Merge pull request 'fix: let deployments advertise offline_access so MCP sessions can refresh' (#20) from fix/oauth-offline-access into main

MCP clients were being kicked back to an interactive login on a short
cycle, reporting "requires re-authorization (token expired)".

Cause: /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource advertised only
openid/profile/email plus the audience scope. A client requests exactly
the scopes it finds there, and Authentik issues a refresh token only when
offline_access is among them — so the client received an access token
with nothing to renew it with. Once that token aged out, re-authenticating
by hand was the only path forward.

This is the same trap the audience scope already documents one comment
further up: a scope missing from this document is a scope the client will
never ask for, however the IdP is configured.

Adds OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS (default false). Enabling it appends
offline_access to the advertised scopes.

Left opt-in rather than always-on because it is only half the fix — the
IdP also needs an offline_access scope mapping on the provider, and
advertising a scope the IdP doesn't offer risks an invalid_scope
rejection that would break authentication outright. A deployment turns
this on after configuring its IdP; README documents both halves and how
to verify each.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ OIDC_AUDIENCE=shared-memory
 # named the scope mapping something else.
 #OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE=aud-shared-memory
 
+# Advertise `offline_access` so MCP clients receive a REFRESH token and can
+# renew silently. Without it the client only gets a short-lived access token
+# and kicks the user back to an interactive login every time it expires.
+#
+# Enable this ONLY after adding an `offline_access` scope mapping to the MCP
+# provider in your IdP — advertising a scope the IdP doesn't offer can fail
+# the whole authorization request. See README -> "Keeping sessions alive".
+#OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS=true
+
 # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Database (Postgres 16 + pgvector — pgvector/pgvector:pg16 image)
 # -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

README.md

@@ -291,9 +291,49 @@ tokens carry `aud: shared-memory` (or whatever value you chose).
 - **Client ID:** auto-generated → copy to `.env` as `OIDC_CLIENT_ID_MCP`
 - **Redirect URIs:** Claude Code prints the exact value when it first
   connects to the MCP endpoint. Paste it into Authentik then.
-- **Scopes:** `openid`, `profile`, `email`
+- **Scopes:** `openid`, `profile`, `email` (plus `offline_access` — see
+  **Keeping sessions alive** below)
 - **Signing Key:** same cert as the Web provider
 
+#### Keeping sessions alive (`offline_access`)
+
+Without this, a connected MCP client gets an access token and **no refresh
+token**. It cannot renew silently, so the moment the access token expires the
+client reports `requires re-authorization (token expired)` and the user has to
+log in again — repeatedly, on a short cycle.
+
+Two changes are required, and **neither works alone**:
+
+1. **In Authentik**, edit the `shared-memory-mcp` provider and add the built-in
+   `authentik default OAuth Mapping: offline_access` to its **Scopes**. You can
+   confirm it took by checking that `offline_access` appears in:
+
+   ```bash
+   curl -s https://auth.example.com/application/o/shared-memory-mcp/.well-known/openid-configuration \
+     | jq .scopes_supported
+   ```
+
+2. **In `.env`**, set `OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS=true` and redeploy.
+
+Step 2 is needed because a client only requests the scopes advertised in our
+`/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` document — the same mechanism that
+makes the `aud` scope mapping necessary below. Step 1 is needed because
+Authentik only issues a refresh token when a configured mapping is requested.
+
+It is left opt-in rather than always-on because advertising a scope the IdP
+doesn't offer risks an `invalid_scope` rejection that breaks authentication
+outright. Configure the IdP first, then flip the flag.
+
+Verify afterwards with:
+
+```bash
+curl -s https://memory.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource | jq .scopes_supported
+```
+
+If interactive login isn't practical at all — a headless container, CI — skip
+OAuth and use a static bearer token instead (**D. Static bearer token**, below);
+those default to a 90-day lifetime.
+
 #### Setting the `aud` claim
 
 The MCP endpoint requires the access token's `aud` claim to equal
@@ -410,6 +450,25 @@ claude plugin marketplace add https://your-git-host/you/shared-memory.git#instan
 The `#ref` suffix is undocumented in `claude plugin marketplace add --help` but is
 honored and persisted in `known_marketplaces.json` (verified on Claude Code 2.1.220).
 
+**Make that an orphan branch, not a branch off `main`.** `marketplace add` reads
+only the manifests, so the branch needs nothing else:
+
+```bash
+git checkout --orphan instance/<name>
+git rm -rf --cached . && find . -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 ! -name .git -exec rm -rf {} +
+# restore just .claude-plugin/marketplace.json, plugin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json,
+# plugin/.mcp.json — fill in your URL and client ID
+claude plugin validate . && git add -A && git commit && git push
+```
+
+A branch off `main` carries a full copy of the application it has no reason to
+have, so it drifts and someone can cut a stale deploy from it. Worse, syncing it
+means `git merge origin/main`, which **silently replaces those manifests** with
+the placeholders below — no conflict is raised, because only `main` ever touches
+those paths. With no shared history there is nothing to sync and nothing to
+clobber; if the manifest format changes upstream, hand-edit the three files and
+re-run `claude plugin validate .`.
+
 ### B. OAuth flow (manual, per-machine)
 
 ```bash
@@ -576,6 +635,80 @@ The OIDC client you use locally must accept
 
 ---
 
+## Running the tests
+
+```bash
+pnpm test          # all packages
+pnpm --filter @shared-memory/web test:watch
+```
+
+Unit tests (e.g. `lib/memory-patch.test.ts`) need nothing but `pnpm install`.
+
+The integration tests in `lib/mcp/tools.integration.test.ts` exercise the
+real tool handlers against a **real Postgres with pgvector** — they assert on
+stored rows, so there is no mock DB to drift from production behaviour. Spin
+one up:
+
+```bash
+docker run -d --name sm-test-db \
+  -e POSTGRES_USER=test -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=test \
+  -e POSTGRES_DB=shared_memory_test \
+  -p 55432:5432 pgvector/pgvector:pg16
+
+for f in apps/web/drizzle/*.sql; do
+  docker exec -i sm-test-db psql -U test -d shared_memory_test -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q < "$f"
+done
+
+pnpm test
+```
+
+The default `DATABASE_URL` assumes the published port is reachable on
+localhost. If your test runner is itself inside a container, point it at the
+database container's address instead:
+
+```bash
+DATABASE_URL="postgres://test:test@$(docker inspect -f \
+  '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' sm-test-db):5432/shared_memory_test" \
+  pnpm test
+```
+
+The embedder sidecar is stubbed in tests (it's an external ML service); the
+stub is deterministic per-text, so re-embedding is verified by asserting the
+stored vector actually changed — not by asserting a mock was called.
+
+Teardown: `docker rm -f sm-test-db`.
+
+### Linting
+
+```bash
+pnpm lint
+```
+
+Runs the ESLint CLI directly against `eslint.config.mjs`. Note that `next
+lint` is deprecated (it goes away in Next 16) and had never been configured
+here, so this replaces it. `eslint-config-next` is still published in the
+legacy `.eslintrc` format, so the config bridges it through `FlatCompat`;
+that bridge can be dropped once the package ships a native flat export.
+
+The tree is currently clean at `--max-warnings=0`, so adding that flag to
+the `lint` script is a cheap way to keep it that way.
+
+---
+
+## Design notes
+
+`docs/` holds decision records for changes whose reasoning isn't recoverable
+from the diff — what was built, what was deliberately rejected, and what would
+reopen a closed question.
+
+- [`docs/memory-api-improvements.md`](docs/memory-api-improvements.md) — why
+  `memory_get` stopped returning the embedding and tsvector, why `memory_patch`
+  refuses ambiguous matches instead of guessing, why `memory_append` was
+  dropped, and why file-mirroring was left as a convention rather than
+  mechanised.
+
+---
+
 ## Troubleshooting
 
 - **`401 claim invalid: aud`** from `/api/mcp` — your MCP client isn't

apps/web/app/(authed)/dashboard/page.tsx

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { db } from "@/lib/db/client";
 import { memories, projects, projectShares } from "@/lib/db/schema";
 import { getUserGroupNames, readableProjectIds } from "@/lib/access";
 import { Container, PageHeader } from "@/app/_components/ui/container";
-import { Card, CardBody, CardHeader } from "@/app/_components/ui/card";
+import { Card, CardBody } from "@/app/_components/ui/card";
 import { Badge } from "@/app/_components/ui/badge";
 import { Button } from "@/app/_components/ui/button";
 import { EmptyState } from "@/app/_components/ui/empty-state";

apps/web/app/(authed)/projects/[key]/activity/page.tsx

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { db, pg } from "@/lib/db/client";
 import { projects, users } from "@/lib/db/schema";
 import { getProjectAccess, getUserGroupNames, readableProjectIds } from "@/lib/access";
 import { Container, PageHeader } from "@/app/_components/ui/container";
-import { Card, CardBody } from "@/app/_components/ui/card";
+import { Card } from "@/app/_components/ui/card";
 import { Badge } from "@/app/_components/ui/badge";
 import { Button } from "@/app/_components/ui/button";
 import { EmptyState } from "@/app/_components/ui/empty-state";

apps/web/app/(authed)/settings/page.tsx

@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ export default async function SettingsPage() {
           </CardHeader>
           <CardBody className="text-sm text-fg-muted">
             OIDC group memberships from your IdP, refreshed at sign-in. Used
-            by the upcoming sharing feature to scope project visibility.
+            to scope project sharing &mdash; memories and snippets in a shared
+            project are readable by member groups and editable by read-write
+            groups.
           </CardBody>
         </Card>
       </div>

apps/web/app/(authed)/settings/tokens/page.tsx

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache";
-import { and, asc, desc, eq, isNull } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { and, asc, desc, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
 import { auth } from "@/auth";
 import { env } from "@/lib/env";
 import { db } from "@/lib/db/client";

apps/web/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, test, vi } from "vitest";
+
+/**
+ * The resource metadata document is the ONLY way an MCP client learns which
+ * scopes to request. Authentik evaluates a scope mapping only when the client
+ * asks for that scope by name — so a scope missing from this document is a
+ * scope the client will never request, no matter how the IdP is configured.
+ *
+ * That is exactly how `offline_access` came to be missing: without it the IdP
+ * issues an access token and no refresh token, so the client cannot renew
+ * silently and the user is forced to re-authenticate every time the access
+ * token expires.
+ */
+
+async function fetchMetadata(): Promise<{ scopes_supported: string[] }> {
+  vi.resetModules();
+  const { GET } = await import("@/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route");
+  return (await GET().json()) as { scopes_supported: string[] };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  delete process.env.OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS;
+  delete process.env.OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE;
+});
+
+describe("oauth-protected-resource metadata", () => {
+  test("omits offline_access by default, so deployments without the IdP mapping are unaffected", async () => {
+    const body = await fetchMetadata();
+
+    expect(body.scopes_supported).not.toContain("offline_access");
+  });
+
+  test("advertises offline_access when the deployment opts in", async () => {
+    process.env.OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS = "true";
+
+    const body = await fetchMetadata();
+
+    expect(body.scopes_supported).toContain("offline_access");
+  });
+
+  test("still advertises the audience scope when offline_access is enabled", async () => {
+    // Regression guard: the audience scope is what makes `aud` appear on the
+    // token at all. Dropping it would break authentication outright.
+    process.env.OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS = "true";
+
+    const body = await fetchMetadata();
+
+    expect(body.scopes_supported).toContain("aud-test-audience");
+    expect(body.scopes_supported).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining(["openid", "profile", "email"]),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("honours an explicit audience scope name alongside offline_access", async () => {
+    process.env.OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS = "true";
+    process.env.OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE = "custom-aud-scope";
+
+    const body = await fetchMetadata();
+
+    expect(body.scopes_supported).toContain("custom-aud-scope");
+    expect(body.scopes_supported).toContain("offline_access");
+  });
+});

apps/web/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/route.ts

@@ -21,13 +21,24 @@ export function GET() {
   const audienceScope =
     env().OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE ?? `aud-${env().OIDC_AUDIENCE}`;
 
+  // Same mechanism as the audience scope, different consequence: a client
+  // only requests `offline_access` if it sees the name here, and without
+  // that request the IdP returns no refresh token — so the client cannot
+  // renew and the user gets kicked back to an interactive login whenever
+  // the access token expires.
+  //
+  // Opt-in, because the IdP needs a matching scope mapping; advertising one
+  // it doesn't offer can fail the whole authorization request.
+  const scopes = ["openid", "profile", "email", audienceScope];
+  if (env().OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS) scopes.push("offline_access");
+
   return NextResponse.json({
     resource,
     // The MCP application's issuer, which is not necessarily the Web UI's —
     // see mcpIssuer(). Advertising the wrong one sends clients to a discovery
     // document whose tokens this endpoint will then reject on `iss`.
