336 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
336 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
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Episode: 3841
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Title: HPR3841: The Oh No! News.
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3841/hpr3841.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 06:23:20
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3841 from Monday the 24th of April 2023.
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Today's show is entitled The Oh No News.
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It is hosted by some guy on the internet and is about 21 minutes long.
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It carries a clean flag.
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The summary is, Scotie and Bumblebee discusses U.S. Marshall's service ransomware attack
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and more.
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Hello and welcome to another episode of Hacker Public Radio.
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I'm your host, some guy on the internet and I'm here with...
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Hi, I'm Bumblebee.
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Let's begin The Oh No News.
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Let's start with threat analysis, your attack surface.
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In our first article, U.S. Marshall service computer systems hit by ransomware attack.
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Oh no!
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The ransomware attackers, known as Scorch, has hit a computer systems at the U.S. Marshall
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services.
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All right, B, what do you know about ransomware?
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Not much, to be honest.
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If I think about it, I just think that if you hear the word ransom, you think that something
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is being taken and that you need to either pay or give something as leverage or something
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like that.
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I don't...
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That's the only thing I could think of.
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Is it something like that?
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Very, very close.
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That is the gist of it.
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Rantomware is software malware that usually encrypts a victim's systems, their servers, their
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data, and then the user is locked out of that data because they don't have the encryption
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key.
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The users then give in a message, you know, an ultimatum either pay the attacker to get
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the key to then decrypt their data.
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The federal government has put in place guidelines instructing U.S. companies to not only report
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when these incidents occur, but also not to pay the ransom.
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Which I can understand that it just makes people do it over again.
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If you're good to humor that behavior, that is what's going to happen.
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But I can understand the feeling of wanting to go away and you just do that so I can understand.
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No, in this case, because it's the United States Marshall services, these criminal actors
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are attacking law enforcement in this situation.
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So they're not just out attacking your local businesses target Walmart in the other healthcare
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industries.
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They're actually attacking the people who would ultimately pursue the criminals out of
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all the things to hack into hacking into the U.S. government federal government is not
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a smart idea.
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I would agree 100% on that.
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Now one of the ways that ransomware spreads or a victim encounters ransomware is usually
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through email a victim clicks on something in an email.
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It looks like a legitimate form or document or whatever, but what they don't realize is
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that document has been infected with the malware payload.
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The payload is designed to quietly in the background begin encrypting all of the user's
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data.
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Most of the time they're designed to spread.
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So if your computer is connected to a network, it will begin to spread to other devices
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on the network.
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So if you're connected to a backup server, it will spread to that backup server and
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it will begin encrypting all of the data on the backup server as well.
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Not only does it deny the user's access to their data, but it also sends the data back
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to the attackers.
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Now encrypting all of the user's data has two functions.
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One, it denies the user access to their own data.
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And two, it also prevents the users or limits the user's ability to discover how the attackers
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infiltrated the system.
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So any tracks left behind by the attackers are now covered by the encryption.
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What is the reason for them to do it to see if they can do it?
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Obviously, they're not asking for money because that doesn't make sense because they know
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if anyone knows the US government would never pay them, what information are they trying
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to receive or take that the US marshals have?
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That's my question.
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Very good question.
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Remember when I mentioned that the ransomware has two functions.
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One, encrypts the data so that the user cannot have access to it.
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The second function of it is to cover their tracks while the attackers steal the data.
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They mention that federal judges, as well as other criminal fugitives, a lot of that
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data was being stored on the service.
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So legal processes, administrative information, and other personally identifiable information
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pertaining to the subjects of the United States Marshall Service investigation, as well
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as third party information, and US Marshall employees information was stolen.
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So basically they are able to identify undercover agents, judges, decisions that are being
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made, and all of the underworkings that are being held or administrative by the US Marshall
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Services.
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Yeah, because I was thinking the same thing, very similar things, because anyone that
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is employed, when you do an employee, you give them your home address.
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It may be their direct deposits are in there.
