capabilities/default.json - Drop every `store:*` grant. `@tauri-apps/plugin-store` has no caller in `app/src`, and the plugin's `resolve_store_path` is a `PathBuf::push` against AppData — `push` discards the base for an absolute path, so the grant was an arbitrary host read/write from the webview. - Replace `opener:default` with a scoped `opener:allow-open-url` (http/https only). That drops `reveal_item_in_dir`, which the plugin does not scope-check and nothing here calls, and the unused mailto:/tel: scope. - Record the unscopable `drag:allow-start-drag` residual risk in `description`. tauri.conf.json - Add `form-action 'none'`, `base-uri 'none'`, `object-src 'none'`. `form-action` has no `default-src` fallback, so an injected auto-submitting form was unblocked even though `script-src 'self'` blocks XSS. - Remove the dead `asset:` / `https://asset.localhost` img-src and `data:` font-src grants; `blob:` stays (the file viewer uses it). auth_bridge - The reserved-port set covered only this project's mappings and the two browser-view ranges. It now also covers the gateway, STT and web-terminal host ports (configured value and shipped default, read off the settings models) and every other project's published host port. A container binding container-loopback 4000 / 9876 / 7681 while those services were stopped had that port mirrored onto the host, unauthenticated, within one poll. - Gate the host listener on fetch metadata: refuse a request that is a cross-site sub-resource, allow navigations (the OAuth redirect) and anything without `Sec-Fetch-*`. Non-HTTP connections are classified from their first line and forwarded verbatim. Residual risk is spelled out in the module docs. - Bound the forwards: max concurrent connections per port, a first-byte deadline enforced before any `docker exec` is created, and an idle timeout. browser_view/mod.rs - `pick_viewer_port` reads procfs with `/usr/bin/cat`, not a bare `cat` the container can shim via its writable PATH entry. - Treat port choice as check-then-bind: walk to the next free candidate when the viewer does not come up, instead of failing the start. BrowserTab.tsx - Sandbox the viewer iframe. Container-controlled content could `top.location` the app's webview away. `allow-top-navigation*` and `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` are deliberately absent. HelpDialog.tsx - Escape the quote characters in the entity pass and escape captured attribute values. `href="$2"` with `$2` = `[^)]+` let remote GitHub markdown close the attribute and open another, in a document rendered with `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`. web_terminal/terminal.html - SRI hashes plus `crossorigin` on the three jsdelivr bundles and the stylesheet, and a CSP for the page — it is served 0.0.0.0 behind a permissive CORS layer and nothing else gives it one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBq2rGum6GX7xXgsas1fDc
101 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript
101 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import { renderMarkdown } from "./HelpDialog";
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/**
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* `renderMarkdown` builds HTML by regex substitution and the result is handed
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* to `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`. Its input is the help document, which is
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* fetched from GitHub at runtime — remote, versioned by someone else, and not
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* something the app gets to trust. These tests pin the escaping.
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*/
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/**
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* Parse rendered HTML and return its first anchor, asserting that *no* element
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* anywhere in the output grew an attribute outside the allowed set. A broken
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* attribute value is only interesting if it becomes an attribute, so the check
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* has to run through a real parser rather than over the string.
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*/
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const ALLOWED_ATTRS = new Set(["class", "href", "target", "rel", "id"]);
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function onlyAnchor(html: string): HTMLAnchorElement {
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const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(html, "text/html");
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for (const el of Array.from(doc.body.querySelectorAll("*"))) {
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for (const name of attrNames(el)) {
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expect(ALLOWED_ATTRS.has(name), `unexpected attribute ${name}`).toBe(true);
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}
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}
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const anchors = doc.querySelectorAll("a");
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expect(anchors.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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return anchors[0] as HTMLAnchorElement;
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}
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/** Attribute names the parser actually saw on an element. */
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function attrNames(el: Element): string[] {
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return Array.from(el.attributes).map((a) => a.name);
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}
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describe("renderMarkdown escaping", () => {
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it("escapes the quote characters an attribute value is delimited by", () => {
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const html = renderMarkdown('He said "hi" and it\'s fine.');
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expect(html).not.toMatch(/said "hi"/);
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expect(html).toContain(""hi"");
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expect(html).toContain("it's");
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});
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it("does not let a link target break out of href=\"…\"", () => {
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// The sink: the URL capture is `[^)]+`, which includes `"` and spaces, and
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// the value lands directly inside `href="…"`. Asserted through the DOM,
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// not by string matching — the payload text legitimately survives *inside*
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// the attribute value; what must not happen is it becoming an attribute.
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const a = onlyAnchor(
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renderMarkdown(
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'[click](https://example.com/" onmouseover="steal() formaction="https://evil.example)',
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),
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);
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expect(attrNames(a)).toEqual(["class", "href", "target", "rel"]);
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expect(a.getAttribute("href")).toContain('" onmouseover="');
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});
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it("does not let an in-document anchor break out of href=\"#…\"", () => {
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const a = onlyAnchor(
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renderMarkdown('[jump](#top" onfocus="steal() autofocus="x)'),
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);
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expect(attrNames(a)).toEqual(["class", "href"]);
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});
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it("does not let a bare URL break out of href=\"…\"", () => {
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const a = onlyAnchor(
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renderMarkdown('See https://example.com/a"onmouseover="steal()\n'),
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);
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expect(attrNames(a)).toEqual(["class", "href", "target", "rel"]);
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});
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it("still renders ordinary links intact", () => {
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const html = renderMarkdown("[docs](https://example.com/a?x=1&y=2)");
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// `&` was entity-escaped by the first pass and must not be escaped twice.
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expect(html).toContain('href="https://example.com/a?x=1&y=2"');
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expect(html).not.toContain("&amp;");
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expect(html).toContain('target="_blank"');
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expect(html).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
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expect(html).toContain(">docs</a>");
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});
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it("still renders an in-document anchor link intact", () => {
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const html = renderMarkdown("[jump](#getting-started)");
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expect(html).toContain('href="#getting-started"');
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});
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it("keeps header slugs stable across the new quote escaping", () => {
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// The regression this guards: quotes now become entities *before*
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// `slugify` sees them, and an entity's letters would otherwise survive
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// into the id ("claude39s-setup"), silently breaking every
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// `[…](#claudes-setup)` in the document.
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expect(renderMarkdown("## Claude's setup")).toContain('id="claudes-setup"');
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expect(renderMarkdown('## The "safe" mode')).toContain('id="the-safe-mode"');
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});
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it("still refuses to emit raw tags from the source document", () => {
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const html = renderMarkdown("<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>");
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expect(html).not.toContain("<img");
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expect(html).toContain("<img");
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});
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});
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