Three defects stood between this codebase and a working Entra deployment.
All three fail silently, which is why they are grouped: each one masks the
next, and fixing any two still leaves a broken or dangerous install.
1. JWKS discovery. The key set URL was hardcoded to `${issuer}/jwks/`,
which is Authentik's convention, not a standard. Entra serves keys at
`/{tenant}/discovery/v2.0/keys`, so every Entra-issued MCP token failed
verification on a 404 — authentication was impossible, not merely
misconfigured. We now read `jwks_uri` from the issuer's discovery
document and fall back to the old path, so Authentik is untouched.
Discovery failure arms a 60s retry rather than pinning the wrong URL
for the life of the container.
2. Identity. Entra's `sub` is pairwise — derived from the token
recipient — so the Web UI and MCP app registrations emit different
`sub` values for the same human. Keyed on (iss, sub), that person got
two rows: sign into the Web UI, connect Claude Code, land in an empty
account. Both paths upsert, so nothing errored. Identity now keys on
`oid`, which Microsoft documents as constant across applications in a
tenant, via one resolver both surfaces share. Rows created before the
0005 migration adopt their `oid` on next sign-in.
3. Groups overage. Past 200 groups Entra omits `groups` entirely and
substitutes a `_claim_names` pointer. `normalizeGroupsClaim` read that
as "zero groups" and the sync deleted every membership the user had,
revoking access to every shared project on both surfaces with no error
raised. Both surfaces now refuse such a token instead — the Web UI
fails the sign-in, MCP returns 401 — leaving memberships intact and
naming the operator fix. An absent claim with no overage marker still
clears memberships, which is unchanged and deliberate.
Verified against a real pgvector instance: 66 tests pass, and reverting
either new behaviour fails exactly the tests that cover it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds project-level sharing via the new project_shares table plus the
infrastructure that makes multi-user editing safe and visible.
Authorization (lib/access.ts):
- getAccessibleProjects / getProjectAccess centralise the predicate
used by every read and write path.
- readableProjectIds / writableProjectIds drive listing-style queries.
- Web UI Server Actions and pages source group memberships from the
user_groups table so authorization works without depending on
Agent A's session callback shape.
Optimistic locking:
- memories + snippets gain version + last_edited_by columns. Every
UPDATE bumps version and stamps the editor; UPDATE WHERE clauses
require the caller's pre-fetched version, surfacing a clear
"refresh and try again" error on lost-write races rather than
silently clobbering.
- MemoryUpdateInput / SnippetPutInput accept an optional version
token.
MCP tools:
- memory.write / .update / .delete / .get / .list / .search,
snippet.put / .get / .list / .delete now respect shared-project
access (read = owner | any share, write = owner | rw share).
- project, defaults to ctx.defaultProjectKey from the X-Project-Key
header (populated by the MCP route — Agent A's wiring).
- project.identify returns shared projects you have access to and
prefers an owned project on key collision, audit-logging the
collision so an operator can debug it.
- Tool descriptions for memory.update, memory.write, snippet.put,
and project.identify updated with the co-edit / shared-project
notes.
Web UI:
- Project detail page: ownership badge, shared-with-N-groups badge,
owner-only "Manage sharing" section (add/flip/remove shares via
lib/share-actions.ts). Add-share is constrained to groups the
granter is already in.
- "Shared" chips on memory cards in /memories and /dashboard.
- "Last edited by ..." on memory + snippet detail pages, shown only
when the last editor isn't the row's original author so the chip
stays informative.
- Read-only viewers (ro shares) lose Edit/Delete affordances on
memories and snippets.
Migration 0004_project_shares.sql adds project_shares + the two new
columns on memories and snippets; it depends on Agent A's
0003_groups.sql for the groups, user_groups, and memory_access enum.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundational work for the upcoming group-scoped sharing feature.
