use bollard::container::{LogOutput, UploadToContainerOptions}; use bollard::exec::{CreateExecOptions, ResizeExecOptions, StartExecResults}; use futures_util::{Stream, StreamExt}; use std::collections::HashMap; use std::pin::Pin; use std::sync::Arc; use tokio::io::{AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt}; use tokio::sync::{mpsc, Mutex}; use super::client::get_docker; /// A `docker exec` that has been created and started with stdin/stdout/stderr /// attached — the raw duplex halves, before any policy about what to do with /// them. /// /// This is the single place in the codebase that knows how to open an attached /// exec. Both consumers are built on it: /// * [`ExecSessionManager`] — interactive terminals and the audio bridge, /// which pump bytes through mpsc channels and a callback. /// * `auth_bridge` — per-connection `socat` tunnels, which pump bytes /// straight between a host TCP socket and these halves. /// /// With `tty = false` the output stream is demultiplexed by Docker, so the /// consumer can tell [`LogOutput::StdOut`] from [`LogOutput::StdErr`]. That /// distinction matters for the auth bridge: `socat`'s diagnostics must not be /// spliced into the proxied byte stream. pub struct AttachedExec { pub exec_id: String, pub output: Pin> + Send>>, pub input: Pin>, } /// Create and start an exec with stdin + stdout + stderr attached, returning the /// raw duplex halves. Runs as `claude` in `/workspace`, like every other exec /// this app opens. pub async fn create_attached_exec( container_id: &str, cmd: Vec, tty: bool, ) -> Result { create_attached_exec_as(container_id, cmd, tty, "claude", "/workspace").await } /// [`create_attached_exec`] with the user and working directory spelled out. /// /// Only base-image migration needs this: replaying `apt` and unpacking a /// payload tar at `/` have to run as **root**, and every other caller wants the /// `claude` / `/workspace` defaults that [`create_attached_exec`] supplies. It /// stays the single place an attached exec is opened. pub async fn create_attached_exec_as( container_id: &str, cmd: Vec, tty: bool, user: &str, working_dir: &str, ) -> Result { let docker = get_docker()?; let exec = docker .create_exec( container_id, CreateExecOptions { attach_stdin: Some(true), attach_stdout: Some(true), attach_stderr: Some(true), tty: Some(tty), cmd: Some(cmd), user: Some(user.to_string()), working_dir: Some(working_dir.to_string()), ..Default::default() }, ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?; let exec_id = exec.id.clone(); match docker .start_exec(&exec_id, None) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))? { StartExecResults::Attached { output, input } => Ok(AttachedExec { exec_id, output, input, }), StartExecResults::Detached => Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()), } } pub struct ExecSession { pub exec_id: String, pub container_id: String, pub input_tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender>, shutdown_tx: mpsc::Sender<()>, } impl ExecSession { pub async fn send_input(&self, data: Vec) -> Result<(), String> { self.input_tx .send(data) .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to send input: {}", e)) } #[allow(dead_code)] pub async fn resize(&self, cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<(), String> { let docker = get_docker()?; docker .resize_exec( &self.exec_id, ResizeExecOptions { width: cols, height: rows, }, ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to resize exec: {}", e)) } pub fn shutdown(&self) { let _ = self.shutdown_tx.try_send(()); } } pub struct ExecSessionManager { sessions: Arc>>, } impl ExecSessionManager { pub fn new() -> Self { Self { sessions: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())), } } pub async fn create_session( &self, container_id: &str, session_id: &str, cmd: Vec, on_output: F, on_exit: Box, ) -> Result<(), String> where F: Fn(Vec) + Send + 'static, { self.create_session_with_tty(container_id, session_id, cmd, true, on_output, on_exit) .await } pub async fn create_session_with_tty( &self, container_id: &str, session_id: &str, cmd: Vec, tty: bool, on_output: F, on_exit: Box, ) -> Result<(), String> where F: Fn(Vec) + Send + 'static, { let AttachedExec { exec_id, mut output, mut input, } = create_attached_exec(container_id, cmd, tty).await?; let (input_tx, mut input_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::>(); let (shutdown_tx, mut shutdown_rx) = mpsc::channel::<()>(1); // Output reader task let session_id_clone = session_id.to_string(); let shutdown_tx_clone = shutdown_tx.clone(); tokio::spawn(async move { loop { tokio::select! { msg = output.next() => { match msg { Some(Ok(output)) => { on_output(output.into_bytes().to_vec()); } Some(Err(e)) => { log::error!