Adversarial review of the branch produced findings across four areas. This addresses them, plus the Windows CI environment. Secrets. commit_container_snapshot baked the container's full env into the per-project snapshot image, so the shared OAuth token — and the AWS keys, git token and gateway master key — outlived revocation and were readable via docker inspect. Verified against Engine 29.6 that a commit body's config merges over the container's: keys cannot be dropped but can be overwritten, so all of them now commit as KEY=. clear_claude_token additionally rewrites images from earlier builds and reports honestly when a tag could not be rewritten. The recommendation to move the token out of env entirely was not taken, with reasoning: apiKeyHelper is a different auth method that outranks CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN rather than a transport for it, and no file-based delivery exists. The durable exposure — the image — is what is closed here. Separately noted, not fixed: entrypoint.sh captures the token into the scheduler's .env inside the persisted volume. URL spoofing. Three call sites reached openUrl with container-controlled strings, one of which the review missed (the WebLinksAddon handler). The sign-in URL was scraped from container output with a longest-match tie-break and no userinfo check, so claude.ai@evil.tld rendered as "claude.ai…" in a truncating element. There is now one sanitizer in front of every sink — scheme allowlist, no userinfo, C0/C1 and quote rejection, host allowlist for the sign-in case, first-match — and the origin renders un-truncated. The toast is keyed so a changed URL remounts, closing a bait-and-switch where the user read one URL and clicked another. Migration. The rollback pin was best-effort: a tag failure was logged and the migration continued past remove_container, after which the final commit overwrote the only copy of the old system layer. It now aborts before anything destructive and reads the tag back. /var was destroyed while the ordinary recreate path preserves it — making the "safe" alternative to Reset more destructive than Reset's alternative; data-bearing subtrees are now detected and disclosed in the pre-flight rather than copied, since tarring a live database onto a different base's packages is a corruption risk. resume_migration now verifies the migration-state label instead of reporting success for a container that never swapped. dismiss actually resolves the record rather than leaving the feature permanently refusing to migrate. Start and Reset are guarded while a migration is live. Lifecycle. The gateway no longer publishes on 0.0.0.0 — bind address and advertised URL are derived together so they cannot drift. Disabling it now stops it. App exit runs teardown concurrently under a budget with a visible shutting-down state instead of blocking for minutes. Auto-starts retry when Docker is not up yet, and the polling-recovery path now reconciles, so interrupted migrations are still recovered. Auth-bridge forwards are capped, closing a container-driven fd exhaustion. Windows CI. build-windows failed on this branch with "linker link.exe not found". The runner had no MSVC build tools and the workflow assumed a hand-provisioned machine, so a bare runner registers, accepts jobs and fails at link time after downloading the whole crate graph. The job now installs the VC++ workload when vswhere cannot find it, matching how it already conditionally installs Rust and Node. 192 Rust tests, 274 frontend tests, both builds clean, zero warnings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
644 lines
22 KiB
Rust
644 lines
22 KiB
Rust
use bollard::container::{LogOutput, UploadToContainerOptions};
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use bollard::exec::{CreateExecOptions, ResizeExecOptions, StartExecResults};
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use futures_util::{Stream, StreamExt};
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::pin::Pin;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use tokio::io::{AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
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use tokio::sync::{mpsc, Mutex};
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use super::client::get_docker;
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/// A `docker exec` that has been created and started with stdin/stdout/stderr
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/// attached — the raw duplex halves, before any policy about what to do with
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/// them.
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///
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/// This is the single place in the codebase that knows how to open an attached
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/// exec. Both consumers are built on it:
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/// * [`ExecSessionManager`] — interactive terminals and the audio bridge,
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/// which pump bytes through mpsc channels and a callback.
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/// * `auth_bridge` — per-connection `socat` tunnels, which pump bytes
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/// straight between a host TCP socket and these halves.
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///
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/// With `tty = false` the output stream is demultiplexed by Docker, so the
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/// consumer can tell [`LogOutput::StdOut`] from [`LogOutput::StdErr`]. That
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/// distinction matters for the auth bridge: `socat`'s diagnostics must not be
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/// spliced into the proxied byte stream.
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pub struct AttachedExec {
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pub exec_id: String,
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pub output: Pin<Box<dyn Stream<Item = Result<LogOutput, bollard::errors::Error>> + Send>>,
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pub input: Pin<Box<dyn AsyncWrite + Send>>,
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}
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/// Create and start an exec with stdin + stdout + stderr attached, returning the
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/// raw duplex halves. Runs as `claude` in `/workspace`, like every other exec
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/// this app opens.
