182 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
182 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
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Episode: 4005
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Title: HPR4005: Sgoti's reply to multiple shows.
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr4005/hpr4005.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 18:31:32
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 4,05 for Friday the 8th of December 2023.
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Today's show is entitled Scotus Reply to Multiple Shows.
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It is hosted by some guy on the internet, and is about 15 minutes long.
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It carries a clean flag.
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The summary is, Scotus Reply to a few HPR shows.
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Hello and welcome to another episode of Hacker Public Radio, I'm your host, some guy on
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the internet.
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Alright, this is actually round 2 of recording this show.
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I didn't like the way the first one came out.
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I rambled a bit too much into the laughing and talking about all sorts of nonsense, and
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I had a good time making it, but it was way, way off topic.
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So one more time, alright, first show that I want to talk about, this is a reply show.
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I don't know if I mentioned that or not.
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So the first show I'm replying to is Operator Show Beeper.com, which is HPR 3988.
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He did a great job.
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I think that Beeper is a wonderful project.
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I just don't think it's for me.
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It's a great solution, just not my solution.
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I want less notifications, less interaction in that way.
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You know, don't give me wrong.
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We all have multiple chat programs that we use, and the idea of tying them all together
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into one sounds great, but it also sounds super complicated and bound to fail.
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How many of you have ever seen three studios?
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It did a gag, where one of the studios was supposed to be fixing the plumbing downstairs,
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and there was a pipe leaking water.
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Basically it was just dumping free flowing water in the house, so he would just keep getting
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a new elbow and dumping it, you know, tying it on, and another one and another one, just
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over and over again, and then he'd eventually encased himself in this webbing of pipes
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and above his head was like a wide pipe or a tea pipe, just spewing water all over him
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and all in the house and everything, and it was just a mess.
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That's what I think about when I think of this type, not Beeper itself, but this type
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of operation, right, because Matrix bridges are already finicky and just require just
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a lot of time and effort to maintain them, or so I've heard I've never actually maintained
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one.
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The idea that a company is building a prop, building a service off of this, a product
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off of this, it just sounds way too complicated, but I wish you the best of luck, it sounds
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cool, definitely give us more updates in the future.
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I'm also interested in how the iOS, I message thing works with that, you know, very curious
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as to how that works.
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So number two, that I want to reply to anyways, HPR 3989, which is a Hookah's last past
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security update, great stuff, I mean, while we're at it, let me also make sure that we
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talk about operators response to a hookah as well, let me add this in here, I need to make
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sure update my notes here, because I listened to that show earlier today, which is HPR 3994,
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the last past response by operator to a hookah talking about a last past's hack, I already
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discussed it in the past as well, I do not fault any company for getting attacked, especially
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a company like last past, who has as their business model, they hold the keys to everyone's
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kingdom, you're going to get attacked, if you're on the internet, you're already being
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attacked, is just whether or not you know about it or not or and or whether or not you
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can stop it.
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Yeah, no fault for getting attacked, however, I think the last past, at least back when
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the attack occurred, had very bad internal policy, where it was reported by an anonymous
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source, believed to be a last past employee, and I think ours technica did the reporting
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didn't, that that's where I covered it anyway, reported that the that developer, who was
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like ground zero for the attack, basically was using his work laptop and as his personal
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laptop, so he was just running everything on one machine, so it's not the fact that
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you were attacked, it is just that you allow such terrible policy, like that was allowed
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to happen, and it's one thing where, okay guy tried something crazy, you know, he's
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skirting the rules and I get it, you can't keep an eye on everybody, you gotta have some
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trust for some people to kind of get away with some things, but there are also environments
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where this cannot happen, right?