("Exec output error for {}: {}", session_id_clone, e); break; } None => { log::info!("Exec output stream ended for {}", session_id_clone); break; } } } _ = shutdown_rx.recv() => { log::info!("Exec session {} shutting down", session_id_clone); break; } } } on_exit(); let _ = shutdown_tx_clone; }); // Input writer task tokio::spawn(async move { while let Some(data) = input_rx.recv().await { if let Err(e) = input.write_all(&data).await { log::error!("Failed to write to exec stdin: {}", e); break; } } }); let session = ExecSession { exec_id, container_id: container_id.to_string(), input_tx, shutdown_tx, }; self.sessions .lock() .await .insert(session_id.to_string(), session); Ok(()) } pub async fn send_input(&self, session_id: &str, data: Vec) -> Result<(), String> { let sessions = self.sessions.lock().await; let session = sessions .get(session_id) .ok_or_else(|| format!("Session {} not found", session_id))?; session.send_input(data).await } pub async fn resize(&self, session_id: &str, cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<(), String> { // Clone the exec_id under the lock, then drop the lock before the // async Docker API call to avoid holding the mutex across await. let exec_id = { let sessions = self.sessions.lock().await; let session = sessions .get(session_id) .ok_or_else(|| format!("Session {} not found", session_id))?; session.exec_id.clone() }; let docker = get_docker()?; docker .resize_exec( &exec_id, ResizeExecOptions { width: cols, height: rows, }, ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to resize exec: {}", e)) } pub async fn close_session(&self, session_id: &str) { let mut sessions = self.sessions.lock().await; if let Some(session) = sessions.remove(session_id) { session.shutdown(); } } pub async fn close_sessions_for_container(&self, container_id: &str) { let mut sessions = self.sessions.lock().await; let ids_to_close: Vec = sessions .iter() .filter(|(_, s)| s.container_id == container_id) .map(|(id, _)| id.clone()) .collect(); for id in ids_to_close { if let Some(session) = sessions.remove(&id) { session.shutdown(); } } } pub async fn close_all_sessions(&self) { let mut sessions = self.sessions.lock().await; for (_, session) in sessions.drain() { session.shutdown(); } } pub async fn get_container_id(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result { let sessions = self.sessions.lock().await; let session = sessions .get(session_id) .ok_or_else(|| format!("Session {} not found", session_id))?; Ok(session.container_id.clone()) } pub async fn write_file_to_container( &self, container_id: &str, file_name: &str, data: &[u8], ) -> Result { let docker = get_docker()?; // Build a tar archive in memory containing the file let mut tar_buf = Vec::new(); { let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf); let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu(); header.set_size(data.len() as u64); header.set_mode(0o644); header.set_cksum(); builder .append_data(&mut header, file_name, data) .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?; builder .finish() .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?; } docker .upload_to_container( container_id, Some(UploadToContainerOptions { path: "/tmp".to_string(), ..Default::default() }), tar_buf.into(), ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?; Ok(format!("/tmp/{}", file_name)) } } /// Upload a host file into the container's `/tmp` under `dest_name`. The file is /// read and packed into the tar inside a blocking task, so the synchronous IO /// runs off the async worker. The tar's declared entry size is taken from the /// bytes actually read (not a separate `stat`), so a file changing size between /// a size check and the read can't desync the header and corrupt the archive. /// Returns the in-container path (`/tmp/`). pub async fn upload_host_file_to_container( container_id: &str, host_path: &str, dest_name: &str, ) -> Result { let host_path = host_path.to_string(); let dest_name = dest_name.to_string(); let dest_for_blk = dest_name.clone(); let tar_buf = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result, String> { let data = std::fs::read(&host_path) .