Files
Triple-C/app/src-tauri/src/models/settings_export.rs
T
shadow-test 97e58db3c1
Secret Scan / scan (push) Successful in 6s
Build App (Preview) / compute-version (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Secret Scan / scan (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Build App (Preview) / create-release (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Build App (Preview) / build-macos (pull_request) Successful in 2m41s
Build App (Preview) / build-windows (pull_request) Successful in 4m53s
Build App (Preview) / build-linux (pull_request) Successful in 7m5s
Build App (Preview) / prune-previews (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Close gateway-secret desync, TOCTOU, and undisclosed custom-image gaps
Round 4 review findings:

- Disclose and warn on a custom Docker image the import would set (HIGH):
  it's the image every project container is created from, so an
  undisclosed change here was a sharper version of the redirected-base-URL
  problem round 3 already flagged for the model backends.
- Recreate a running gateway container when an import restores a new
  secret with the shape unchanged (MEDIUM): reconcile_gateway's shape
  comparison can't see a secret-only change, so the container would
  otherwise keep serving old key material indefinitely.
- Report keychain write failures back to the caller instead of only
  logging them (MEDIUM): apply_settings_import now returns
  SettingsImportOutcome with secret_restore_warnings so a partial restore
  can't read as unqualified success.
- Pin a hash of the previewed file's ciphertext and refuse to apply if it
  changed on disk (MEDIUM): closes a TOCTOU between preview and apply.
- Sanitize and cap every free-form string a preview surfaces, and move the
  warning boxes above the replace list in the UI (MEDIUM): an unbounded
  base URL or image name could otherwise push the security warnings below
  the scroll fold.
- Validate the Docker socket path on import the same as the SSH key and CA
  cert paths (LOW): it was the one mounted host path validate_settings_update
  didn't cover.
- Fix ExportedSecrets::is_empty() to treat whitespace-only as blank, like
  every other secret-presence check in this feature (LOW).
- Authenticate the file header as AEAD associated data (LOW, defense in
  depth) and correct two doc comments that overstated the password not
  being cached.
2026-08-27 14:24:06 -07:00

367 lines
17 KiB
Rust

//! Settings export/import — see triple-c#35.
//!
//! `SettingsExportPayload` is the whole plaintext export before encryption
//! and after decryption (see `storage::settings_crypto`). It bundles
//! `AppSettings` — with one field carved out, see below — with the global
//! secrets that live in the OS keychain instead: the shared Claude Code
//! OAuth login and the model gateway's two keys. Per-project settings,
//! per-project secrets, and anything living in a project's Docker volumes
//! are deliberately out of scope: this exports the *host* environment, not
//! any one project's.
//!
//! **`AppSettings` is not entirely the non-secret shape it looks like.**
//! `WebTerminalSettings::access_token` is a live bearer credential for a
//! server that binds every interface, stored as a plain field on the
//! struct that is otherwise safe to treat as config. A review of this
//! feature caught it: exporting `AppSettings` wholesale would have carried
//! that token along as if it were as inert as a port number, and — worse —
//! importing it would apply `web_terminal.enabled` and the token together
//! with no more warning than any other setting, letting a crafted export
//! silently stand up a LAN-listening terminal server with an
//! attacker-known token on the next launch. `export_settings` /
//! `apply_settings_import` blank this field out of the `settings` they
//! read from and write to, and it travels only through
//! [`ExportedSecrets::web_terminal_access_token`] instead, with the same
//! "only overwrite what the import actually has" treatment as the other
//! three secrets.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::{AppSettings, ImageSource};
/// Bumped when the shape of [`SettingsExportPayload`] changes in a way that
/// isn't just an additive, `#[serde(default)]`-covered field — e.g. if a
/// field is ever removed or its meaning changes. `apply_settings_import`
/// checks this before touching anything.
pub const SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION: u32 = 1;
/// The global secrets bundled into an export. Deliberately a separate struct
/// from `AppSettings`: these live in the OS keychain, never in
/// `settings.json`, and — outside of this export/import flow — the values
/// themselves never cross into the frontend; see the doc comments on
/// `storage::secure::get_gateway_api_key` and
/// `commands::settings_export_commands` for why that boundary matters here
/// too.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct ExportedSecrets {
#[serde(default)]
pub claude_oauth_token: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub gateway_api_key: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub gateway_master_key: Option<String>,
/// See the module doc comment — this is `AppSettings::web_terminal
/// .access_token`, carved out because it is a live bearer credential,
/// not config, despite living on a struct that is otherwise safe to
/// export wholesale.
