Files
shared-memory/apps/web/lib/auth/jwt.ts
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 4.7 7712023c32 feat(phase-4a): groups sync + X-Project-Key header substrate
Foundational work for the upcoming group-scoped sharing feature.

Schema (migration 0003_groups.sql + drizzle schema):
  - memory_access enum ('ro' | 'rw') reserved for Agent B's project_shares
  - groups (id, oidc_iss, name, display_name, …) keyed by (oidc_iss, name)
    so different IdPs can both have e.g. "platform" without colliding
  - user_groups (user_id, group_id, synced_at) PK (user_id, group_id)

Auth (auth.ts + lib/auth/sync-groups.ts):
  - jwt callback now syncs `profile.groups` after upserting the user
  - syncUserGroupsFromClaim runs in a single tx: upserts each group,
    inserts new memberships, deletes ones no longer in the claim
  - missing/empty claim → user has zero groups (wipe memberships)
  - EntraID GUID-vs-name edge case: we treat whatever strings the claim
    emits as names verbatim; groups overage (>200 groups → no claim)
    is documented as unsupported in v1

UserContext + JWT (lib/mcp/context.ts, lib/auth/jwt.ts):
  - AuthenticatedClaims.groups surfaced from verified JWT payload
  - UserContext.groups: string[] — live from OIDC token claim, falls
    back to DB snapshot for CLI (HMAC) tokens which carry no claim
  - UserContext.defaultProjectKey: optional, set from header

MCP route (app/api/mcp/route.ts):
  - reads X-Project-Key header, validates against ProjectKey Zod schema,
    400 on invalid; empty/missing leaves defaultProjectKey undefined
  - auto-upserts the header-supplied project so first-use works without
    a separate project.identify call

Tools (lib/mcp/tools.ts):
  - withDefaultProject helper injects ctx.defaultProjectKey when the
    caller omits `project`. Per-tool defaultScope hint avoids breaking
    snippet.put (user-scope default) while making memory.write
    (project-scope default) honor the header
  - applied to memory.write/list/search/update and all snippet.* tools

Web UI:
  - /settings/groups debug page lists current memberships with synced_at
    and a clear empty state pointing at README troubleshooting
  - /settings/tokens grows a "Pin to project" dropdown; selected key is
    baked into the generated `claude mcp add` snippet as
    `--header "X-Project-Key: <key>"`. The JWT itself stays
    identity-only — pinning is purely a UX shortcut
  - settings landing page links to /settings/groups
  - README troubleshooting bullet covers the empty-groups path for
    Authentik / EntraID / Keycloak

Refactor:
  - extracted resolveProjectId + upsertProject from memory-actions.ts
    into lib/projects.ts so the MCP route can reuse upsertProject

Verification:
  - pnpm typecheck clean
  - SKIP_ENV_VALIDATION=true pnpm build clean; /settings/groups in route table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 09:39:47 -07:00