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I think about that too, but I more think of people safety more than them trying to steal
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someone's identity.
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Obviously, they were looking for something, but it's terrifying.
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They won't pay, but, and it doesn't say anywhere that there was even a ransom.
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If these people aren't asking for anything in return, that means they were fishing for information.
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They were fact finding, which is, in my personal opinion, even more scary than them asking
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for money.
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Exactly.
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They are, as you put fact finding in this attack, this attack potentially revealed a lot
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of strategies that the US Marshall Services had up their sleeves, and it's now floating
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around on the internet.
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Some attacker is possibly bidding this information out to whomever is willing to pay for it.
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So this kind of information has very deep consequences behind it.
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But it also shows the intelligence of these people.
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For someone like me and you, to have, like you said, three backups.
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I mean, I have so many backups.
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So if someone happened to hack my computer, I'm like, all right, I'll just wipe my hard drive
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and then get my other hard drive to back everything back up.
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And there's no worry.
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I mean, it's inconvenient, yes.
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But I don't sit here and I'm not going to write home about for them to be able to hack
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the government, which a lot of people that are in the government are MIT graduates and
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all of these very skilled individuals.
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And for them to be able to get through that, that is very telling on who these people are.
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No matter how brilliant we are, if we don't keep ourselves informed and follow best practices
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will all eventually succumb to these type of attacks.
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So it's not a matter of when or it's not a matter of how it's a matter of when for us.
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Now next story, major data breach for US lawmakers and staff in this story.
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Our US Congress suffered a major data breach attackers claim to have stolen information
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for over 170,000 people over at the US Congress.
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That's the House of Representative and US Senate.
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Some of this information included social security numbers and birthdays.
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So this is very, very valuable information.
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So B, what do you think about this attack?
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I think it's devastating.
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This criminal has all of this information from hundreds of thousands of people.
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What they can do with this information, whether they sell it or use it, is really terrifying.
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We just don't know what they're going to do with it.
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You're right.
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Now also in this attack, they mentioned the potential for fishing.
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So these lawmakers and their staffers are not only going to have to one, review security
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protocol, but two, now they have to go and update others on the protocol, meaning other
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family members so that may be experiencing attacks in the future.
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People don't realize that when they're looking for something, they may not be looking for
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one individual.
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They may be looking for hundreds of thousands just to have information.
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Their families, they have their social security numbers on there.
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Their emails, their birthdays, their phone numbers, their home addresses, everything.
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When I was reading one of the headlines, they talked about that they're having security
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for these people now because of this.
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These are government officials, the highest of what we have.
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Even if these hackers didn't have the intention to physically harm them, the information that
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they're selling to other people, they might have that intent.
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Now, B, you mentioned security that they're going to be providing the lawmakers.
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Are we talking about, you know, secret service or something here?
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Not at this moment, mostly it's identity protection.
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Oh, I got what you're saying, the identity and credit protection, the monitoring services
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got you.
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Absolutely.
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It'd be very difficult for them to have hundreds and thousands of them having, like you
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said, secret service.
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I mean, I wouldn't be surprised that they're doing that for the regular house representative,
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but I'm not certain if they're doing it for staff.
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On our next summit, we are going to talk about the owner of breach forms was arrested
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for conspiracy to commit access device fraud.
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All right.
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So in this story, this breach forms was where they sell data, so what do you think about
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this?
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Well, it's really interesting because if you remember the last segment we were talking
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about the politicians and the providers in the US House of Representatives, all of their
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information was stolen and well, it was stolen and sold on this site.
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They attempted to sell all the personal information on breach forms website.
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So that being said, currently he was arrested on March 15th and he received bail on the
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16th and he is supposed to be in court on the 24th.
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Oh, man.
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So we're talking about a place where attackers actually take their stolen data, go to
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a bidding site to then sell that data.
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This bidding site was seized by the FBI and the attacker who ran it was put in jail for
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what sort of cybercrime was he charged with conspiracy to commit access device fraud.
