Triple-C/app/src-tauri/gen/schemas/capabilities.json

{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"Default capabilities for Triple-C. Every entry here is an IPC command a compromised webview can call directly, so the set is an enumeration of what `app/src` actually invokes — plugin and core grants verified against tauri 2.11.0's `PLUGINS` table in tauri's own `build.rs` rather than assumed from a plugin's `default` set, app-command grants (the bare `allow-*` entries) cross-checked by this crate's `build.rs` against `generate_handler!`. `core:default` in particular is NOT used: it is an alias for `core:{path,event,window,webview,app,image,resources,menu,tray}:default`, and `core:image:default` carries `allow-from-path`, whose handler (`tauri-2.11.0/src/image/plugin.rs:41` → `src/image/mod.rs:96`) is a bare `std::fs::read(path)` with no scope mechanism of any kind. Nothing imports `@tauri-apps/api/image`, so the whole plugin is dropped rather than scoped — there is nothing to scope it with. `core:menu` and `core:tray` are dropped for the same reason (no menu, no tray icon); `core:window` and `core:path` because nothing imports them; `core:resources:allow-close` because no frontend value is a `Resource`; and `core:event`'s `allow-emit`/`allow-emit-to` because the frontend only ever *listens* — every emit in this app originates in Rust. Three notes on what is deliberately kept or accepted: (1) `core:webview:allow-internal-toggle-devtools` is not called by `app/src` at all — it is called by Tauri's own injected `toggle-devtools.js`, which binds Ctrl/Cmd+Shift+I. Both that script and the command behind it are `#[cfg(any(debug_assertions, feature = \"devtools\"))]`, so this grant is a `tauri dev` convenience that does not exist in a release bundle. (2) `opener:allow-open-url` is **gone**. It could not be narrowed by host — `TerminalView`'s `WebLinksAddon` opens links Claude printed inside the container, which are arbitrary by construction, so a host allowlist would have deleted the feature rather than bounded it — and it was carried here as an accepted residual risk: a compromised webview could make the OS open an attacker-chosen http(s) URL, an outbound channel. That risk is now closed rather than recorded. Every host-browser open in the app goes through the `open_url_external` command in `url_open.rs`, which exists because the AppImage environment leaks into a cold-launched browser on Linux (triple-c#34) and which re-validates the URL in Rust — scheme allowlist, no embedded credentials, no control characters, length cap, ASCII asserted before `execvp`. On macOS and Windows that command reaches the same plugin as before, via `OpenerExt::open_url`, whose desktop implementation calls `crate::open::open` directly and is therefore not gated by this file at all (`tauri-plugin-opener-2.5.3/src/lib.rs:60`). The plugin stays a dependency for exactly that reason; what is removed is the webview's ability to reach it without passing the Rust validation. (3) `drag:allow-start-drag` is **gone**, together with the OS drag-out it existed for. It could not be scoped — `tauri-plugin-drag` takes the item paths from the caller and has no scope mechanism, so a compromised webview could call `startDrag({ item: ['~/.ssh/id_rsa'] })` against any host path the user can read — and it was carried as an accepted residual risk for one gesture. Drag-out was held back for separate hardening (see branch `hold/disk-and-dragout`) and the plugin is no longer a dependency. Getting a file *out* of a container is either \"Back up container\" on the project's Overview tab, which archives a tree through the Docker API, or the Files tab's per-row \"Save to host…\", which copies one file; getting one *in* is a drop on the Terminal or the Files tab's \"Upload…\". None of the four touches this permission. The Files tab's two are worth separating out here, because they are the only host-path commands in the app whose dialog is opened by **Rust** rather than by the webview — `pick_save_path` and `pick_files_to_upload` in `commands/file_commands.rs` drive `tauri-plugin-dialog` from the backend, so a compromised webview can ask for a picker and nothing more: it cannot name a host path as an *input* to either command. Be precise about the limit of that claim — host paths do still travel outward in error text (`Failed to create /home/j/Documents/x.txt.triple-c-part-1a2b3c4d: Permission denied`), including canonicalized ones, which disclose symlink targets. That is accepted; the app already hands the webview the project paths. What is closed is the direction that mattered — the webview naming where bytes go. That is the shape an earlier revision of this file named as the honest one if the Files tab ever regained host I/O, and it is the shape it regained it in. The `dialog:allow-open` / `dialog:allow-save` grants below are therefore *not* what those two use; they remain for the frontend pickers in Add Project, the Config tab's workspace and access sections, the CA-certificate field and Backup. Two commands still take a host