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read {}: {}", host_path, e))?; let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024); { let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf); let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu(); // Size comes from the bytes in hand, so header and payload can't disagree. header.set_size(data.len() as u64); header.set_mode(0o644); header.set_cksum(); builder .append_data(&mut header, &dest_for_blk, &data[..]) .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?; builder .finish() .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?; } Ok(tar_buf) }) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Upload task panicked: {}", e))??; let docker = get_docker()?; docker .upload_to_container( container_id, Some(UploadToContainerOptions { path: "/tmp".to_string(), ..Default::default() }), tar_buf.into(), ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?; Ok(format!("/tmp/{}", dest_name)) } /// Write `data` into the container at `/` with `mode`. /// /// For small, generated files — migration uses it for the `tar -T` include /// list, which can be too long to pass as argv. Anything large should be /// streamed through an attached exec's stdin instead, since this buffers the /// whole payload in memory twice (once raw, once tarred). pub async fn upload_bytes_to_container( container_id: &str, dest_dir: &str, file_name: &str, data: &[u8], mode: u32, ) -> Result { let docker = get_docker()?; let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024); { let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf); let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu(); header.set_size(data.len() as u64); header.set_mode(mode); header.set_cksum(); builder .append_data(&mut header, file_name, data) .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?; builder .finish() .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?; } docker .upload_to_container( container_id, Some(UploadToContainerOptions { path: dest_dir.to_string(), ..Default::default() }), tar_buf.into(), ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?; Ok(format!("{}/{}", dest_dir.trim_end_matches('/'), file_name)) } /// Ceiling on how much container output a one-shot exec will buffer into the /// host process. /// /// Every `exec_oneshot*` call reads the whole stream into a `String` before any /// caller sees a byte, and what it is reading is *container-controlled* — the /// scheduler notifications reader `cat`s up to 50 files with no size cap, and /// the auth bridge reads `/proc/net/tcp` every two seconds. Neither has an /// upstream bound, so this is where the bound goes. Generous enough that no /// legitimate reader (the largest is a package manifest of a full image) comes /// close. pub const MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT: usize = 8 * 1024 * 1024; /// The auth bridge's per-tick budget. It reads two procfs files whose rows are /// ~150 bytes; a real container has tens of listeners, and the parser only ever /// yields at most one entry per port number. 1 MiB is thousands of rows — far /// past anything genuine, far short of a problem. pub const PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT: usize = 1024 * 1024; /// Append to `buf` while it stays inside `limit`. Returns `false` once the /// limit is exceeded, at which point the caller must stop reading. fn push_capped(buf: &mut String, chunk: &str, limit: usize) -> bool { if buf.len() + chunk.len() > limit { return false; } buf.push_str(chunk); true } /// Run a one-shot (non-interactive) exec command in a container and collect stdout. pub async fn exec_oneshot(container_id: &str, cmd: Vec) -> Result { exec_oneshot_env(container_id, cmd, Vec::new()).await } /// [`exec_oneshot`] with a caller-chosen output ceiling, for readers whose /// input is fully container-controlled and whose legitimate output is small. pub async fn exec_oneshot_limited( container_id: &str, cmd: Vec, limit: usize, ) -> Result { exec_oneshot_inner(container_id, "claude", cmd, Vec::new(), limit) .await .map(|(output, _)| output) } /// Like `exec_oneshot`, but passes additional environment variables to the exec /// process. Secrets passed this way live only in `/proc//environ` (readable /// by the same user / root) rather than in the process argv, so they are not /// exposed via `ps`. /// /// NOTE: the command's exit code is NOT checked — callers that need to know /// whether the command succeeded should use `exec_oneshot_env_status`. pub async fn exec_oneshot_env( container_id: &str, cmd: Vec, env: Vec, ) -> Result { exec_oneshot_env_status(container_id, cmd, env) .await .map(|(output, _exit_code)| output) } /// Like `exec_oneshot_env`, but also returns the command's exit code (0 on /// success). The returned string