Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
shadowdao 3f17a5b2d6 Merge: Phase 4c+d+e project sharing + co-edit + awareness (Agent B)
# Conflicts:
#	apps/web/lib/db/schema.ts
#	apps/web/lib/mcp/context.ts
2026-05-17 09:54:48 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 d5823ca78c feat(sharing): project shares, co-edit safety, awareness UI (Phase 4c+d+e)
Adds project-level sharing via the new project_shares table plus the
infrastructure that makes multi-user editing safe and visible.

Authorization (lib/access.ts):
  - getAccessibleProjects / getProjectAccess centralise the predicate
    used by every read and write path.
  - readableProjectIds / writableProjectIds drive listing-style queries.
  - Web UI Server Actions and pages source group memberships from the
    user_groups table so authorization works without depending on
    Agent A's session callback shape.

Optimistic locking:
  - memories + snippets gain version + last_edited_by columns. Every
    UPDATE bumps version and stamps the editor; UPDATE WHERE clauses
    require the caller's pre-fetched version, surfacing a clear
    "refresh and try again" error on lost-write races rather than
    silently clobbering.
  - MemoryUpdateInput / SnippetPutInput accept an optional version
    token.

MCP tools:
  - memory.write / .update / .delete / .get / .list / .search,
    snippet.put / .get / .list / .delete now respect shared-project
    access (read = owner | any share, write = owner | rw share).
  - project, defaults to ctx.defaultProjectKey from the X-Project-Key
    header (populated by the MCP route — Agent A's wiring).
  - project.identify returns shared projects you have access to and
    prefers an owned project on key collision, audit-logging the
    collision so an operator can debug it.
  - Tool descriptions for memory.update, memory.write, snippet.put,
    and project.identify updated with the co-edit / shared-project
    notes.

Web UI:
  - Project detail page: ownership badge, shared-with-N-groups badge,
    owner-only "Manage sharing" section (add/flip/remove shares via
    lib/share-actions.ts). Add-share is constrained to groups the
    granter is already in.
  - "Shared" chips on memory cards in /memories and /dashboard.
  - "Last edited by ..." on memory + snippet detail pages, shown only
    when the last editor isn't the row's original author so the chip
    stays informative.
  - Read-only viewers (ro shares) lose Edit/Delete affordances on
    memories and snippets.

Migration 0004_project_shares.sql adds project_shares + the two new
columns on memories and snippets; it depends on Agent A's
0003_groups.sql for the groups, user_groups, and memory_access enum.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 09:50:59 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 7712023c32 feat(phase-4a): groups sync + X-Project-Key header substrate
Foundational work for the upcoming group-scoped sharing feature.

Schema (migration 0003_groups.sql + drizzle schema):
  - memory_access enum ('ro' | 'rw') reserved for Agent B's project_shares
  - groups (id, oidc_iss, name, display_name, …) keyed by (oidc_iss, name)
    so different IdPs can both have e.g. "platform" without colliding
  - user_groups (user_id, group_id, synced_at) PK (user_id, group_id)

Auth (auth.ts + lib/auth/sync-groups.ts):
  - jwt callback now syncs `profile.groups` after upserting the user
  - syncUserGroupsFromClaim runs in a single tx: upserts each group,
    inserts new memberships, deletes ones no longer in the claim
  - missing/empty claim → user has zero groups (wipe memberships)
  - EntraID GUID-vs-name edge case: we treat whatever strings the claim
    emits as names verbatim; groups overage (>200 groups → no claim)
    is documented as unsupported in v1

UserContext + JWT (lib/mcp/context.ts, lib/auth/jwt.ts):
  - AuthenticatedClaims.groups surfaced from verified JWT payload
  - UserContext.groups: string[] — live from OIDC token claim, falls
    back to DB snapshot for CLI (HMAC) tokens which carry no claim
  - UserContext.defaultProjectKey: optional, set from header

MCP route (app/api/mcp/route.ts):
  - reads X-Project-Key header, validates against ProjectKey Zod schema,
    400 on invalid; empty/missing leaves defaultProjectKey undefined
  - auto-upserts the header-supplied project so first-use works without
    a separate project.identify call

Tools (lib/mcp/tools.ts):
  - withDefaultProject helper injects ctx.defaultProjectKey when the
    caller omits `project`. Per-tool defaultScope hint avoids breaking
    snippet.put (user-scope default) while making memory.write
    (project-scope default) honor the header
  - applied to memory.write/list/search/update and all snippet.* tools

Web UI:
  - /settings/groups debug page lists current memberships with synced_at
    and a clear empty state pointing at README troubleshooting
  - /settings/tokens grows a "Pin to project" dropdown; selected key is
    baked into the generated `claude mcp add` snippet as
    `--header "X-Project-Key: <key>"`. The JWT itself stays
    identity-only — pinning is purely a UX shortcut
  - settings landing page links to /settings/groups
  - README troubleshooting bullet covers the empty-groups path for
    Authentik / EntraID / Keycloak

Refactor:
  - extracted resolveProjectId + upsertProject from memory-actions.ts
    into lib/projects.ts so the MCP route can reuse upsertProject

Verification:
  - pnpm typecheck clean
  - SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true pnpm build clean; /settings/groups in route table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 09:39:47 -07:00
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 077d0a0825 feat: Phase 1 — Authentik auth, MCP endpoint, persistent memory
End-to-end Phase 1 of shared-memory: a logged-in Authentik user can sign
into the Web UI (/me debug page), and an MCP client with an Authentik-
issued bearer token can call memory.write / memory.list / memory.get /
memory.delete plus project.identify against /api/mcp.

Stack:
- Next.js 15 (App Router) + React 19 + TypeScript, pnpm workspaces
- Drizzle ORM + Postgres 16 + pgvector + pg_trgm
- Auth.js v5 with Authentik provider (Web UI)
- jose + Authentik JWKS for MCP bearer-token validation
- JSON-RPC 2.0 dispatcher implementing the MCP wire protocol over plain
  HTTP POST (hand-rolled to fit Next.js App Router; switches to SSE in a
  later phase if server-initiated events are needed)
- bge-small embeddings sidecar deferred to Phase 2; the schema already
  reserves the vector(384) column + IVFFlat index, FTS via a STORED
  tsvector column, and the visibility enum (private/shared/team) so
  cross-user memory sharing can be added without a future migration

Deployment supports two modes (set in .env, never committed):
- Behind an external reverse proxy (HAProxy / nginx / Cloudflare Tunnel /
  Traefik) — DEFAULT; the app exposes APP_PORT on the host with
  X-Forwarded-* trusted, no in-container TLS
- Built-in TLS via Caddy — opt-in with `docker compose --profile tls up`

Discovery endpoint at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728)
points MCP clients at the Authentik authorization server after a 401.

README walks through both Authentik providers (Web UI + MCP resource
server), the audience scope mapping, redirect URIs, and includes a worked
HAProxy config snippet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 07:04:11 -07:00