Files
Triple-C/app/src-tauri/src/auth_bridge/mod.rs
T
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 2de00b3c55 Fix review findings: secrets in snapshots, URL spoofing, migration data loss
Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas.
This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment.

Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into
the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS
keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were
readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit
body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but
can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token
additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly
when a tag could not be rewritten.

The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken,
with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no
file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what
is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the
token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume.

URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled
strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler).
The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match
tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as
"claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in
front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote
rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the
origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL
remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and
clicked another.

Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged
and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the
final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now
aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was
destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the
"safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative;
data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight
rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different
base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the
migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that
never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving
the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded
while a migration is live.

Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and
advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it
now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a
visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts
retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now
reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge
forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion.

Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe
not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed
a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and
fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now
installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it
already conditionally installs Rust and Node.

192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 19:35:39 -07:00

703 lines
27 KiB
Rust

//! Auth Bridge — lets browser-based OAuth logins run by CLIs *inside* a
//! container complete against the browser on the *host*.
//!
//! ## The problem
//!
//! `claude login`, Concourse's `fly login`, `aws sso login` and friends all use
//! the same pattern: start a throwaway HTTP listener on a random loopback port,
//! then open a browser at a provider URL whose redirect points back to
//! `http://localhost:<that port>/callback`. Run inside a container, the listener
//! is on the *container's* loopback, the browser is on the *host's*, and the
//! callback goes nowhere — the login just hangs. The ports are ephemeral and not
//! configurable, so nothing can be pre-published at container creation time.
//!
//! ## The mechanism
//!
//! While the bridge is enabled for a running project, poll the container every
//! [`POLL_INTERVAL`] for loopback TCP listeners (see [`proc_net`]). For each one
//! that appears, bind the *same* port on the host's loopback and proxy each
//! accepted connection into the container over `docker exec … socat` (see
//! [`tunnel`]). When the in-container listener goes away, drop the host
//! listener. The host and container therefore agree on the port number, which is
//! the whole trick: the redirect URL the provider was given resolves correctly
//! on both sides.
//!
//! ## Lifecycle and teardown
//!
//! One poller task per project. It is the only thing that owns
//! [`PortForward`]s, and it always tears them down on its way out, so every way
//! the bridge can end funnels through the same code:
//!
//! | Trigger | Path |
//! |---|---|
//! | Bridge disabled | `set_auth_bridge_enabled(false)` → [`AuthBridgeManager::stop`] |
//! | Container stopped via UI | `stop_project_container` → [`AuthBridgeManager::stop`] |
//! | Container stopped/died another way | poller's own `is_container_running` check → loop exits |