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Right now they're not releasing much information based on the court case, but what they are
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saying is that they did seize all of his information, his documents, everything that he had
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on it and right now they're trying to see who he bought it from.
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Oh, so they're doing a trace investigation now.
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Wow, well, I hope they end up finding out the links in this chain and bring them all
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down actually because this is scary.
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Absolutely, because at the moment they don't they don't have much information on whose
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stole said documents and information, but they do know where is being sold.
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So which is terrifying.
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All of these things could be sold and put on the black market or even have it as public
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view.
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It's easy to change a phone number and change an email, you can't change a birthday
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or your social.
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Yeah, you're right.
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So in our next story, it turns out it's a remote admin tool or it was disguised as
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in a remote admin tool, but it was actually malware.
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Well, it's pretty obvious that they were selling it just so they can use it to hack
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into other people's information.
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Literally, you were paying to be hacked.
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Yeah, you're paying for your, you're paying to be made a victim here.
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So this was a very insidious attack out of all the ones we've spoken today.
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This one is probably the most ridiculous.
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You want to, you want to know something even scarier about it?
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The device that you have that you call an iPhone is virtually the same thing.
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Here's someone selling you a device telling you it's secure and you can use it to manage
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your daily life.
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Meanwhile, they're turning around and selling every single thing you do with that device
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to a third party that you have no knowledge of.
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Absolutely.
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It's the same thing when you see all those people, they say, oh, we will not sell or share
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your information.
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I'm always like, are you sure though?
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Are you sure though?
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Yeah.
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I think the only difference between those scenarios with the iPhone and other services and
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this one, this particular piece of malware was offered directly to attackers.
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So that's the only difference here.
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They charged you money to become a victim and then sold the information to attackers who
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could have a much more direct path to exploiting you and the FBI sees that took it down.
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So hopefully this is out of the way, but I don't recall seeing any arrests being made
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there.
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So the people that are doing this are still out there with that source code.
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So we'll just have to look out for another administrative tool popping up on the market.
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Let's go ahead and move on to our next story.
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Hopefully this one isn't as scary.
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And living systems provider notice of data breach.
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All right.
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And this story, be help me out here.
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Am I seeing what I think I'm seeing?
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Is this our most vulnerable citizens under attack?
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Unfortunately, yeah, it's so, so devastating.
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It's so sad because most of the elderly don't understand technology the way that we do.
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So they expect that when they go to a community care center or what we call it a nursing home,
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they want to live out their life in peace.
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They don't want to have to worry about this.
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Most of these elderly, they worry about getting a phone call and scamming them that way.
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That's a lot of the times where these people pry.
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And now they hack into this to take it from our seniors.
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It's just disgusting.
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A company by name of independent living systems has had to put out a notice that their customers
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elderly citizens who went there for safety and security all bundled up together to make
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one prime target became under attack.
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And now the types of information released in this attack.
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I mean, it's it's kind of heartbreaking to hear it, but here, here is how their names,
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their addresses, their date of birth, driver's license, state identification numbers, social
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security numbers, financial information, Medicare and Medicaid, other medical record
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numbers, as well as their mental and physical treatments and condition information, everything
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down to their food delivery information, their diagnosis codes and diagnosis information,
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the date they were admitted, the date that they were discharged, prescription information,
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all of this was taken from this database.
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This was a massive breach that left many vulnerable.
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Independent living system is a third party.
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So they are kind of like a broker, if you will, they manage a lot of these places.
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The place that was actually hacked was Florida Community Care.
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They're the actual nursing home or living facility is what most in the medical field call
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it is a living facility.
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So on average with insurance, cured with medical insurance, you will pay, you could pay
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as low as 5,000 some people, but in my experience, people had to pay 20, 30, 40 grand, depending
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on the facility you go to.
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Is this 20, 30, 40 grand a year?
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No, this is per month.
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What goes into these facilities besides your security that got broken into that we're
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now experiencing talking about, but there's also the care that depending on the type of
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patient there is or what we call resident, there could be feeding protocols, there could
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be bathing protocols, there could be a wide range of things which cost different.