-    authorization_servers: [mcpIssuer()],
+    authorization_servers: [mcpIssuer()],  // as configured, slash and all
-    scopes_supported: ["openid", "profile", "email", audienceScope],
+    scopes_supported: scopes,
     bearer_methods_supported: ["header"],
     resource_documentation: `${resource}/`,
   });

apps/web/eslint.config.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import { dirname } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { FlatCompat } from "@eslint/eslintrc";
+
+/**
+ * ESLint flat config.
+ *
+ * `next lint` is deprecated (removed in Next 16) and was never configured
+ * here, so `pnpm lint` used to drop into an interactive setup prompt and
+ * exit non-zero. This runs the ESLint CLI directly instead.
+ *
+ * `eslint-config-next` is still published in the legacy .eslintrc format,
+ * so FlatCompat bridges it into flat config. That bridge goes away when
+ * the config ships a native flat export.
+ */
+const compat = new FlatCompat({
+  baseDirectory: dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)),
+});
+
+const config = [
+  {
+    ignores: [
+      ".next/**",
+      "node_modules/**",
+      "next-env.d.ts",
+      // Generated SQL/journal artifacts from drizzle-kit.
+      "drizzle/**",
+    ],
+  },
+  ...compat.extends("next/core-web-vitals", "next/typescript"),
+];
+
+export default config;

apps/web/lib/auth/jwt.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,25 @@ const g = globalThis as GlobalWithJwks;
  * application slug, so this is NOT interchangeable with OIDC_ISSUER.
  */
 export function mcpIssuer(): string {
-  return (env().OIDC_ISSUER_MCP ?? env().OIDC_ISSUER).replace(/\/$/, "");
+  return env().OIDC_ISSUER_MCP ?? env().OIDC_ISSUER;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Issuer values accepted for the `iss` claim.
+ *
+ * jose compares `iss` by exact string, and IdPs are inconsistent about the
+ * trailing slash: Authentik emits `.../application/o/<slug>/` while the same
+ * value is routinely configured without it. Normalizing to one form and
+ * comparing against that fails whenever the two disagree — which is exactly
+ * how this broke: the URL-safe (stripped) form was reused for the claim check
+ * against a token whose `iss` ended in a slash.
+ *
+ * Accept both spellings rather than making correctness depend on how someone
+ * typed an env var.
+ */
+function acceptedIssuers(): [string, string] {
+  const bare = mcpIssuer().replace(/\/$/, "");
+  return [bare, `${bare}/`];
 }
 
 function jwks() {
@@ -37,7 +55,7 @@ function jwks() {
   // Authentik discovery is at `${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
   // the JWKS URI is normally `${issuer}/jwks/` or `${issuer}/.well-known/jwks.json`.
   // Authentik canonically serves `${issuer}/jwks/`.
-  const url = new URL(`${mcpIssuer()}/jwks/`);
+  const url = new URL(`${mcpIssuer().replace(/\/$/, "")}/jwks/`);
   g.__sharedMemoryJwks = createRemoteJWKSet(url, {
     cacheMaxAge: 10 * 60 * 1000, // 10 min
     cooldownDuration: 30 * 1000,
@@ -126,7 +144,7 @@ export async function authenticateBearer(authHeader: string | null): Promise<Aut
     }
 
     const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, jwks(), {
-      issuer: mcpIssuer(),
+      issuer: acceptedIssuers(),
       audience: env().OIDC_AUDIENCE,
     });
     if (!payload.sub) {

apps/web/lib/env.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ const envSchema = z.object({
   // Defaults to the `aud-<audience>` convention used in the README setup.
   OIDC_AUDIENCE_SCOPE: optional(z.string().min(1)),
 
+  // Advertise `offline_access` in the protected-resource metadata.
+  //
+  // Without it the IdP issues an access token and NO refresh token, so an
+  // MCP client cannot renew silently — it has to send the user back through
+  // an interactive login every time the access token expires. Turning this
+  // on is what makes long-lived sessions stop dropping out.
+  //
+  // Defaults OFF because it is only half the fix: the IdP must also have an
+  // `offline_access` scope mapping on the provider. Advertising a scope the
+  // IdP doesn't offer risks an `invalid_scope` rejection that would break
+  // authentication outright, so a deployment opts in only after configuring
+  // its IdP. See README -> "Keeping sessions alive".
+  OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS: Bool.optional().default(false),
+
   // Database
   DATABASE_URL: z.string().url(),
 
@@ -119,6 +133,7 @@ function buildPhaseStub(): Env {
     CLI_TOKEN_SECRET: "build-phase-secret-not-used-at-runtime-xxxxxxxx",
     PLUGIN_MARKETPLACE_NAME: "shared-memory",
     ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP: false,
+    OIDC_OFFLINE_ACCESS: false,
   };
 }
 

apps/web/lib/mcp/tools.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test, vi } from "vitest";
+
+/**
+ * Integration tests for memory.get and memory.patch against a REAL
+ * Postgres (pgvector). See CONTRIBUTING/README for spinning up the test
+ * database; without it these tests fail to connect rather than silently
+ * passing.
+ *
+ * The embedder sidecar is the one thing stubbed — it's an external HTTP
+ * service running an ML model. The stub is deterministic per-text, which
+ * lets the re-embedding test assert on the STORED VECTOR CHANGING (real
+ * DB state) rather than on "was the mock called".
+ */
+vi.mock("@/lib/embedder", () => ({
+  embedText: async (text: string) => {
+    // Deterministic pseudo-vector: distinct texts produce distinct vectors.
+    let h = 0;
+    for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i++) h = (h * 31 + text.charCodeAt(i)) | 0;
+    return Array.from({ length: 384 }, (_, i) => ((h + i * 7919) % 1000) / 1000);
+  },
+  embedTexts: async (texts: string[]) => texts.map(() => Array(384).fill(0.1)),
+  embedderReady: async () => true,
+  EmbedderError: class extends Error {},
+}));
+
+const { db, pg } = await import("@/lib/db/client");
+const { memories, projects, users } = await import("@/lib/db/schema");
+const { toolMap } = await import("@/lib/mcp/tools");
+const { eq } = await import("drizzle-orm");
+type UserContext = import("@/lib/mcp/context").UserContext;
+
+const ORIGINAL = [
+  "# Roadmap",
+  "",
+  "## RECENTLY SHIPPED",
+  "- v1.0 initial release",
+  "",
+  "## IN PROGRESS",
+  "- patch primitive",
+  "",
+].join("\n");
+
+let userId: string;
+let projectId: string;
+let memoryId: string;
+let ctx: UserContext;
+
+async function seedMemory(content = ORIGINAL): Promise<string> {
+  const row = await db
+    .insert(memories)
+    .values({
+      userId,
+      projectId,
+      scope: "project",
+      content,
+      tags: ["roadmap"],
+      embedding: Array(384).fill(0.5),
+    })
+    .returning({ id: memories.id });
+  return row[0]!.id;
+}
+
+async function readContent(id: string): Promise<string> {
+  const r = await db
+    .select({ content: memories.content })
+    .from(memories)
+    .where(eq(memories.id, id));
+  return r[0]!.content;
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  const u = await db
+    .insert(users)
+    .values({ oidcSub: "test-sub", oidcIss: "http://test", email: "t@example.com" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: users.id });
+  userId =
+    u[0]?.id ??
+    (await db.select({ id: users.id }).from(users).limit(1))[0]!.id;
+
+  const p = await db
+    .insert(projects)
+    .values({ userId, key: "test-project", displayName: "Test Project" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: projects.id });
+  projectId =
+    p[0]?.id ??
+    (await db.select({ id: projects.id }).from(projects).limit(1))[0]!.id;
+
+  ctx = {
+    userId,
+    sub: "test-sub",
+    iss: "http://test",
+    email: null,
+    name: null,
+    groups: [],
+  };
+});
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  memoryId = await seedMemory();
+});
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await db.delete(memories);
+  await pg.end();
+});
+
+describe("memory.get response shape (P1)", () => {
+  test("does not leak the embedding or the tsvector to the caller", async () => {
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.get"]!.handler({ id: memoryId }, ctx);
+    const fields = Object.keys(res.structuredContent as object);
+
+    expect(fields).not.toContain("embedding");
+    expect(fields).not.toContain("contentTsv");
+  });
+
+  test("returns exactly the same 9 fields as memory.list", async () => {
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.get"]!.handler({ id: memoryId }, ctx);
+    const fields = Object.keys(res.structuredContent as object).sort();
+
+    expect(fields).toEqual(
+      [
+        "content",
+        "createdAt",
+        "id",
+        "lastEditedBy",
+        "projectId",
+        "scope",
+        "tags",
+        "updatedAt",
+        "version",
+      ].sort(),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("still returns the full content", async () => {
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.get"]!.handler({ id: memoryId }, ctx);
+    expect((res.structuredContent as { content: string }).content).toBe(ORIGINAL);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("memory.patch (P2)", () => {
+  test("applies a unique patch and increments version by exactly 1", async () => {
+    const before = await db
+      .select({ version: memories.version })
+      .from(memories)
+      .where(eq(memories.id, memoryId));
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      {
+        id: memoryId,
+        old_string: "## RECENTLY SHIPPED",
+        new_string: "## RECENTLY SHIPPED\n- v1.1 patch primitive",
+      },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBeFalsy();
+    const after = res.structuredContent as { version: number };
+    expect(after.version).toBe(before[0]!.version + 1);
+    expect(await readContent(memoryId)).toContain("- v1.1 patch primitive");
+    // The rest of the document survived.
+    expect(await readContent(memoryId)).toContain("- v1.0 initial release");
+    expect(await readContent(memoryId)).toContain("## IN PROGRESS");
+  });
+
+  test("refuses an absent old_string and leaves content byte-identical", async () => {
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      { id: memoryId, old_string: "## NOT PRESENT", new_string: "x" },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(await readContent(memoryId)).toBe(ORIGINAL);
+  });
+
+  test("refuses an ambiguous old_string, naming the count, leaving content unchanged", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory("alpha\nalpha\nbeta\n");
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      { id, old_string: "alpha", new_string: "gamma" },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.content[0]!.text).toMatch(/2/);
+    expect(await readContent(id)).toBe("alpha\nalpha\nbeta\n");
+  });
+
+  test("refuses a stale version and leaves content unchanged", async () => {
+    const current = await db
+      .select({ version: memories.version })
+      .from(memories)
+      .where(eq(memories.id, memoryId));
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      {
+        id: memoryId,
+        old_string: "## IN PROGRESS",
+        new_string: "## DONE",
+        version: current[0]!.version + 99,
+      },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(await readContent(memoryId)).toBe(ORIGINAL);
+  });
+
+  test("rejects a patch that would push content past the 64,000-char limit", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory("A".repeat(63_950) + "ANCHOR");
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      { id, old_string: "ANCHOR", new_string: "B".repeat(100) },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(await readContent(id)).toBe("A".repeat(63_950) + "ANCHOR");
+  });
+
+  test("re-embeds: the stored vector changes after a patch", async () => {
+    const before = await pg<{ embedding: string }[]>`
+      SELECT embedding::text AS embedding FROM memories WHERE id = ${memoryId}
+    `;
+
+    await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      { id: memoryId, old_string: "- patch primitive", new_string: "- shipped it" },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    const after = await pg<{ embedding: string }[]>`
+      SELECT embedding::text AS embedding FROM memories WHERE id = ${memoryId}
+    `;
+
+    expect(after[0]!.embedding).not.toBe(before[0]!.embedding);
+  });
+
+  test("full-text index updates itself, because content_tsv is a generated column", async () => {
+    // This is the claim that a patch cannot rot FTS. Postgres maintains
+    // content_tsv; only the embedding needs an explicit recompute.
+    await toolMap["memory.patch"]!.handler(
+      {
+        id: memoryId,
+        old_string: "- patch primitive",
+        new_string: "- kumquat marmalade",
+      },
+      ctx,
+    );
+
+    const hit = await pg<{ n: number }[]>`
+      SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM memories
+      WHERE id = ${memoryId} AND content_tsv @@ plainto_tsquery('english', 'kumquat')
+    `;
+    expect(hit[0]!.n).toBe(1);
+  });
+});

apps/web/lib/mcp/tools.mutations.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test, vi } from "vitest";
+
+/**
+ * Integration cover for the memory MUTATION paths (write / update / delete)
+ * against a real Postgres. These exist mainly as a safety net for the
+ * shared-mutation refactor: the MCP tools and the Web UI Server Actions
+ * used to reimplement the same authorize → CAS → re-embed → audit sequence
+ * separately, and these assertions pin the behaviour that must survive
+ * being pulled into one place.
