Commit Graph
8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 6b28e1d6c8 feat: add the logo, and point people at the plugin before they mint a token
Logo: the app had no icon at all — public/ held only .gitkeep and the page
emitted no <link rel="icon">, so browsers requested /favicon.ico, got a 404
and showed a blank tab. app/icon.svg is picked up automatically by the App
Router; public/logo.svg is a currentColor variant for in-app use.

The mark is three retrieval signals converging on a single memory, which is
what the search actually does (vector + full-text + tags fused by RRF) and
what the product does (many sessions, one store). Checked at 16px: the outer
strokes are held at equal opacity because asymmetry read as a rendering
artifact rather than as ranking.

Tokens page: reframed so a bearer token is the exception rather than the
default. A token is a credential to store and rotate; the plugin just signs
you in. The install hint renders only when PLUGIN_MARKETPLACE_URL is set —
a copyable command pointing nowhere is worse than no command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 06:22:51 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 54c29d182d fix: actually pass the new optional env vars into the container
OIDC_ISSUER_MCP and OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE were added to .env and read by the
app, but never reached it: the compose `environment:` block is an explicit
allow-list, not env_file, so anything not named there is silently dropped.
The aud scope only worked because its computed default happened to be right.

Also make optional vars tolerate the empty string. compose renders `${VAR:-}`
as "" rather than omitting the key, so an unset optional var would arrive as
"" and fail .url()/.min(1) validation — taking the app down at boot rather
than falling back to its default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 06:14:16 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 1fed65a187 fix: verify MCP tokens against the MCP application's issuer
Second failure on the same path. With the aud fix in place, tokens now carry
`aud: shared-memory` correctly but are still rejected — this time on `iss`.

The MCP endpoint is a separate application in the IdP from the Web UI, and
Authentik's default per_provider issuer mode stamps each token with its own
application slug. MCP tokens therefore carry
`.../application/o/shared-memory-mcp/` while OIDC_ISSUER points at
`.../application/o/shared-memory/`, so jwtVerify throws "claim invalid: iss".

Introduce OIDC_ISSUER_MCP (defaults to OIDC_ISSUER) and use it for both the
issuer check and the JWKS URL. The protected-resource metadata now advertises
that same issuer — previously it pointed clients at the Web UI's discovery
document while the tokens came from the MCP provider.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 06:10:35 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 60cfb19772 fix: advertise the audience scope so tokens actually carry aud
The OAuth path to /api/mcp has never worked end to end. Every access token
arrived without an `aud` claim and jwt.ts rejected it with
"claim invalid: aud" (401), even though the handshake, consent and PKCE all
succeeded. Only the CLI HMAC path worked, because cli-token.ts sets the
audience itself — which is why this went unnoticed.

Cause: Authentik evaluates a scope mapping only when the client REQUESTS
that scope by name. An MCP client learns which scopes to request from
`scopes_supported` in our RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata, and we only
advertised openid/profile/email. So the `aud-shared-memory` mapping was
attached to the provider but never evaluated.

Advertise the audience scope in that metadata. Name is derived as
`aud-<OIDC_AUDIENCE>` to match the README convention, overridable with the
new optional OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE for deployments that named it differently.

Also documents that Claude Code's RFC 8707 `resource` parameter is ignored
by Authentik 2026.5, so it cannot be relied on for audience binding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 05:58:56 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 9a8b504f51 feat: Phase 2 — embeddings + hybrid memory.search
Adds a small embedder sidecar (Xenova/bge-small-en-v1.5, ONNX, CPU-only)
that the web app calls inline on memory.write and memory.update, and on
demand from the new memory.search tool.

memory.search performs three candidate fetches in parallel — pgvector
cosine similarity, Postgres full-text via plainto_tsquery + ts_rank_cd,
and tag-set overlap — then fuses them with Reciprocal Rank Fusion
(k=60). Each result carries its per-source rank so the model can see
*why* a memory surfaced.

The migrator boot step gained an idempotent embedding backfill: any row
with embedding IS NULL is batched (32 at a time) through the embedder
after SQL migrations apply. Safe to run on every boot.

New tool memory.update fixes the missing edit path; centralises the
re-embed-on-content-change rule alongside write.

Stack additions:
- apps/embedder/ — Fastify server, persistent /data/models volume so the
  ~30 MB model only downloads once
- apps/web/lib/embedder.ts — typed HTTP client with batched embed +
  health probe
- packages/schemas — MemoryUpdateInput, MemorySearchInput
- docker-compose — embedder service, healthcheck, app + migrator both
  depend_on it healthy; EMBEDDER_URL promoted to a required env var

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 09:04:44 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 2bd8ea705d feat(auth): CLI tokens minted at /connect for containerized MCP clients
Adds a second token kind alongside Authentik OIDC access tokens for MCP
authentication. When the user visits /connect after signing into the Web
UI, the server mints an HMAC-signed JWT (kid="cli-v1") carrying their
Authentik identity in oidc_iss / oidc_sub claims. The token is shown
once in React state — never put in the URL or persisted on the client.

The MCP endpoint's bearer-token verifier dispatches by JWT `kid` header:
CLI tokens are verified locally via HS256(CLI_TOKEN_SECRET); everything
else goes through Authentik JWKS. Both paths resolve to the same
AuthenticatedClaims shape so userContextFromClaims handles them
identically.

This unblocks MCP clients running in containers where the OAuth loopback
callback isn't reachable — paste the token into Claude Code as a static
Authorization header and skip the OAuth flow entirely.

Revocation in v1 is "rotate CLI_TOKEN_SECRET to invalidate every issued
CLI token at once." Per-token revocation can come later if needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 08:36:11 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 3de1701175 fix(env): coerce empty EMBEDDER_URL to undefined
Zod's .url().optional() still rejects "" because the empty string is a
present value. EMBEDDER_URL is unused in Phase 1 and intentionally left
blank in .env, so preprocess "" to undefined before validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 08:10:47 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 077d0a0825 feat: Phase 1 — Authentik auth, MCP endpoint, persistent memory
End-to-end Phase 1 of shared-memory: a logged-in Authentik user can sign
into the Web UI (/me debug page), and an MCP client with an Authentik-
issued bearer token can call memory.write / memory.list / memory.get /
memory.delete plus project.identify against /api/mcp.

Stack:
- Next.js 15 (App Router) + React 19 + TypeScript, pnpm workspaces
- Drizzle ORM + Postgres 16 + pgvector + pg_trgm
- Auth.js v5 with Authentik provider (Web UI)
- jose + Authentik JWKS for MCP bearer-token validation
- JSON-RPC 2.0 dispatcher implementing the MCP wire protocol over plain
  HTTP POST (hand-rolled to fit Next.js App Router; switches to SSE in a
  later phase if server-initiated events are needed)
- bge-small embeddings sidecar deferred to Phase 2; the schema already
  reserves the vector(384) column + IVFFlat index, FTS via a STORED
  tsvector column, and the visibility enum (private/shared/team) so
  cross-user memory sharing can be added without a future migration

Deployment supports two modes (set in .env, never committed):
- Behind an external reverse proxy (HAProxy / nginx / Cloudflare Tunnel /
  Traefik) — DEFAULT; the app exposes APP_PORT on the host with
  X-Forwarded-* trusted, no in-container TLS
- Built-in TLS via Caddy — opt-in with `docker compose --profile tls up`

Discovery endpoint at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728)
points MCP clients at the Authentik authorization server after a 401.

README walks through both Authentik providers (Web UI + MCP resource
server), the audience scope mapping, redirect URIs, and includes a worked
HAProxy config snippet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 07:04:11 -07:00