144 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify, errors as joseErrors } from "jose";
import type { JWTPayload } from "jose";
import { env } from "@/lib/env";
import { CLI_TOKEN_KID, tokenKid, verifyCliToken } from "./cli-token";
/**
* Authenticates a bearer token presented to the MCP endpoint. Two token
* kinds are accepted, dispatched by the JWT `kid` header:
*
* - Authentik-issued OIDC access tokens (any kid) — verified against
* Authentik's JWKS over the network.
* - CLI tokens minted at /connect (kid="cli-v1") — verified locally
* with the HMAC CLI_TOKEN_SECRET.
*
* Both resolve to the same `AuthenticatedClaims` shape so downstream code
* (`userContextFromClaims`) doesn't care which path produced them.
*
* This is distinct from the NextAuth session cookie path used by the Web UI.
*/
type GlobalWithJwks = typeof globalThis & {
__sharedMemoryJwks?: ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>;
};
const g = globalThis as GlobalWithJwks;
function jwks() {
if (g.__sharedMemoryJwks) return g.__sharedMemoryJwks;
// Authentik discovery is at `${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
// the JWKS URI is normally `${issuer}/jwks/` or `${issuer}/.well-known/jwks.json`.
// Authentik canonically serves `${issuer}/jwks/`.
const issuer = env().OIDC_ISSUER.replace(/\/$/, "");
const url = new URL(`${issuer}/jwks/`);
g.__sharedMemoryJwks = createRemoteJWKSet(url, {
cacheMaxAge: 10 * 60 * 1000, // 10 min
cooldownDuration: 30 * 1000,
});
return g.__sharedMemoryJwks;
}
export interface AuthenticatedClaims extends JWTPayload {
sub: string;
iss: string;
/**
* Group names from the OIDC `groups` claim. Authentik / Keycloak / properly-
* configured EntraID emit `string[]` here. We coerce non-array / non-string
* entries away and present an empty array if the claim is absent. For CLI
* (HMAC) tokens this is always undefined — the consumer (userContextFromClaims)
* falls back to the DB snapshot from the user's last interactive sign-in.
*/
groups?: string[];
}
export class UnauthorizedError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly reason: string,
public readonly wwwAuthenticate: string,
) {
super(reason);
this.name = "UnauthorizedError";
}
}
/**
* Pull `groups` off a verified OIDC payload as a clean `string[]`. Non-
* string entries are dropped silently. Returns undefined when the claim
* is absent so callers can distinguish "no claim emitted" from "user is
* in zero groups" (`[]`).
*/
function extractGroupsClaim(payload: JWTPayload): string[] | undefined {
const raw = (payload as { groups?: unknown }).groups;
if (raw === undefined || raw === null) return undefined;
if (!Array.isArray(raw)) return [];
const out: string[] = [];
for (const v of raw) {
if (typeof v === "string" && v.trim().length > 0) out.push(v.trim());
}
return out;
}
function buildWwwAuthenticate(error?: string, description?: string): string {
const parts: string[] = [`Bearer realm="OAuth"`];
// RFC 9728 — point clients at our protected-resource metadata so they can
// discover the authorization server.
parts.push(`resource_metadata="${env().PUBLIC_URL.replace(/\/$/, "")}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"`);
if (error) parts.push(`error="${error}"`);
if (description) parts.push(`error_description="${description.replace(/"/g, "'")}"`);
return parts.join(", ");
}
export async function authenticateBearer(authHeader: string | null): Promise<AuthenticatedClaims> {
if (!authHeader || !authHeader.toLowerCase().startsWith("bearer ")) {
throw new UnauthorizedError("missing bearer token", buildWwwAuthenticate());
}
const token = authHeader.slice("bearer ".length).trim();
if (!token) {
throw new UnauthorizedError("empty bearer token", buildWwwAuthenticate("invalid_token"));
}
// Dispatch by kid: CLI tokens are verified locally, everything else goes
// through Authentik JWKS. We never attempt JWKS verification for CLI
// tokens (or vice versa) so a kid mismatch fails fast.
const isCliToken = tokenKid(token) === CLI_TOKEN_KID;
try {
if (isCliToken) {
const claims = await verifyCliToken(token);
// CLI tokens carry the user's real Authentik identity in oidc_iss /
// oidc_sub. Surface those on the standard claims shape so user
// context resolution is identical to the Authentik path. CLI tokens
// never carry a groups claim — leave `groups` undefined; the user-
// context resolver falls back to the DB snapshot.
return {
...claims,
iss: claims.oidc_iss,
sub: claims.oidc_sub,
} as AuthenticatedClaims;
}
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, jwks(), {
issuer: env().OIDC_ISSUER,
audience: env().OIDC_AUDIENCE,
});
if (!payload.sub) {
throw new UnauthorizedError(
"token missing sub claim",
buildWwwAuthenticate("invalid_token", "missing sub"),
);
}
return { ...payload, groups: extractGroupsClaim(payload) } as AuthenticatedClaims;
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof UnauthorizedError) throw err;
const desc =
err instanceof joseErrors.JWTExpired
? "token expired"
: err instanceof joseErrors.JWTInvalid
? "token invalid"
: err instanceof joseErrors.JWTClaimValidationFailed
? `claim invalid: ${err.claim}`
: "verification failed";
throw new UnauthorizedError(desc, buildWwwAuthenticate("invalid_token", desc));
}
}