fix: key MCP identity on the canonical issuer, not the token issuer
Verifying against OIDC_ISSUER_MCP fixed the 401, but would have introduced a quieter bug. Identity is keyed on (oidc_iss, oidc_sub) and userContextFromClaims UPSERTS rather than failing, so a token carrying the MCP application's issuer would have created a SECOND user row for the same person: MCP calls would succeed against an account holding none of their memories, and nothing would appear broken. Authentik's `sub` is `user.uid`, a user-level value that is identical across providers (verified against the live instance), so the issuer is the only differing component. Pin it to OIDC_ISSUER after verification. No stray rows exist to clean up — verification failed before this path could ever create one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -335,6 +335,13 @@ reliable pattern:
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> curl -s https://auth.example.com/application/o/shared-memory-mcp/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .issuer
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> curl -s https://auth.example.com/application/o/shared-memory-mcp/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .issuer
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> ```
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> ```
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>
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>
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> **Identity note:** the app verifies MCP tokens against `OIDC_ISSUER_MCP` but
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> keys the user record on `OIDC_ISSUER`. Authentik's `sub` is `user.uid`, which
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> is stable across providers, so the same person resolves to the same row
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> whether they arrive via the Web UI or the MCP endpoint. Without that
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> normalization the MCP path silently creates a second, empty account instead
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> of failing visibly.
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>
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> Note also that Claude Code sends an RFC 8707 `resource` parameter on the
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> Note also that Claude Code sends an RFC 8707 `resource` parameter on the
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> authorize request; Authentik 2026.5 ignores it, so it cannot be relied on
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> authorize request; Authentik 2026.5 ignores it, so it cannot be relied on
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> for audience binding. The scope mapping is what sets `aud`.
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> for audience binding. The scope mapping is what sets `aud`.
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@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@ export async function authenticateBearer(authHeader: string | null): Promise<Aut
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buildWwwAuthenticate("invalid_token", "missing sub"),
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buildWwwAuthenticate("invalid_token", "missing sub"),
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);
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);
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}
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}
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return { ...payload, groups: extractGroupsClaim(payload) } as AuthenticatedClaims;
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// Normalize the issuer for identity purposes.
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//
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// The token was just verified against mcpIssuer() — that check is done.
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// But identity is keyed on (oidc_iss, oidc_sub), and the Web UI signs
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// people in through a DIFFERENT application whose tokens carry
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// OIDC_ISSUER. Authentik's `sub` is stable across providers (it is
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// `user.uid`, a user-level value), so the only thing that differs is the
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// issuer.
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//
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// Leave it un-normalized and userContextFromClaims — which UPSERTS rather
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// than failing — quietly creates a SECOND user row for the same human:
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// MCP writes would land in an account with none of their memories, and
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// nothing would look broken. Pin identity to the canonical issuer.
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return {
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...payload,
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iss: env().OIDC_ISSUER,
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groups: extractGroupsClaim(payload),
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} as AuthenticatedClaims;
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} catch (err) {
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof UnauthorizedError) throw err;
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if (err instanceof UnauthorizedError) throw err;
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const desc =
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const desc =
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