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pub async fn create_attached_exec(
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container_id: &str,
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cmd: Vec<String>,
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tty: bool,
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) -> Result<AttachedExec, String> {
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create_attached_exec_as(container_id, cmd, tty, "claude", "/workspace").await
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}
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/// [`create_attached_exec`] with the user and working directory spelled out.
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///
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/// Only base-image migration needs this: replaying `apt` and unpacking a
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/// payload tar at `/` have to run as **root**, and every other caller wants the
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/// `claude` / `/workspace` defaults that [`create_attached_exec`] supplies. It
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/// stays the single place an attached exec is opened.
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pub async fn create_attached_exec_as(
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container_id: &str,
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cmd: Vec<String>,
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tty: bool,
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user: &str,
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working_dir: &str,
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) -> Result<AttachedExec, String> {
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let docker = get_docker()?;
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let exec = docker
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.create_exec(
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container_id,
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CreateExecOptions {
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attach_stdin: Some(true),
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attach_stdout: Some(true),
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attach_stderr: Some(true),
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tty: Some(tty),
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cmd: Some(cmd),
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user: Some(user.to_string()),
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working_dir: Some(working_dir.to_string()),
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..Default::default()
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},
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)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?;
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let exec_id = exec.id.clone();
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match docker
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.start_exec(&exec_id, None)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?
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{
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StartExecResults::Attached { output, input } => Ok(AttachedExec {
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exec_id,
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output,
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input,
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}),
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StartExecResults::Detached => Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()),
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}
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}
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pub struct ExecSession {
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pub exec_id: String,
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pub container_id: String,
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pub input_tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender<Vec<u8>>,
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shutdown_tx: mpsc::Sender<()>,
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}
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impl ExecSession {
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pub async fn send_input(&self, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), String> {
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self.input_tx
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.send(data)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to send input: {}", e))
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}
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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pub async fn resize(&self, cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<(), String> {
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let docker = get_docker()?;
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docker
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.resize_exec(
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&self.exec_id,
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ResizeExecOptions {
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width: cols,
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height: rows,
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},
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)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to resize exec: {}", e))
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}
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pub fn shutdown(&self) {
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let _ = self.shutdown_tx.try_send(());
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}
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}
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pub struct ExecSessionManager {
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sessions: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ExecSession>>>,
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}
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impl ExecSessionManager {
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pub fn new() -> Self {
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Self {
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sessions: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
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}
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}
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pub async fn create_session<F>(
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&self,
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container_id: &str,
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session_id: &str,
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cmd: Vec<String>,
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on_output: F,
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on_exit: Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>,
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) -> Result<(), String>
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where
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F: Fn(Vec<u8>) + Send + 'static,
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{
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self.create_session_with_tty(container_id, session_id, cmd, true, on_output, on_exit)
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.await
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}
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pub async fn create_session_with_tty<F>(
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&self,
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container_id: &str,
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session_id: &str,
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cmd: Vec<String>,
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tty: bool,
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on_output: F,
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on_exit: Box<dyn FnOnce() + Send>,
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) -> Result<(), String>
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where
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F: Fn(Vec<u8>) + Send + 'static,
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{
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let AttachedExec {
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exec_id,
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mut output,
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mut input,
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} = create_attached_exec(container_id, cmd, tty).await?;
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let (input_tx, mut input_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<Vec<u8>>();
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let (shutdown_tx, mut shutdown_rx) = mpsc::channel::<()>(1);
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// Output reader task
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let session_id_clone = session_id.to_string();
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let shutdown_tx_clone = shutdown_tx.clone();
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tokio::spawn(async move {
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loop {
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tokio::select! {
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msg = output.next() => {
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match msg {
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Some(Ok(output)) => {
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on_output(output.into_bytes().to_vec());
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}
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Some(Err(e)) => {
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log::error!("Exec output error for {}: {}", session_id_clone, e);
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break;
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}
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None => {
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log::info!("Exec output stream ended for {}", session_id_clone);
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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_ = shutdown_rx.recv() => {
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log::info!("Exec session {} shutting down", session_id_clone);
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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on_exit();
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let _ = shutdown_tx_clone;
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});
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// Input writer task
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tokio::spawn(async move {
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while let Some(data) = input_rx.recv().await {
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if let Err(e) = input.write_all(&data).await {
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log::error!("Failed to write to exec stdin: {}", e);
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break;
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}
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}
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});
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let session = ExecSession {
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exec_id,
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container_id: container_id.to_string(),
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input_tx,
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shutdown_tx,
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};
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self.sessions
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.lock()
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.await
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.insert(session_id.to_string(), session);
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Ok(())
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}
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pub async fn send_input(&self, session_id: &str, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), String> {
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let sessions = self.sessions.lock().await;
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let session = sessions
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.get(session_id)
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.ok_or_else(|| format!("Session {} not found", session_id))?;
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session.send_input(data).await
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}
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pub async fn resize(&self, session_id: &str, cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<(), String> {
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// Clone the exec_id under the lock, then drop the lock before the
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// async Docker API call to avoid holding the mutex across await.