path over IPC as a string — the terminal drop and `download_container_backup` — and for those `validate_host_path` is the boundary rather than defence in depth. This file is the reviewed threat model of record, so keep this census accurate: a stale reference here is worse than none. Note that dragging files *into* the app is unaffected: `dragDropEnabled` and `onDragDropEvent` are core webview behaviour and need no grant. Historical note kept because it is easy to re-introduce: the `store:*` grants were removed — nothing in `app/src` uses `@tauri-apps/plugin-store`, and the plugin's `resolve_store_path` is a `PathBuf::push` against AppData, which `push` discards outright when handed an absolute path, so the grant was an arbitrary host-file read/write primitive (`plugin:store|load` + `set` + `save` on `~/.claude/settings.json` is host code execution). A second capability file, `file-viewer.json`, covers the `file-viewer-*` windows the terminal file viewer opens on `viewer.html`; it is the only other local-origin window, its grants are listed and justified there, and its one non-obvious grant (`core:window:allow-destroy`) exists because `onCloseRequested` cannot close a window without it. App commands are gated by this file too. `build.rs` declares a Tauri `AppManifest` listing every command in `generate_handler!`, which is what makes tauri 2.11.0 apply the ACL to app commands at all (`webview/mod.rs:1794` skips it when no app manifest exists), and the bare `allow-<command>` entries below are the complete list of app commands the main window may call. `build.rs` refuses to build unless every registered command has exactly one such grant, in the file whose `windows` its name says it belongs to (`viewer_*` in `file-viewer.json`, everything else here), and unless every bare entry names a registered command — so a forgotten, misspelled, duplicated or misfiled grant is a failed `cargo check`, not a feature that dies at runtime with `not allowed by ACL`. `deny-*` is banned by the same check: in tauri 2.11.0 a deny matches regardless of window or origin, so a deny meant for the viewer would deny main too. Hand-written files under `permissions/` are refused for the same reason — they would be grants this census cannot see. Because the census can only vouch for what it reads, `build.rs` also refuses any capability it did not check: anything in `capabilities/` other than a top-level `*.json` file (tauri also loads `.toml`/`.json5` there, and subdirectories), a `webviews` or `remote` key in a capability file (either would extend grants beyond what `windows` says), `app.security.capabilities` declared inline in `tauri.conf.json`, any `tauri.<platform>.conf.json`, or `TAURI_CONFIG`, and a tauri config in a format the census cannot parse (JSON5, TOML). OS/editor junk (`.DS_Store`, `Thumbs.db`, editor swap files) is recognised and skipped in `capabilities/` and `permissions/` rather than refused, since tauri never loads it either. Each failure names the check that failed (\"stray entry in capabilities/\", \"capabilities declared outside capabilities/\", \"hand-written permission\", …) rather than always reading as a grant/handler mismatch. Known gap: adding a new `tauri.<platform>.conf.json` to a tree that has already been built once only takes effect on a clean build or in CI — cargo's incremental build has no reason to notice a file that did not exist on the previous build. The pop-out stays capability-less. The Rust label gates in `commands/file_viewer_commands.rs` remain, because the ACL says *which* window may call a command and the label says *whose* registry entry it acts on; they are not redundant. The rules live in `src/command_census.rs`, which is unit-tested, and `src/test/capabilities.test.ts` checks the other direction: that the code that runs in each window imports only the wrappers that window is granted. On the CSP side: `app.security.csp` in `tauri.conf.json` covers the shipped bundle, and there is deliberately no `devCsp`. `npm run tauri dev` loads the main document straight from Vite at `build.devUrl` (`http://localhost:1420`), and Tauri only attaches a CSP to documents it serves itself — `protocol/tauri.rs:217` sets the header on `tauri://` assets, and the dev server is proxied through that protocol only when `PROXY_DEV_SERVER`, which is `cfg!