feat(auth): CLI tokens minted at /connect for containerized MCP clients
Adds a second token kind alongside Authentik OIDC access tokens for MCP authentication. When the user visits /connect after signing into the Web UI, the server mints an HMAC-signed JWT (kid="cli-v1") carrying their Authentik identity in oidc_iss / oidc_sub claims. The token is shown once in React state — never put in the URL or persisted on the client. The MCP endpoint's bearer-token verifier dispatches by JWT `kid` header: CLI tokens are verified locally via HS256(CLI_TOKEN_SECRET); everything else goes through Authentik JWKS. Both paths resolve to the same AuthenticatedClaims shape so userContextFromClaims handles them identically. This unblocks MCP clients running in containers where the OAuth loopback callback isn't reachable — paste the token into Claude Code as a static Authorization header and skip the OAuth flow entirely. Revocation in v1 is "rotate CLI_TOKEN_SECRET to invalidate every issued CLI token at once." Per-token revocation can come later if needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ const envSchema = z.object({
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// NextAuth
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: z.string().min(32, "NEXTAUTH_SECRET must be at least 32 chars"),
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// Signing key for CLI tokens minted at /connect. Rotate this to invalidate
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// every issued CLI token at once.
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CLI_TOKEN_SECRET: z.string().min(32, "CLI_TOKEN_SECRET must be at least 32 chars"),
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// Behavior flags
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ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP: Bool.optional().default(false),
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});
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@@ -72,6 +76,7 @@ function buildPhaseStub(): Env {
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EMBEDDING_MODEL: "Xenova/bge-small-en-v1.5",
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EMBEDDING_DIM: 384,
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NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "build-phase-secret-not-used-at-runtime-xxxxxxxx",
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CLI_TOKEN_SECRET: "build-phase-secret-not-used-at-runtime-xxxxxxxx",
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ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP: false,
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};
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}
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