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let exec_id = {
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let sessions = self.sessions.lock().await;
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let session = sessions
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.get(session_id)
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.ok_or_else(|| format!("Session {} not found", session_id))?;
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session.exec_id.clone()
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};
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let docker = get_docker()?;
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docker
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.resize_exec(
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&exec_id,
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ResizeExecOptions {
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width: cols,
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height: rows,
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},
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)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to resize exec: {}", e))
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}
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pub async fn close_session(&self, session_id: &str) {
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let mut sessions = self.sessions.lock().await;
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if let Some(session) = sessions.remove(session_id) {
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session.shutdown();
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}
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}
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pub async fn close_sessions_for_container(&self, container_id: &str) {
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let mut sessions = self.sessions.lock().await;
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let ids_to_close: Vec<String> = sessions
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.iter()
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.filter(|(_, s)| s.container_id == container_id)
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.map(|(id, _)| id.clone())
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.collect();
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for id in ids_to_close {
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if let Some(session) = sessions.remove(&id) {
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session.shutdown();
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}
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}
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}
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pub async fn close_all_sessions(&self) {
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let mut sessions = self.sessions.lock().await;
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for (_, session) in sessions.drain() {
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session.shutdown();
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}
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}
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pub async fn get_container_id(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
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let sessions = self.sessions.lock().await;
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let session = sessions
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.get(session_id)
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.ok_or_else(|| format!("Session {} not found", session_id))?;
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Ok(session.container_id.clone())
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}
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pub async fn write_file_to_container(
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&self,
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container_id: &str,
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file_name: &str,
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data: &[u8],
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) -> Result<String, String> {
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let docker = get_docker()?;
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// Build a tar archive in memory containing the file
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let mut tar_buf = Vec::new();
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{
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let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
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let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
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header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
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header.set_mode(0o644);
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header.set_cksum();
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builder
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.append_data(&mut header, file_name, data)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
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builder
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.finish()
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
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}
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docker
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.upload_to_container(
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container_id,
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Some(UploadToContainerOptions {
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path: "/tmp".to_string(),
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..Default::default()
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}),
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tar_buf.into(),
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)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?;
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Ok(format!("/tmp/{}", file_name))
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}
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}
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/// Upload a host file into the container's `/tmp` under `dest_name`. The file is
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/// read and packed into the tar inside a blocking task, so the synchronous IO
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/// runs off the async worker. The tar's declared entry size is taken from the
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/// bytes actually read (not a separate `stat`), so a file changing size between
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/// a size check and the read can't desync the header and corrupt the archive.
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/// Returns the in-container path (`/tmp/<dest_name>`).
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pub async fn upload_host_file_to_container(
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container_id: &str,
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host_path: &str,
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dest_name: &str,
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) -> Result<String, String> {
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let host_path = host_path.to_string();
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let dest_name = dest_name.to_string();
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let dest_for_blk = dest_name.clone();
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let tar_buf = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
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let data = std::fs::read(&host_path)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read {}: {}", host_path, e))?;
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let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024);
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{
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let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
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let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
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// Size comes from the bytes in hand, so header and payload can't disagree.
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header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
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header.set_mode(0o644);
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header.set_cksum();
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builder
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.append_data(&mut header, &dest_for_blk, &data[..])
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
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builder
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.finish()
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
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}
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Ok(tar_buf)
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})
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Upload task panicked: {}", e))??;
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let docker = get_docker()?;
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docker
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.upload_to_container(
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container_id,
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Some(UploadToContainerOptions {
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path: "/tmp".to_string(),
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..Default::default()
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}),
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tar_buf.into(),
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)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?;
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Ok(format!("/tmp/{}", dest_name))
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}
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/// Write `data` into the container at `<dest_dir>/<file_name>` with `mode`.
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///
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/// For small, generated files — migration uses it for the `tar -T` include
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/// list, which can be too long to pass as argv. Anything large should be
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/// streamed through an attached exec's stdin instead, since this buffers the
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/// whole payload in memory twice (once raw, once tarred).