+ */
+vi.mock("@/lib/embedder", () => ({
+  embedText: async (text: string) => {
+    let h = 0;
+    for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i++) h = (h * 31 + text.charCodeAt(i)) | 0;
+    return Array.from({ length: 384 }, (_, i) => ((h + i * 7919) % 1000) / 1000);
+  },
+  embedTexts: async (texts: string[]) => texts.map(() => Array(384).fill(0.1)),
+  embedderReady: async () => true,
+  EmbedderError: class extends Error {},
+}));
+
+const { db, pg } = await import("@/lib/db/client");
+const { memories, projects, users, groups, userGroups, projectShares } = await import(
+  "@/lib/db/schema"
+);
+const { toolMap } = await import("@/lib/mcp/tools");
+const { eq } = await import("drizzle-orm");
+type UserContext = import("@/lib/mcp/context").UserContext;
+
+const ISS = "http://test";
+
+let author: UserContext;
+let projectOwnerId: string;
+let ownProjectId: string;
+let sharedProjectId: string;
+let sharedGroupId: string;
+
+function ctxFor(userId: string, sub: string, groupNames: string[] = []): UserContext {
+  return { userId, sub, iss: ISS, email: null, name: null, groups: groupNames };
+}
+
+async function upsertUser(sub: string): Promise<string> {
+  const r = await db
+    .insert(users)
+    .values({ oidcSub: sub, oidcIss: ISS })
+    .onConflictDoUpdate({ target: [users.oidcIss, users.oidcSub], set: { oidcSub: sub } })
+    .returning({ id: users.id });
+  return r[0]!.id;
+}
+
+async function seedMemory(
+  userId: string,
+  projectId: string | null,
+  content = "seed content",
+): Promise<string> {
+  const r = await db
+    .insert(memories)
+    .values({
+      userId,
+      projectId,
+      scope: projectId ? "project" : "user",
+      content,
+      tags: [],
+      embedding: Array(384).fill(0.5),
+      lastEditedBy: userId,
+    })
+    .returning({ id: memories.id });
+  return r[0]!.id;
+}
+
+async function setShareAccess(access: "ro" | "rw") {
+  await db
+    .insert(projectShares)
+    .values({ projectId: sharedProjectId, groupId: sharedGroupId, access })
+    .onConflictDoUpdate({
+      target: [projectShares.projectId, projectShares.groupId],
+      set: { access },
+    });
+}
+
+async function isDeleted(id: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const r = await db
+    .select({ deletedAt: memories.deletedAt })
+    .from(memories)
+    .where(eq(memories.id, id));
+  return r[0]!.deletedAt !== null;
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  const authorId = await upsertUser("author-sub");
+  projectOwnerId = await upsertUser("owner-sub");
+
+  const own = await db
+    .insert(projects)
+    .values({ userId: authorId, key: "author-own", displayName: "Author Own" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: projects.id });
+  ownProjectId =
+    own[0]?.id ??
+    (
+      await db
+        .select({ id: projects.id })
+        .from(projects)
+        .where(eq(projects.key, "author-own"))
+    )[0]!.id;
+
+  const shared = await db
+    .insert(projects)
+    .values({ userId: projectOwnerId, key: "team-shared", displayName: "Team Shared" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: projects.id });
+  sharedProjectId =
+    shared[0]?.id ??
+    (
+      await db
+        .select({ id: projects.id })
+        .from(projects)
+        .where(eq(projects.key, "team-shared"))
+    )[0]!.id;
+
+  const g = await db
+    .insert(groups)
+    .values({ oidcIss: ISS, name: "team" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: groups.id });
+  sharedGroupId =
+    g[0]?.id ??
+    (await db.select({ id: groups.id }).from(groups).where(eq(groups.name, "team")))[0]!
+      .id;
+
+  await db
+    .insert(userGroups)
+    .values({ userId: authorId, groupId: sharedGroupId })
+    .onConflictDoNothing();
+
+  author = ctxFor(authorId, "author-sub", ["team"]);
+});
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db.delete(memories);
+  await setShareAccess("rw");
+});
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await db.delete(memories);
+  await pg.end();
+});
+
+describe("memory.write", () => {
+  test("writes into a project the caller owns", async () => {
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.write"]!.handler(
+      { content: "hello", scope: "project", project: "author-own" },
+      author,
+    );
+    expect(res.isError).toBeFalsy();
+  });
+
+  test("refuses an unknown project rather than creating one", async () => {
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.write"]!.handler(
+      { content: "hello", scope: "project", project: "does-not-exist" },
+      author,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.content[0]!.text).toMatch(/project\.identify/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("memory.update", () => {
+  test("updates content and increments version", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(author.userId, ownProjectId);
+    const before = await db
+      .select({ version: memories.version })
+      .from(memories)
+      .where(eq(memories.id, id));
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.update"]!.handler(
+      { id, content: "revised content" },
+      author,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBeFalsy();
+    expect((res.structuredContent as { version: number }).version).toBe(
+      before[0]!.version + 1,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("refuses a stale version", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(author.userId, ownProjectId);
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.update"]!.handler(
+      { id, content: "revised", version: 99 },
+      author,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("denies updating a memory in a project shared read-only", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(author.userId, sharedProjectId);
+    await setShareAccess("ro");
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.update"]!.handler(
+      { id, content: "sneaky edit" },
+      author,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("memory.delete authorization", () => {
+  test("allows deleting a memory in a project shared read-write", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(author.userId, sharedProjectId);
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.delete"]!.handler({ id }, author);
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBeFalsy();
+    expect(await isDeleted(id)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("denies deleting a memory in a project shared read-only, even to its author", async () => {
+    // The realistic path here: the memory was written while the share was
+    // rw, then an owner downgraded the group to ro. Authoring the row must
+    // not grant a standing write privilege the project ACL has revoked —
+    // memory.update already refuses this, and delete must agree.
+    const id = await seedMemory(author.userId, sharedProjectId);
+    await setShareAccess("ro");
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.delete"]!.handler({ id }, author);
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(await isDeleted(id)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("denies deleting another user's user-scope memory", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(projectOwnerId, null);
+
+    const res = await toolMap["memory.delete"]!.handler({ id }, author);
+
+    expect(res.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(await isDeleted(id)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

apps/web/lib/mcp/tools.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
   MemoryIdInput,
   MemoryDeleteInput,
   MemoryListInput,
+  MemoryPatchInput,
   MemorySearchInput,
   MemoryUpdateInput,
   MemoryWriteInput,
@@ -20,20 +21,22 @@ import {
   SnippetListInput,
   SnippetDeleteInput,
 } from "@shared-memory/schemas";
-import { embedText } from "@/lib/embedder";
 import { searchMemories } from "@/lib/memories";
+import {
+  createMemory,
+  patchMemory,
+  softDeleteMemory,
+  updateMemory,
+  type Actor,
+  type ProjectResolver,
+} from "@/lib/memory-mutations";
 import {
   getSnippet,
   putSnippet,
   listSnippets,
   softDeleteSnippet,
 } from "@/lib/snippets";
-import {
+import { getProjectAccess, readableProjectIds } from "@/lib/access";
-  CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR,
-  canWriteProject,
-  getProjectAccess,
-  readableProjectIds,
-} from "@/lib/access";
 import type { UserContext } from "./context";
 
 /**
@@ -151,6 +154,27 @@ function withDefaultProject(
   return { ...obj, project: ctx.defaultProjectKey };
 }
 
+/** Adapt an MCP request context to the shared mutation layer. */
+function mcpActor(ctx: UserContext): Actor {
+  return { userId: ctx.userId, groups: ctx.groups, via: "mcp" };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Project resolution for MCP writes. Unlike the Web UI, the MCP surface
+ * never auto-creates a project — an unknown key is an error telling the
+ * caller to run project.identify first, which keeps agents from silently
+ * spawning near-miss projects off a typo'd key.
+ */
+function mcpProjectResolver(ctx: UserContext): ProjectResolver {
+  return async (key: string) => {
+    const id = await resolveProjectId(ctx, key);
+    if (!id) {
+      return { ok: false, error: `unknown project '${key}'; call project.identify first` };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, value: id };
+  };
+}
+
 // ---------- tools ----------
 
 const projectIdentify: ToolDef = {
@@ -373,55 +397,18 @@ const memoryWrite: ToolDef = {
     const parsed = MemoryWriteInput.safeParse(withDefaultProject(args, ctx));
     if (!parsed.success) return err(parsed.error.message);
 
-    const scope = parsed.data.scope;
+    // Fold the X-Project-Key fallback in before the shared path sees it.
-    let projectId: string | null = null;
+    const input = {
-    let projectKey: string | undefined = undefined;
+      ...parsed.data,
-    if (scope === "project") {
+      project: projectKeyOrDefault(ctx, parsed.data.project),
-      projectKey = projectKeyOrDefault(ctx, parsed.data.project);
+    };
-      if (!projectKey) {
+    if (input.scope === "project" && !input.project) {
       return err("scope=project requires `project` key (or X-Project-Key header)");
     }
-      projectId = await resolveProjectId(ctx, projectKey);
-      if (!projectId) {
-        return err(`unknown project '${projectKey}'; call project.identify first`);
-      }
-      // Authorize write. Owner always allowed; otherwise require rw.
-      const allowed = await canWriteProject(ctx.userId, ctx.groups, projectId);
-      if (!allowed) {
-        return err(`no write access to project '${projectKey}'`);
-      }
-    }
 
-    // Embed inline so the new memory is searchable immediately. Slower
+    const res = await createMemory(mcpActor(ctx), input, mcpProjectResolver(ctx));
-    // writes (~50–150 ms) are an acceptable price for that guarantee; if
+    if (!res.ok) return err(res.error);
-    // embedder pressure ever forces an async path, only this section
+    return ok(res.value, `wrote memory ${res.value.id}`);
-    // needs to change.
-    const embedding = await embedText(parsed.data.content);
-
-    const inserted = await db
-      .insert(memories)
-      .values({
-        userId: ctx.userId,
-        projectId,
-        scope,
-        content: parsed.data.content,
-        tags: parsed.data.tags ?? [],
-        embedding,
-        lastEditedBy: ctx.userId,
-      })
-      .returning({ id: memories.id, createdAt: memories.createdAt });
-
-    const m = inserted[0]!;
-    await db.insert(auditLog).values({
-      userId: ctx.userId,
-      actor: "mcp",
-      action: "memory.write",
-      entityType: "memory",
-      entityId: m.id,
-      payload: { scope, projectKey: projectKey ?? null, tags: parsed.data.tags ?? [] },
-    });
-
-    return ok({ id: m.id, createdAt: m.createdAt }, `wrote memory ${m.id}`);
   },
 };
 
@@ -508,8 +495,28 @@ const memoryGet: ToolDef = {
     const parsed = MemoryIdInput.safeParse(args);
     if (!parsed.success) return err(parsed.error.message);
 
+    // Project explicitly rather than `select()`-ing the raw row. The
+    // table carries `embedding` (384 floats) and `content_tsv` (the full
+    // lexeme index, which outgrows `content` itself on large memories) —
+    // both are Postgres retrieval internals that no MCP client can use,
+    // and together they were the majority of every response. Returning
+    // them also pushed large memories past the tool-output cap. This is
+    // the same 9-field shape memory.list and memory.search return.
     const row = await db
-      .select()
+      .select({
+        id: memories.id,
+        scope: memories.scope,
+        projectId: memories.projectId,
+        content: memories.content,
+        tags: memories.tags,
+        version: memories.version,
+        lastEditedBy: memories.lastEditedBy,
+        createdAt: memories.createdAt,
+        updatedAt: memories.updatedAt,
+        // Needed for the authorization check below; stripped before the
+        // response so the payload matches list/search exactly.
+        userId: memories.userId,
+      })
       .from(memories)
       .where(and(eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
       .limit(1);
@@ -518,8 +525,8 @@ const memoryGet: ToolDef = {
 
     // Authorize read: own row, OR project-scope row in an accessible
     // project. Anything else looks "not found" to the caller.
-    const m = row[0];
+    const { userId, ...m } = row[0];
-    if (m.userId !== ctx.userId) {
+    if (userId !== ctx.userId) {
       if (!m.projectId) return err("not found");
       const access = await getProjectAccess(ctx.userId, ctx.groups, m.projectId);
       if (access === null) return err("not found");
@@ -550,57 +557,9 @@ const memoryDelete: ToolDef = {
     const parsed = MemoryDeleteInput.safeParse(args);
     if (!parsed.success) return err(parsed.error.message);
 
-    // Look up the row first to authorize and capture its current version
+    const res = await softDeleteMemory(mcpActor(ctx), parsed.data);
-    // for the CAS. Shared-project writes need a per-project access check.