contains both stdout and stderr, interleaved /// in arrival order, which is useful for surfacing failure detail. pub async fn exec_oneshot_env_status( container_id: &str, cmd: Vec, env: Vec, ) -> Result<(String, i64), String> { exec_oneshot_as(container_id, "claude", cmd, env).await } /// [`exec_oneshot_env_status`] with the user spelled out. /// /// Base-image migration is the only caller that needs anything but `claude`: /// `apt-get`, `npm -g` and the payload unpack all run as **root**. Note that /// the container does grant `claude` passwordless sudo, but going through /// `sudo` would put the whole command in `ps` output and add a second failure /// mode to interpret, so the exec is simply created as root. pub async fn exec_oneshot_as( container_id: &str, user: &str, cmd: Vec, env: Vec, ) -> Result<(String, i64), String> { exec_oneshot_inner(container_id, user, cmd, env, MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT).await } async fn exec_oneshot_inner( container_id: &str, user: &str, cmd: Vec, env: Vec, limit: usize, ) -> Result<(String, i64), String> { let docker = get_docker()?; let exec = docker .create_exec( container_id, CreateExecOptions { attach_stdout: Some(true), attach_stderr: Some(true), cmd: Some(cmd), env: if env.is_empty() { None } else { Some(env) }, user: Some(user.to_string()), ..Default::default() }, ) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?; let result = docker .start_exec(&exec.id, None) .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?; let mut combined = String::new(); match result { StartExecResults::Attached { mut output, .. } => { while let Some(msg) = output.next().await { match msg { Ok(data) => { let chunk = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data.into_bytes()).into_owned(); if !push_capped(&mut combined, &chunk, limit) { // Stop reading rather than truncate silently: every // caller parses this output, and a half-read // manifest or JSON array is worse than an error. // Dropping `output` kills the exec's stream. return Err(format!( "Command output exceeded {} bytes and was abandoned", limit )); } } Err(e) => return Err(format!("Exec output error: {}", e)), } } } StartExecResults::Detached => return Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()), } // The output stream draining doesn't strictly guarantee inspect_exec has the // final exit_code populated yet, so poll until the exec reports finished. let exit_code = wait_for_exec_exit(&exec.id).await.unwrap_or(0); Ok((combined, exit_code)) } /// Poll `inspect_exec` until the exec reports finished and return its exit code. /// Returns `None` if the code can't be determined (inspect error, or the exec /// doesn't report finished within ~1s — which shouldn't happen once its output /// stream has drained). pub async fn wait_for_exec_exit(exec_id: &str) -> Option { let docker = get_docker().ok()?; for _ in 0..40 { match docker.inspect_exec(exec_id).await { Ok(info) => { if info.running != Some(true) { // Finished: use the reported code (default 0 if somehow absent). return Some(info.exit_code.unwrap_or(0)); } } Err(_) => return None, } tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(25)).await; } None } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; #[test] fn output_under_the_limit_is_buffered_whole() { let mut buf = String::new(); assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "hello ", 16)); assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "world", 16)); assert_eq!(buf, "hello world"); } #[test] fn output_over_the_limit_is_refused_rather_than_truncated() { // The abandoned chunk must not land in the buffer either: a caller that // ignored the error would otherwise parse a half-read document. let mut buf = String::new(); assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 12)); assert!(!push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 12)); assert_eq!(buf, "0123456789"); } #[test] fn a_single_oversized_chunk_is_refused() { let mut buf = String::new(); assert!(!push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 4)); assert!(buf.is_empty()); } #[test] fn the_bridge_budget_is_far_smaller_than_the_general_one() { // The auth bridge re-reads container-controlled procfs every 2s, so it // gets a tighter ceiling than one-shot readers that run on demand. assert!(PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT < MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT); // …but still comfortably above a genuine /proc/net/tcp{,6} pair. assert!(PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT > 100 * 150); } }