# Base image mirrored into the in-house registry to remove docker.io # (Cloudflare R2) as a single point of failure for CI builds. The 2026-05-12 # Cloudflare incident took down docker.io blob pulls and broke this image's CI. # Refresh procedure (run on a workstation that can reach docker.io, e.g. # monthly or when Python patches drop): # docker pull docker.io/library/python:3.12-slim # docker tag docker.io/library/python:3.12-slim \ # repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/python:3.12-slim # docker push repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/python:3.12-slim # Future improvement: a scheduled Gitea Action that does the above automatically. FROM repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/python:3.12-slim # image.source is what ghcr.io uses to link the package to a GitHub repo # sidebar; pointing at the public GitHub mirror enables that linking. The # canonical source-of-truth git remote is still Gitea, but Gitea's registry # doesn't consume this label, so there's no contention. # Stamped from the VERSION file by CI (build-arg) so `docker inspect` reports # what's running on any host. Defaults to "dev" for local/manual builds. ARG VERSION=dev LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="haproxy-manager-base" \ org.opencontainers.image.description="HAProxy management API with Let's Encrypt automation, Coraza WAF integration, and template-driven config" \ org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/shadowdao/haproxy-manager-base" \ org.opencontainers.image.version="${VERSION}" \ org.opencontainers.image.licenses="MIT" # haproxy comes from the UPSTREAM-maintained apt repo https://haproxy.debian.net # (Vincent Bernat's builds, the Debian maintainer's own), suite # `trixie-backports-`, NOT from Debian trixie's archive. # # WHY (2026-11-16 forensics): Debian trixie ships 3.0.11 (+ security revisions). # That build aborts via HAProxy's own watchdog inside the DNS resolver # (resolv_process_responses / snr_resolution_cb, haproxy issue #3101) - whole # edge down 15-52 s per abort on sdbees/whp01. The fix ("dns: bind the # nameserver sockets to the initiating thread", "resolvers: make # process_resolvers() single-threaded") is in 3.0.13+, 3.1.11+ and 3.2.6+; # Debian trixie will not take it. See docs/go-port/haproxy-edge-upgrade-and-logging.md # in the WHP repo for the version evidence and the rollout plan. # # Series: 3.2 (LTS, supported to 2030-Q2). Its trixie package is built with # USE_QUIC=1 against the system OpenSSL 3.5.x NATIVE QUIC API (depends on # libssl3t64 >= 3.5.1), so no USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT layer. (3.0.x upstream # has no trixie packages and would need a source build.) # # The repo keeps MANY patch versions of a series (27 as of 2026-11: 3.2.10 .. # 3.2.26, all flagged `NotAutomatic: yes`), so "latest of the series" would let any # rebuild silently take an untested 3.2.27+. The pin is therefore the EXACT Debian # package version, HAPROXY_EXACT (default below), and the build: # * pins apt to it (`Pin: version `; NOTE a bare # `3.2.26` does NOT match: apt compares the FULL version "3.2.26-1~bpo13+1", # and with a non-matching pin apt falls back to Debian's own 3.0.11 package); # * FAILS unless `dpkg-query` reports EXACTLY HAPROXY_EXACT, and `haproxy -v` # reports the series (so an unreachable repo, which would leave Debian's # 3.0.11, fails closed, and a 3.2 -> 3.3/3.4 jump can never arrive by accident); # * records the resolved version in /haproxy/HAPROXY_VERSION; the `haproxy -c` # gate below proves the binary accepts the fleet config. # Taking a new patch is a DELIBERATE edit of the default below (or # --build-arg HAPROXY_EXACT=3.2.27-1~bpo13+1), tested before it merges; CI never # passes it, so a rebuild is reproducible. # The repo signing key is COMMITTED (keys/haproxy-debian-net/, Vincent Bernat, # fingerprint AEF2 3487 66F3 71C6 89A7 3600 95A4 2FE8 3535 25F9) and used with # signed-by, never fetched at build time. The fingerprint is asserted below. ARG HAPROXY_UPSTREAM=3.2 ARG