Schema (migration 0003_groups.sql + drizzle schema):
- memory_access enum ('ro' | 'rw') reserved for Agent B's project_shares
- groups (id, oidc_iss, name, display_name, …) keyed by (oidc_iss, name)
so different IdPs can both have e.g. "platform" without colliding
- user_groups (user_id, group_id, synced_at) PK (user_id, group_id)
Auth (auth.ts + lib/auth/sync-groups.ts):
- jwt callback now syncs `profile.groups` after upserting the user
- syncUserGroupsFromClaim runs in a single tx: upserts each group,
inserts new memberships, deletes ones no longer in the claim
- missing/empty claim → user has zero groups (wipe memberships)
- EntraID GUID-vs-name edge case: we treat whatever strings the claim
emits as names verbatim; groups overage (>200 groups → no claim)
is documented as unsupported in v1
UserContext + JWT (lib/mcp/context.ts, lib/auth/jwt.ts):
- AuthenticatedClaims.groups surfaced from verified JWT payload
- UserContext.groups: string[] — live from OIDC token claim, falls
back to DB snapshot for CLI (HMAC) tokens which carry no claim
- UserContext.defaultProjectKey: optional, set from header
MCP route (app/api/mcp/route.ts):
- reads X-Project-Key header, validates against ProjectKey Zod schema,
400 on invalid; empty/missing leaves defaultProjectKey undefined
- auto-upserts the header-supplied project so first-use works without
a separate project.identify call
Tools (lib/mcp/tools.ts):
- withDefaultProject helper injects ctx.defaultProjectKey when the
caller omits `project`. Per-tool defaultScope hint avoids breaking
snippet.put (user-scope default) while making memory.write
(project-scope default) honor the header
- applied to memory.write/list/search/update and all snippet.* tools
Web UI:
- /settings/groups debug page lists current memberships with synced_at
and a clear empty state pointing at README troubleshooting
- /settings/tokens grows a "Pin to project" dropdown; selected key is
baked into the generated `claude mcp add` snippet as
`--header "X-Project-Key: <key>"`. The JWT itself stays
identity-only — pinning is purely a UX shortcut
- settings landing page links to /settings/groups
- README troubleshooting bullet covers the empty-groups path for
Authentik / EntraID / Keycloak
Refactor:
- extracted resolveProjectId + upsertProject from memory-actions.ts
into lib/projects.ts so the MCP route can reuse upsertProject
Verification:
- pnpm typecheck clean
- SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true pnpm build clean; /settings/groups in route table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
End-to-end Phase 1 of shared-memory: a logged-in Authentik user can sign
into the Web UI (/me debug page), and an MCP client with an Authentik-
issued bearer token can call memory.write / memory.list / memory.get /
memory.delete plus project.identify against /api/mcp.
Stack:
- Next.js 15 (App Router) + React 19 + TypeScript, pnpm workspaces
- Drizzle ORM + Postgres 16 + pgvector + pg_trgm
- Auth.js v5 with Authentik provider (Web UI)
- jose + Authentik JWKS for MCP bearer-token validation
- JSON-RPC 2.0 dispatcher implementing the MCP wire protocol over plain
HTTP POST (hand-rolled to fit Next.js App Router; switches to SSE in a
later phase if server-initiated events are needed)
- bge-small embeddings sidecar deferred to Phase 2; the schema already
reserves the vector(384) column + IVFFlat index, FTS via a STORED
tsvector column, and the visibility enum (private/shared/team) so
cross-user memory sharing can be added without a future migration
Deployment supports two modes (set in .env, never committed):
- Behind an external reverse proxy (HAProxy / nginx / Cloudflare Tunnel /
Traefik) — DEFAULT; the app exposes APP_PORT on the host with
X-Forwarded-* trusted, no in-container TLS
- Built-in TLS via Caddy — opt-in with `docker compose --profile tls up`
Discovery endpoint at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728)
points MCP clients at the Authentik authorization server after a 401.
README walks through both Authentik providers (Web UI + MCP resource
server), the audience scope mapping, redirect URIs, and includes a worked
HAProxy config snippet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5