebSocket handler with JSON protocol, session management, cleanup on disconnect - `terminal.html` — Self-contained xterm.js web UI embedded via `include_str!()` - **`models/`** — Serde structs (`Project`, `Backend`, `BedrockConfig`, `OllamaConfig`, `LlamaCppConfig`, `OpenAiCompatibleConfig`, `ClaudeCodeSettings`, `ContainerInfo`, `AppSettings`, `WebTerminalSettings`). These define the IPC contract with the frontend. - **`storage/`** — Persistence: `projects_store.rs` (JSON file with atomic writes), `secure.rs` (OS keychain via `keyring` crate), `settings_store.rs` ### Container (`container/`) - **`Dockerfile`** — Ubuntu 24.04 base with Claude Code, Node.js 22, Python 3.12, Rust, Docker CLI, git, gh, AWS CLI v2, ripgrep, pnpm, uv, ruff pre-installed, plus the shared libraries a browser links against (see below) - **Browser runtime libraries are baked in; browser *binaries* are not.** A layer runs `npx --yes playwright@latest install-deps chromium` as root, so Playwright names its own dependencies and the list cannot rot against Ubuntu 24.04's `t64` renames or a new Chromium dependency. Measured: +99 packages, +334 MiB unpacked / +119 MiB compressed, on both arches. Do not replace it with a hand-written apt list without pinning the Playwright version you derived it from — a `chromium`-only list saves ~94 MiB (Playwright's `tools` group: xvfb and the CJK fonts) and nothing more, because `libgbm1` → `mesa-libgallium` → `libllvm20` is ~213 MiB that no trimming removes. - The `install-deps --dry-run` call after it is a **build-time assertion, not decoration**: on a platform Playwright's table does not cover, `install-deps` prints a warning and returns having installed nothing **with exit status 0**. Without the assertion that ships a broken image behind a clean build log. - Baking the libraries but not the browsers is the whole point of the split. Browsers live in `~/.cache/ms-playwright` (home volume) and already survive recreation *and* migration; a runtime `apt-get install` of the libraries lands in the writable layer, is re-paid after every Reset, and is **lost on base-image migration**, which replays apt from a manifest. The runtime approach converges on the worst state: a 400 MB browser present with its libraries gone. - The layer sits immediately after Node (npx is its only prerequisite) and well above the shim `COPY`s, so editing a shim does not re-run a multi-hundred-megabyte apt install. - **`entrypoint.sh`** — UID/GID remapping to match host user, SSH key setup, git config, docker socket permissions, Claude Code settings.json injection, then `sleep infinity` - **`triple-c-scheduler`** — Bash-based scheduled task system for recurring Claude Code invocations **`/home/claude` in the image is seed-only.** It is the mount point of the named volume `triple-c-home-{projectId}`, so after a project's *first* start the image's copy of that directory is masked permanently and can never be updated again. A change you make under `/home/claude` in the `Dockerfile` or in `entrypoint.sh`'s "copy this into the home dir" style reaches **new projects only** — existing ones will never see it, with or without a base-image migration. So: **anything that must stay upgradable belongs in `/usr/local/bin` or `/opt`, or must be seeded by `entrypoint.sh` at runtime** (i.e. written on every start, from a source outside the home volume, the way `CLAUDE_INSTRUCTIONS` → `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md` and the Mission Control skill copy already are). Putting it in the image's `/home/claude` and expecting an image update to deliver it is the mistake. The flip side is the useful half of the same fact: Claude Code itself (`~/.local/bin`), cargo, uv, ruff, the OAuth login, `~/.claude.json`, skills, transcripts, scheduler tasks and SSH keys all re-attach for free when a container is recreated from a *different* image — which is what makes base-image migration cheap. ### Corporate CA certificates (`docker/ca_certs.rs`, `entrypoint.sh`) A global `AppSettings::ca_cert_path` with a per-project `Project::ca_cert_path` override, accepting a single certificate file **or** a directory. Follows the SSH/AWS host-mount pattern: read-only bind mount at `/tmp/.host-ca`, applied by the entrypoint on every start, so it survives recreation, migration and Reset. Four things here are not obvious: - **`update-ca-certificates` globs `*.crt`, case-sensitively.** A `.pem` that is merely copied into `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` is ignored in total silence. Certificates are *renamed* — `container_cert_name()` in Rust, mirrored in a few lines of shell in `entrypoint.sh` (the Rust side carries the unit tests). A single-file mount lands at `/tmp/.host-ca/.crt` so the entrypoint only ever sees a directory and the file keeps a recognisable name. - **The system store is not enough.** Only curl/git/apt read it. Node — and therefore Claude Code itself — needs `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`; Python/requests need `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`/`SSL_CERT_FILE`; Chrome/Chromium read neither and want their own NSS database at `~/.pki/nssdb`, seeded with `certutil` (`libnss3-tools`, added to the image for this). The NSS step warns and continues if `certutil` is missing rather than failing the start. - **Those env vars are set from Rust at creation, never exported by the entrypoint.