Files
Triple-C/app/src-tauri/src/commands/terminal_commands.rs
T
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 2c9482a67d
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Build Container / build-container (pull_request) Successful in 1m35s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m38s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 5m51s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 6m50s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Give the Files tab back its uploads and downloads
`upload_file_to_container` and `download_container_file` existed on main before
any of this work started. "Ship the Files tab container-side only" removed them
and called it narrowing scope; from a user's side it was a regression they
upgraded into. This restores the feature.

The reason for the removal was real — four consecutive audits found their
criticals in host paths crossing IPC — so the feature comes back only in the
shape that removes the class rather than patching it a fifth time. The dialogs
are opened by **Rust** (`pick_save_path`, `pick_files_to_upload`), not by the
webview. A frontend `open()`/`save()` handing the backend a path string is
exactly what failed, and the backend cannot tell such a string from one a
compromised webview invented. Now the webview can ask for a picker and that is
the whole of its influence: it cannot name a host path as an input. That is the
shape the previous round's own notes named as the honest one if this ever
returned.

None of the machinery the audits condemned returns. No `link(2)` destination
reservation, no placeholder rollback, no collision marker: the OS save dialog
already asks about overwriting and Docker's extractor overwrites on upload the
way `cp` does, so there was nothing left for it to do. Download reuses the
sequence `download_container_backup` has been using unchanged — resolve, stream
into a partial file beside the destination, rename last — so a failed transfer
never touches the file that was already there. Upload reuses the terminal
drop's hardened uploader, with the container's uid/gid resolved once per
selection rather than once per file.

Against a container that is actively hostile rather than merely surprising:

  * the read is `dd iflag=nonblock`, not `cat`. `[ -f ]` and the `open` after it
    are two syscalls and the container owns the filesystem in between; a loop
    swapping the file for a FIFO wins that race, and `cat` then blocks forever
    with no writer and no timeout anywhere on the path — the `invoke` never
    settles and a partial is left in the user's directory for good. Verified in
    a real container that `cat` hangs, that `iflag=nonblock` returns, and that
    it is byte-identical on a regular file.
  * the read is bracketed by a second `[ -f ]`, because non-blocking turns that
    hang into an empty file that would otherwise be renamed over the
    destination and reported as a successful save.
  * an *undeterminable* exit code is a failure. Backup catches this class with
    its `total == 0` check, which download cannot have because an empty file is
    a legitimate save; without a replacement, a project restarted mid-download
    renames a truncated partial over the user's file and reports the byte count
    as if it were whole.
  * container stderr is capped. Every other reader of container output in the
    tree is capped for this reason; the two streaming commands were the
    exception, and stdout was bounded by disk while stderr was bounded by
    nothing.
  * the script's refusals are framed rather than used verbatim, so a directory
    named to look like one of our own sentences cannot become the toast
    headline through `readableRefusal`.
  * the partial name is capped at NAME_MAX. A bundler's 230-character content
    hash is a name that fits its directory and produces a partial name that
    does not.

Also: a non-UTF-8 dialog path is refused by name rather than silently mangled
into a different path by U+FFFD substitution; both actions carry in-flight
state, so a second click cannot open a second dialog and a slow save is not
indistinguishable from a dead button; and the upload's completion message names
the directory, since the picker is modal and the user can browse elsewhere
while it is open.

Not restored: drag-and-drop, in either direction. `drag:allow-start-drag` stays
ungranted and `hold/disk-and-dragout` still holds that work.

Two bugs the new tests caught while being written: a double-click on "Save to
host…" opened the file viewer on top of the save dialog, and an N-file upload
made N redundant execs to re-ask `id -u`.

Docs that asserted this feature did not and must not exist are corrected —
CLAUDE.md, README, HOW-TO-USE, TECHNICAL and the capability threat model. The
"no host path crosses IPC" claim is deliberately narrowed to the inbound
direction: paths do still travel outward inside error text, canonical ones
included, and the reviewed record should not overstate.

600 frontend tests, 473 Rust, no new clippy warnings. Every new test was
mutation-checked; four that survived their first mutation were rewritten,
including two whose mutations turned out to be unfaithful and one that was
blind to a dismissal leaving a row stuck on "Saving…".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LHL9ty7arp8FHwvE77ne7y
2026-08-25 10:00:21 -07:00

