Files
Triple-C/app/src-tauri/src/auth_bridge/tunnel.rs
T
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 cc5f691677 Add llama.cpp backend, model gateway, URL relay and browser view
Four features, plus a latent bug fix.

llama.cpp backend. Claude Code only ever speaks the Anthropic Messages
API — confirmed empirically by pointing it at a logging server, which
received POST /v1/messages?beta=true. llama-server implements that
natively (verified in its README, alongside --port default 8080), so
this is a plain base-URL backend with no translation shim, the same
shape as Ollama. Its --api-key defaults to none, so the auth token is a
placeholder Claude Code requires and llama-server ignores.

Model alias fix. ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL is documented as "also
used for background functionality", and Triple-C set none of the alias
vars. So on every custom-endpoint backend, Claude Code resolved `haiku`
to an Anthropic model id and sent it to a local server that does not
have it — background features failed silently. All four
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_{OPUS,SONNET,HAIKU,FABLE}_MODEL vars are now pinned to
the backend's configured model, with an optional Haiku override, and
blanked for Anthropic and Bedrock so those keep Claude Code's defaults.
The deprecated ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL is never emitted. Existing
Ollama and OpenAI-Compatible containers are recreated once so the new
env reaches them; the snapshot is preserved.

Model gateway. Optional LiteLLM sibling container, off by default,
mirroring stt.rs — this is what makes real OpenAI usable, since
api.openai.com has no /v1/messages. Pinned to v1.96.0 by tag and digest:
the 1.82.7/1.82.8 malware was PyPI-only and never affected the official
images, which is precisely why this builds FROM the image rather than
pip-installing, but 1.84.0 is still the floor for proxy CVEs (API-key
SQLi, Host-header auth bypass, MCP auth bypass). Binds 0.0.0.0 because
project containers consume it, and therefore always sets a master_key —
LiteLLM without one accepts any key. The provider key lives in the OS
keychain and is uploaded into a volume, never an image layer or label.

URL relay. A container-side xdg-open/BROWSER shim opens URLs in the
host's browser. Uses an OSC sequence to /dev/tty rather than a printed
sentinel, because the shim usually runs as a grandchild of a process
capturing its children's output. Degrades to printing the URL when no
terminal is attached, so scheduled tasks do not hang. Only http/https,
with control characters rejected before new URL() — which strips
newlines, so java\nscript: would otherwise parse as javascript:. Nothing
auto-opens; the user confirms. The web terminal shows a tap-to-open
banner instead, since that browser may be a phone across a tunnel.

Browser view. A Project Home tab that watches and takes over the browser
Claude drives with Playwright, using Playwright's own dashboard. Zero
image cost — Playwright stays user-installed. It does not reuse the auth
bridge's PortForward, which binds an unauthenticated port: correct for a
throwaway OAuth listener, wrong for mouse and keyboard control of a
browser in a passwordless-sudo container. Instead a token-gated loopback
proxy checks Host, then token or a forbidden-header origin signal,
before a byte reaches the container. Host ports are confined to
47820..=47827 so CSP frame-src can enumerate them rather than widening
to a wildcard, with a test asserting the two agree.

188 frontend tests, 107 Rust tests, both builds clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 16:55:28 -07:00