//! | Project deleted | `remove_project` → [`AuthBridgeManager::stop`]; also the poller's `store.get()` check |
//! | Container rebuilt | `rebuild_project_container` → stop, then start re-arms it |
//! | App exit | window `CloseRequested` → [`AuthBridgeManager::stop_all`] |
//!
//! [`AuthBridgeManager::stop`] awaits the poller, so host ports are provably
//! released before it returns. As a backstop for any path that skips all of the
//! above (a panicking poller, an aborted task), `PortForward`'s [`Drop`] aborts
//! the accept loop, which drops the socket.
pub mod proc_net;
pub mod tunnel;
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap, HashSet};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use serde::Serialize;
use tauri::{AppHandle, Emitter};
use tokio::sync::{watch, Mutex};
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
use crate::docker::container::is_container_running;
use crate::docker::exec::{exec_oneshot_limited, PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT};
use crate::storage::projects_store::ProjectsStore;
use proc_net::PortFamily;
use tunnel::PortForward;
/// How often the container is polled for new/vanished loopback listeners.
/// Short enough that a login redirect isn't left waiting, cheap enough to run
/// continuously (one `cat` of two procfs files per tick).
const POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
/// Emitted whenever the bridged-port set (or the conflict set) changes.
/// Payload: `{ project_id, status: AuthBridgeStatus }`.
const AUTH_BRIDGE_EVENT: &str = "auth-bridge-changed";
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// IPC response models
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// A port currently bound on the host loopback and forwarded into the container.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct BridgedPort {
pub port: u16,
pub family: PortFamily,
/// RFC 3339 timestamp of when the host listener was bound.
pub bridged_at: String,
}
/// A loopback listener that was discovered but could not be bridged.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct PortConflict {
pub port: u16,
pub reason: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct AuthBridgeStatus {
pub enabled: bool,
pub active_ports: Vec<BridgedPort>,
pub conflicts: Vec<PortConflict>,
}
impl AuthBridgeStatus {
fn disabled() -> Self {
Self {
enabled: false,
active_ports: Vec::new(),
conflicts: Vec::new(),
}
}
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Manager
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Everything the poller owns for one project. Live ports and conflicts sit
/// behind an `Arc<Mutex<…>>` so `get_auth_bridge_status` can read them without
/// disturbing the poller.
#[derive(Default)]
struct BridgeState {
forwards: BTreeMap<u16, PortForward>,
conflicts: BTreeMap<u16, String>,
}
impl BridgeState {
fn snapshot(&self, enabled: bool) -> AuthBridgeStatus {
AuthBridgeStatus {
enabled,
active_ports: self
.forwards
.values()
.map(|f| BridgedPort {
port: f.port,
family: f.family,
bridged_at: f.bridged_at.clone(),
})
.collect(),
conflicts: self
.conflicts
.iter()
.map(|(port, reason)| PortConflict {
port: *port,
reason: reason.clone(),
})
.collect(),
}
}
}
struct ProjectBridge {
/// Distinguishes this poller from a later one for the same project, so a
/// poller that exits late can't remove its replacement's map entry.
epoch: u64,
cancel: watch::Sender<bool>,
state: Arc<Mutex<BridgeState>>,
poller: JoinHandle<()>,
}
type BridgeMap = Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ProjectBridge>>>;
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct AuthBridgeManager {
bridges: BridgeMap,
next_epoch: AtomicU64,
}
impl AuthBridgeManager {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Start polling for `project_id`. Idempotent: a call while a live poller
/// already exists for the project is a no-op.
pub async fn start(
&self,
project_id: String,
container_id: String,
app: AppHandle,
store: Arc<ProjectsStore>,
) {
let mut map = self.bridges.lock().await;
// A finished poller has already torn its ports down, so its entry is
// just a husk and can be replaced. A live one means we're already on.
if map
.get(&project_id)
.is_some_and(|b| !b.poller.is_finished())
{
return;
}
let epoch = self.next_epoch.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(BridgeState::default()));
let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = watch::channel(false);
log::info!(
"Auth bridge: starting for project {} (container {})",
project_id,
&container_id[..container_id.len().min(12)]
);
let poller = tokio::spawn(poll_loop(
project_id.clone(),
container_id,
epoch,
app,
store,
state.clone(),
self.bridges.clone(),
cancel_rx,
));
map.insert(
project_id,
ProjectBridge {
epoch,
cancel: cancel_tx,
state,
poller,
},
);
}
/// Stop the bridge for one project and wait until every host port it held
/// has been released.
pub async fn stop(&self, project_id: &str) {
// Remove under the lock, then release it before awaiting: the poller
// takes the same lock to deregister itself on exit.
let bridge = self.bridges.lock().await.remove(project_id);
if let Some(bridge) = bridge {
