Files
Triple-C/app/src/components/terminal/UrlToast.test.tsx
T
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 22d142c70d Shift+Enter newline, OAuth URL truncation, and the auth bridge toggle
Three fixes that all land on the same journey: sign in, paste a prompt,
and have the terminal behave the way every other Claude Code host does.

Shift+Enter inserts a newline
-----------------------------
xterm.js does not consult `shiftKey` for Enter (`Keyboard.ts`, case 13),
so Shift+Enter was byte-identical to Enter and submitted the prompt.
Both terminals now send `\x1b\r` (ESC+CR) instead, which Claude Code
parses as return+meta — the same bytes its own `/terminal-setup` writes
into the VS Code, Cursor, Alacritty and Zed keymaps, so this is in-band
rather than a guess. Not `\n`: Claude Code accepts it, but a shell would
run the line, so the two session types would diverge. Bound in Claude
sessions only for that reason.

`entrypoint.sh` sets `shiftEnterKeyBindingInstalled` in `~/.claude.json`
so the CLI stops printing its "run /terminal-setup" tip. Purely
cosmetic — the decoding is unconditional either way.

Alt+Enter has always done the same thing (xterm ESC-prefixes on altKey)
and was simply never documented. It is now, along with the rest.

OAuth login URL truncation
--------------------------
Two producers wrote one toast slot, last-writer-wins. The OSC 7777 relay
delivers the URL base64-encoded and therefore exact; ~300 ms later the
screen-scraper's debounce fired and overwrote it with a truncated guess
at the same link — a URL that parses, points at the right host, and
authorises nothing. The user is the one who has to notice.

Why the scraper truncated: `ANSI_RE` strips OSC sequences wholesale,
including the OSC 8 hyperlink whose parameter carries the complete URL.
Claude Code slices the *visible* text of that hyperlink to the terminal
width while every emission carries the whole URL in its parameter. The
backend already knew this (`commands/auth_token_commands.rs`); the
frontend did not.

- `urlDetector` now reads OSC 8 targets out of the raw buffer before
  stripping, filtered by a port of `usable_sign_in_link`, and tags every
  candidate with its provenance.
- The prompt slot gained `supersedes`: better provenance always wins,
  worse never does, and between equals only a candidate that *extends*
  what is showing may replace it. That last rule is `extendsUrl`,
  factored out of `pickSignInUrl` rather than copied — same rule, same
  reason, one implementation.
- `flatten` splits on a bare `\r` as well as on `\r?\n`, so a
  `\r`-repainted TUI frame no longer inflates a line past the width and
  suppresses a join that should have happened; and the width is now
  sampled at `feed()` rather than read at `scan()`, so a resize inside
  the 300 ms debounce cannot reassemble 80-column text against a
  120-column rule.

Also corrects the comment claiming `acquire_claude_token` enables the
auth bridge. It deliberately does not, and the module comment in
`auth_token_commands.rs` explains at length why not.

The auth bridge toggle
----------------------
`setAuthBridgeEnabled` and `getAuthBridgeStatus` had zero call sites:
the Rust was complete, the IPC wrapper shipped, and there was nowhere to
click — so the docs told users to "enable the Auth Bridge" for a switch
that did not exist. `AuthBridgeRow` is that switch, in Config → Runtime.
It deliberately does not go through the tab's stopped-only save: the
dedicated command exists so the bridge can be flipped while a login is
hanging in a running container, which is the only moment anyone reaches
for it.

It also subscribes to `auth-bridge-changed`, which the poller has been
emitting to nobody — so a host port the bridge could not take was a
completely silent failure, indistinguishable from a login that hung.

`tunnel.rs` promotes the best-effort `::1` bind failure from debug to a
warning recorded on the port. Half-bound is the failure mode that looks
like success: the status says bridged, and a client that resolves
`localhost` to `::1` without falling back is still refused.

Finally, for a recognised Anthropic sign-in URL the toast now leads with
"In container" and demotes the host "Open". The callback listener is
inside the container, so the container-side browser closes the loop with
no host round trip and no auth bridge; the host button stays as the
fallback. Ordinary URLs are unchanged.