271 lines
10 KiB
Rust

//! Host-side loopback listener for one bridged port, and the per-connection
//! tunnel that carries its bytes into the container.
//!
//! ## Why not connect to the container's IP
//!
//! Container IPs are not routable from the host on Docker Desktop (macOS and
//! Windows run the engine in a VM), so a host→`172.17.x.x` dial cannot be the
//! transport. The Docker API is the only channel guaranteed to reach the
//! container from the host, so each accepted connection is carried by a
//! `docker exec` running `socat - TCP:127.0.0.1:<port>`, with the exec's stdin
//! and stdout wired to the TCP socket. `socat` ships in the container image.
//!
//! The exec plumbing itself is *not* reimplemented here: it comes from
//! [`crate::docker::exec::create_attached_exec`], the same helper the
//! interactive terminal sessions are built on.
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
use bollard::container::LogOutput;
use futures_util::StreamExt;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
use tokio::task::{JoinHandle, JoinSet};
use crate::docker::exec::{create_attached_exec, AttachedExec};
use super::proc_net::PortFamily;
/// Buffer size for the host→container direction. OAuth callbacks are tiny; this
/// only needs to not be pathological.
const PUMP_BUF: usize = 16 * 1024;
/// Aborts a task when dropped, so a cancelled parent can never leave a detached
/// child running.
struct AbortOnDrop(JoinHandle<()>);
impl Drop for AbortOnDrop {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.0.abort();
}
}
/// One host loopback port bound and proxied into the container.
///
/// The accept loop owns the [`TcpListener`](tokio::net::TcpListener)s and the
/// [`JoinSet`] of live connection tasks, so aborting the single task handle
/// releases the port *and* tears down every connection under it. [`Drop`] does
/// that as a backstop; [`PortForward::shutdown`] does it deterministically by
/// also awaiting the aborted task, which guarantees the socket is closed before
/// the caller proceeds (important when a port is rebound right after).
pub struct PortForward {
pub port: u16,
pub family: PortFamily,
pub bridged_at: String,
task: JoinHandle<()>,
}
impl Drop for PortForward {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.task.abort();
}
}
impl PortForward {
/// Bind `port` on the host loopback and start proxying into `container_id`.
///
/// The bind happens before the task is spawned, so an already-taken port is
/// reported to the caller as an error rather than disappearing into a
/// background task.
pub async fn bind(
container_id: String,
port: u16,
family: PortFamily,
) -> Result<Self, std::io::Error> {
// SECURITY BOUNDARY: the host side binds loopback ONLY — 127.0.0.1 and
// ::1, never 0.0.0.0 / ::. Everything reachable through this socket is
// an unauthenticated service inside the container that deliberately
// bound loopback because it expected to be reachable from nowhere else.
// Binding a wildcard address here would publish container internals to
// every host on the LAN. Do not "fix" a connectivity problem by
// widening these addresses.
let v4 = TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, port))).await?;
// Also take ::1 when it is available. Browsers and CLIs resolve
// `localhost` to either family, and the IPv6 answer is often tried
// first, so a v4-only host listener would miss those callbacks. This is
// best-effort: if ::1 is unavailable (no IPv6, or that half is taken)
// the v4 listener alone still works, so it is not treated as a conflict.
let v6 = match TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST, port))).await {
Ok(l) => Some(l),
Err(e) => {
log::debug!(
"Auth bridge: bound 127.0.0.1:{} but not [::1]:{} ({}) — continuing with IPv4 only",
port,
port,
e
);
None
}
};
let target = family.socat_target(port);
let task = tokio::spawn(accept_loop(container_id, port, target, v4, v6));
Ok(Self {
port,
family,
bridged_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
task,
})
}
/// Stop accepting, drop the host socket, and abort every in-flight
/// connection. Awaits the aborted task so the port is provably released
/// when this returns.
pub async fn shutdown(&mut self) {
self.task.abort();
let _ = (&mut self.task).await;
}
}
/// Accept on both loopback listeners until aborted. Dropping this future drops
/// the listeners (freeing the port) and the `JoinSet` (aborting live tunnels).
async fn accept_loop(
container_id: String,
port: u16,
target: String,
v4: TcpListener,
v6: Option<TcpListener>,
) {
let mut conns: JoinSet<()> = JoinSet::new();
loop {
let accepted = tokio::select! {
r = v4.accept() => r,
r = accept_optional(v6.as_ref()) => r,
// Reap finished tunnels so the JoinSet doesn't grow without bound.
// When the set is empty `join_next()` yields None, the pattern fails
// to match, and the branch simply drops out of the select.
Some(_) = conns.join_next() => continue,
};
match accepted {
Ok((stream, peer)) => {
log::debug!("Auth bridge: connection from {} to bridged port {}", peer, port);
let _ = stream.set_nodelay(true);
conns.spawn(tunnel_connection(
container_id.clone(),
target.clone(),
stream,
port,
));
}
Err(e) => {
log::warn!("Auth bridge: accept failed on port {}: {} — stopping listener", port, e);
return;
}
}
}
}
/// `accept()` on an optional listener; never completes when there is none, so it
/// can sit in a `select!` arm unconditionally.
async fn accept_optional(
listener: Option<&TcpListener>,
) -> std::io::Result<(TcpStream, SocketAddr)> {
match listener {
Some(l) => l.accept().await,
None => std::future::pending().await,
}
}
/// Carry one accepted host connection into the container over `socat`.
async fn tunnel_connection(container_id: String, target: String, stream: TcpStream, port: u16) {
tunnel_connection_with_prelude(container_id, target, stream, port, Vec::new()).await
}
/// As [`tunnel_connection`], but `prelude` is written into the container first,
/// ahead of anything further read from `stream`.
///
/// This exists for callers that must *inspect* the beginning of a connection
/// before deciding to forward it — the browser-view proxy reads the HTTP request
/// head off the socket to check a token, and then has to put those same bytes
/// back on the wire. Passing them here keeps the byte stream exact, rather than
/// re-serialising a parsed request.
pub async fn tunnel_connection_with_prelude(
container_id: String,
target: String,
stream: TcpStream,
port: u16,
prelude: Vec<u8>,
) {
let cmd = vec!["socat".to_string(), "-".to_string(), target.clone()];
let AttachedExec {
mut output,
mut input,
..
} = match create_attached_exec(&container_id, cmd, false).await {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(e) => {
log::warn!(
"Auth bridge: failed to open tunnel exec for port {} ({}): {}",
port,
target,
e
);
return;
}
};
let (mut host_rx, mut host_tx) = stream.into_split();
// Host → container. Runs as its own task so the container→host direction is
// never blocked behind a client that has stopped sending. Finishing this
// direction drops `input`, which closes the exec's stdin and lets socat see
// a clean EOF (a half-close, not a teardown of the whole connection).
let upstream = AbortOnDrop(tokio::spawn(async move {
// Bytes the caller already consumed from the socket go first, so the
// container sees the connection exactly as the client sent it.
if !prelude.is_empty()
&& (input.write_all(&prelude).await.is_err() || input.flush().await.is_err())
{
return;
}
let mut buf = vec![0u8; PUMP_BUF];
loop {
match host_rx.read(&mut buf).await {
Ok(0) => break,
Ok(n) => {
if input.write_all(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() || input.flush().await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Err(_) => break,
}
}
}));
// Container → host. This direction is authoritative: when the exec's output
// stream ends, socat has exited and the connection is over.
while let Some(chunk) = output.next().await {
match chunk {
// Only stdout is payload. The exec is created with tty = false
// precisely so Docker demultiplexes these, keeping socat's stderr
// diagnostics out of the proxied byte stream.
Ok(LogOutput::StdOut { message }) => {
if host_tx.write_all(&message).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Ok(LogOutput::StdErr { message }) => {
log::debug!(
"Auth bridge: socat stderr for port {}: {}",
port,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&message).trim()
);
}
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => {
log::debug!("Auth bridge: tunnel stream error on port {}: {}", port, e);
break;
}
}
}
let _ = host_tx.shutdown().await;
// Explicit: stop reading from the host now that the container side is gone.
drop(upstream);
}