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pub async fn upload_bytes_to_container(
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container_id: &str,
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dest_dir: &str,
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file_name: &str,
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data: &[u8],
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mode: u32,
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) -> Result<String, String> {
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let docker = get_docker()?;
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let mut tar_buf = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() + 1024);
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{
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let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(&mut tar_buf);
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let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
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header.set_size(data.len() as u64);
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header.set_mode(mode);
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header.set_cksum();
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builder
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.append_data(&mut header, file_name, data)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create tar entry: {}", e))?;
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builder
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.finish()
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to finalize tar: {}", e))?;
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}
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|
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docker
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.upload_to_container(
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container_id,
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Some(UploadToContainerOptions {
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path: dest_dir.to_string(),
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..Default::default()
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}),
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tar_buf.into(),
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)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to upload file to container: {}", e))?;
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Ok(format!("{}/{}", dest_dir.trim_end_matches('/'), file_name))
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}
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|
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/// Ceiling on how much container output a one-shot exec will buffer into the
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/// host process.
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///
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/// Every `exec_oneshot*` call reads the whole stream into a `String` before any
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/// caller sees a byte, and what it is reading is *container-controlled* — the
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/// scheduler notifications reader `cat`s up to 50 files with no size cap, and
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/// the auth bridge reads `/proc/net/tcp` every two seconds. Neither has an
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/// upstream bound, so this is where the bound goes. Generous enough that no
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/// legitimate reader (the largest is a package manifest of a full image) comes
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/// close.
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pub const MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT: usize = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
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|
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/// The auth bridge's per-tick budget. It reads two procfs files whose rows are
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/// ~150 bytes; a real container has tens of listeners, and the parser only ever
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/// yields at most one entry per port number. 1 MiB is thousands of rows — far
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/// past anything genuine, far short of a problem.
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pub const PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT: usize = 1024 * 1024;
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|
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/// Append to `buf` while it stays inside `limit`. Returns `false` once the
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/// limit is exceeded, at which point the caller must stop reading.
|
|
fn push_capped(buf: &mut String, chunk: &str, limit: usize) -> bool {
|
|
if buf.len() + chunk.len() > limit {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
buf.push_str(chunk);
|
|
true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Run a one-shot (non-interactive) exec command in a container and collect stdout.
|
|
pub async fn exec_oneshot(container_id: &str, cmd: Vec<String>) -> Result<String, String> {
|
|
exec_oneshot_env(container_id, cmd, Vec::new()).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// [`exec_oneshot`] with a caller-chosen output ceiling, for readers whose
|
|
/// input is fully container-controlled and whose legitimate output is small.
|
|
pub async fn exec_oneshot_limited(
|
|
container_id: &str,
|
|
cmd: Vec<String>,
|
|
limit: usize,
|
|
) -> Result<String, String> {
|
|
exec_oneshot_inner(container_id, "claude", cmd, Vec::new(), limit)
|
|
.await
|
|
.map(|(output, _)| output)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Like `exec_oneshot`, but passes additional environment variables to the exec
|
|
/// process. Secrets passed this way live only in `/proc/<pid>/environ` (readable
|
|
/// by the same user / root) rather than in the process argv, so they are not
|
|
/// exposed via `ps`.
|
|
///
|
|
/// NOTE: the command's exit code is NOT checked — callers that need to know
|
|
/// whether the command succeeded should use `exec_oneshot_env_status`.
|
|
pub async fn exec_oneshot_env(
|
|
container_id: &str,
|
|
cmd: Vec<String>,
|
|
env: Vec<String>,
|
|
) -> Result<String, String> {
|
|
exec_oneshot_env_status(container_id, cmd, env)
|
|
.await
|
|
.map(|(output, _exit_code)| output)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Like `exec_oneshot_env`, but also returns the command's exit code (0 on
|
|
/// success). The returned string contains both stdout and stderr, interleaved
|
|
/// in arrival order, which is useful for surfacing failure detail.
|
|
pub async fn exec_oneshot_env_status(
|
|
container_id: &str,
|
|
cmd: Vec<String>,
|
|
env: Vec<String>,
|
|
) -> Result<(String, i64), String> {
|
|
exec_oneshot_as(container_id, "claude", cmd, env).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// [`exec_oneshot_env_status`] with the user spelled out.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Base-image migration is the only caller that needs anything but `claude`:
|
|
/// `apt-get`, `npm -g` and the payload unpack all run as **root**. Note that
|
|
/// the container does grant `claude` passwordless sudo, but going through
|
|
/// `sudo` would put the whole command in `ps` output and add a second failure
|
|
/// mode to interpret, so the exec is simply created as root.