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If someone just has Alzheimer's, but they're able to walk and talk and speak for themselves,
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but they just have slight confusion, then they don't charge as much.
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But if they're what we call in medical field, a complete, which means they mean complete
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assistance, that someone is 10 times more vulnerable because they can't say, oh, I've been,
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you know, someone stole my identity because 90% of the time they can't communicate with
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you, which is even worse.
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All right.
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So what you're telling me is people pay for the ultimate living package for their golden
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years, and that package is expected to be secure, not only from the physical, because
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they're kind of gated away or kept separate, but they're also expected to be kept safe
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digitally as well.
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And this facility down in Florida was hit, and not only was the facility hit, but the
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third party which manages the data was also hit.
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Yes.
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What I've looked into is that this independent living system actually manages three other
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places.
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Wow.
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Let's, let's go ahead and switch on over to user space for a little bit.
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In this new segment, we're going to talk about how PayPal is issuing a $2,500 fee for
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miss information on social media.
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Whoa.
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PayPal introducing a $2,500 fee.
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Apparently, I can understand for certain points of views that maybe they're trying
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to fight hate speech, but it seems a little excessive to me.
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What do you think?
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Yeah.
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I'd say it's not just excessive.
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It is absolutely crazy.
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From what I can see here, they're imposing a fine on their customers of $2,500 for
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quote, miss information, close quote, and they're the judges behind what is considered
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miss information.
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So if you want to challenge it, just know they're the judge and jury.
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Now from what I could tell PayPal has reversed on this effort, but how long?
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But I want to ask you a question.
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I introduced you to HPR and I sent you a link so that way you can kind of see what the
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community has for a website and some of our content on the site.
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Let me know.
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What do you think about HPR?
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I had a little bit of a hard time navigating a little bit.
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I don't know if it's because it was my first time when I hit the page or the link that
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you gave me.
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I didn't realize I had to go all the way down to listen to said recording.
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I didn't know where I guess the recording would be or the podcast or radio aspect would
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be.
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For the whole time, I was like clicking things.
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I didn't know.
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I was clicking the icons.
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I was clicking the all-no news image because there's a lot of thickness that you can click
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on because you put links in the description.
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You do all of those which are great, but I had no idea where to find it.
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That was my one issue with it.
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Obviously, when I did find it, now I know that it's at the end.
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I'm just used to most of them being the first thing you see here.
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Listen here.
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And the listen now button is at the bottom.
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||
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I don't know if that's purposeful, but the one thing I really did like is how organized
|
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|
it is.
|
||
|
|
For the most part, it is pretty organized.
|
||
|
|
It's bright.
|
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|
|
I'm all about day mode.
|
||
|
|
I like that about it.
|
||
|
|
For user-friendly purposes, as long as you click through a little bit, it's pretty easy
|
||
|
|
to follow.
|
||
|
|
All right.
|
||
|
|
That's some good information for the site administrators who are looking for feedback
|
||
|
|
for future changes to the show.
|
||
|
|
I mean, to the site, I thank you for that information.
|
||
|
|
This concludes another episode of the all-no news, the I want to thank you for coming
|
||
|
|
by and participating in this with me.
|
||
|
|
Yeah.
|
||
|
|
I had a good time and I'm really happy that we learned all this information and that
|
||
|
|
we can be resilient and protect ourselves.
|
||
|
|
All right, thank you all for listening and we'll see you in the next episode of the
|
||
|
|
all-no news.
|
||
|
|
Oh, no!
|
||
|
|
You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio at Hacker Public Radio does work.
|
||
|
|
Today's show was contributed by a HBR listener like yourself.
|
||
|
|
If you ever thought of recording podcasts, you click on our contribute link to find out
|
||
|
|
how easy it really is.
|
||
|
|
The hosting for HBR has been kindly provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive
|
||
|
|
and our things.net.
|
||
|
|
On the Sadois status, today's show is released under Creative Commons, Attribution 4.0 International
|
||
|
|
License.
|