359 lines
13 KiB
Rust

use tauri::{AppHandle, Emitter, State};
use crate::commands::aws_commands;
use crate::models::{Backend, BedrockAuthMethod, Project};
use crate::AppState;
/// Build the command to run in the container terminal.
///
/// For Bedrock Profile projects, wraps `claude` in a bash script that validates
/// the AWS session first. If the SSO session is expired, runs `aws sso login`
/// so the user can re-authenticate (the URL is clickable via xterm.js WebLinksAddon).
fn build_terminal_cmd(project: &Project, state: &AppState, session_name: Option<&str>) -> Vec<String> {
let is_bedrock_profile = project.backend == Backend::Bedrock
&& project
.bedrock_config
.as_ref()
.map(|b| b.auth_method == BedrockAuthMethod::Profile)
.unwrap_or(false);
let permission_args = project.effective_permission_mode().cli_args();
if !is_bedrock_profile {
let mut cmd = vec!["claude".to_string()];
cmd.extend(permission_args);
if let Some(name) = session_name {
if !name.is_empty() {
cmd.push("-n".to_string());
cmd.push(name.to_string());
}
}
return cmd;
}
let profile = aws_commands::resolve_profile_for_project(
project,
state.settings_store.get().global_aws.aws_profile.as_deref(),
);
// Build a bash wrapper that validates credentials, re-auths if needed,
// then exec's into claude.
let name_flag = session_name
.filter(|n| !n.is_empty())
.map(|n| format!(" -n '{}'", n.replace('\'', "'\\''")))
.unwrap_or_default();
// The args are interpolated into a shell script string, so single-quote
// each one (same escaping style as name_flag above).
let permission_flags: String = permission_args
.iter()
.map(|a| format!(" '{}'", a.replace('\'', "'\\''")))
.collect();
let claude_cmd = format!("exec claude{}{}", permission_flags, name_flag);
let script = format!(
r#"
echo "Validating AWS session for profile '{profile}'..."
if aws sts get-caller-identity --profile '{profile}' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "AWS session valid."
else
echo "AWS session expired or invalid."
# Check if this profile uses SSO (has sso_start_url or sso_session configured)
if aws configure get sso_start_url --profile '{profile}' >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
aws configure get sso_session --profile '{profile}' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Starting SSO login..."
echo ""
triple-c-sso-refresh
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "SSO login failed or was cancelled. Starting Claude anyway..."
echo "You may see authentication errors."
echo ""
fi
else
echo "Profile '{profile}' does not use SSO. Check your AWS credentials."
echo "Starting Claude anyway..."
echo ""
fi
fi
{claude_cmd}
"#,
profile = profile,
claude_cmd = claude_cmd
);
vec![
"bash".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
script,
]
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn open_terminal_session(
project_id: String,
session_id: String,
session_type: Option<String>,
session_name: Option<String>,
app_handle: AppHandle,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let project = state
.projects_store
.get(&project_id)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("Project {} not found", project_id))?;
let container_id = project
.container_id
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| "Container not running".to_string())?;
let cmd = match session_type.as_deref() {
Some("bash") => vec!["bash".to_string(), "-l".to_string()],
_ => build_terminal_cmd(&project, &state, session_name.as_deref()),
};
let output_event = format!("terminal-output-{}", session_id);
let exit_event = format!("terminal-exit-{}", session_id);
let app_handle_output = app_handle.clone();
let app_handle_exit = app_handle.clone();
state
.exec_manager
.create_session(
container_id,
&session_id,
cmd,
move |data| {
let _ = app_handle_output.emit(&output_event, data);
},
Box::new(move || {
let _ = app_handle_exit.emit(&exit_event, ());
}),
)
.await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn terminal_input(
session_id: String,
data: Vec<u8>,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
state.exec_manager.send_input(&session_id, data).await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn terminal_resize(
session_id: String,
cols: u16,
rows: u16,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
state.exec_manager.resize(&session_id, cols, rows).await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn close_terminal_session(
session_id: String,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
// Close audio bridge if it exists
let audio_session_id = format!("audio-{}", session_id);
state.exec_manager.close_session(&audio_session_id).await;
// Close terminal session
state.exec_manager.close_session(&session_id).await;
Ok(())
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn paste_image_to_terminal(
session_id: String,
image_data: Vec<u8>,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<String, String> {
let container_id = state.exec_manager.get_container_id(&session_id).await?;
let timestamp = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_millis();
let file_name = format!("clipboard_{}.png", timestamp);
state
.exec_manager
.write_file_to_container(&container_id, &file_name, &image_data)
.await
}
/// Copy a host file (e.g. dragged onto the terminal) into the container so
/// Claude Code can read it, and return the in-container path. Mirrors the
/// image-paste flow: the file is placed under /tmp/triple-c-drops/ keeping its
/// original name. Returns an error for paths that aren't readable regular files
/// (e.g. a dropped directory).
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn upload_host_file_to_terminal(
session_id: String,
host_path: String,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<String, String> {
// The drop target is a host path chosen by the webview, not by the OS drag
// itself, so it goes through `file_commands`' host-read policy: absolute,