** A terminal session is a `docker exec`, which inherits the container's configured env and sees nothing the entrypoint exported — the same lesson that made `$BROWSER` an image-level `ENV`. The bundle path is deterministic (`/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`), so Rust can set them up front. They are emitted **empty** when no CA is configured, for the `MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS` reason: `docker commit` bakes env into the snapshot image. Empty is safe — verified on Ubuntu 24.04 that curl, `openssl s_client` and Python's `ssl` behave exactly as with the vars unset. - **`triple-c.ca-fingerprint` covers the certificate *bytes*, not just the path.** Replacing a rotated CA at the same location must recreate the container; the copy inside is made once, at start, so nothing else would notice. The entrypoint is stamped/idempotent on restart, and actively **removes** `triple-c-*.crt` when the setting is cleared — `/usr/local/share` rides the project's snapshot image, so turning the feature off has to undo, not merely stop. ### Container Lifecycle Containers use a **stop/start** model (not create/destroy). Installed packages persist across stops. The `.claude` config dir uses a named Docker volume (`triple-c-claude-config-{projectId}`), nested inside the home volume (`triple-c-home-{projectId}`), so OAuth tokens and Claude Code config survive container stop/start *and* container recreation. **Reset is the exception and it is destructive.** `rebuild_project_container` calls `remove_project_volumes`, which deletes *both* volumes — so a Reset wipes `~/.claude`, `~/.claude.json`, the OAuth credential, installed skills, and session transcripts. That is intentional (Reset exists to get back to a clean base image), but do not describe Reset as preserving credentials. ### Base-image migration (`docker/migration.rs`, `commands/migration_commands.rs`) A container is created from `triple-c-snapshot-{projectId}:latest` whenever that image exists, and every recreation re-commits it — so without an explicit act, a project stays on the base image it was first built from **forever** and never picks up a new `socat`, a new `/usr/local/bin` shim or a security update. Migration is the non-destructive way out; Reset is the destructive one. - **Staleness is a surfaced signal, not an automatic trigger.** `triple-c.base-image-id` records the lineage but is deliberately **not** compared in `container_needs_recreation` — see the long comment there. Comparing it would recreate every project *from its own snapshot* on the next base bump: churn on the old base, and it would consume the "you should migrate" signal without migrating. `get_container_staleness` surfaces it; `migrate_project_to_base` acts on it. - **A missing lineage label means "unknown, probe instead", never "stale".** - **`:latest` keeps pointing at the old lineage until the final commit.** That is what makes every crash before that point self-heal — `start_project_container` just recreates from the old snapshot. After the container swap, the new container's `triple-c.migration-state=in-progress` label plus the persisted state file let `reconcile_project_statuses` offer resume or rollback. - **Rollback restores the system layer only.** The volumes are never touched at any point, so work done in `$HOME` during a migrated session survives a rollback. Say so in any UI copy. - **`/var` is never copied either, and that is the one way migration is *more* destructive than the ordinary recreate.** A recreate builds from the project's snapshot, so `/var/lib/postgresql` rides along; a migration builds from the base and the apt replay hands back an empty cluster. Copying a live database's files onto a different base's version of the same package is a corruption risk, not a fix — so the answer is disclosure. `unpreserved_data()` reports first-level directories under `/var/lib` and `/var/www` that the base does not ship *and* that hold non-dpkg-owned files (which is what keeps `/var/lib/apt` and `/var/lib/dpkg` out of it), and the pre-flight, the banner and the finished report all name them. Do not make this silent. - **The rollback pin is not best-effort.** After `commit_container_snapshot` the commit is the only copy of the old system layer, so a `docker tag` that fails — or succeeds without the reference resolving — aborts the migration before `remove_container`. Same rule in reverse for `rollback_migration`: the image is confirmed to exist before the container is destroyed. - **`resume` must check the container's `triple-c.migration-state` label**, exactly as `reconcile_migration` does. Without it a record left behind by a failed commit "resumes" into the *old, unmigrated* container and commits it as migrated. - **Anything that stops, removes or recreates a project's container consults `migration_commands::is_migrating`.