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You got one of the guys who have the keys to the kingdom, and his keys gives access to
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everyone else's keys, and you're trying to tell me this was allowed to fly, yeah, I
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don't blame you for being attacked, but the reasons why you were attacked bad policy
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and that kind of thing, yeah, that's, that's where I would not recommend a company like
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LastPass, I think Trey also did a comment on this on a hookah show about changing your
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passwords, yes indeed, for every one of those people that used LastPass and did not change
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every single one of their accounts, credentials that were stored in that vault, they're asking
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for trouble, right?
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I don't blame them because they were attacked, however, now that you know you were attacked,
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your credentials are now in the hands of people who were rushing to crack them, and I'm
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pretty sure you know you're using a bone head password, right?
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My dog's name plus, you know, the year I got them, that kind of thing, you know that
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vault's gonna go down sooner or later, and when it does, everything goes with it, so
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what do you do?
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Well, you're smart enough, you get out there and you start changing all your credentials
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because here's another thing, when LastPass is forced to admit to the breach, it could
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be months after it actually happened, so the attackers have had this data and been cracking,
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you know, working on it for all this time, when you hear about it, get on it, and yes,
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I know a lot of us like me, I have about, you know, 300 plus accounts online, so that
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would mean a lot of work that needs to be done, however, I'd like to get into my accounts
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in the future, right?
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I liked for my bank to maintain its secure status and not wake up the next day and find
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my account empty, so I better get on that, right?
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So I think these are great shows, and also if I remember correctly, I've been listening
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to so many shows and things, operator throughout an invitation to doing shows collaborating,
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I'm always looking to collaborate, I'd like to, you know, try to, try to sync up sometime
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where we can get together and cut a show, I think email is a good topic we can discuss,
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I'd like to, you know, spitballs my ideas at you about email, or whatever, maybe even
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browser security, even a matter of fact, in that show, I think it was the LastPass response
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show, or one of the shows that he's done, I can't recall right now, he was talking about
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different ways to secure applications by creating different users and having those
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users run the applications in that way if an attacker does breach it, they would have
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to, you know, escalate permissions, or try, because that user doesn't have permissions,
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they would have to hop to another user, and then, you know, that kind of thing.
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I have never thought to do that on a desktop environment, I have done that on server when
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I ran a Minecraft server, you know, you have your user that you normally operate and manage
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things with, and then the services that you're running, you create different users for those
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services, and you don't grant them any pseudo or anything like that, so that way they just only
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manage their services, and you kind of build isolation between things that way, but I've never
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thought to do that on a desktop, I don't even know how, or I guess the process would be similar,
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but when you're calling the application, yeah, that, it just, it sounds different, and that could
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be a point of conversation between us, right, we could actually discuss that, that sounds like a
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great idea, I wouldn't mind testing it at all, sounds like a fun test, I wonder how long I could
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keep something like that up, because I don't know what the interaction is, one of the things about
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security that I've learned anyways, is that there's a hundred different ways for you to be secure,
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there's actually more or whatever, but how many of them are you actually going to keep up with,
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because each step has just a little bit more inconvenience, how many of them are you actually
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going to stick with, because taking it back to password managers for just a second again,
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I mean, why not, this is my show, I can bring us back there all day long if I need to, right,
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so long as I'm making great points, but we talk about best practices where you would have one
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password manager that's going to have like your username and login, and then there's going to be
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a second password manager that's going to contain TLTP keys, so it's going to be generating the TLTP,
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you'd have to authenticate with one manager just to get the basic credentials, and then authenticate
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with a second entirely different manager to then be able to perform the two factor using TLTP,
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this sounds great as a best practice, but in reality, you're introducing so much friction,
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no one's ever going to do that and keep up with it, right, you might be able to test it out for
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a month or two and think, okay, well, you know, it was nice and then, you know, let's put it all
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in one manager now because the manager is either secure or it isn't, you're going to have
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loss somewhere, it's like that I'm going to make an analogy here and probably ruin the entire
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thing, right, like, you know, there's no perpetual energy, energy that just constantly goes on forever
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and ever, whatever, and I think about that with every process that we create, there's loss and
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every process. Now, right now we're trying to process maximum security for the user, we're already
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asking them not to use that thing they can easily remember because it's insecure, right, don't use
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your daughter's name and the day she was born, okay, so they're not using that and you got to also
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tell them don't use your house address or any phone numbers you previously had or any of that,
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right, has to be something completely unrelated to you. In fact, we can't even trust you to generate
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it because you're subconsciously going to generate something that is related to you anyways.