|
|
pub async fn exec_oneshot_as(
|
|
container_id: &str,
|
|
user: &str,
|
|
cmd: Vec<String>,
|
|
env: Vec<String>,
|
|
) -> Result<(String, i64), String> {
|
|
exec_oneshot_inner(container_id, user, cmd, env, MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn exec_oneshot_inner(
|
|
container_id: &str,
|
|
user: &str,
|
|
cmd: Vec<String>,
|
|
env: Vec<String>,
|
|
limit: usize,
|
|
) -> Result<(String, i64), String> {
|
|
let docker = get_docker()?;
|
|
|
|
let exec = docker
|
|
.create_exec(
|
|
container_id,
|
|
CreateExecOptions {
|
|
attach_stdout: Some(true),
|
|
attach_stderr: Some(true),
|
|
cmd: Some(cmd),
|
|
env: if env.is_empty() { None } else { Some(env) },
|
|
user: Some(user.to_string()),
|
|
..Default::default()
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await
|
|
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to create exec: {}", e))?;
|
|
|
|
let result = docker
|
|
.start_exec(&exec.id, None)
|
|
.await
|
|
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to start exec: {}", e))?;
|
|
|
|
let mut combined = String::new();
|
|
match result {
|
|
StartExecResults::Attached { mut output, .. } => {
|
|
while let Some(msg) = output.next().await {
|
|
match msg {
|
|
Ok(data) => {
|
|
let chunk = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data.into_bytes()).into_owned();
|
|
if !push_capped(&mut combined, &chunk, limit) {
|
|
// Stop reading rather than truncate silently: every
|
|
// caller parses this output, and a half-read
|
|
// manifest or JSON array is worse than an error.
|
|
// Dropping `output` kills the exec's stream.
|
|
return Err(format!(
|
|
"Command output exceeded {} bytes and was abandoned",
|
|
limit
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Err(e) => return Err(format!("Exec output error: {}", e)),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
StartExecResults::Detached => return Err("Exec started in detached mode".to_string()),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The output stream draining doesn't strictly guarantee inspect_exec has the
|
|
// final exit_code populated yet, so poll until the exec reports finished.
|
|
let exit_code = wait_for_exec_exit(&exec.id).await.unwrap_or(0);
|
|
|
|
Ok((combined, exit_code))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Poll `inspect_exec` until the exec reports finished and return its exit code.
|
|
/// Returns `None` if the code can't be determined (inspect error, or the exec
|
|
/// doesn't report finished within ~1s — which shouldn't happen once its output
|
|
/// stream has drained).
|
|
pub async fn wait_for_exec_exit(exec_id: &str) -> Option<i64> {
|
|
let docker = get_docker().ok()?;
|
|
for _ in 0..40 {
|
|
match docker.inspect_exec(exec_id).await {
|
|
Ok(info) => {
|
|
if info.running != Some(true) {
|
|
// Finished: use the reported code (default 0 if somehow absent).
|
|
return Some(info.exit_code.unwrap_or(0));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Err(_) => return None,
|
|
}
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(25)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn output_under_the_limit_is_buffered_whole() {
|
|
let mut buf = String::new();
|
|
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "hello ", 16));
|
|
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "world", 16));
|
|
assert_eq!(buf, "hello world");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn output_over_the_limit_is_refused_rather_than_truncated() {
|
|
// The abandoned chunk must not land in the buffer either: a caller that
|
|
// ignored the error would otherwise parse a half-read document.
|
|
let mut buf = String::new();
|
|
assert!(push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 12));
|
|
assert!(!push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 12));
|
|
assert_eq!(buf, "0123456789");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn a_single_oversized_chunk_is_refused() {
|
|
let mut buf = String::new();
|
|
assert!(!push_capped(&mut buf, "0123456789", 4));
|
|
assert!(buf.is_empty());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn the_bridge_budget_is_far_smaller_than_the_general_one() {
|
|
// The auth bridge re-reads container-controlled procfs every 2s, so it
|
|
// gets a tighter ceiling than one-shot readers that run on demand.
|
|
assert!(PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT < MAX_ONESHOT_OUTPUT);
|
|
// …but still comfortably above a genuine /proc/net/tcp{,6} pair.
|
|
assert!(PROC_NET_OUTPUT_LIMIT > 100 * 150);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|