+    if (!res.ok) return err(res.error);
-    const target = await db
+    return ok({ id: res.value.id, deleted: true }, `deleted memory ${res.value.id}`);
-      .select({
-        id: memories.id,
-        userId: memories.userId,
-        projectId: memories.projectId,
-        scope: memories.scope,
-        version: memories.version,
-      })
-      .from(memories)
-      .where(and(eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
-      .limit(1);
-    const m = target[0];
-    if (!m) return err("not found");
-
-    if (m.userId !== ctx.userId) {
-      // Not the owner. User-scope memories can only be deleted by their
-      // owner; project-scope require rw access on the project.
-      if (m.scope === "user" || !m.projectId) return err("not found");
-      const allowed = await canWriteProject(ctx.userId, ctx.groups, m.projectId);
-      if (!allowed) return err("no write access to this project");
-    }
-
-    // Optimistic-lock CAS: pin to the caller-supplied version when given,
-    // else the version we just read in this handler. The 0-row response
-    // tells us a peer raced us.
-    const expectedVersion = parsed.data.version ?? m.version;
-    const updated = await db
-      .update(memories)
-      .set({ deletedAt: new Date(), lastEditedBy: ctx.userId })
-      .where(
-        and(
-          eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id),
-          eq(memories.version, expectedVersion),
-          isNull(memories.deletedAt),
-        ),
-      )
-      .returning({ id: memories.id });
-
-    if (!updated[0]) return err(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
-
-    await db.insert(auditLog).values({
-      userId: ctx.userId,
-      actor: "mcp",
-      action: "memory.delete",
-      entityType: "memory",
-      entityId: updated[0].id,
-    });
-
-    return ok({ id: updated[0].id, deleted: true }, `deleted memory ${updated[0].id}`);
   },
 };
 
@@ -638,124 +597,51 @@ const memoryUpdate: ToolDef = {
     const parsed = MemoryUpdateInput.safeParse(withDefaultProject(args, ctx));
     if (!parsed.success) return err(parsed.error.message);
 
-    const existingRows = await db
+    const res = await updateMemory(mcpActor(ctx), parsed.data, mcpProjectResolver(ctx));
-      .select({
+    if (!res.ok) return err(res.error);
-        id: memories.id,
+    return ok(res.value, `updated memory ${res.value.id}`);
-        content: memories.content,
+  },
-        scope: memories.scope,
+};
-        projectId: memories.projectId,
-        projectKey: projects.key,
-        version: memories.version,
-        userId: memories.userId,
-      })
-      .from(memories)
-      .leftJoin(projects, eq(memories.projectId, projects.id))
-      .where(and(eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
-      .limit(1);
-    const existing = existingRows[0];
-    if (!existing) return err("not found");
 
-    // Authorize write.
+const memoryPatch: ToolDef = {
-    if (existing.scope === "user") {
+  name: "memory.patch",
-      if (existing.userId !== ctx.userId) return err("not found");
+  description:
-    } else if (existing.projectId) {
+    "Replace one exact snippet of a memory's content, leaving the rest untouched — the same mental model as editing a file. Use this INSTEAD of memory.update whenever you're making a small edit to a large memory: adding an entry under a heading, correcting a line, updating a status. memory.update requires you to resend the entire document, which risks silently dropping content you didn't mean to touch; memory.patch only needs the fragment you're changing. `old_string` must appear EXACTLY once — if it's missing or ambiguous the call fails and nothing is changed, so include enough surrounding context to make it unique. Pass an empty `new_string` to delete the matched text. Re-embeds automatically, preserves the memory's id, and accepts `version` for the same concurrent-edit protection as memory.update.",
-      const allowed = await canWriteProject(ctx.userId, ctx.groups, existing.projectId);
+  inputSchema: {
-      if (!allowed) return err("no write access to this project");
+    type: "object",
-    }
+    properties: {
+      id: { type: "string", format: "uuid" },
+      old_string: {
+        type: "string",
+        description:
+          "The exact text to replace. Must occur exactly once in the memory's content — include surrounding lines if the fragment alone would be ambiguous.",
+      },
+      new_string: {
+        type: "string",
+        description:
+          "The replacement text. May be empty to delete the matched text (the memory itself may not be left empty).",
+      },
+      version: {
+        type: "integer",
+        minimum: 0,
+        description:
+          "Optimistic-locking token from memory.get / memory.list. When supplied, the patch is rejected if the row was edited by someone else since you read it.",
+      },
+    },
+    required: ["id", "old_string", "new_string"],
+  },
+  async handler(args, ctx) {
+    const parsed = MemoryPatchInput.safeParse(args);
+    if (!parsed.success) return err(parsed.error.message);
 
-    const update: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    const res = await patchMemory(mcpActor(ctx), parsed.data);
-      updatedAt: new Date(),
+    if (!res.ok) return err(res.error);
-      lastEditedBy: ctx.userId,
-      version: existing.version + 1,
-    };
-    if (parsed.data.tags !== undefined) update.tags = parsed.data.tags;
-    if (parsed.data.content !== undefined && parsed.data.content !== existing.content) {
-      update.content = parsed.data.content;
-      update.embedding = await embedText(parsed.data.content);
-    }
 
-    let scopeChanged = false;
+    const { id, delta, contentLength } = res.value;
-    let projectChanged = false;
+    return ok(
-    let newProjectKey: string | null = existing.projectKey ?? null;
+      res.value,
-
+      `patched memory ${id} (${delta >= 0 ? "+" : ""}${delta} chars, now ${contentLength})`,
-    if (parsed.data.scope !== undefined) {
-      if (parsed.data.scope === "user") {
-        if (existing.scope !== "user") {
-          update.scope = "user";
-          scopeChanged = true;
-        }
-        if (existing.projectId !== null) {
-          update.projectId = null;
-          projectChanged = true;
-          newProjectKey = null;
-        }
-      } else {
-        // scope === 'project' — schema refine guarantees `project` is set.
-        const projectKey = parsed.data.project!;
-        const projectId = await resolveProjectId(ctx, projectKey);
-        if (!projectId) {
-          return err(`unknown project '${projectKey}'; call project.identify first`);
-        }
-        // Moving INTO a project requires write access there.
-        const allowedTarget = await canWriteProject(ctx.userId, ctx.groups, projectId);
-        if (!allowedTarget) {
-          return err(`no write access to project '${projectKey}'`);
-        }
-        if (existing.scope !== "project") {
-          update.scope = "project";
-          scopeChanged = true;
-        }
-        if (existing.projectId !== projectId) {
-          update.projectId = projectId;
-          projectChanged = true;
-          newProjectKey = projectKey;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    const expectedVersion = parsed.data.version ?? existing.version;
-    const updated = await db
-      .update(memories)
-      .set(update)
-      .where(
-        and(
-          eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id),
-          eq(memories.version, expectedVersion),
-        ),
-      )
-      .returning({
-        id: memories.id,
-        updatedAt: memories.updatedAt,
-        version: memories.version,
-      });
-
-    if (!updated[0]) return err(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
-
-    const auditFields = Object.keys(update).filter(
-      (k) => k !== "updatedAt" && k !== "version" && k !== "lastEditedBy",
     );
-    const auditPayload: Record<string, unknown> = { fields: auditFields };
-    if (scopeChanged || projectChanged) {
-      auditPayload.scope = {
-        from: existing.scope,
-        to: update.scope ?? existing.scope,
-      };
-      auditPayload.projectKey = {
-        from: existing.projectKey ?? null,
-        to: newProjectKey,
-      };
-    }
-
-    await db.insert(auditLog).values({
-      userId: ctx.userId,
-      actor: "mcp",
-      action: "memory.update",
-      entityType: "memory",
-      entityId: updated[0]!.id,
-      payload: auditPayload,
-    });
-
-    return ok(updated[0]!, `updated memory ${updated[0]!.id}`);
   },
 };
 
@@ -1113,6 +999,7 @@ export const tools: ToolDef[] = [
   projectIdentify,
   memoryWrite,
   memoryUpdate,
+  memoryPatch,
   memoryList,
   memoryGet,
   memorySearch,

apps/web/lib/memory-actions.ts

@@ -2,37 +2,36 @@
 
 import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache";
 import { redirect } from "next/navigation";
-import { and, eq, inArray, isNull } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { and, eq, inArray } from "drizzle-orm";
 import { auth } from "@/auth";
 import { db } from "@/lib/db/client";
-import { memories, projects, auditLog } from "@/lib/db/schema";
+import { projects } from "@/lib/db/schema";
-import { embedText } from "@/lib/embedder";
 import { resolveProjectId, upsertProject } from "@/lib/projects";
 import {
   MemoryWriteInput,
   MemoryUpdateInput,
   MemoryDeleteInput,
 } from "@shared-memory/schemas";
+import { getUserGroupNames, readableProjectIds } from "@/lib/access";
 import {
-  CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR,
+  createMemory,
-  canWriteProject,
+  softDeleteMemory,
-  getUserGroupNames,
+  updateMemory,
-  readableProjectIds,
+  type Actor,
-} from "@/lib/access";
+  type Outcome,
+  type ProjectResolver,
+} from "@/lib/memory-mutations";
 
 /**
- * Server Actions for memory CRUD from the Web UI. Mirrors the MCP tools
+ * Server Actions for memory CRUD from the Web UI.
- * but writes through the same DB layer, so updates and deletes here are
+ *
- * indistinguishable from those made via Claude Code.
+ * These are thin adapters: form parsing, then `lib/memory-mutations`,
+ * then revalidate/redirect. The authorize → mutate → re-embed → CAS →
+ * audit sequence lives in that shared module so this surface and the MCP
+ * tools cannot drift apart — they previously did, and the sharing rules
+ * ended up subtly different between them.
  *
  * `actor` is "web" in audit_log so we can tell the two paths apart later.
- *
- * Sharing: project-scope memories may live under projects shared with
- * the user's groups. Reads include those projects; writes require the
- * user to own the project or have an `rw` share. Cross-user concurrent
- * edits use the `version` column for optimistic locking — if the stored
- * version no longer matches what the form submitted, we surface
- * `CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR` rather than clobber.
  */
 
 async function requireUserId(): Promise<string> {
@@ -41,6 +40,52 @@ async function requireUserId(): Promise<string> {
   return session.user.id;
 }
 
+/** Server Actions signal failure by throwing; the shared layer returns Outcome. */
+function must<T>(outcome: Outcome<T>): T {
+  if (!outcome.ok) throw new Error(outcome.error);
+  return outcome.value;
+}
+
+async function webActor(): Promise<{ actor: Actor; resolveProject: ProjectResolver }> {
+  const userId = await requireUserId();
+  const groups = await getUserGroupNames(userId);
+  return {
+    actor: { userId, groups, via: "web" },
+    resolveProject: webProjectResolver(userId, groups),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Project resolution for Web UI writes. Unlike the MCP surface, an
+ * unknown key is CREATED rather than rejected — a person typing a project
+ * name into a form means to make one. Shared projects are matched only
+ * within the set the user can actually read, because `projects.key` is
+ * unique per user rather than globally: an unscoped key match could
+ * otherwise select someone else's project.
+ *
+ * Write access to whatever this returns is enforced centrally by the
+ * mutation layer, so it deliberately isn't re-checked here.
+ */
+function webProjectResolver(userId: string, groupNames: string[]): ProjectResolver {
+  return async (key: string) => {
+    const owned = await resolveProjectId(userId, key);
+    if (owned) return { ok: true, value: owned };
+
+    const readableIds = await readableProjectIds(userId, groupNames);
+    const shared =
+      readableIds.length > 0
+        ? await db
+            .select({ id: projects.id })
+            .from(projects)
+            .where(and(eq(projects.key, key), inArray(projects.id, readableIds)))
+            .limit(1)
+        : [];
+    if (shared[0]) return { ok: true, value: shared[0].id };
+
+    return { ok: true, value: await upsertProject(userId, key) };
+  };
+}
+
 function parseTags(raw: FormDataEntryValue | null): string[] {
   if (typeof raw !== "string") return [];
   return raw
@@ -50,95 +95,26 @@ function parseTags(raw: FormDataEntryValue | null): string[] {
 }
 
 export async function createMemoryAction(formData: FormData) {
-  const userId = await requireUserId();
+  const { actor, resolveProject } = await webActor();
-  const groupNames = await getUserGroupNames(userId);
 
-  const payload = {
+  const parsed = MemoryWriteInput.safeParse({
     content: String(formData.get("content") ?? "").trim(),
     scope: (formData.get("scope") as "project" | "user") || "project",
     project: (formData.get("project") as string | null)?.trim() || undefined,
     tags: parseTags(formData.get("tags")),
-  };
+  });
-  const parsed = MemoryWriteInput.safeParse(payload);
   if (!parsed.success) {
     throw new Error(parsed.error.issues.map((i) => i.message).join("; "));
   }
 
-  let projectId: string | null = null;
+  const created = must(await createMemory(actor, parsed.data, resolveProject));
-  if (parsed.data.scope === "project") {
-    if (!parsed.data.project) throw new Error("scope=project requires `project`");
-    // Same priority as memory.update's reclassification path: prefer an
-    // owned project; otherwise check for a shared one we have rw on;
-    // otherwise auto-upsert as owner.