let _ = bridge.cancel.send(true);
let _ = bridge.poller.await;
log::info!("Auth bridge: stopped for project {}", project_id);
}
}
/// Stop every bridge. Used on app exit.
pub async fn stop_all(&self) {
let bridges: Vec<(String, ProjectBridge)> =
self.bridges.lock().await.drain().collect();
for (project_id, bridge) in bridges {
let _ = bridge.cancel.send(true);
let _ = bridge.poller.await;
log::info!("Auth bridge: stopped for project {}", project_id);
}
}
/// Current status. `enabled` comes from the persisted project record, so a
/// project whose bridge is on but whose container is stopped still reports
/// `enabled: true` with no active ports.
pub async fn status(&self, project_id: &str, enabled: bool) -> AuthBridgeStatus {
// Clone the per-project handle out and drop the map lock before taking
// the state lock. Holding both across the nested await is not a
// deadlock — the order is consistently bridges→state — but it puts a
// cheap UI status call behind whatever the poller is doing under
// `state`, and behind every other project's status call too.
let state = self.bridges.lock().await.get(project_id).map(|b| b.state.clone());
match state {
Some(state) => state.lock().await.snapshot(enabled),
None => AuthBridgeStatus {
enabled,
..AuthBridgeStatus::disabled()
},
}
}
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Poller
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn poll_loop(
project_id: String,
container_id: String,
epoch: u64,
app: AppHandle,
store: Arc<ProjectsStore>,
state: Arc<Mutex<BridgeState>>,
bridges: BridgeMap,
mut cancel: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) {
let mut exec_failures: u32 = 0;
loop {
// Stop conditions checked every tick, so the bridge winds itself down
// even when nothing calls `stop()` (container died, project deleted
// out from under us, flag flipped off by another path).
let project = match store.get(&project_id) {
Some(p) => p,
None => {
log::info!("Auth bridge: project {} is gone — tearing down", project_id);
break;
}
};
if !project.auth_bridge_enabled {
log::info!("Auth bridge: disabled for project {} — tearing down", project_id);
break;
}
if !is_container_running(&container_id).await.unwrap_or(false) {
log::info!(
"Auth bridge: container for project {} is no longer running — tearing down",
project_id
);
break;
}
// One exec per tick reads both procfs files.
//
// Absolute path, deliberately: the image's `ENV PATH` puts a
// container-writable directory first, so a bare `cat` is a name the
// container can rebind to a shim that prints whatever it likes. It
// still could not make us bind a *non-loopback* port, but it decides
// how much output this loop ingests and how many host ports it is asked
// for, which is why the call is also length-capped and the result
// count is capped in `reconcile`.
let cmd = vec![
"/usr/bin/cat".to_string(),
"/proc/net/tcp".to_string(),
"/proc/net/tcp6".to_string(),
];
// Cancellation races the exec, not just the sleep, so disabling the
// bridge or stopping the container doesn't wait out an in-flight poll.
let discovery = tokio::select! {
_ = cancel.changed() => break,
res = exec_oneshot_limited(&container_id, cmd, PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT) => res,
};
match discovery {
Ok(text) => {
exec_failures = 0;
let discovered = proc_net::parse_loopback_listeners(&text);
let skip = skipped_ports(&project);
if reconcile(&container_id, &discovered, &skip, &state).await {
emit_status(&app, &project_id, &state, true).await;
}
}
Err(e) => {
exec_failures += 1;
// Transient failures happen (container restarting, engine busy);
// only complain once per streak.
if exec_failures == 1 {
log::warn!(
"Auth bridge: failed to read /proc/net/tcp in container for project {}: {}",
project_id,
e
);
}
}
}
tokio::select! {
_ = cancel.changed() => break,
_ = tokio::time::sleep(POLL_INTERVAL) => {}
}
}
teardown(&project_id, &state).await;
emit_status(
&app,
&project_id,
&state,
store
.get(&project_id)
.is_some_and(|p| p.auth_bridge_enabled),
)
.await;
// Deregister, unless a newer poller has already taken this project's slot.
let mut map = bridges.lock().await;
if map.get(&project_id).is_some_and(|b| b.epoch == epoch) {
map.remove(&project_id);
}
}
/// Ports Docker already handles for this project. A container port that is
/// explicitly published has a host-side path already, and the mapping's host
/// port is a binding we must not fight over.
///
/// [`RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS`] is folded in as well: those are container
/// loopback listeners another feature owns and exposes on its own,
/// authenticated terms.
fn skipped_ports(project: &crate::models::Project) -> HashSet<u16> {
let mut skip: HashSet<u16> = project
.port_mappings
.iter()
.flat_map(|m| [m.container_port, m.host_port])
.collect();
skip.extend(RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.clone());
skip.extend(RESERVED_HOST_PORTS.clone());
skip
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Reservations
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Container loopback ports another feature owns, which the bridge must leave