(all(dev, mobile))` and therefore false for every desktop build. A `devCsp` here would be inert config that reads as protection, which is worse than its absence. If a CSP in dev is wanted, the only place that can set one is the Vite dev server's own `server.headers` in `app/vite.config.ts`; it is not set today, and dev is not the shipped configuration.","local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:event:allow-listen","core:event:allow-unlisten","core:webview:allow-internal-toggle-devtools","dialog:allow-open","dialog:allow-save","allow-check-docker","allow-check-image-exists","allow-build-image","allow-get-container-info","allow-list-projects","allow-add-project","allow-remove-project","allow-update-project","allow-start-project-container","allow-stop-project-container","allow-rebuild-project-container","allow-reconcile-project-statuses","allow-list-notes","allow-save-note","allow-delete-note","allow-get-container-staleness","allow-migrate-project-to-base","allow-confirm-migration","allow-rollback-migration","allow-get-migration-state","allow-set-auth-bridge-enabled","allow-get-auth-bridge-status","allow-set-browser-view-enabled","allow-get-browser-view-status","allow-check-browser-view-support","allow-install-browser-view-support","allow-install-browser-view-browser","allow-open-browser-view-popout","allow-close-browser-view-popout","allow-get-browser-view-popout-state","allow-set-browser-view-popout-always-on-top","allow-open-page-in-container-browser","allow-set-container-page-viewport","allow-get-container-page-state","allow-close-container-page","allow-set-browser-view-match-window","allow-get-browser-view-match-window","allow-acquire-claude-token","allow-submit-claude-token-code","allow-cancel-claude-token","allow-has-claude-token","allow-clear-claude-token","allow-sweep-claude-token-snapshots","allow-get-settings","allow-update-settings","allow-pull-image","allow-detect-aws-config","allow-inspect-ca-cert-path","allow-list-aws-profiles","allow-detect-host-timezone","allow-export-settings","allow-preview-settings-import","allow-apply-settings-import","allow-open-terminal-session","allow-terminal-input","allow-terminal-resize","allow-close-terminal-session","allow-paste-image-to-terminal","allow-upload-host-file-to-terminal","allow-start-audio-bridge","allow-send-audio-data","allow-stop-audio-bridge","allow-list-container-files","allow-download-container-backup","allow-download-container-file","allow-upload-files-to-container","allow-read-container-file","allow-rename-container-path","allow-create-container-directory","allow-open-file-viewer","allow-aws-sso-refresh","allow-get-app-version","allow-check-for-updates","allow-check-image-update","allow-get-help-content","allow-open-url-external","allow-detect-install-options","allow-run-docker-install","allow-start-web-terminal","allow-stop-web-terminal","allow-get-web-terminal-status","allow-regenerate-web-terminal-token","allow-get-stt-status","allow-start-stt","allow-stop-stt","allow-build-stt-image","allow-pull-stt-image","allow-transcribe-audio","allow-get-gateway-status","allow-start-gateway","allow-stop-gateway","allow-check-gateway-health","allow-build-gateway-image","allow-pull-gateway-image","allow-set-gateway-api-key","allow-clear-gateway-api-key","allow-get-gateway-auth-token","allow-regenerate-gateway-auth-token","allow-list-claude-sessions","allow-resume-session-command","allow-list-container-capabilities","allow-list-scheduled-tasks","allow-add-scheduled-task","allow-update-scheduled-task","allow-get-scheduled-task-log","allow-set-scheduled-task-enabled","allow-run-scheduled-task-now","allow-remove-scheduled-task","allow-get-scheduler-notifications","allow-clear-scheduler-notifications"]},"file-viewer":{"identifier":"file-viewer","description":"The terminal file viewer windows (`file-viewer-<n>`, opened by `open_file_viewer` on the app's own `viewer.html`). Same rules as `default.json`, including the layout checks: this file itself must stay a top-level `capabilities/*.json` with no `webviews` or `remote` key, or `build.rs` refuses the build rather than grant something the census cannot see. The five bare `allow-viewer-*` grants are the only app commands a viewer window can invoke: `build.rs` declares the AppManifest that makes tauri enforce that, and refuses any other bare grant in this file. The label gate inside `commands/file_viewer_commands.rs` is still what stops window A acting on window B's registry entry, because the ACL only decides which window may call. The rest of this file is the plugin-command surface a compromised viewer webview could reach, and it is the smallest one that lets the window work. `core:event:allow-listen`/`allow-unlisten` are for `file-viewer-goto` (Rust → this window; the viewer subscribes through `getCurrentWindow().listen`, because a bare `listen()` in *any* window receives an `emit_to`). `core:window:allow-destroy` is not optional: `getCurrentWindow().onCloseRequested` in @tauri-apps/api 2.11 makes Rust `prevent_close()` whenever a JS listener exists and then calls `destroy()` itself, so without this grant the window's X button does nothing once the unsaved-changes guard is installed. `allow-close` is deliberately absent — nothing calls it, and `destroy` is the only exit. No `set-title`/`set-focus`/`unminimize`: those are done from Rust when a second click targets an already-open file. `core:webview:allow-internal-toggle-devtools` is the same dev-only convenience `default.json` carries.","local":true,"windows":["file-viewer-*"],"permissions":["core:event:allow-listen","core:event:allow-unlisten","core:window:allow-destroy","core:webview:allow-internal-toggle-devtools","allow-viewer-get-state","allow-viewer-choose-file","allow-viewer-read-file","allow-viewer-poll-file","allow-viewer-write-file"]}}