-    const owned = await resolveProjectId(userId, parsed.data.project);
-    if (owned) {
-      projectId = owned;
-    } else {
-      // Restrict the by-key lookup to projects the user can actually
-      // read. Without this, a different user's project with the same
-      // key string could be selected (`projects.key` is unique per user,
-      // not globally), opening a cross-user write hazard.
-      const readableIds = await readableProjectIds(userId, groupNames);
-      const sharedRow =
-        readableIds.length > 0
-          ? await db
-              .select({ id: projects.id })
-              .from(projects)
-              .where(
-                and(
-                  eq(projects.key, parsed.data.project),
-                  inArray(projects.id, readableIds),
-                ),
-              )
-              .limit(1)
-          : [];
-      if (sharedRow[0]) {
-        const allowed = await canWriteProject(userId, groupNames, sharedRow[0].id);
-        if (!allowed) {
-          throw new Error(`no write access to project '${parsed.data.project}'`);
-        }
-        projectId = sharedRow[0].id;
-      } else {
-        projectId = await upsertProject(userId, parsed.data.project);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  const embedding = await embedText(parsed.data.content);
-
-  const inserted = await db
-    .insert(memories)
-    .values({
-      userId,
-      projectId,
-      scope: parsed.data.scope,
-      content: parsed.data.content,
-      tags: parsed.data.tags ?? [],
-      embedding,
-      lastEditedBy: userId,
-    })
-    .returning({ id: memories.id });
-
-  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
-    userId,
-    actor: "web",
-    action: "memory.write",
-    entityType: "memory",
-    entityId: inserted[0]!.id,
-    payload: {
-      scope: parsed.data.scope,
-      projectKey: parsed.data.project ?? null,
-      tags: parsed.data.tags ?? [],
-    },
-  });
 
   revalidatePath("/memories");
-  redirect(`/memories/${inserted[0]!.id}`);
+  redirect(`/memories/${created.id}`);
 }
 
 export async function updateMemoryAction(formData: FormData) {
-  const userId = await requireUserId();
+  const { actor, resolveProject } = await webActor();
-  const groupNames = await getUserGroupNames(userId);
 
   const id = String(formData.get("id") ?? "");
   const rawScope = formData.get("scope");
@@ -164,153 +140,7 @@ export async function updateMemoryAction(formData: FormData) {
     throw new Error(parsed.error.issues.map((i) => i.message).join("; "));
   }
 
-  // Fetch the row regardless of ownership — we may be editing a shared
+  must(await updateMemory(actor, parsed.data, resolveProject));
-  // memory. Authorization is enforced below against the project, not
-  // by `user_id`.
-  const existingRows = await db
-    .select({
-      id: memories.id,
-      content: memories.content,
-      scope: memories.scope,
-      projectId: memories.projectId,
-      projectKey: projects.key,
-      version: memories.version,
-      userId: memories.userId,
-    })
-    .from(memories)
-    .leftJoin(projects, eq(memories.projectId, projects.id))
-    .where(and(eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
-    .limit(1);
-  const existing = existingRows[0];
-  if (!existing) throw new Error("not found");
-
-  // Authorize write. For user-scope memories, only the owner can edit.
-  // For project-scope memories, owner OR a group with rw access.
-  if (existing.scope === "user") {
-    if (existing.userId !== userId) throw new Error("not found");
-  } else if (existing.projectId) {
-    const allowed = await canWriteProject(userId, groupNames, existing.projectId);
-    if (!allowed) {
-      throw new Error("you don't have write access to this project");
-    }
-  }
-
-  const update: Record<string, unknown> = {
-    updatedAt: new Date(),
-    lastEditedBy: userId,
-    version: existing.version + 1,
-  };
-  if (parsed.data.tags !== undefined) update.tags = parsed.data.tags;
-  if (parsed.data.content !== undefined && parsed.data.content !== existing.content) {
-    update.content = parsed.data.content;
-    update.embedding = await embedText(parsed.data.content);
-  }
-
-  let scopeChanged = false;
-  let projectChanged = false;
-  let newProjectKey: string | null = existing.projectKey ?? null;
-
-  if (parsed.data.scope !== undefined) {
-    if (parsed.data.scope === "user") {
-      if (existing.scope !== "user") {
-        update.scope = "user";
-        scopeChanged = true;
-      }
-      if (existing.projectId !== null) {
-        update.projectId = null;
-        projectChanged = true;
-        newProjectKey = null;
-      }
-    } else {
-      // scope === 'project' — schema refine guarantees project is set.
-      // Moving INTO a project requires write access there. Owners get
-      // a fresh project upsert; non-owners must target an existing one
-      // they have rw on.
-      const projectKey = parsed.data.project!;
-      let projectId: string;
-      const existingId = await resolveProjectId(userId, projectKey);
-      if (existingId) {
-        projectId = existingId;
-      } else {
-        // Restrict the shared-project lookup to projects the user can
-        // actually read (`projects.key` is unique per user, not globally,
-        // so an unscoped key match could resolve another user's project).
-        const readableIds = await readableProjectIds(userId, groupNames);
-        const sharedRow =
-          readableIds.length > 0
-            ? await db
-                .select({ id: projects.id })
-                .from(projects)
-                .where(
-                  and(eq(projects.key, projectKey), inArray(projects.id, readableIds)),
-                )
-                .limit(1)
-            : [];
-        if (sharedRow[0]) {
-          const allowed = await canWriteProject(userId, groupNames, sharedRow[0].id);
-          if (!allowed) {
-            throw new Error(`no write access to project '${projectKey}'`);
-          }
-          projectId = sharedRow[0].id;
-        } else {
-          // Auto-upsert as owner — user becomes the project owner of a
-          // brand-new private project.
-          projectId = await upsertProject(userId, projectKey);
-        }
-      }
-      if (existing.scope !== "project") {
-        update.scope = "project";
-        scopeChanged = true;
-      }
-      if (existing.projectId !== projectId) {
-        update.projectId = projectId;
-        projectChanged = true;
-        newProjectKey = projectKey;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Optimistic-locking guard. When `version` is supplied, the UPDATE
-  // matches on (id, version); a 0-row result means the caller's view
-  // is stale. When `version` is NOT supplied, we still match on the
-  // pre-fetched version to keep behaviour deterministic.
-  const expectedVersion = parsed.data.version ?? existing.version;
-  const updated = await db
-    .update(memories)
-    .set(update)
-    .where(
-      and(
-        eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id),
-        eq(memories.version, expectedVersion),
-      ),
-    )
-    .returning({ id: memories.id });
-
-  if (!updated[0]) throw new Error(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
-
-  const auditFields = Object.keys(update).filter(
-    (k) => k !== "updatedAt" && k !== "version" && k !== "lastEditedBy",
-  );
-  const auditPayload: Record<string, unknown> = { fields: auditFields };
-  if (scopeChanged || projectChanged) {
-    auditPayload.scope = {
-      from: existing.scope,
-      to: update.scope ?? existing.scope,
-    };
-    auditPayload.projectKey = {
-      from: existing.projectKey ?? null,
-      to: newProjectKey,
-    };
-  }
-
-  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
-    userId,
-    actor: "web",
-    action: "memory.update",
-    entityType: "memory",
-    entityId: parsed.data.id,
-    payload: auditPayload,
-  });
 
   revalidatePath(`/memories/${parsed.data.id}`);
   revalidatePath("/memories");
@@ -318,8 +148,7 @@ export async function updateMemoryAction(formData: FormData) {
 }
 
 export async function deleteMemoryAction(formData: FormData) {
-  const userId = await requireUserId();
+  const { actor } = await webActor();
-  const groupNames = await getUserGroupNames(userId);
   const id = String(formData.get("id") ?? "");
   const rawVersion = formData.get("version");
   const version =
@@ -332,53 +161,7 @@ export async function deleteMemoryAction(formData: FormData) {
   });
   if (!parsed.success) throw new Error(parsed.error.issues[0]!.message);
 
-  // Authorize delete: same rule as update — owner OR rw on the project.
+  must(await softDeleteMemory(actor, parsed.data));
-  const existing = await db
-    .select({
-      id: memories.id,
-      scope: memories.scope,
-      projectId: memories.projectId,
-      userId: memories.userId,
-      version: memories.version,
-    })
-    .from(memories)
-    .where(and(eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
-    .limit(1);
-  const row = existing[0];
-  if (!row) throw new Error("not found");
-
-  if (row.scope === "user") {
-    if (row.userId !== userId) throw new Error("not found");
-  } else if (row.projectId) {
-    const allowed = await canWriteProject(userId, groupNames, row.projectId);
-    if (!allowed) throw new Error("you don't have write access to this project");
-  }
-
-  // CAS on version so a peer's concurrent edit can't be silently overwritten
-  // by this delete. Form may or may not supply version; fall back to the row
-  // we just read to keep behaviour deterministic.
-  const expectedVersion = parsed.data.version ?? row.version;
-  const updated = await db
-    .update(memories)
-    .set({ deletedAt: new Date(), lastEditedBy: userId })
-    .where(
-      and(
-        eq(memories.id, parsed.data.id),
-        eq(memories.version, expectedVersion),
-        isNull(memories.deletedAt),
-      ),
-    )
-    .returning({ id: memories.id });
-
-  if (!updated[0]) throw new Error(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
-
-  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
-    userId,
-    actor: "web",
-    action: "memory.delete",
-    entityType: "memory",
-    entityId: updated[0].id,
-  });
 
   revalidatePath("/memories");
   redirect("/memories");

apps/web/lib/memory-mutations.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test, vi } from "vitest";
+
+/**
+ * Tests for the shared mutation layer itself — the code both the MCP
+ * tools and the Web UI Server Actions now route through.
+ *
+ * Two things matter here:
+ *   1. The ProjectResolver seam really is the ONLY behavioural difference
+ *      between the two surfaces.
+ *   2. The authorization rule is uniform across update / patch / delete.
+ *      It previously wasn't: delete-over-MCP let a row's author bypass the
+ *      project ACL.
+ */
+vi.mock("@/lib/embedder", () => ({
+  embedText: async (text: string) => {
+    let h = 0;
+    for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i++) h = (h * 31 + text.charCodeAt(i)) | 0;
+    return Array.from({ length: 384 }, (_, i) => ((h + i * 7919) % 1000) / 1000);
+  },
+  embedTexts: async (texts: string[]) => texts.map(() => Array(384).fill(0.1)),
+  embedderReady: async () => true,
+  EmbedderError: class extends Error {},
+}));
+
+const { db, pg } = await import("@/lib/db/client");
+const { memories, projects, users, groups, userGroups, projectShares } = await import(
+  "@/lib/db/schema"
+);
+const { createMemory, updateMemory, patchMemory, softDeleteMemory } = await import(
+  "@/lib/memory-mutations"
+);
+const { and, eq } = await import("drizzle-orm");
+type Actor = import("@/lib/memory-mutations").Actor;
+type ProjectResolver = import("@/lib/memory-mutations").ProjectResolver;
+
+const ISS = "http://test-mutations";
+
+let actor: Actor;
+let otherUserId: string;
+let sharedProjectId: string;
+let sharedGroupId: string;
+
+/** Mirrors the MCP surface: unknown project keys are refused. */
+const refusingResolver: ProjectResolver = async (key) => ({
+  ok: false,
+  error: `unknown project '${key}'; call project.identify first`,
+});
+
+/** Mirrors the Web UI surface: unknown project keys are created. */
+function creatingResolver(userId: string): ProjectResolver {
+  return async (key) => {
+    const existing = await db
+      .select({ id: projects.id })
+      .from(projects)
+      .where(and(eq(projects.key, key), eq(projects.userId, userId)))
+      .limit(1);
+    if (existing[0]) return { ok: true, value: existing[0].id };
+    const created = await db
+      .insert(projects)
+      .values({ userId, key, displayName: key })
+      .returning({ id: projects.id });
+    return { ok: true, value: created[0]!.id };
+  };
+}
+
+async function seedMemory(userId: string, projectId: string | null): Promise<string> {
+  const r = await db
+    .insert(memories)
+    .values({
+      userId,
+      projectId,
+      scope: projectId ? "project" : "user",
+      content: "line one\nline two\n",
+      tags: [],
+      embedding: Array(384).fill(0.5),
+      lastEditedBy: userId,
+    })
+    .returning({ id: memories.id });
+  return r[0]!.id;
+}
+
+async function setShareAccess(access: "ro" | "rw") {
+  await db
+    .insert(projectShares)
+    .values({ projectId: sharedProjectId, groupId: sharedGroupId, access })
+    .onConflictDoUpdate({
+      target: [projectShares.projectId, projectShares.groupId],
+      set: { access },
+    });
+}
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  const me = await db
+    .insert(users)
+    .values({ oidcSub: "mut-me", oidcIss: ISS })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: users.id });
+  const myId =
+    me[0]?.id ??
