Closes the account-takeover chain and related issues found in audit:
- WS auth brute-force protection: per-session lockout (authThrottle) + per-
socket failure cap that closes the socket (1008); applied to both web-client
and desktop auth. Failed auth no longer leaves the socket open for unlimited
guesses.
- WS upgrades now pass an IP-based rate limiter and Origin allowlist before
handleUpgrade (previously bypassed all HTTP middleware); trust proxy set so
limiting keys on the real client IP.
- /health no longer leaks live session IDs (counts only).
- .env.example rate-limit fixed (900000ms / 300) from the accidental ~11k rps.
- Credentials moved out of URLs into the X-MacroPad-Password header; images
fetched via header + blob URLs; login stores creds in sessionStorage.
- Session creation bounded (max sessions, min password length) and TTL-pruned;
session store writes are now atomic (temp+rename) and debounced.
- Session IDs lengthened to 12 chars with rejection sampling (no modulo bias).
- Enable helmet CSP; restrict CORS to configured origins.
- Request IDs use crypto.randomUUID; drop postinstall build hook and uuid dep.
- Uniform response for unknown session IDs (removes enumeration oracle).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
