Files
Triple-C/app/src/hooks/useClaudeAuth.ts
T
shadow-testandClaude Opus 5 2de00b3c55 Fix review findings: secrets in snapshots, URL spoofing, migration data loss
Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas.
This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment.

Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into
the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS
keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were
readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit
body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but
can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token
additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly
when a tag could not be rewritten.

The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken,
with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no
file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what
is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the
token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume.

URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled
strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler).
The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match
tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as
"claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in
front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote
rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the
origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL
remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and
clicked another.

Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged
and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the
final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now
aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was
destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the
"safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative;
data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight
rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different
base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the
migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that
never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving
the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded
while a migration is live.

Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and
advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it
now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a
visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts
retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now
reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge
forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion.

Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe
not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed
a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and
fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now
installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it
already conditionally installs Rust and Node.

192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 19:35:39 -07:00

278 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { listen, type UnlistenFn } from "@tauri-apps/api/event";
import * as commands from "../lib/tauri-commands";
import { ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS, sanitizeRelayUrl } from "../lib/urlRelay";
import type {
ClaudeTokenOutputEvent,
ClaudeTokenProgressEvent,
} from "../lib/types";
/**
* Front-end half of the shared Claude Code token flow.
*
* The token itself never crosses the IPC boundary — `has_claude_token` returns
* a boolean and the streamed output is redacted backend-side. Nothing in here
* stores, parses, or renders a credential; the transcript is displayed as-is
* precisely because it has already been scrubbed.
*/
/** Emitted by `auth_token_commands.rs`; payload shapes live in `lib/types.ts`. */
const PROGRESS_EVENT = "claude-token-progress";
const OUTPUT_EVENT = "claude-token-output";
/** Bound on the retained transcript. The tail is the interesting part. */
const MAX_OUTPUT = 64 * 1024;
/**
* Tauri rejects an `invoke` with the Rust `Err(String)` itself, and this
* backend writes its errors as complete, actionable sentences ("The container
* for 'x' is not running. Start it, then run authentication again."). So use
* them verbatim rather than stringifying an opaque value, and only synthesise
* a message when the rejection is something else — a thrown `Error`, or an IPC
* channel that died without one.
*/
export function authErrorMessage(e: unknown, fallback: string): string {
if (typeof e === "string" && e.trim()) return e.trim();
if (e instanceof Error && e.message.trim()) return e.message.trim();
return fallback;
}
/**
* Pick the sign-in URL out of `claude setup-token`'s transcript.
*
* **The transcript is container output, so every candidate here is
* attacker-controlled if the sandboxed agent misbehaves.** It is then rendered
* under a heading that says "Sign in with Anthropic" and handed to the host
* browser, which makes this the highest-value URL in the app to spoof: a user
* who follows it types their real Anthropic credentials into whatever it
* resolves to. Three rules follow, and none of them are optional:
*
* - Every candidate goes through the shared {@link sanitizeRelayUrl}, with a
* host allowlist. Only Anthropic's own domains can be a sign-in link;
* userinfo (`https://claude.ai@evil.tld/...`) and control characters are
* rejected there.
* - The **first** surviving candidate wins. The previous rule was
* longest-wins, which handed the choice to the attacker: pad a hostile URL
* and it displaces the real one that came before it.
* - The one exception is a candidate that *extends* the current pick, i.e.