#[serde(default)]
pub web_terminal_access_token: Option<String>,
}
impl ExportedSecrets {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
let blank = |s: &Option<String>| s.as_deref().is_none_or(|v| v.trim().is_empty());
blank(&self.claude_oauth_token)
&& blank(&self.gateway_api_key)
&& blank(&self.gateway_master_key)
&& blank(&self.web_terminal_access_token)
}
}
/// What `apply_settings_import` hands back: the settings that were actually
/// saved, plus a human-readable note for each keychain secret this import
/// carried but could not be restored. A keychain write failing partway
/// through must not read as unqualified success just because the settings
/// half of the import went through.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SettingsImportOutcome {
pub settings: AppSettings,
#[serde(default)]
pub secret_restore_warnings: Vec<String>,
}
/// The full plaintext payload — this is what gets encrypted on export and
/// what decryption recovers on import. Never written to disk unencrypted;
/// see `storage::settings_crypto`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SettingsExportPayload {
pub format_version: u32,
/// RFC3339. Purely informational — shown in the import preview so a user
/// picking between a few old export files has something to go on.
pub exported_at: String,
/// The exporting app's `CARGO_PKG_VERSION`. Also informational: every
/// field below already round-trips through `#[serde(default)]`-covered
/// `AppSettings`, so an older or newer export still deserializes; this is
/// for a human to notice "this is from a much older version" if an import
/// ever looks wrong, not something the code branches on.
pub app_version: String,
pub settings: AppSettings,
#[serde(default)]
pub secrets: ExportedSecrets,
}
/// What `preview_settings_import` hands the frontend before anything is
/// applied — counts and presence flags only, **never** a secret value itself,
/// so this type is safe to return across the IPC boundary and render
/// directly. The confirmation UI is built from this.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SettingsImportPreview {
pub exported_at: String,
pub app_version: String,
pub custom_env_var_count: usize,
pub gateway_model_count: usize,
pub has_claude_code_settings: bool,
pub has_claude_oauth_token: bool,
pub has_gateway_api_key: bool,
pub has_gateway_master_key: bool,
pub has_web_terminal_access_token: bool,
/// Whether the imported settings turn the web terminal on. Named
/// separately from the token above: `enabled` and the token are two
/// different fields, either can be true without the other, and
/// "this import turns on a service that listens on your network" is
/// exactly the kind of change a wholesale settings replace must not
/// bury in a generic "settings replaced" line — see the module doc
/// comment on why this field exists at all.
pub enables_web_terminal: bool,
/// Non-blank custom base URLs the import would set, so a redirect of
/// model traffic to somewhere other than the usual provider is visible
/// at import time rather than discovered later. These are endpoints, not
/// secrets — safe to show verbatim, unlike everything above.
#[serde(default)]
pub ollama_base_url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub llamacpp_base_url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub openai_compatible_base_url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub gateway_api_base: Option<String>,
/// Whether the import sets a custom Docker image, and its name if so —
/// disclosed for the same reason as the base URLs above, and arguably
/// more sharply: this is the image *every* project container is created
/// from (`models::container_config::resolve_image_name`), so a crafted
/// export pointing it at an attacker-controlled image is a path to
/// running arbitrary code with whatever a project's containers are
/// allowed to reach (the Docker socket, an SSH key, project files) —
/// not merely a redirected API endpoint.
#[serde(default)]
pub image_source: ImageSource,
#[serde(default)]
pub custom_image_name: Option<String>,
}
/// A cap on how much of a decrypted, not-yet-trusted string gets echoed back
/// into a preview a user reads and a UI renders without truncation of its
/// own. Applied to every field above that carries free-form text straight
/// from the import file rather than a count or a boolean — a base URL or an
/// image name a hostile export author controls has had no validation done
/// on it yet at preview time, and nothing stops it from being pathological
/// (embedded control characters, or long enough to blow out the confirmation
/// dialog and push the security warnings below it off screen).
const MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN: usize = 100;
fn sanitize_for_preview(value: &str) -> String {
let cleaned: String = value.chars().filter(|c| !c.is_control()).collect();
let trimmed = cleaned.trim();
if trimmed.chars().count() > MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN {
let truncated: String = trimmed.chars().take(MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN).collect();
format!("{}…", truncated)
} else {
trimmed.to_string()
}
}
impl SettingsImportPreview {
pub fn from_payload(payload: &SettingsExportPayload) -> Self {
let non_blank = |s: &Option<String>| s.as_deref().is_some_and(|v| !v.trim().is_empty());
let sanitized_non_blank = |s: &Option<String>| {
s.as_deref()
.map(sanitize_for_preview)
.filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
};
Self {
exported_at: payload.exported_at.clone(),
app_version: payload.app_version.clone(),
custom_env_var_count: payload.settings.global_custom_env_vars.len(),
gateway_model_count: payload.settings.gateway.models.len(),
has_claude_code_settings: payload.settings.global_claude_code_settings.is_some(),
has_claude_oauth_token: non_blank(&payload.secrets.claude_oauth_token),
has_gateway_api_key: non_blank(&payload.secrets.gateway_api_key),
has_gateway_master_key: non_blank(&payload.secrets.gateway_master_key),
has_web_terminal_access_token: non_blank(&payload.secrets.web_terminal_access_token),