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So just use this manager that is designed to provide you with random information, it will give
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you something that you can use and hey, don't even use a password, use a pass phrase because it will
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give you more complexity, a better string and it'll be easier to remember because these are
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dictionary words rather than just non-stop gobbledygook and then while you add that,
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make sure you set up two factor authentication and not just two fact, not just any two factor,
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let's let's let's say multi factor because we have to include biometrics. Sure, your face is the
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only face like yours but it's going to be easy to break in your device using your face so your
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fingerprint will be a little bit more secure. However, laws allow us to sort of compel that away
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from you. So if you were relying on that to keep your data safe, yeah, that's kind of tough.
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Not only that, your fingerprints, you know, I'm just going to put this out there super paranoid mode
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here, your fingerprints are out in the open. Think about all the places right now where your fingerprints
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exist. So I would not want to use that as a second factor. I'd much rather use a bit of data that
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only I and this manager that I used to create it, that is the cone of silence, right? The manager
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and me, that's where the information exists outside of that, you would have to steal it. So I have
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more trust in that. Now, then there's another best practice, right? You can secure your manager
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with its own set of credentials and multi factor, except instead of using a TLTP code for your manager
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or biometrics for your manager, you use a hardware device like a ubiquity. Do you understand? We
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have already added so many layers of security on top. You're far from low hanging fruit already,
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and you're far, you're far enough away from it to where you could actually be flirting with
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paranoia, you know what I mean? And that's where I am. That's where I'm comfortable being. Now,
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the thing with security as well is it is an exercise and it is a lifestyle. I'll say,
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because sure you can exercise security, right? When you're at work, you have this super serious,
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this super secure environment that you have to live within while you're there. That's just an
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exercise because when you leave work, you no longer have to maintain that. However, what you do on
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a daily basis to keep yourself secured, that is the lifestyle. That is what you need to be able to
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maintain long term and build on top of because as security and technology, all of it evolves,
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so does the threat. The threat always exists and you need to be able to keep up with it. So you have
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to be able to build layers on top of it. And as long as you can live it, I mean, it'll work for you.
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So I'm all up for exploring better ways to live security. Now to mention this will also give us a
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good chance to take the pictures out of it. Start talking about air gap machines and everything
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else just to be able to like watch YouTube. Alright, I covered a couple of shows here. I'm going
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to go ahead and pick another few and do another show on those. Thank you guys for listening. If you
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do have a show response of your own, hit on over the hacker public radio. Don't just leave a comment,
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guys. Do a show response. Let us know what you think about these shows that we've got, right?
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Aren't they great? Round of applause for our hookah tray. Even though traded and do a show. You know,
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he left a comment, but we still love him anyway. He's great and operate, huh? By the way,
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where's DNT? Has he been hiding somewhere? I have to put an APB out on DNT. You know what? I think
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I found out what happened to DNT. After that last show we did, we we mentioned Black Colonel. And
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I think I think Black Colonel got to him. We sent a bunch of confused and angry users over the
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Black Colonel's inbox. Or at least not me. I didn't do it. I think DNT did it. But either way.
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Alright, alright. I'm out of here for real this time. Take it easy.
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You have been listening to hacker public radio at hacker public radio does work. Today's show was
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contributed by a HBR listener like yourself. If you ever thought of recording a podcast,
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you click on our contribute link to find out how easy it really is. Hosting for HBR has been
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kindly provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive, and our syncs.net. On this
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otherwise stated, today's show is released under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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License.
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