HAPROXY_EXACT=3.2.26-1~bpo13+1 # OPTIONAL internal package cache, e.g. --build-arg PKG_CACHE=https://192.168.1.40 # (CT130 pkg-cache, https only; CI sets it only after probing the cache with the # pinned CA). Unset = the upstream Debian repositories, exactly as before. The # apt sources are restored before this RUN ends (restore FAILS the build if any # reference to the cache is left), so no shipped layer carries the cache address. # NOTE: CT130 does not proxy haproxy.debian.net (see the design doc); that one # repo is always fetched directly. # Canonical script + docs: cloud-apache-container (scripts/pkg-cache-repos.sh, # docs/pkg-cache.md there); this repo carries byte-identical copies. ARG PKG_CACHE= COPY ./scripts/pkg-cache-repos.sh /usr/local/sbin/pkg-cache-repos.sh COPY ./keys/pkg-cache/ /usr/local/share/pkg-cache/ COPY ./keys/haproxy-debian-net/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg /etc/apt/keyrings/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg RUN /usr/local/sbin/pkg-cache-repos.sh apt && \ apt update -y && apt dist-upgrade -y && \ apt install -y --no-install-recommends gnupg ca-certificates && \ keys="$(gpg --show-keys --with-colons /etc/apt/keyrings/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg)" && \ [ "$(printf '%s\n' "${keys}" | grep -c '^pub:')" = 1 ] && \ [ "$(printf '%s\n' "${keys}" | awk -F: '/^fpr:/{print $10; exit}')" = 'AEF2348766F371C689A7360095A42FE8353525F9' ] && \ apt purge -y gnupg && \ echo "deb [signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/haproxy-archive-keyring.gpg] https://haproxy.debian.net trixie-backports-${HAPROXY_UPSTREAM} main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/haproxy-debian-net.list && \ apt update -y && \ pin="${HAPROXY_EXACT}" && \ printf 'Package: haproxy\nPin: version %s\nPin-Priority: 1001\n' "${pin}" > /etc/apt/preferences.d/haproxy-upstream-pin && \ apt install socat haproxy cron certbot curl jq net-tools -y && apt-mark hold haproxy && \ rm -f /etc/apt/preferences.d/haproxy-upstream-pin && \ deb_ver="$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' haproxy)" && \ [ "${deb_ver}" = "${HAPROXY_EXACT}" ] || { echo "FATAL: installed haproxy '${deb_ver}' is not the pinned '${HAPROXY_EXACT}' (repo unreachable, or the pin did not match)" >&2; exit 1; } && \ case "${deb_ver}" in "${HAPROXY_UPSTREAM}".*) ;; *) echo "FATAL: installed haproxy ${deb_ver} is not series ${HAPROXY_UPSTREAM}" >&2; exit 1;; esac && \ haproxy -v | head -n1 | grep -F "version ${HAPROXY_UPSTREAM}." && \ haproxy -vv | grep -E 'USE_QUIC=1|\+QUIC ' >/dev/null && \ if haproxy -vv | grep -q 'USE_QUIC_OPENSSL_COMPAT=1'; then echo "FATAL: QUIC compat layer build, expected native OpenSSL QUIC" >&2; exit 1; fi && \ mkdir -p /haproxy && { haproxy -v | head -n1; echo "package ${deb_ver}"; } > /haproxy/HAPROXY_VERSION && \ echo "haproxy OK: series ${HAPROXY_UPSTREAM}, Debian package ${deb_ver} (exact pin)" && \ /usr/local/sbin/pkg-cache-repos.sh restore && \ apt clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* WORKDIR /haproxy COPY ./templates /haproxy/templates COPY requirements.txt /haproxy/ COPY haproxy_manager.py /haproxy/ COPY haproxy_gunicorn_worker.py /haproxy/ # Read by GET /api/capabilities (WHP gates whole-site re-bundling on it). COPY VERSION /haproxy/VERSION COPY scripts /haproxy/scripts COPY trusted_ips.list /etc/haproxy/trusted_ips.list COPY trusted_ips.map /etc/haproxy/trusted_ips.map # /etc/haproxy is a named volume in deployed containers, so baked-in files # under that path get shadowed by the volume on existing deployments. The # trusted_ips.