Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Irena Rindos 9733a250fa refact(event): move observability/event to event (#3704) 2023-09-12 08:15:34 -04:00
hashicorp-copywrite[bot]andJohan Brandhorst-Satzkorn 29da0bcb92 [COMPLIANCE] License changes (#3567)
* Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package.

This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository.

* Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package

This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository.

* Updating the license from MPL to Business Source License

Going forward, this project will be licensed under the Business Source License v1.1. Please see our blog post for more details at https://hashi.co/bsl-blog, FAQ at www.hashicorp.com/licensing-faq, and details of the license at www.hashicorp.com/bsl.

* Update copyright file headers to BUS-1.1

* Rerun make gen

This will pick up the last of the license changes

* Revert "Rerun make gen"

This reverts commit dbe0968bffd92745d8663c6940debae098395a6b.

* Remove copywrite from generation script

The current version of copywrite is not sophisticated enough
to only apply the copywrite changes to certain subdirectories,
so to avoid accidentally relicensing our api and sdk modules,
we will stop running the copywrite script until such time
that it can do the right thing.

* License protobuf API as MPL

The protobuf API files are used to generate the SDK,
since we want the SDK to be MPL, the protobuf files
must also be MPL. This extends to all protobuf files
whose sources end up in the SDK directory, including:

- internal/proto/controller/api
- internal/proto/controller/custom_options
- internal/proto/plugin

It also includes the generated service directory in
internal/gen/controller/api/services, since they are
generated from the protobuf sources used for the SDK.

* Change website license file name

This makes the naming scheme consistent with the rest
of the repository.

* Add note on licensing to README

* Set copywrite license to BUSL

* Revert "Add note on licensing to README"

This reverts commit 4d865a91a7a4f11605f0dc4609355d7e3c3cfffe.

---------

Co-authored-by: hashicorp-copywrite[bot] <110428419+hashicorp-copywrite[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Johan Brandhorst-Satzkorn <johan.brandhorst@gmail.com>
2023-08-11 10:31:53 -07:00
Jeff MitchellandIrena Rindos bdf7bf7702 Do not allow PKI-KMS workers to have names updated via API (#3143)
Do not allow PKI-KMS workers to have names updated via API

This would cause their public IDs to change, which we do not want.

Descriptions are also disallowed, since those come from the config file.

This also adds logic to allow upgrading from old KMS method to new, with
a test.

Co-authored-by: Irena Rindos <irenarindos@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-04-03 17:44:41 -04:00
Jeff Mitchell 163ce184b8 KMS-PKI Workers (#3101)
This adds a new mechanism for worker authentication that uses the
third-party arbitration of the original KMS flow by leveraging
recently-added capabilities in nodeenrollment to support a registration
wrapper. This allows for workers to be registered to the system with
just a name and a matching wrapper, while at the same time allowing
these workers to be used for private Vault access and multi-hop as they
contain per-worker encryption keys and support rotation.

Nodes using this mode will generate and rotate credentials in-memory
(using another recently added nodeenrollment capability) so will have a
new set of keys on every startup. This has the side effect of ensuring
that there is never a conflict or re-use of these credentials.

Note that the normal test worker flow was using the now-deprecated KMS
method; there is still a test that uses this (explicitly) but all other
tests using test workers that did not specify a specific PKI flow now
actually use this mechanism. This means there is fairly decent test
coverage in a general sense, plus the specific tests updated/added for
this feature.

This also adds a new KMS type that can be used to have
distinct KMSes for upstream authentication vs. accepting from
downstream.
2023-03-30 16:20:28 -04:00
Johan Brandhorst-Satzkorn 3c29308673 chore: Add license headers to all files 2023-02-03 15:54:27 -08:00
Todd 19b549c44a Rename package servers to server (#2222) 2022-06-20 18:20:17 -07:00
Haotian 40ba275759 feat(worker): add 'initial_upstreams' field to worker config to prepare to replace 'controllers' field. Update worker config description on website. 2022-06-13 15:45:03 -07:00
Todd b58dada40d Move the server daemons into their own package (#2061)
* Move the server daemons into their own package

With this change the internal/server package now is dedicated to the server domain (workers and controllers) and not to the server daemons.
The hope is that this will make it easier to keep the daemons decoupled from the representation of the servers in the database.
2022-05-09 12:45:10 -07:00
Hugo Vieira aae944be37 test(worker): Remove test-only hooks from actual code
This change introduces a `nonceFn` field that can be changed
by a test but at runtime is transparent to the code that calls it.

The current nonce-generating logic defaults to a test-only field which
opens us up to this value inadvertently being set.
With this change, the default behavior becomes using `base62` to
generate a random nonce, and any tests have to explicitly change that.
2022-03-29 16:46:02 +01:00
Hugo Vieira 61e310998f refactor(worker): Decouple listeners/servers shutdown
This change is the Worker-side counterpart to the change in
eebdfb88dc.
2022-03-29 16:46:02 +01:00
Jeff Mitchell 1782f6a4e4 Enhance worker connection security (#1641)
This stores worker connection nonces within the database to ensure
uniqueness of connections. Prior the connection required any attacker to
be able to decrypt the incoming encrypted authentication message in
order to replay (and if the attacker has access to the KMS you have
bigger problems), but with this change even if an attacker does have
access to the KMS key, they cannot reuse the same message. (If they're
able to encrypt against the KMS key, they can still act as a worker with
a new message, so this only really helps if they only have decryption
capabilities.)
2021-10-27 20:32:07 -04:00