+    (
+      await db.select({ id: users.id }).from(users).where(eq(users.oidcSub, "mut-me"))
+    )[0]!.id;
+
+  const other = await db
+    .insert(users)
+    .values({ oidcSub: "mut-other", oidcIss: ISS })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: users.id });
+  otherUserId =
+    other[0]?.id ??
+    (
+      await db.select({ id: users.id }).from(users).where(eq(users.oidcSub, "mut-other"))
+    )[0]!.id;
+
+  const p = await db
+    .insert(projects)
+    .values({ userId: otherUserId, key: "mut-shared", displayName: "Shared" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: projects.id });
+  sharedProjectId =
+    p[0]?.id ??
+    (
+      await db
+        .select({ id: projects.id })
+        .from(projects)
+        .where(eq(projects.key, "mut-shared"))
+    )[0]!.id;
+
+  const g = await db
+    .insert(groups)
+    .values({ oidcIss: ISS, name: "mut-team" })
+    .onConflictDoNothing()
+    .returning({ id: groups.id });
+  sharedGroupId =
+    g[0]?.id ??
+    (
+      await db.select({ id: groups.id }).from(groups).where(eq(groups.name, "mut-team"))
+    )[0]!.id;
+
+  await db
+    .insert(userGroups)
+    .values({ userId: myId, groupId: sharedGroupId })
+    .onConflictDoNothing();
+
+  actor = { userId: myId, groups: ["mut-team"], via: "mcp" };
+});
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await db.delete(memories);
+  await setShareAccess("rw");
+});
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await db.delete(memories);
+  await pg.end();
+});
+
+describe("the ProjectResolver seam", () => {
+  test("a refusing resolver rejects an unknown project without creating one", async () => {
+    const res = await createMemory(
+      actor,
+      { content: "x", scope: "project", project: "brand-new-key", tags: [] },
+      refusingResolver,
+    );
+
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+    const rows = await db
+      .select({ id: projects.id })
+      .from(projects)
+      .where(eq(projects.key, "brand-new-key"));
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  test("a creating resolver makes the project and writes into it", async () => {
+    const res = await createMemory(
+      actor,
+      { content: "x", scope: "project", project: "made-on-demand", tags: [] },
+      creatingResolver(actor.userId),
+    );
+
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+    const rows = await db
+      .select({ id: projects.id })
+      .from(projects)
+      .where(eq(projects.key, "made-on-demand"));
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("authorization is uniform across mutations", () => {
+  // Each of these seeds a memory the actor AUTHORED, then downgrades the
+  // share to read-only. Authoring must not survive as a write privilege.
+  test("update is denied on a read-only share", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(actor.userId, sharedProjectId);
+    await setShareAccess("ro");
+
+    const res = await updateMemory(actor, { id, content: "edited" }, refusingResolver);
+
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("patch is denied on a read-only share", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(actor.userId, sharedProjectId);
+    await setShareAccess("ro");
+
+    const res = await patchMemory(actor, {
+      id,
+      old_string: "line one",
+      new_string: "line uno",
+    });
+
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("delete is denied on a read-only share", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(actor.userId, sharedProjectId);
+    await setShareAccess("ro");
+
+    const res = await softDeleteMemory(actor, { id });
+
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("all three are allowed again once the share is read-write", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(actor.userId, sharedProjectId);
+
+    expect((await updateMemory(actor, { id, content: "a\nb\n" }, refusingResolver)).ok).toBe(
+      true,
+    );
+    expect((await patchMemory(actor, { id, old_string: "a", new_string: "c" })).ok).toBe(
+      true,
+    );
+    expect((await softDeleteMemory(actor, { id })).ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("another user's user-scope memory is invisible to all three", async () => {
+    const id = await seedMemory(otherUserId, null);
+
+    expect((await updateMemory(actor, { id, content: "x" }, refusingResolver)).ok).toBe(
+      false,
+    );
+    expect(
+      (await patchMemory(actor, { id, old_string: "line one", new_string: "y" })).ok,
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect((await softDeleteMemory(actor, { id })).ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("audit trail records the originating surface", () => {
+  test("via: 'web' and via: 'mcp' are both preserved", async () => {
+    const webRes = await createMemory(
+      { ...actor, via: "web" },
+      { content: "from the web", scope: "user", tags: [] },
+      refusingResolver,
+    );
+    expect(webRes.ok).toBe(true);
+
+    const rows = await pg<{ actor: string }[]>`
+      SELECT actor FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'memory.write' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
+    `;
+    expect(rows[0]!.actor).toBe("web");
+  });
+});

apps/web/lib/memory-mutations.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+import { and, eq, isNull } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { db } from "@/lib/db/client";
+import { memories, projects, auditLog } from "@/lib/db/schema";
+import { embedText } from "@/lib/embedder";
+import { applyPatch } from "@/lib/memory-patch";
+import { CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR, canWriteProject } from "@/lib/access";
+import type {
+  MemoryDeleteInput,
+  MemoryPatchInput,
+  MemoryUpdateInput,
+  MemoryWriteInput,
+} from "@shared-memory/schemas";
+
+/**
+ * The single write path for memories.
+ *
+ * Both surfaces — the MCP tools and the Web UI Server Actions — used to
+ * reimplement authorize → mutate → re-embed → CAS → audit independently.
+ * They drifted: `memory.delete` over MCP skipped the project ACL whenever
+ * the caller happened to author the row, which `memory.update` and the
+ * whole Web UI did not. Consolidating here is what keeps those rules in
+ * one place, so a change to the sharing model can't be half-applied.
+ *
+ * Callers keep their own presentation concerns: MCP maps Outcome to a
+ * ToolResult, the Web UI throws and then revalidates/redirects.
+ */
+
+export interface Actor {
+  userId: string;
+  /** Group names, for project-share authorization. */
+  groups: string[];
+  /** Recorded as audit_log.actor so the two surfaces stay distinguishable. */
+  via: "web" | "mcp";
+}
+
+export type Outcome<T> = { ok: true; value: T } | { ok: false; error: string };
+
+const fail = (error: string): Outcome<never> => ({ ok: false, error });
+const succeed = <T>(value: T): Outcome<T> => ({ ok: true, value });
+
+/**
+ * Resolves a project key to an id for a write. Injected because this is
+ * the one place the two surfaces genuinely, deliberately differ: MCP
+ * refuses unknown projects (the caller is expected to run project.identify
+ * first), while the Web UI creates one owned by the user. Everything else
+ * about a write is identical.
+ */
+export type ProjectResolver = (key: string) => Promise<Outcome<string>>;
+
+interface WriteTarget {
+  scope: "project" | "user";
+  projectId: string | null;
+  userId: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The authorization rule for every mutating operation:
+ *   - user-scope  → only the owner may write (anything else reads as 404)
+ *   - project-scope → owner of the project, or a group with `rw`
+ *
+ * Authoring a row grants nothing on its own. A memory you wrote while a
+ * share was `rw` becomes read-only to you when an owner downgrades that
+ * share to `ro` — the project ACL is the authority, not the byline.
+ */
+async function authorizeWrite(actor: Actor, row: WriteTarget): Promise<Outcome<null>> {
+  if (row.scope === "user") {
+    return row.userId === actor.userId ? succeed(null) : fail("not found");
+  }
+  if (row.projectId) {
+    const allowed = await canWriteProject(actor.userId, actor.groups, row.projectId);
+    if (!allowed) return fail("no write access to this project");
+  }
+  return succeed(null);
+}
+
+export async function createMemory(
+  actor: Actor,
+  input: MemoryWriteInput,
+  resolveProject: ProjectResolver,
+): Promise<Outcome<{ id: string; createdAt: Date }>> {
+  let projectId: string | null = null;
+  const projectKey = input.scope === "project" ? input.project : undefined;
+
+  if (input.scope === "project") {
+    if (!projectKey) return fail("scope=project requires `project`");
+    const resolved = await resolveProject(projectKey);
+    if (!resolved.ok) return resolved;
+    projectId = resolved.value;
+    const allowed = await canWriteProject(actor.userId, actor.groups, projectId);
+    if (!allowed) return fail(`no write access to project '${projectKey}'`);
+  }
+
+  // Embed inline so the new memory is searchable immediately. Slower
+  // writes (~50–150 ms) are an acceptable price for that guarantee.
+  const embedding = await embedText(input.content);
+
+  const inserted = await db
+    .insert(memories)
+    .values({
+      userId: actor.userId,
+      projectId,
+      scope: input.scope,
+      content: input.content,
+      tags: input.tags ?? [],
+      embedding,
+      lastEditedBy: actor.userId,
+    })
+    .returning({ id: memories.id, createdAt: memories.createdAt });
+
+  const row = inserted[0]!;
+  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
+    userId: actor.userId,
+    actor: actor.via,
+    action: "memory.write",
+    entityType: "memory",
+    entityId: row.id,
+    payload: {
+      scope: input.scope,
+      projectKey: projectKey ?? null,
+      tags: input.tags ?? [],
+    },
+  });
+
+  return succeed(row);
+}
+
+export interface MutatedMemory {
+  id: string;
+  updatedAt: Date;
+  version: number;
+}
+
+export async function updateMemory(
+  actor: Actor,
+  input: MemoryUpdateInput,
+  resolveProject: ProjectResolver,
+): Promise<Outcome<MutatedMemory>> {
+  const existingRows = await db
+    .select({
+      id: memories.id,
+      content: memories.content,
+      scope: memories.scope,
+      projectId: memories.projectId,
+      projectKey: projects.key,
+      version: memories.version,
+      userId: memories.userId,
+    })
+    .from(memories)
+    .leftJoin(projects, eq(memories.projectId, projects.id))
+    .where(and(eq(memories.id, input.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
+    .limit(1);
+  const existing = existingRows[0];
+  if (!existing) return fail("not found");
+
+  const authorized = await authorizeWrite(actor, existing);
+  if (!authorized.ok) return authorized;
+
+  const update: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    updatedAt: new Date(),
+    lastEditedBy: actor.userId,
+    version: existing.version + 1,
+  };
+  if (input.tags !== undefined) update.tags = input.tags;
+  if (input.content !== undefined && input.content !== existing.content) {
+    update.content = input.content;
+    update.embedding = await embedText(input.content);
+  }
+
+  let scopeChanged = false;
+  let projectChanged = false;
+  let newProjectKey: string | null = existing.projectKey ?? null;
+
+  if (input.scope !== undefined) {
+    if (input.scope === "user") {
+      if (existing.scope !== "user") {
+        update.scope = "user";
+        scopeChanged = true;
+      }
+      if (existing.projectId !== null) {
+        update.projectId = null;
+        projectChanged = true;
+        newProjectKey = null;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // scope === 'project' — the schema refine guarantees `project` is set.
+      // Moving INTO a project requires write access there.
