Files
shared-memory/apps/web/app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/[...path]/route.ts
T
shadowdaoandClaude Opus 5 3be9135aee docs: correct the segment-decoding comment on the catch-all route
Review caught the stated invariant being false. Next splits the matched
suffix on literal `/` before decoding each piece, so a segment can be empty
(`api//mcp`) and a single segment can carry a decoded slash (`api%2Fmcp`).
Neither reaches the allowlist — both fail closed — but the comment claimed
an invariant the router does not provide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 16:32:46 -07:00

64 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
import { buildResourceMetadata, publicOrigin } from "@/lib/auth/resource-metadata";
export const runtime = "nodejs";
export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
/**
* Resource paths this deployment will publish metadata for.
*
* An allowlist rather than a wildcard, for two reasons. RFC 9728 §3.1 maps a
* metadata URL to one specific protected resource, so answering for arbitrary
* paths would advertise resources this app does not serve — a client could
* "discover" `https://host/anything` as an OAuth-protected resource and be
* told, wrongly, that tokens for it are obtainable from our IdP. And every
* path that answers is surface: a wildcard turns this into an open reflector
* that echoes attacker-chosen path segments back inside a JSON document.
*
* `api/mcp` is the only MCP endpoint here (app/api/mcp/route.ts). Add an
* entry when a second one ships — not before.
*/
const METADATA_RESOURCE_PATHS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(["api/mcp"]);
/**
* RFC 9728 §3.1 — path-suffixed protected resource metadata.
*
* For a resource identified by `https://host/api/mcp`, the spec puts its
* metadata at `https://host/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp`:
* the resource's path is appended to the well-known path. Clients that derive
* the metadata URL from the MCP endpoint URL — rather than reading
* `resource_metadata` off our 401's `WWW-Authenticate` header — probe that URL
* first, and before this route existed they got Next.js's 404 HTML page, which
* fails discovery with a JSON parse error rather than anything diagnosable.
*
* The document is identical to the root one except for `resource`, which must
* name the suffixed identifier: §3.3 requires the client to check that the
* returned `resource` equals the identifier it asked about, so echoing the
* bare origin here would make a strict client reject the document outright.
*/
export async function GET(
_req: Request,
ctx: { params: Promise<{ path: string[] }> },
): Promise<NextResponse> {
const { path } = await ctx.params;
// Next splits the matched suffix on literal `/` and only then decodes each
// piece, so a segment can be empty (`api//mcp` -> ["api","","mcp"]) and a
// single segment can itself contain a decoded slash (`api%2Fmcp` -> one
// element, "api/mcp"). Join and compare on the same normalized form the
// allowlist is written in, and let anything else fail closed.
const resourcePath = path.join("/");
if (!METADATA_RESOURCE_PATHS.has(resourcePath)) {
// JSON, not the HTML 404 page, so a client that probes a wrong path gets
// a parseable answer instead of the failure mode this route exists to fix.
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: "not_found", error_description: "no such protected resource" },
{ status: 404 },
);
}
return NextResponse.json(
buildResourceMetadata(`${publicOrigin()}/${resourcePath}`),
);
}