Tests: 402 frontend (was 359), 285 Rust (unchanged).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
2026-08-23 08:31:39 -07:00

137 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { render, screen } from "@testing-library/react";
import UrlToast from "./UrlToast";
/**
* The toast is the *only* thing standing between a container-chosen URL and
* the host's browser, so what it shows has to be what will be opened — and the
* part that decides that is the origin.
*/
describe("UrlToast", () => {
const noop = () => {};
it("shows the origin separately from the truncatable remainder", () => {
render(
<UrlToast
url="https://github.com/login/device?code=ABCD-EFGH"
onOpen={noop}
onDismiss={noop}
/>,
);
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-origin")).toHaveTextContent(
"https://github.com",
);
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-rest")).toHaveTextContent(
"/login/device?code=ABCD-EFGH",
);
});
it("keeps the origin intact when the path is long enough to push it out", () => {
const url = `https://evil.tld/${"padding/".repeat(200)}end`;
render(<UrlToast url={url} onOpen={noop} onDismiss={noop} />);
// The registrable domain must be present in its own element, whole. A
// single ellipsised line would render this and show only the padding.
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-origin")).toHaveTextContent(
"https://evil.tld",
);
});
it("exposes the whole URL as a tooltip", () => {
const url = "https://example.com/a/b?c=d";
render(<UrlToast url={url} onOpen={noop} onDismiss={noop} />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-url")).toHaveAttribute("title", url);
});
it("announces itself, so a replacement prompt is not silent", () => {
render(
<UrlToast url="https://example.com/" onOpen={noop} onDismiss={noop} />,
);
expect(screen.getByRole("status")).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("opens only via the button, never on its own", () => {
const onOpen = vi.fn();
render(
<UrlToast url="https://example.com/" onOpen={onOpen} onDismiss={noop} />,
);
expect(onOpen).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Open" }).click();
expect(onOpen).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
describe("Anthropic sign-in links", () => {
// The callback listener a `claude login` is waiting on is *inside* the
// container. Sending the user to their host browser completes the sign-in
// and then posts the result where nothing is listening, and the terminal
// hangs to its timeout — so for these, and only these, the container-side
// browser leads.
const SIGN_IN =
"https://claude.ai/oauth/authorize?code=true&client_id=abc&response_type=code";
function actions() {
return screen
.getAllByRole("button")
.map((b) => b.textContent)
.filter((t) => t === "Open" || t === "In container");
}
it("puts the container browser first", () => {
render(
<UrlToast
url={SIGN_IN}
onOpen={noop}
onOpenInContainer={noop}
onDismiss={noop}
/>,
);
expect(actions()).toEqual(["In container", "Open"]);
expect(screen.getByTestId("url-toast-signin-hint")).toHaveTextContent(
/callback listener is inside the container/i,
);
});
it("keeps the host browser available as a fallback", () => {
const onOpen = vi.fn();
render(
<UrlToast
url={SIGN_IN}
onOpen={onOpen}
onOpenInContainer={noop}
onDismiss={noop}
/>,
);
screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Open" }).click();
expect(onOpen).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it("leaves an ordinary URL alone", () => {
// A `gh auth login` device code, a docs page, a preview build — the host
// browser is the right answer for all of them and stays the default.
render(
<UrlToast
url="https://github.com/login/device?code=ABCD-EFGH"
onOpen={noop}
onOpenInContainer={noop}
onDismiss={noop}
/>,
);
expect(actions()).toEqual(["Open", "In container"]);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("url-toast-signin-hint")).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it("is not fooled by a lookalike host", () => {
// `isAnthropicSignInUrl` uses the same allowlist the sign-in flow does,
// so a URL that merely says "claude.ai" somewhere is not one.
render(
<UrlToast
url="https://claude.ai.evil.tld/oauth/authorize?x=1"
onOpen={noop}
onOpenInContainer={noop}
onDismiss={noop}
/>,
);
expect(actions()).toEqual(["Open", "In container"]);
});
});
});