* pair above predates that discovery and is handled by the # older start-up.sh guard (out of scope here). cloudflare_ips.list and # trusted_proxies.list are staged under /haproxy/defaults instead, so # start-up.sh can always read the image's baked copy regardless of what the # volume shadows /etc/haproxy with. COPY cloudflare_ips.list /haproxy/defaults/cloudflare_ips.list COPY trusted_proxies.list /haproxy/defaults/trusted_proxies.list COPY wpadmin_gate_exempt.list /haproxy/defaults/wpadmin_gate_exempt.list # Place errorfiles outside the volumed path; the HAProxy config references # them by absolute path. COPY errors /haproxy/errors RUN chmod +x /haproxy/scripts/* RUN pip install -r requirements.txt # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Build gate: no image ships unless the real haproxy binary accepts the config # this image's templates actually produce. # # On 2026-08-14 a template change rendered fine, passed all 13 unit tests, and # was rejected by HAProxy ("invalid arg 2 in converter 'regsub'"). It was only # caught because someone built an image by hand and ran `haproxy -c`. Nothing # in the build or in CI would have stopped it: .gitea/workflows/build-push.yaml # is checkout -> build -> push, and test-config-rollback.py's "haproxy" is a # shell stub that only rejects a sentinel token. In production an invalid # haproxy.cfg means init.py refuses to start HAProxy while the container stays # Up - ports 80/443 unbound, every site on the host down, /health still 200. # # This lives in the Dockerfile rather than in the workflow deliberately: # * it cannot be skipped, and it protects local `docker build` too; # * no workflow restructuring (build-push-action builds and pushes in one # step, so gating in CI would mean splitting build from push); # * it validates against the EXACT haproxy binary in this image. The # installed haproxy can move between builds (Debian revisions) - this # turns "the new haproxy rejects our config" from a silent production # risk into a build failure. # # The unit suites run here too. They had never run anywhere automated either, # and they cost a few seconds. RUN python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-wpadmin-gate.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-trusted-proxy-gate.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-xmlrpc-rate-limit.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-default-splash.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-access-log-receiver.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-haproxy-stderr-relay.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-haproxy-supervisor.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-config-rollback.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-cert-write-safety.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-cert-scripts.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-waf-body-inspection.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-gunicorn-socket-timeouts.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/test-gunicorn-access-logging.py \ && python3 /haproxy/scripts/validate-rendered-config.py # Create log directories RUN mkdir -p /var/log/haproxy && touch /var/log/haproxy-manager.log /var/log/haproxy-manager-errors.log RUN chmod 755 /var/log/haproxy-manager.log /var/log/haproxy-manager-errors.log # Set up cron for certificate renewal with proper permissions and environment RUN mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs && \ echo 'PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin' > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root && \ echo '0 */12 * * * /haproxy/scripts/renew-certificates.sh >> /var/log/haproxy-manager.log 2>&1' >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root && \ chmod 600 /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root && \ chown root:crontab /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root # 443/udp carries HTTP/3 (QUIC). EXPOSE is documentation only — the container # must still be run with `-p 443:443/udp` for the UDP listener to be reachable. EXPOSE 80 443 443/udp 8000 # Health check: management API (:8000, short timeout) AND HAProxy (:80). # See scripts/healthcheck.sh. NOTE: WHP's lib-edge-container.sh passes its own # --health-cmd, which REPLACES this one on deployed hosts; it must be pointed # at /haproxy/scripts/healthcheck.sh for the fleet to get the :8000 probe. HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=60s --retries=3 \ CMD /haproxy/scripts/healthcheck.sh CMD ["/haproxy/scripts/start-up.sh"]