# WHP day-one enforce overrides for coraza-spoa.
#
# Global mode in config.yaml is SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly. The rule ID
# ranges below are promoted to enforcement individually, chosen for very
# low false-positive rate on the kinds of customer traffic seen on WHP
# (WordPress, WooCommerce, Divi page builders).
#
# When bumping the upstream coraza-spoa pin (and thus the bundled CRS):
#  1. Skim the CRS CHANGELOG for new/changed rules in these ID ranges.
#  2. Verify they're still high-confidence before promoting the new image.
#  3. Smoke-test in staging detect-only mode for 24h before flipping enforce.
#
# Per-customer false-positive tuning lives in a future per-customer
# override mechanism; v1 is server-wide.

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 913xxx — Scanner User-Agents
# (sqlmap, nikto, nmap-scripts, dirbuster, masscan, gobuster, ZAP, w3af, etc.)
# Legitimate browsers and apps never send these UAs. Pure recon/exploit
# tooling. Highest signal-to-noise rule family in CRS.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SecRuleUpdateActionById 913100-913199 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 930120 — LFI: explicit traversal to sensitive system files
# (/etc/passwd, /proc/self/, /.ssh/, /etc/shadow, /etc/group, etc.)
# Unambiguous probe pattern; no legitimate site path leads here.
# Note: 930xxx as a whole includes broader traversal patterns that can FP
# on legitimate relative-path file browsers — keep those detect-only.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SecRuleUpdateActionById 930120 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 932100-932160 — RCE: Unix shell command injection
# Patterns like `; cat /etc/passwd`, `|whoami`, backtick `\`uname\``,
# $(...) substitution, &&/|| chaining with shell builtins.
# Don't appear in normal POST bodies, URL params, or headers. Targeting
# these is unambiguous attempted command execution.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SecRuleUpdateActionById 932100-932160 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 933170-933200 — PHP Webshell access patterns
# Direct requests to known webshell paths: c99.php, r57.php, b374k.php,
# wso.php, alfa.php, mini.php, etc. Almost universally reconnaissance
# scanning for post-exploitation. Even legitimate WordPress installs
# never serve these paths.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SecRuleUpdateActionById 933170-933200 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 944100-944300 — Log4Shell / JNDI injection
# `${jndi:ldap://}`, `${jndi:rmi://}`, and obfuscated variants thereof
# in headers, query strings, or bodies. Even our PHP/Node stack isn't
# vulnerable, but blocking at the edge keeps logs clean and protects
# any future Java workloads.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SecRuleUpdateActionById 944100-944300 "ctl:ruleEngine=On"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Rule families intentionally kept at DETECT-ONLY for v1 — high FP rate
# on customer mix. Promote individually after observation:
#
#   941xxx (XSS)        — Divi rich-text editor saves, TinyMCE submissions
#   942xxx (SQLi)       — WP admin queries reflected in params
#   920xxx (Protocol)   — Cloudflare-in-front sometimes injects odd headers
#   950xxx-953xxx       — Data leakage / backup-file disclosure (mixed FP)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------