#!/usr/bin/env bash # PIA over WireGuard, headless. # # PIA's desktop client (pia-daemon + piactl) cannot work here: its daemon never # accepts a client connection without the GUI running, and `piactl --help` says # as much. This talks to PIA's public API directly instead, which is the path # PIA themselves document for headless use. # # sudo pia-wg.sh up tunnel up, only 1.1.1.1 routed through it (safe test) # sudo pia-wg.sh up --full tunnel up, all *public* traffic exits via PIA # sudo pia-wg.sh down tear down, restoring DNS and routes # sudo pia-wg.sh status handshake, DNS and current public IP # # Requires the project's "VPN support" setting (Config -> Runtime) to be on. # # PIA_CREDS credentials file, two lines: username, then password # (default ~/pia-creds; never echoed by this script) # PIA_REGION region id (default us_chicago). List them with: # curl -s https://serverlist.piaservers.net/vpninfo/servers/v6 \ # | head -1 | jq -r '.regions[].id' set -euo pipefail CREDS=${PIA_CREDS:-/home/claude/pia-creds} REGION=${PIA_REGION:-us_chicago} IFACE=pia0 STATE=/run/pia-wg # Kept off the tunnel in --full mode. The container's DNS resolver, the Docker # host network (host.docker.internal, any host-side Ollama), sibling containers # and the LAN all live in here. PIA cannot route any of it, so without these # exclusions the container reaches the public internet and nothing else -- # including, fatally, its own resolver. PRIVATE_NETS="10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 169.254.0.0/16" # Args are joined with spaces so a long message can be written as several # source lines without the indentation ending up in the output. die() { echo "pia-wg: $*" >&2; exit 1; } preflight() { [ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || die "run with sudo" # CAP_NET_ADMIN is bit 12. Checking it by name gives a usable error; without # it the first `ip` call fails with a bare "Operation not permitted" that # points nowhere near the setting that actually needs changing. local caps caps=$(awk '/^CapEff:/{print $2}' /proc/self/status) if [ $(( 0x$caps & 0x1000 )) -eq 0 ]; then die "this container has no CAP_NET_ADMIN." \ "Turn on \"VPN support\" in Config -> Runtime and start the project" \ "again. That recreates the container; the home and .claude volumes" \ "are preserved, so nothing in them is lost." fi [ -e /dev/net/tun ] || \ die "/dev/net/tun is missing." \ "Same fix: turn on \"VPN support\" in Config -> Runtime. If it is" \ "already on, the Docker host's kernel is missing the tun module." command -v wg >/dev/null || die "wireguard-tools is not installed." [ -r "$CREDS" ] || \ die "no credentials at $CREDS." \ "Two lines are expected: username, then password." \ "Set PIA_CREDS to read them from somewhere else." } # Record every route we add so teardown removes exactly those and nothing else. add_route() { ip route add $1 2>/dev/null && echo "$1" >> "$STATE/routes" || true; } up() { preflight mkdir -p "$STATE"; cd "$STATE" [ -f ca.rsa.4096.crt ] || curl -sf -m 20 -o ca.rsa.4096.crt \ https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pia-foss/manual-connections/master/ca.rsa.4096.crt \ || die "could not fetch PIA's CA certificate" local u p tok srv sip scn priv pub resp ep gw dns u=$(sed -n 1p "$CREDS"); p=$(sed -n 2p "$CREDS") tok=$(curl -sf -m 25 -u "$u:$p" \ https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/gtoken/generateToken | jq -r .token) [ -n "$tok" ] && [ "$tok" != null ] || die "PIA authentication failed - check $CREDS" curl -sf -m 30 https://serverlist.piaservers.net/vpninfo/servers/v6 | head -1 > servers.json srv=$(jq -r --arg r "$REGION" '.regions[] | select(.id==$r) | .servers.wg[0]' servers.json) sip=$(echo "$srv" | jq -r .ip); scn=$(echo "$srv" | jq -r .cn) [ -n "$sip" ] && [ "$sip" != null ] || die "no WireGuard server for region $REGION" priv=$(wg genkey); pub=$(echo "$priv" | wg pubkey) printf '%s' "$priv" > wg.priv; chmod 600 wg.priv # PIA pins its certificate to the server's common name, which is why this # connects by CN and lets --connect-to point that name at the real address. resp=$(curl -sf -m 25 -G --connect-to "$scn::$sip:" --cacert ca.rsa.4096.crt \ --data-urlencode "pt=$tok" --data-urlencode "pubkey=$pub" \ "https://$scn:1337/addKey") [ "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .status)" = OK ] || die "key registration failed: $resp" : > "$STATE/routes" ip link del "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null || true ip link add "$IFACE" type wireguard wg set "$IFACE" private-key wg.priv \ peer "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_key)" \ endpoint "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_ip):$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_port)" \ allowed-ips 0.0.0.0/0 persistent-keepalive 25 ip addr add "$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .peer_ip)/32" dev "$IFACE" ip link set "$IFACE" up if [ "${1:-}" = "--full" ]; then # Pin the endpoint to the pre-existing gateway first, so the tunnel's own # packets do not try to route through the tunnel. Then beat the default # route with two half-routes rather than replacing it -- nothing to restore # on teardown, and the container keeps working if this script dies midway. ep=$(echo "$resp" | jq -r .server_ip) gw=$(ip route show default | awk '{print $3; exit}') add_route "$ep/32 via $gw" add_route "0.0.0.0/1 dev $IFACE" add_route "128.0.0.0/1 dev $IFACE" # Keep container, host and LAN traffic off the tunnel. Longer prefixes than # the two halves above, so these win. for n in $PRIVATE_NETS; do add_route "$n via $gw"; done # PIA's resolver lives inside 10/8, so pin it back through the tunnel with a # /32 -- longer still, so it beats the 10.0.0.0/8 exclusion just added. # Using PIA's resolver rather than the container's keeps DNS from leaking, # and the container's own resolver is unreachable from inside the tunnel. dns=$(echo "$resp" | jq -r '.dns_servers[]? // empty' | head -2) if [ -n "$dns" ]; then cp /etc/resolv.conf "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak" for d in $dns; do add_route "$d/32 dev $IFACE"; done # resolv.conf is a bind mount: write through it, never replace it. for d in $dns; do echo "nameserver $d"; done > /etc/resolv.conf else echo "pia-wg: warning - PIA returned no DNS servers; leaving resolv.conf alone" >&2 fi echo "full tunnel: public traffic exits via PIA; private ranges stay local" else add_route "1.1.1.1/32 dev $IFACE" echo "test route only: 1.1.1.1 goes via PIA, everything else unchanged" fi sleep 2 status } down() { [ "$(id -u)" = 0 ] || die "run with sudo" if [ -f "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak" ]; then cat "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak" > /etc/resolv.conf rm -f "$STATE/resolv.conf.bak" fi if [ -f "$STATE/routes" ]; then # Reverse order: the specific overrides go before the ranges they sit in. tac "$STATE/routes" | while read -r r; do [ -n "$r" ] && ip route del $r 2>/dev/null || true done rm -f "$STATE/routes" fi ip link del "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null || true echo "tunnel down" } status() { wg show "$IFACE" 2>/dev/null | grep -E "latest handshake|transfer" || echo "no tunnel up" # Resolve a name, not an IP literal. A curl to 1.1.1.1 succeeds while DNS is # completely broken, which is exactly how a dead resolver goes unnoticed. printf 'DNS: ' if timeout 10 getent hosts api.anthropic.com >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "ok (via $(sed -n 's/^nameserver //p' /etc/resolv.conf | tr '\n' ' '))" else echo "BROKEN - cannot resolve api.anthropic.com" fi echo -n "public IP: " curl -s -m 20 https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace | sed -n 's/^ip=//p' } case "${1:-}" in up) shift; up "${1:-}" ;; down) down ;; status) status ;; *) sed -n '2,20p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; exit 1 ;; esac