** The window between `remove_container` and the create that follows looks exactly like "no container" to Start, and Reset would delete the volumes out from under a live run. - **`/etc` is never copied**, only reported: the snapshot lineage has `/etc/apt/sources.list.d/nodesource.sources` where the current base has `nodesource.list`, and having both breaks every `apt-get update` on a duplicate source. Verified, not theoretical. - **`docker diff` is useless here** — on a snapshot-derived container it reports only changes since the last commit. Migration diffs two filesystem manifests instead, filtered through dpkg ownership and presence-in-the-new-base. Measured on a real project, that turns 8,677 raw path differences into 2 genuinely user-authored ones. ### Authentication Per-project, independently configured: - **Anthropic (OAuth)** — `claude login` in terminal, token persists in config volume - **AWS Bedrock** — Static keys, profile, or bearer token injected as env vars - **Ollama** — Connect to a local or remote Ollama server via `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` (e.g., `http://host.docker.internal:11434`) - **llama.cpp** — Connect to a local or remote `llama-server` via `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` (e.g., `http://host.docker.internal:8080`, its default port) - **OpenAI Compatible** — Connect through a gateway implementing the **Anthropic Messages API** (LiteLLM) via `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` + `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN` **Claude Code only ever speaks the Anthropic Messages API** (`POST /v1/messages?beta=true`) to `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` — never OpenAI's `/v1/chat/completions`. Ollama and llama.cpp implement `/v1/messages` natively, which is why each gets a plain base-URL backend with no translation shim. A server that only exposes an OpenAI-shaped API does not work behind any backend. For every backend pointing at a custom endpoint (`Backend::uses_custom_endpoint`), all four `ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_{OPUS,SONNET,HAIKU,FABLE}_MODEL` vars are pinned to the backend's configured model id, with an optional per-backend Haiku override. Without this, Claude Code's background calls resolve `haiku` to an Anthropic model id the local server does not have and fail silently. Anthropic and Bedrock deliberately keep Claude Code's own defaults. `ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL` is deprecated and must not be used. ## Styling - **Tailwind CSS v4** with the Vite plugin (`@tailwindcss/vite`). No separate tailwind config file. - All colors use CSS custom properties in `index.css` `:root` (e.g., `--bg-primary`, `--text-secondary`, `--accent`) - `color-scheme: dark` is set on `:root` for native dark-mode controls - **Do not** add a global `* { padding: 0 }` reset — Tailwind v4 uses CSS `@layer`, and unlayered CSS overrides all layered utilities ## Key Conventions - Frontend types in `lib/types.ts` must stay in sync with Rust structs in `models/` - Tauri commands are registered in `lib.rs` via `.invoke_handler(tauri::generate_handler![...])` - `capabilities/default.json` grants permissions for **plugin** commands only (`core:`, `dialog:`, `store:`, `opener:`). Application commands registered through `generate_handler!` do **not** need an entry there — adding one is not required and none exists for any app command. - The `projects.json` file uses atomic writes (write to `.tmp`, then `rename()`). Corrupted files are backed up to `.bak`. - **Adding project state that changes the container?** `container_needs_recreation()` is entirely **label-based** — it does not diff the container's env. If a new setting affects the container's environment or configuration, you must also write a corresponding `triple-c.*` label at creation and compare it there, or the change will silently not take effect until some unrelated setting forces a rebuild. Never put a secret in a label; labels are readable via `docker inspect`. (`triple-c.base-image-id` is the one deliberate exception — it is written but not compared; the reasoning is in the comment beside the check.) - **Always write a `triple-c.*` label explicitly, even when the value is empty.** Docker merges an image's labels into a container's at creation, and `docker commit` copies container labels onto the snapshot image — so a label stamped once rides that snapshot into *every* future container forever. Verified on this host, and it is not hypothetical: `triple-c.mcp-fingerprint` has not been written by any code since the MCP feature was removed, yet a snapshot image was found still carrying a non-empty one, which made its one-shot recreation shim recreate that project on every single start. Writing the key explicitly overrides the inherited value — the same defence `MANAGED_AUTH_KEYS` applies to env vars. - **New model fields need an explicit serde default when the correct default isn't the zero value.** `#[serde(default)]` on a `bool` yields `false`; follow the `default_full_permissions` pattern in `models/project.rs` for anything that should default to true. - Cross-platform paths: Docker socket is `/var/run/docker.sock` on Linux/macOS, `//./pipe/docker_engine` on Windows ## Testing Frontend tests use Vitest with jsdom environment and React Testing Library. Setup file at `src/test/setup.ts`. Run a single test file: ```bash cd app npx vitest run src/path/to/test.test.ts ```