enables_web_terminal: payload.settings.web_terminal.enabled,
ollama_base_url: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.global_ollama.base_url),
llamacpp_base_url: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.global_llamacpp.base_url),
openai_compatible_base_url: sanitized_non_blank(
&payload.settings.global_openai_compatible.base_url,
),
gateway_api_base: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.gateway.api_base),
image_source: payload.settings.image_source.clone(),
custom_image_name: sanitized_non_blank(&payload.settings.custom_image_name),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::models::AppSettings;
fn payload_with(secrets: ExportedSecrets) -> SettingsExportPayload {
let settings = AppSettings {
global_custom_env_vars: vec![
crate::models::EnvVar {
key: "A".to_string(),
value: "1".to_string(),
},
crate::models::EnvVar {
key: "B".to_string(),
value: "2".to_string(),
},
],
..AppSettings::default()
};
SettingsExportPayload {
format_version: SETTINGS_EXPORT_FORMAT_VERSION,
exported_at: "2026-08-27T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
app_version: "0.4.14".to_string(),
settings,
secrets,
}
}
#[test]
fn the_preview_never_carries_a_secret_value() {
let payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some("sk-super-secret-token".to_string()),
gateway_api_key: Some("sk-another-secret".to_string()),
gateway_master_key: Some("sk-triple-c-yet-another".to_string()),
web_terminal_access_token: Some("wt-super-secret-token".to_string()),
});
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&preview).unwrap();
assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-super-secret-token"));
assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-another-secret"));
assert!(!serialized.contains("sk-triple-c-yet-another"));
assert!(!serialized.contains("wt-super-secret-token"));
assert!(preview.has_claude_oauth_token);
assert!(preview.has_gateway_api_key);
assert!(preview.has_gateway_master_key);
assert!(preview.has_web_terminal_access_token);
}
#[test]
fn a_blank_secret_reads_as_absent_in_the_preview() {
// A keychain entry that exists but holds only whitespace must not
// read as "present" — same "blank counts as absent" rule the
// keychain layer itself applies when storing these.
let payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some(" ".to_string()),
gateway_api_key: None,
gateway_master_key: None,
web_terminal_access_token: Some(" ".to_string()),
});
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert!(!preview.has_claude_oauth_token);
assert!(!preview.has_gateway_api_key);
assert!(!preview.has_gateway_master_key);
assert!(!preview.has_web_terminal_access_token);
}
#[test]
fn enabling_the_web_terminal_is_surfaced_regardless_of_whether_a_token_came_with_it() {
// `enabled` and the token are independent fields — a crafted export
// could set one without the other, and both are worth a user's
// attention: this is the field that exists specifically so "this
// import turns on a service that listens on your network" cannot
// hide inside a generic "settings replaced" summary.
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.web_terminal.enabled = true;
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert!(preview.enables_web_terminal);
assert!(!preview.has_web_terminal_access_token);
}
#[test]
fn custom_base_urls_are_surfaced_but_blank_ones_read_as_absent() {
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.global_ollama.base_url = Some("http://attacker.example:11434".to_string());
payload.settings.global_llamacpp.base_url = Some(" ".to_string());
payload.settings.gateway.api_base = Some("https://gateway.example/v1".to_string());
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(
preview.ollama_base_url.as_deref(),
Some("http://attacker.example:11434")
);
assert_eq!(preview.llamacpp_base_url, None);
assert_eq!(preview.openai_compatible_base_url, None);
assert_eq!(
preview.gateway_api_base.as_deref(),
Some("https://gateway.example/v1")
);
}
#[test]
fn counts_reflect_the_real_settings() {
let payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(preview.custom_env_var_count, 2);
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_secrets_bundle_reports_itself_as_empty() {
assert!(ExportedSecrets::default().is_empty());
assert!(!ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some("x".to_string()),
..Default::default()
}
.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_secrets_bundle_holding_only_whitespace_still_reports_itself_as_empty() {
// Matches the "blank counts as absent" rule every other consumer of
// these fields applies (`has_claude_oauth_token` and friends above) —
// a keychain entry that exists but holds only whitespace carries
// nothing usable, so the export-time "nothing to export" log line
// must still fire for it.
assert!(ExportedSecrets {
claude_oauth_token: Some(" ".to_string()),
..Default::default()
}
.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn a_custom_docker_image_is_surfaced() {
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.image_source = crate::models::ImageSource::Custom;
payload.settings.custom_image_name = Some("ghcr.io/attacker/triple-c:latest".to_string());
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(preview.image_source, crate::models::ImageSource::Custom);
assert_eq!(
preview.custom_image_name.as_deref(),
Some("ghcr.io/attacker/triple-c:latest")
);
}
#[test]
fn preview_strings_are_stripped_of_control_characters_and_capped_in_length() {
let mut payload = payload_with(ExportedSecrets::default());
payload.settings.global_ollama.base_url =
Some(format!("http://example.test/{}\u{0007}bell", "x".repeat(200)));
let preview = SettingsImportPreview::from_payload(&payload);
let shown = preview.ollama_base_url.expect("non-blank base url");
assert!(!shown.contains('\u{0007}'), "control character leaked into the preview");
// +1 for the trailing ellipsis appended when truncated.
assert!(
shown.chars().count() <= MAX_PREVIEW_STRING_LEN + 1,
"preview string was not capped: {} chars",
shown.chars().count()
);
}
}