+      const projectKey = input.project!;
+      const resolved = await resolveProject(projectKey);
+      if (!resolved.ok) return resolved;
+      const targetId = resolved.value;
+      const allowed = await canWriteProject(actor.userId, actor.groups, targetId);
+      if (!allowed) return fail(`no write access to project '${projectKey}'`);
+
+      if (existing.scope !== "project") {
+        update.scope = "project";
+        scopeChanged = true;
+      }
+      if (existing.projectId !== targetId) {
+        update.projectId = targetId;
+        projectChanged = true;
+        newProjectKey = projectKey;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  const updated = await casUpdate(input.id, update, input.version ?? existing.version);
+  if (!updated) return fail(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
+
+  const auditFields = Object.keys(update).filter(
+    (k) => k !== "updatedAt" && k !== "version" && k !== "lastEditedBy",
+  );
+  const auditPayload: Record<string, unknown> = { fields: auditFields };
+  if (scopeChanged || projectChanged) {
+    auditPayload.scope = { from: existing.scope, to: update.scope ?? existing.scope };
+    auditPayload.projectKey = { from: existing.projectKey ?? null, to: newProjectKey };
+  }
+
+  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
+    userId: actor.userId,
+    actor: actor.via,
+    action: "memory.update",
+    entityType: "memory",
+    entityId: updated.id,
+    payload: auditPayload,
+  });
+
+  return succeed(updated);
+}
+
+export async function patchMemory(
+  actor: Actor,
+  input: MemoryPatchInput,
+): Promise<Outcome<MutatedMemory & { contentLength: number; delta: number }>> {
+  const existingRows = await db
+    .select({
+      content: memories.content,
+      scope: memories.scope,
+      projectId: memories.projectId,
+      version: memories.version,
+      userId: memories.userId,
+    })
+    .from(memories)
+    .where(and(eq(memories.id, input.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
+    .limit(1);
+  const existing = existingRows[0];
+  if (!existing) return fail("not found");
+
+  const authorized = await authorizeWrite(actor, existing);
+  if (!authorized.ok) return authorized;
+
+  const patch = applyPatch(existing.content, input.old_string, input.new_string);
+  if (!patch.ok) return fail(patch.error);
+
+  const updated = await casUpdate(
+    input.id,
+    {
+      content: patch.content,
+      embedding: await embedText(patch.content),
+      updatedAt: new Date(),
+      lastEditedBy: actor.userId,
+      version: existing.version + 1,
+    },
+    input.version ?? existing.version,
+  );
+  if (!updated) return fail(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
+
+  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
+    userId: actor.userId,
+    actor: actor.via,
+    action: "memory.patch",
+    entityType: "memory",
+    entityId: updated.id,
+    payload: {
+      fields: ["content"],
+      patch: {
+        offset: existing.content.indexOf(input.old_string),
+        removed: input.old_string.length,
+        added: input.new_string.length,
+      },
+    },
+  });
+
+  return succeed({
+    ...updated,
+    contentLength: patch.content.length,
+    delta: patch.content.length - existing.content.length,
+  });
+}
+
+export async function softDeleteMemory(
+  actor: Actor,
+  input: MemoryDeleteInput,
+): Promise<Outcome<{ id: string }>> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select({
+      id: memories.id,
+      userId: memories.userId,
+      projectId: memories.projectId,
+      scope: memories.scope,
+      version: memories.version,
+    })
+    .from(memories)
+    .where(and(eq(memories.id, input.id), isNull(memories.deletedAt)))
+    .limit(1);
+  const existing = rows[0];
+  if (!existing) return fail("not found");
+
+  const authorized = await authorizeWrite(actor, existing);
+  if (!authorized.ok) return authorized;
+
+  const updated = await db
+    .update(memories)
+    .set({ deletedAt: new Date(), lastEditedBy: actor.userId })
+    .where(
+      and(
+        eq(memories.id, input.id),
+        eq(memories.version, input.version ?? existing.version),
+        isNull(memories.deletedAt),
+      ),
+    )
+    .returning({ id: memories.id });
+
+  if (!updated[0]) return fail(CONCURRENT_EDIT_ERROR);
+
+  await db.insert(auditLog).values({
+    userId: actor.userId,
+    actor: actor.via,
+    action: "memory.delete",
+    entityType: "memory",
+    entityId: updated[0].id,
+  });
+
+  return succeed(updated[0]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compare-and-set on `version`. A zero-row result means a peer edited the
+ * row between our read and this write. Callers that omit an explicit
+ * version pass the one they just read, which still closes the read-
+ * modify-write window inside a single handler.
+ */
+async function casUpdate(
+  id: string,
+  update: Record<string, unknown>,
+  expectedVersion: number,
+): Promise<MutatedMemory | null> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .update(memories)
+    .set(update)
+    .where(and(eq(memories.id, id), eq(memories.version, expectedVersion)))
+    .returning({
+      id: memories.id,
+      updatedAt: memories.updatedAt,
+      version: memories.version,
+    });
+  return rows[0] ?? null;
+}

apps/web/lib/memory-patch.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+import { describe, expect, test } from "vitest";
+import { applyPatch } from "@/lib/memory-patch";
+
+describe("applyPatch", () => {
+  test("replaces an old_string that occurs exactly once", () => {
+    const result = applyPatch("alpha beta gamma", "beta", "BETA");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (result.ok) expect(result.content).toBe("alpha BETA gamma");
+  });
+
+  test("refuses when old_string is absent, rather than silently doing nothing", () => {
+    const result = applyPatch("alpha beta gamma", "delta", "DELTA");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.error).toMatch(/not found/i);
+  });
+
+  test("refuses when old_string is ambiguous, and reports the match count", () => {
+    const result = applyPatch("x marks the spot, x marks it twice", "x", "y");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      expect(result.error).toMatch(/2/);
+      expect(result.error).toMatch(/match/i);
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("treats old_string literally, not as a regular expression", () => {
+    // A naive RegExp implementation would match "axb" here.
+    const result = applyPatch("axb and a.b", "a.b", "REPLACED");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (result.ok) expect(result.content).toBe("axb and REPLACED");
+  });
+
+  test("replaces a multi-line old_string, preserving surrounding text", () => {
+    const content = "## HEADING\n- one\n- two\n\n## OTHER\n";
+    const result = applyPatch(content, "## HEADING\n- one", "## HEADING\n- zero\n- one");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (result.ok) {
+      expect(result.content).toBe("## HEADING\n- zero\n- one\n- two\n\n## OTHER\n");
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("rejects a patch whose result would exceed the 64,000-char content limit", () => {
+    // The anchor must be unique, or the ambiguity check fires first and
+    // this stops testing the length limit at all.
+    const content = "A".repeat(63_950) + "ANCHOR";
+    const result = applyPatch(content, "ANCHOR", "B".repeat(100));
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.error).toMatch(/64,?000|limit/i);
+  });
+
+  test("rejects a no-op patch where new_string equals old_string", () => {
+    const result = applyPatch("alpha beta", "beta", "beta");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.error).toMatch(/identical|no-op|unchanged/i);
+  });
+
+  test("allows a patch that deletes text by replacing with an empty string", () => {
+    const result = applyPatch("keep this, drop this", ", drop this", "");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (result.ok) expect(result.content).toBe("keep this");
+  });
+
+  test("rejects a patch that would empty the memory entirely", () => {
+    const result = applyPatch("all of it", "all of it", "");
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.error).toMatch(/empty/i);
+  });
+});

apps/web/lib/memory-patch.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import { MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX } from "@shared-memory/schemas";
+
+/**
+ * Pure string-level semantics for `memory.patch`.
+ *
+ * Kept free of any DB or auth dependency so both the MCP tool handler and
+ * the Web UI can share it, and so the refuse-rather-than-clobber rules
+ * below are directly testable.
+ *
+ * The contract mirrors the file-editing primitive coding agents already
+ * use: an `old_string` that is absent or ambiguous is an ERROR, never a
+ * silent no-op and never an arbitrary pick. That refusal is the property
+ * that makes the operation safe to hand to an agent editing a shared
+ * document it cannot afford to corrupt.
+ */
+export type PatchOutcome =
+  | { ok: true; content: string }
+  | { ok: false; error: string };
+
+function countOccurrences(haystack: string, needle: string): number {
+  let count = 0;
+  let from = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    const at = haystack.indexOf(needle, from);
+    if (at === -1) return count;
+    count += 1;
+    // Advance past this match so overlapping matches aren't double-counted.
+    from = at + needle.length;
+  }
+}
+
+export function applyPatch(
+  content: string,
+  oldString: string,
+  newString: string,
+): PatchOutcome {
+  if (oldString === newString) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: "old_string and new_string are identical; the patch would change nothing",
+    };
+  }
+
+  const first = content.indexOf(oldString);
+  if (first === -1) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error:
+        "old_string not found in the memory content; nothing was changed. Fetch the memory with memory.get and copy the exact text you mean to replace.",
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Only pay for a full count once we know there's more than one match.
+  if (content.indexOf(oldString, first + oldString.length) !== -1) {
+    const count = countOccurrences(content, oldString);
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: `old_string matches ${count} times; it must match exactly once. Nothing was changed — include more surrounding context to identify the one you mean.`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const patched =
+    content.slice(0, first) + newString + content.slice(first + oldString.length);
+
+  if (patched.length === 0) {
+    return { ok: false, error: "the patch would leave the memory empty" };
+  }
+  if (patched.length > MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: `the patched content would be ${patched.length.toLocaleString("en-US")} characters, over the ${MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX.toLocaleString("en-US")}-character limit`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return { ok: true, content: patched };
+}

apps/web/package.json

@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
     "dev": "next dev --port 3000",
     "build": "next build",
     "start": "next start --port 3000",
-    "lint": "next lint",
+    "lint": "eslint .",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:watch": "vitest",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
     "db:generate": "drizzle-kit generate",
     "db:migrate": "tsx ./scripts/migrate.ts",
@@ -26,16 +28,18 @@
     "zod": "^3.23.8"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
+    "@eslint/eslintrc": "^3.3.6",
+    "@tailwindcss/postcss": "^4.0.0",
     "@types/node": "^22.10.2",
     "@types/react": "^19.0.2",
     "@types/react-dom": "^19.0.2",
-    "@tailwindcss/postcss": "^4.0.0",
     "drizzle-kit": "^0.30.1",
     "esbuild": "^0.24.2",
     "eslint": "^9.17.0",
     "eslint-config-next": "^15.1.0",
     "tailwindcss": "^4.0.0",
     "tsx": "^4.19.2",
-    "typescript": "^5.7.2"
+    "typescript": "^5.7.2",
+    "vitest": "^2"
   }
 }

apps/web/postcss.config.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
-export default {
+const config = {
   plugins: {
     "@tailwindcss/postcss": {},
   },
 };
+
+export default config;

apps/web/vitest.config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import { defineConfig } from "vitest/config";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+export default defineConfig({
+  resolve: {
+    alias: {
+      "@": fileURLToPath(new URL("./", import.meta.url)),
+    },
+  },
+  test: {
+    environment: "node",
+    include: ["lib/**/*.test.ts", "app/**/*.test.ts"],
+    setupFiles: ["./vitest.setup.ts"],
+    // Integration tests share one Postgres database; running files in
+    // parallel would let them clobber each other's rows.
+    fileParallelism: false,
+  },
+});

apps/web/vitest.setup.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/**
+ * Test environment. `lib/env.ts` validates a full production config at
+ * import time, so integration tests that touch the DB need these set
+ * before any module under test is loaded.
+ *
+ * Only DATABASE_URL points at anything real — a throwaway Postgres with
+ * pgvector. The OIDC/secret values exist purely to satisfy validation;
+ * tests construct a UserContext directly rather than going through auth.
+ */
+// NODE_ENV is set to "test" by vitest itself.
+//
+// DATABASE_URL points at a throwaway pgvector instance. The default assumes
+// the published port is reachable on localhost; when the test runner is
+// itself inside a container, export DATABASE_URL with the database
+// container's address instead. See README → Running the tests.
+process.env.DATABASE_URL ??= "postgres://test:test@127.0.0.1:55432/shared_memory_test";
+process.env.PUBLIC_URL ??= "http://localhost:3000";
+process.env.OIDC_ISSUER ??= "http://localhost:9000/application/o/test/";
+process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_ID_WEB ??= "test-web";
+process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_WEB ??= "test-web-secret";
+process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_ID_MCP ??= "test-mcp";
+process.env.OIDC_AUDIENCE ??= "test-audience";
+process.env.EMBEDDER_URL ??= "http://localhost:8080";
+process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET ??= "test-nextauth-secret-at-least-32-chars-long";
+process.env.CLI_TOKEN_SECRET ??= "test-cli-token-secret-at-least-32-chars-long";

docs/memory-api-improvements.md

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+# Decision record: memory read payloads and patch-style updates
+
+**Status:** P1 shipped · P2 shipped · P3 declined
+**Originated:** 2026-08-11, from live use of the deployed server
+**Revised:** 2026-08-11, against source
+**Closed:** 2026-08-11 — implemented in `feat/memory-patch-and-lean-get` (PR #19)
+
+This started as a proposal written from black-box observation of the deployed
+server. It is kept as a decision record because the reasoning behind what was
+built — and behind what was deliberately *not* built — is not recoverable from
+the diff.
+
+---
+
+## 0. Orientation
+
+Tools are defined internally with dots (`memory.get`) and surfaced to clients
+with underscores (`memory_get`). Don't let it confuse a grep.
+
+### Data model
+
+- Memories have `id` (uuid), `content`, `tags[]`, `scope` (`project` | `user`),
+  `projectId`, `visibility`, `version`, `lastEditedBy`, `createdAt`,
+  `updatedAt`, `deletedAt`, plus `userId`, `embedding`, and `contentTsv`
+  (`apps/web/lib/db/schema.ts`).
+- `scope: project` requires `project`; `scope: user` requires it omitted.
+- `version` is an optimistic-locking token, bumped on every successful update.
+  A stale `version` returns a concurrent-edit error.
+- Content limit is 64,000 chars (`packages/schemas/src/index.ts`).