* starts with it. That is the case longest-wins existed for — a repainting
* TUI can land a truncated copy of the same link in the transcript before
* the complete one — and it cannot swap the origin, because a longer string
* with the same prefix has the same host.
*/
export function extractSignInUrl(text: string): string | null {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
const matches = text.match(/https?:\/\/[^\s"'`<>\x00-\x20\x7f]+/g);
if (!matches) return null;
const cleaned = matches
// Trailing punctuation belongs to the prose, not the URL.
.map((url) => url.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]}>'"]+$/, ""))
.map((url) => sanitizeRelayUrl(url, { allowHosts: ANTHROPIC_SIGN_IN_HOSTS }))
.filter((url): url is string => url !== null);
const oauth = cleaned.filter((url) => /oauth|authorize|login/i.test(url));
const pool = oauth.length > 0 ? oauth : cleaned;
let best: string | null = null;
for (const url of pool) {
if (best === null || url.startsWith(best)) best = url;
}
return best;
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Token presence
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export type ClaudeTokenStatus = "checking" | "stored" | "absent" | "unavailable";
/** Whether a shared token exists, plus a way to re-check after a change. */
export function useClaudeTokenStatus() {
const [status, setStatus] = useState<ClaudeTokenStatus>("checking");
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
try {
const present = await commands.hasClaudeToken();
setStatus(present ? "stored" : "absent");
setError(null);
} catch (e) {
setStatus("unavailable");
setError(
authErrorMessage(
e,
"Could not read the OS keychain, so whether a shared token exists is unknown.",
),
);
}
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
void refresh();
}, [refresh]);
return { status, error, refresh };
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Acquisition
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export type AcquisitionPhase = "running" | "succeeded" | "failed";
export interface ClaudeTokenAcquisition {
phase: AcquisitionPhase;
/** Milestone messages from `claude-token-progress`, oldest first. */
progress: string[];
/** Redacted transcript from `claude-token-output`. */
output: string;
signInUrl: string | null;
/** Set when the flow ends badly; always a full sentence the user can act on. */
error: string | null;
submitting: boolean;
codeSubmitted: boolean;
submitError: string | null;
submitCode: (code: string) => Promise<boolean>;
}
/**
* Runs one `acquire_claude_token` flow for the lifetime of the calling
* component. Starts on mount, so mount this only when the user has asked for
* it — the backend allows a single flow at a time.
*
* `onSucceeded` fires once, after the token has been stored.
*/
export function useClaudeTokenAcquisition(
projectId: string,
onSucceeded?: () => void,
): ClaudeTokenAcquisition {
const [phase, setPhase] = useState<AcquisitionPhase>("running");
const [progress, setProgress] = useState<string[]>([]);
const [output, setOutput] = useState("");
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [submitting, setSubmitting] = useState(false);
const [codeSubmitted, setCodeSubmitted] = useState(false);
const [submitError, setSubmitError] = useState<string | null>(null);
// Held in a ref so a fresh callback identity cannot restart the flow.
const succeededRef = useRef(onSucceeded);
succeededRef.current = onSucceeded;
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
const unlisteners: UnlistenFn[] = [];
const register = async <T,>(name: string, handle: (payload: T) => void) => {
const unlisten = await listen<T>(name, (event) => handle(event.payload));
// Registration is async: if the component went away while we were
// awaiting, drop the listener now rather than leaking it.
if (cancelled) {
unlisten();
return;
}
unlisteners.push(unlisten);
};
void (async () => {
try {
await register<ClaudeTokenProgressEvent>(PROGRESS_EVENT, (payload) => {
if (payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
setProgress((prev) =>
prev[prev.length - 1] === payload.message
? prev
: [...prev, payload.message],
);
});
await register<ClaudeTokenOutputEvent>(OUTPUT_EVENT, (payload) => {
if (payload.project_id !== projectId) return;
setOutput((prev) => {
const next = prev + payload.chunk;
return next.length > MAX_OUTPUT
? next.slice(next.length - MAX_OUTPUT)
: next;
});
});
} catch (e) {
if (cancelled) return;
setPhase("failed");
setError(
authErrorMessage(
e,
"Could not subscribe to the authentication events, so the flow was not started. Restart Triple-C and try again.",
),
);
return;
}
if (cancelled) return;
try {
await commands.acquireClaudeToken(projectId);
if (cancelled) return;
setPhase("succeeded");
succeededRef.current?.();
} catch (e) {
if (cancelled) return;
setPhase("failed");
setError(
authErrorMessage(
e,
"`claude setup-token` did not finish. No token was stored — try again.",
),
);
}
})();
return () => {
cancelled = true;
for (const unlisten of unlisteners) {
try {
unlisten();
} catch {
// Nothing useful to do while tearing down.
}
}
};
}, [projectId]);
const submitCode = useCallback(async (code: string) => {
const trimmed = code.trim();
if (!trimmed) {
setSubmitError("Enter the code shown after signing in.");
return false;
}
setSubmitting(true);
setSubmitError(null);
try {
await commands.submitClaudeTokenCode(trimmed);
setCodeSubmitted(true);
return true;
} catch (e) {
setSubmitError(
authErrorMessage(
e,
"Could not deliver the code to `claude setup-token`. Copy it again and retry.",
),
);
return false;
} finally {
setSubmitting(false);
}
}, []);
const signInUrl = useMemo(() => extractSignInUrl(output), [output]);
return {
phase,
progress,
output,
signInUrl,
error,
submitting,
codeSubmitted,
submitError,
submitCode,
};
}