// no traversal, and nothing whose path passes through a hidden directory
// (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.local/bin`) or a system location — applied to
// the path with its symlinks already resolved, so a visible directory that
// *leads* to one of those is refused too. What comes back is that resolved
// path, and it is what gets opened. Four commands touch a host path now,
// but only two take it *over IPC*: this one and `download_container_backup`.
// The Files pane's `download_container_file` and `upload_files_to_container`
// open their dialog from Rust instead, so for them the policy above is
// defence in depth and for these two it is the boundary itself.
// The name is taken from the path the user actually dropped, *before*
// resolution. Deriving it from the resolved path renames the file behind
// the user's back: dropping `~/Downloads/latest.log`, where `latest.log` is
// a symlink, would land it in the container as `2026-08-23.log`.
let base = crate::commands::file_commands::host_upload_name(&host_path)?;
let host_path = crate::commands::file_commands::resolve_host_read_path(&host_path).await?;
let container_id = state.exec_manager.get_container_id(&session_id).await?;
let meta = tokio::fs::metadata(&host_path)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Cannot access {}: {}", host_path, e))?;
// `!is_file()`, not `!is_dir()`. A FIFO is neither a directory nor a
// regular file, reports `len() == 0`, and passes both the directory check
// and the size cap below — and `std::fs::File::open` on one blocks forever
// with no writer, with no timeout anywhere on this path. The upload then
// never returns, the toast sticks on "Adding N files…" for the session and
// the rest of the batch is abandoned. Sockets and device nodes are the same
// shape. This is one of two routes for getting a host file into a
// container (the Files pane's upload is the other), so it is the wrong
// place to be clever.
if !meta.is_file() {
return Err(if meta.is_dir() {
format!("{} is a directory — drop individual files", host_path)
} else {
format!(
"{} is not a regular file — only ordinary files can be dropped into a terminal",
host_path
)
});
}
// Guard against ballooning host RAM: the file is packed into an in-memory
// tar before upload, so cap the size of a dropped file. The ceiling lives
// with the code that does the reading, which re-applies it to the open
// descriptor — this check is here only so the refusal reads like a sentence
// instead of arriving after a 300 MB read.
use crate::docker::exec::MAX_DROP_BYTES;
if meta.len() > MAX_DROP_BYTES {
return Err(format!(
"File too large to drop into the terminal ({:.0} MB; limit {} MB). Mount it into the project instead.",
meta.len() as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0),
MAX_DROP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)
));
}
// Ensure the destination directory exists rather than relying on Docker's
// archive extractor to create the parent for the uploaded tar entry.
crate::docker::exec::exec_oneshot(
&container_id,
vec!["mkdir".to_string(), "-p".to_string(), "/tmp/triple-c-drops".to_string()],
)
.await?;
let file_name = format!("triple-c-drops/{}", base);
crate::docker::exec::upload_host_file_to_container(
&container_id,
&host_path,
"/tmp",
&file_name,
)
.await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn start_audio_bridge(
session_id: String,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
// Get container_id from the terminal session
let container_id = state.exec_manager.get_container_id(&session_id).await?;
// Create audio bridge exec session with ID "audio-{session_id}"
// The loop handles reconnection when the FIFO reader (fake rec) is killed and restarted
let audio_session_id = format!("audio-{}", session_id);
let cmd = vec![
"bash".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
"FIFO=/tmp/triple-c-audio-input; [ -p \"$FIFO\" ] || mkfifo \"$FIFO\"; trap '' PIPE; while true; do cat > \"$FIFO\" 2>/dev/null; sleep 0.1; done".to_string(),
];
state
.exec_manager
.create_session_with_tty(
&container_id,
&audio_session_id,
cmd,
false,
|_data| { /* ignore output from the audio bridge */ },
Box::new(|| { /* no exit handler needed */ }),
)
.await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn send_audio_data(
session_id: String,
data: Vec<u8>,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let audio_session_id = format!("audio-{}", session_id);
state.exec_manager.send_input(&audio_session_id, data).await
}
#[tauri::command]
pub async fn stop_audio_bridge(
session_id: String,
state: State<'_, AppState>,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let audio_session_id = format!("audio-{}", session_id);
state.exec_manager.close_session(&audio_session_id).await;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// A dropped file must be named the way the *user* named it.
///
/// The bug this pins: `upload_host_file_to_terminal` derived the tar entry
/// name from the path *after* symlink resolution, so dropping
/// `~/Downloads/latest.log` — where `latest.log` is a symlink to
/// `2026-08-23.log` — silently landed the file in the container under the
/// target's name. Nothing errored; the user just got a name they never
/// typed.
///
/// This asserts the shared helper's contract from the terminal side: the
/// answer comes from the spelling, and a path that does not name a file is
/// refused rather than silently substituted (it used to fall back to
/// `"dropped-file"`).
#[test]
fn a_dropped_file_keeps_the_name_the_user_dropped() {
use crate::commands::file_commands::host_upload_name;
assert_eq!(
host_upload_name("/home/u/Downloads/latest.log").unwrap(),
"latest.log"
);
assert!(
host_upload_name("/home/u/Downloads/").is_err(),
"a directory is not a file to drop"
);
assert!(
host_upload_name("/home/u/..").is_err(),
"the name becomes a tar entry, a container path and an argv element"
);
}
}