/// alone.
///
/// The bridge's contract is "mirror every container loopback listener onto the
/// same host port, **unauthenticated**" — correct for the throwaway OAuth
/// callback listeners it exists for, wrong for anything sensitive. The
/// browser-view pane runs Playwright's dashboard on a container loopback port
/// in this range and puts a token-gated listener in front of it; mirroring that
/// port here would quietly publish an ungated second door to full control of a
/// browser inside the container.
///
/// This is a constant rather than a registry the pane populates at runtime, and
/// that is the point: Playwright's dashboard is a detached daemon that outlives
/// the app, so after a crash an orphaned viewer can still be listening with
/// nothing in this process left to remember it. A static range is the only form
/// of the rule that survives a restart. It must stay in step with
/// `browser_view::VIEWER_PORTS`, which asserts on it.
pub const RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS: std::ops::RangeInclusive<u16> = 39321..=39328;
/// Host ports another feature binds on demand, which the bridge must not take
/// first.
///
/// These are the browser-view proxy's host ports. The bridge binds *host* ports
/// named by the container, so a container listening on 47820 would have the
/// bridge take the host side of that number — and then the browser-view pane,
/// which only binds when the user opens it, finds its port gone. The two ranges
/// are separate constants because they guard opposite ends of the same
/// mechanism: [`RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS`] is about not *publishing* something,
/// this one is about not *stealing* something.
pub const RESERVED_HOST_PORTS: std::ops::RangeInclusive<u16> =
crate::browser_view::proxy::PROXY_PORTS;
/// Most host ports the bridge will hold for one project at a time.
///
/// The discovery input is entirely container-controlled, and each
/// [`PortForward`] costs two listeners plus a task, so without a cap a
/// container that reports tens of thousands of fake listeners exhausts the
/// app's file descriptors and the host's ephemeral ports in a single tick. A
/// real login flow uses one or two ports at a time; anything past a couple of
/// dozen is not a login.
const MAX_FORWARDS: usize = 24;
/// Most conflicts recorded at once, so a flood of unbindable ports can't grow
/// the status payload (and the UI list) without bound either.
const MAX_CONFLICTS: usize = 32;
/// Bring the set of host listeners in line with what the container is currently
/// listening on. Returns whether anything the UI cares about changed.
async fn reconcile(
container_id: &str,
discovered: &BTreeMap<u16, PortFamily>,
skip: &HashSet<u16>,
state: &Arc<Mutex<BridgeState>>,
) -> bool {
let mut changed = false;
let mut st = state.lock().await;
// Drop host listeners whose container-side counterpart vanished, became
// covered by an explicit port mapping, or changed address family (a family
// change alters the socat target, so it has to be rebound below).
let stale: Vec<u16> = st
.forwards
.iter()
.filter(|(port, forward)| match discovered.get(port) {
None => true,
Some(_) if skip.contains(port) => true,
Some(family) => *family != forward.family,
})
.map(|(port, _)| *port)
.collect();
for port in stale {
if let Some(mut forward) = st.forwards.remove(&port) {
forward.shutdown().await;
log::info!("Auth bridge: released host port {}", port);
changed = true;
}
}
// Forget conflicts for ports that are no longer relevant.
let before = st.conflicts.len();
st.conflicts
.retain(|port, _| discovered.contains_key(port) && !skip.contains(port));
changed |= st.conflicts.len() != before;
for (&port, &family) in discovered {
if skip.contains(&port) || st.forwards.contains_key(&port) {
continue;
}
if st.forwards.len() >= MAX_FORWARDS {
// Don't even attempt the bind: the point of the cap is to stop the
// container dictating how many host resources we take.
changed |= note_conflict(
&mut st,
port,
format!(
"The auth bridge is already holding {} ports for this project; \
{} was not bridged.",
MAX_FORWARDS, port
),
);
continue;
}
match PortForward::bind(container_id.to_string(), port, family).await {
Ok(forward) => {
if st.conflicts.remove(&port).is_some() {
log::info!("Auth bridge: host port {} became available", port);
}
log::info!(
"Auth bridge: bridging 127.0.0.1:{} → container {} ({:?})",
port,
family.socat_target(port),
family
);
st.forwards.insert(port, forward);
changed = true;
}
Err(e) => {
// Conflict policy: never fight for a port. Something else on the
// host owns it — another project's bridge, or an unrelated
// process. Skip it, record why so the UI can say so, and retry
// on later ticks in case the owner releases it. Warn only on
// the transition so a long-lived conflict doesn't spam the log.
let reason = format!(
"Host port {} is already in use ({}); not bridged.",
port, e
);
if st.conflicts.get(&port) != Some(&reason) {
log::warn!("Auth bridge: {}", reason);
}
changed |= note_conflict(&mut st, port, reason);
}
}
}
changed
}
/// Record why a port wasn't bridged, up to [`MAX_CONFLICTS`]. Returns whether