+- Shared projects allow anyone with rw access to edit any memory — hence the
+  locking.
+
+---
+
+## 1. P1 — `memory_get` returned the embedding and the tsvector ✅ SHIPPED
+
+**Problem.** `memory_get` used a bare `select()` and returned the raw DB row,
+including the `embedding` vector and the `contentTsv` lexeme index. Both are
+Postgres retrieval internals with zero value to a model consumer.
+`memory_list` and `memory_search` already projected an explicit 9-field shape —
+`memory_get` was the only outlier.
+
+**Measured against the live server** on a ~13k-char memory:
+
+| | chars | share |
+|---|---|---|
+| `content` | 27,662 | 44.1% |
+| `contentTsv` | 29,912 | 47.7% |
+| `embedding` | 4,688 | 7.5% |
+| other 12 fields | 433 | 0.7% |
+| **total** | **62,695** | |
+
+Two distinct failure shapes, which the original draft had flattened together:
+
+- `embedding` is a **fixed** ~4,690-char tax on every read — 384 dims
+  regardless of content length. Nearly invisible on large memories (7.5%),
+  dominant on small ones (~58% of an ~8k response). Most memories are small.
+- `contentTsv` scales **super-linearly** with content (frequent lexemes
+  accumulate long position lists, ~21 chars/entry) and was the largest single
+  component of the large payload — larger than the content itself.
+
+**This was a correctness problem, not an efficiency nit.** Fetching that memory
+exceeded the MCP tool-output cap and spilled to a file, even though `content`
+alone is comfortably under the limit. `memory_get` was unusable on exactly the
+large living documents P2 exists to serve. At the 64,000-char content ceiling a
+response would land near 140,000 characters, under half of it content.
+
+**Shipped:** `memory_get` returns the same 9 fields as `memory_list` /
+`memory_search`. `userId` is still selected for the authorization check and
+stripped before responding.
+
+**Rejected: an `include: ("embedding" | "tsv")[]` opt-in.** The original draft
+proposed gating the fields behind a flag in case some caller needed them. No
+caller can: no MCP client can consume a 384-float vector or a lexeme index, and
+the Web UI never goes through the MCP tools (it reads via `lib/memories.ts` and
+writes via `lib/memory-actions.ts`). The parameter would have been dead on
+arrival.
+
+---
+
+## 2. P2 — patch-style updates ✅ SHIPPED
+
+**Problem.** `memory_update` accepted only full replacement. Adding four lines
+to a 13,000-char living document meant reproducing the entire document.
+
+**The evidence this was a real blocker.** The WHP roadmap mirror was three
+weeks and two shipped releases out of date. The agent that noticed **declined
+to fix it**, on the grounds that hand-reproducing 13k characters of shared team
+history to add one entry risked silently dropping some of it — a worse outcome
+than leaving it stale.
+
+That is the failure mode this was designed against: **when the only safe way to
+make a small edit is expensive, the edit doesn't happen.**
+
+**Shipped:** `memory_patch(id, old_string, new_string, version?)`
+
+| condition | behaviour |
+|---|---|
+| `old_string` absent | error — never a silent no-op |
+| `old_string` matches >1 | error naming the count — ambiguity never resolves arbitrarily |
+| matches exactly once | replace, bump `version`, re-embed |
+| stale `version` | concurrent-edit error |
+
+Both failure modes refuse rather than clobber. That is the property that makes
+the operation safe to hand to an agent editing a shared document it cannot
+afford to corrupt. Semantics live in `lib/memory-patch.ts` as a pure function,
+free of DB and auth, so both surfaces share them.
+
+**Locking came nearly free.** `memory.update` already computed
+`expectedVersion = version ?? existing.version`, falling back to the version
+read in the same handler. The CAS therefore already guarded the server-side
+read-modify-write; patch copies that shape and is race-safe even when the
+caller omits `version`. No explicit transaction was required.
+
+**Rejected: `memory_append` with a `section` parameter.** Proposed as sugar for
+heading-structured logs. Patch already covers that case exactly —
+`memory_patch(id, "## RECENTLY SHIPPED", "## RECENTLY SHIPPED\n- entry")` — and
+does so *with* the uniqueness guarantee: if the heading appears twice you get an
+error instead of an arbitrary insert. Implementing `section` would have meant
+defining heading-match semantics, insert position within a section, and
+duplicate-heading behaviour, for something patch handles for free.
+
+---
+
+## 3. P3 — deriving mirrors rather than relying on convention ❌ DECLINED
+
+**The problem as stated.** Some memories mirror local files. The sync is
+enforced only by a note in the file's own header: *"MIRRORED to shared-memory
+MCP … when you update this file, also `memory_update` that record."* That
+depends on whoever edits the file noticing the note and performing a second
+write. It went three weeks without one.
+
+Proposed shapes were: a server-side `memory_sync_from_file`, a staleness signal
+via `sourcePath` + content hash, or leaving it manual but cheap via P2.
+
+**Declined, 2026-08-11.** Three reasons, in order of weight:
+
+1. **The cause we have evidence for is now fixed.** The evidence was specific:
+   an agent *noticed* the drift and *declined* to fix it because the edit was
+   expensive and risky. That is a cost failure, not an attention failure. P2
+   makes that edit a single call. We have direct evidence for the cost cause
+   and none yet for any other.
+
+2. **It would likely be a mechanism for N=1.** One mirror is known to exist.
+   A `sourcePath` column, hash computation, and staleness plumbing is real
+   schema-and-sync work; building it to police a single document is
+   disproportionate.
+
+3. **If drift recurs, the better fix probably isn't sync machinery.** P3
+   assumes the mirror should exist and be kept honest. That assumption deserves
+   scrutiny first: the memory is a condensed prose rendition of a file that
+   lives in a container, existing separately only because the memory is
+   cross-machine and the file is not. Two hand-maintained sources of truth plus
+   a drift detector is strictly more machinery than one source of truth. The
+   cheaper answer would be to remove the duplication — make the memory
+   canonical and drop the file, or generate one from the other.
+
+**What would reopen this:** the roadmap going stale *again* now that patching
+is cheap. That is the clean experiment and it costs nothing to run. If it
+drifts again, the cause was attention rather than cost, and option 2 above — a
+staleness signal that makes drift *visible* rather than trying to fix it
+automatically — becomes worth its weight.
+
+Note for whoever picks this up: the mirror is **not** a byte copy of its local
+file. It is a condensed prose rendition with different headings and no
+wiki-links. A naive file-sync would destroy its established form. Any solution
+has to preserve that distinction or deliberately abandon it.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Structural work this depended on ✅ SHIPPED
+
+Neither of these was in the original proposal; both were found once the source
+was available.
+
+### 4.1 The write path was duplicated
+
+`updateMemoryAction` (Web UI) and the `memory.update` MCP handler each
+reimplemented authorize → mutate → re-embed → CAS → audit. Neither delegated to
+a shared helper, and they had **drifted**: `memory.delete` over MCP skipped the
+project ACL whenever the caller authored the row, so a memory written while a
+share was `rw` stayed deletable by its author after an owner downgraded that
+share to `ro`. `memory.update` and the entire Web UI always checked.
+
+Both surfaces now route through `lib/memory-mutations.ts`. Authoring a row
+grants no standing write privilege on any path — the project ACL is the
+authority, not the byline. This was a behaviour change, shipped deliberately,
+and is covered by a test that fails against the old code.
+
+The one genuine difference between the surfaces is injected as a
+`ProjectResolver`: MCP refuses an unknown project key (`call project.identify
+first`) so an agent cannot spawn near-miss projects off a typo, while the Web
+UI creates one, because a person typing a name into a form means to.
+
+### 4.2 There was no test infrastructure
+
+No vitest, no jest, no test files, no `test` script. Added vitest, with
+integration tests running against a real Postgres rather than a mocked DB.
+Setup is documented in the README.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Invariants — preserve these
+
+- **Optimistic locking.** `version` must keep working, and every new mutating
+  primitive must accept it. Shared projects have concurrent editors.
+- **Scope/project rules.** `scope: project` ⇒ `project` required and must
+  already exist on the MCP path; `scope: user` ⇒ `project` omitted.
+- **Re-embedding on content change — and note what this does NOT cover.**
+  `content_tsv` is `GENERATED ALWAYS AS (to_tsvector('english',
+  coalesce(content, ''))) STORED` (`apps/web/drizzle/0000_init.sql`), so
+  Postgres maintains it and **full-text search cannot rot**. Only `embedding`
+  requires an explicit recompute. Any new mutation path must re-embed, or
+  *semantic* retrieval degrades silently while FTS keeps working — which is
+  exactly what makes the failure hard to notice.
+- **Stable `id` across edits.** Never implement an edit as delete + recreate.
+- **64,000-char content limit** enforced after a patch is applied, not just on
+  the incoming fragment.
+- **Audit trail.** Partial edits record match offset and length delta, not just
+  the changed field names.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Acceptance checks
+
+**P1** — verified in tests; the payload figures need a deploy to confirm.
+- ✅ Response contains neither `embedding` nor `contentTsv`.
+- ✅ Field set matches `memory_list` / `memory_search` exactly (9, down from 14).
+- ⏳ Large specimen drops 62,695 → ~28,100 chars (−55%); small specimen ~−75%.
+- ⏳ `memory_get` on `aaea192c-edce-4372-b011-5113a02dea16` returns inline
+  instead of spilling to a file. **This is the check that matters** — it is the
+  difference between the tool working and not working on large memories.
+
+**P2** — all verified against a real Postgres.
+- ✅ Unique `old_string` → applied; `version` incremented by exactly 1.
+- ✅ Absent `old_string` → error; content byte-identical afterward.
+- ✅ `old_string` occurring twice → error naming the count; content unchanged.
+- ✅ Stale `version` → concurrent-edit error; content unchanged.
+- ✅ Content exceeding 64,000 chars post-patch → rejected.
+- ✅ Re-embedding — see the caveat below.
+
+**A trap in the re-embedding check.** The original draft proposed "after a
+patch, `memory_search` finds text introduced by that patch." *That test does not
+work.* Search fuses three rankers via RRF, and because `content_tsv` is a
+generated column the FTS ranker finds the literal inserted text **even if the
+patch skipped re-embedding entirely** — it would pass on a broken
+implementation. The shipped test asserts the **stored vector changed**, using a
+deterministic per-text embedder stub. A separate test pins that `content_tsv`
+updates itself, documenting why the naive check is misleading.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Test specimen
+
+Memory `aaea192c-edce-4372-b011-5113a02dea16` (project
+`cloud-hosting-platform/whp`, tags `roadmap` / `progress-tracker` / `planning`)
+is a good real-world subject: ~13k chars, heading-structured, and its local
+counterpart is
+`/home/claude/.claude/projects/-workspace/memory/project_roadmap.md`.
+
+**It is live team data.** Check its `updatedAt` and `version` before using it as
+a fixture, and prefer a scratch memory for destructive tests.

package.json

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
     "build": "pnpm -r build",
     "dev": "pnpm --filter @shared-memory/web dev",
     "lint": "pnpm -r lint",
+    "test": "pnpm -r test",
     "typecheck": "pnpm -r typecheck",
     "db:generate": "pnpm --filter @shared-memory/web db:generate",
     "db:migrate": "pnpm --filter @shared-memory/web db:migrate"

packages/schemas/src/index.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ export const ProjectKey = z
   .regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9._\-/]+$/, "project key may only contain alphanumerics, ._-/");
 export type ProjectKey = z.infer<typeof ProjectKey>;
 
-export const MemoryContent = z.string().min(1).max(64_000);
+export const MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX = 64_000;
+export const MemoryContent = z.string().min(1).max(MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX);
 
 export const Tags = z
   .array(z.string().min(1).max(64).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9._\-]+$/, "tag must be alphanumeric ._-"))
@@ -84,6 +85,19 @@ export const MemoryUpdateInput = z.object({
   });
 export type MemoryUpdateInput = z.infer<typeof MemoryUpdateInput>;
 
+// memory.patch replaces ONE exact occurrence of `old_string`. Absent or
+// ambiguous matches are errors, never silent no-ops — see applyPatch.
+// `new_string` may be empty (a deletion); the resulting content still has
+// to satisfy MemoryContent, which is checked after the patch is applied.
+export const MemoryPatchInput = z.object({
+  id: z.string().uuid(),
+  old_string: z.string().min(1).max(MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX),
+  new_string: z.string().max(MEMORY_CONTENT_MAX),
+  // Same optimistic-locking token as memory.update.
+  version: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
+});
+export type MemoryPatchInput = z.infer<typeof MemoryPatchInput>;
+
 export const MemorySearchInput = z.object({
   query: z.string().min(1).max(2000),
   project: ProjectKey.optional(),