Because of listing visibility, if no actions are assigned to a user for
an individual resource, it's excluded from the list. This is fine and
good. However, when we made a change in 0.2.0 to restrict the
information returned from listing for the anonymous user for scopes and
auth methods, it exposed the fact that because of the way this
visibility works we had to add `read` to scopes by default -- thereby
rather defeating the purpose of restricting what goes back to `u_anon`
requests.
The purpose of "no-op" is to never be used for real actions within the
API, but as something that can be granted to specifically enable
visibility for the targeted user. This makes the controls over list
visibility much more granular.
Current behavior is that you need list grant on the parent scope when
recursively listing, and this is sufficient. This is good for
administrative workflows but can be unintuitive for resources that only
exist at a project level. This change allows permissions on the child
scope to also be taken into account, so that you can start a recursive
list from a parent scope without direct list support on that scope but
still get back child scopes for which list access is granted.
This also fixes a bug where visibility of a scope for recursive listing
would be based on whether the user had list resources for roles within
that scope instead of for the resource type in question.
* Add -filter to CLI listing.
This doesn't include docs/Changelog yet, that will come shortly.
* Add changelog
* Add website docs and fix a curl output bug
When running single-server mode, use public_cluster_addr if given
Right now you don't need to specify a controller address and we use the
cluster listener address; this allows overriding it to the
public_cluster_addr if one is given.
If `controllers` is specified we allow it to be either the cluster
listener or the public cluster address if one is specified before trying
to parse and use it.
* Switch to execabs for os/exec in connect cmd
This is more of an abundance-of-caution change (e.g. defense in depth)
but it doesn't seem like we should be using binaries from the current
directory for `boundary connect` executions (unless given an explicit
path).
* Update changelog
Jeff Mitchell
Jim
Louis RuchandJeff Mitchell