/// the recorded set changed.
fn note_conflict(state: &mut BridgeState, port: u16, reason: String) -> bool {
match state.conflicts.get(&port) {
Some(existing) if *existing == reason => false,
Some(_) => {
state.conflicts.insert(port, reason);
true
}
None if state.conflicts.len() < MAX_CONFLICTS => {
state.conflicts.insert(port, reason);
true
}
None => false,
}
}
/// Release every host port held for this project. Awaits each shutdown, so on
/// return nothing is bound.
async fn teardown(project_id: &str, state: &Arc<Mutex<BridgeState>>) {
let mut st = state.lock().await;
let forwards = std::mem::take(&mut st.forwards);
st.conflicts.clear();
let count = forwards.len();
for (_, mut forward) in forwards {
forward.shutdown().await;
}
if count > 0 {
log::info!(
"Auth bridge: released {} host port(s) for project {}",
count,
project_id
);
}
}
async fn emit_status(
app: &AppHandle,
project_id: &str,
state: &Arc<Mutex<BridgeState>>,
enabled: bool,
) {
let status = state.lock().await.snapshot(enabled);
let _ = app.emit(
AUTH_BRIDGE_EVENT,
serde_json::json!({
"project_id": project_id,
"status": status,
}),
);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::models::{PortMapping, Project, ProjectPath};
fn project_with_mappings(mappings: Vec<(u16, u16)>) -> Project {
let mut p = Project::new(
"test".to_string(),
vec![ProjectPath {
host_path: "/tmp".to_string(),
mount_name: "tmp".to_string(),
}],
);
p.port_mappings = mappings
.into_iter()
.map(|(host_port, container_port)| PortMapping {
host_port,
container_port,
protocol: "tcp".to_string(),
})
.collect();
p
}
#[test]
fn ports_already_published_by_docker_are_skipped() {
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![(3000, 3000), (8081, 8080)]));
assert!(skip.contains(&3000));
// Both ends of an asymmetric mapping are off limits: the container port
// is already reachable, and the host port is Docker's binding.
assert!(skip.contains(&8080));
assert!(skip.contains(&8081));
assert!(!skip.contains(&34567));
}
#[test]
fn no_mappings_means_nothing_but_the_reserved_ranges_are_skipped() {
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
assert_eq!(
skip.len(),
RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.clone().count() + RESERVED_HOST_PORTS.clone().count()
);
}
#[test]
fn the_browser_views_host_ports_are_never_taken() {
// The bridge binds *host* ports chosen by the container, so without
// this it can take the port the browser-view proxy will want later —
// that pane binds on demand, so first-come would win.
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
for port in RESERVED_HOST_PORTS {
assert!(skip.contains(&port), "host port {} should be reserved", port);
}
assert!(!skip.contains(&(RESERVED_HOST_PORTS.end() + 1)));
}
#[test]
fn conflicts_stop_being_recorded_past_the_cap() {
let mut st = BridgeState::default();
for port in 1000u16..1000 + MAX_CONFLICTS as u16 {
assert!(note_conflict(&mut st, port, "busy".to_string()));
}
// Past the cap: new ports are dropped rather than growing the status
// payload the UI renders.
assert!(!note_conflict(&mut st, 9999, "busy".to_string()));
assert_eq!(st.conflicts.len(), MAX_CONFLICTS);
// A changed reason for a port already tracked still updates.
assert!(!note_conflict(&mut st, 1000, "busy".to_string()));
assert!(note_conflict(&mut st, 1000, "different".to_string()));
assert_eq!(st.conflicts.len(), MAX_CONFLICTS);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_host_ports_one_container_can_demand_are_capped() {
// The container fully controls the discovery input (it can shim the
// probe command), and each forward costs two listeners plus a task —
// uncapped, one tick could exhaust the app's fds and the host's
// ephemeral ports.
let discovered: BTreeMap<u16, PortFamily> =
(45000u16..45200).map(|p| (p, PortFamily::V4)).collect();
let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(BridgeState::default()));
reconcile("no-such-container", &discovered, &HashSet::new(), &state).await;
let mut st = state.lock().await;
assert!(
st.forwards.len() <= MAX_FORWARDS,
"bridged {} ports, cap is {}",
st.forwards.len(),
MAX_FORWARDS
);
assert!(st.conflicts.len() <= MAX_CONFLICTS);
// Nowhere near the 200 the "container" asked for.
assert!(st.forwards.len() + st.conflicts.len() < discovered.len());
for (_, mut forward) in std::mem::take(&mut st.forwards) {
forward.shutdown().await;
}
}
#[test]
fn the_browser_views_ports_are_never_mirrored() {
// Mirroring these would publish an ungated second door to the
// Playwright dashboard, which the pane deliberately keeps behind a
// token-checking listener.
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![]));
for port in RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS {
assert!(skip.contains(&port), "port {} should be reserved", port);
}
assert!(!skip.contains(&(RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.end() + 1)));
// Reservations coexist with Docker's own published ports.
let skip = skipped_ports(&project_with_mappings(vec![(3000, 3000)]));
assert!(skip.contains(RESERVED_CONTAINER_PORTS.start()));
assert!(skip.contains(&3000));
}
}