hpr-knowledge-base/hpr_transcripts/hpr3395.txt

Episode: 3395
Title: HPR3395: Hacking Stories with Reacted: part 1
Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3395/hpr3395.mp3
Transcribed: 2025-10-24 22:41:00

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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3395 for Friday, the 6th of August 2021.
Today's show is entitled Hacking Stories with Reupted.
Part 1. It is hosted by Operator and is about 33 minutes long and carries an explicit flag.
The summary is, I talk about some old old, old pen-testing stories, from days old.
This episode of HBR is brought to you by an Honesthost.com.
Get 15% discount on all shared hosting with the offer code HBR15.
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This is a episode of Hacker Public Radio with your host Redacted.
Today I'm going to be going over a series called Hacker Stories.
I will be using some voice modulation and protecting the clients and users that I've worked with.
But I wanted to go over a couple of stories, or at least one, here on the drive that I'm doing.
So this first one was a school, a technical school that was fairly popular with younger generations.
And I would say they're pretty big school, I think, to head several campuses in the city.
But anyways, these guys wanted a physical assessment.
We had done some remote stuff with them before in the past.
It was pretty high level.
But they wanted a full bone, physical, you know, fishing, and all that good stuff.
So I had been on my own for a while and this was, I think, an on my own assessment.
And they had two kind of buildings or two targets.
One was like a corporate or a home office or a school office thing where all their technical
information and accounting and all the administration and all that stuff was out of.
Which had a few floors and about five floors or so of this tall water building.
And the other campus was an actual school where they had the equipment.
I don't want to say what kind of equipment it was, but it was fairly high in the equipment
for these kids to work on.
Really cool, creative environment for people to test out and work on these different types of equipment.
So we're talking about some pretty high dollar stuff.
You had goons wearing various colors depending on what type of goon they were.
The students had particular colors.
And myself, I was supposed to get a shirt.
But I never got a shirt for the school so that I would blend in with the other other students.
So did my, you know, recon about the building, did a couple of drive rounds.
You know, they had physical cameras and physical everything.
You have your get out of jail card, all that stuff.
The general approach is that you're given kind of some scope of what you can do,
what you can't do.
And then more importantly, what the contacts are for your get out of jailness.
And you have that with the document and printed information.
And you take that once you do get caught or if you do get caught.
I haven't done a whole lot of them, but when I have, they're quite exciting stories because
the physical stuff can be quite entertaining sometimes.
So I just want to try to bring a couple of these to you guys.
So what ended up happening is did some recon.
And the first time around, I think this was a two year engagement actually.
We hit him first and then we hit him a second time.
So I'll go over the first time.
The first time we hit him, I want to say, yeah.
So the first time we hit him was at the regular office.
It wasn't actually at the school, it was at the administration office.
So the contact there was probably two cubes away or two offices away from where I sat.
So it was behind two layers of bad access.
So if I wanted to go to the restroom, I kind of had to do it during lunch rush because
I had to kind of piggyback two layers deep into to get back to my cube where my system was and
all that stuff. So that was a bit of a predicament.
Physical access is usually pretty easy.
What I like to do is pretend like that I'm on my phone.
A lot of people don't want to bother you.
You're on your phone and people let you open the door.
Nobody's going to interrupt your phone call.
And you're talking about a guy with a black backpack and spiky hair and a green
line green phone, like suspect on all levels, right?
And I never really got stopped that much.
And if it was, it was because I was kind of turning up the knob too much.
So physical is actually kind of cheating.
It's a little too easy.
And I don't have a whole lot of experience in that space anyways.
But I'll go more along the story.
The first thing we got there, I got there, did some recon with the round,
figured out what the floors were.
The first floor was where I was told that I would try to sit.
And again, that was behind two layers at Badge Access.
So I got past the two layers.
You kind of, what you want to do is kind of go in one room.
And there's millions of books out there.
But what I had success in is that kind of go into a common area
and then come out of the common area and follow someone else to a second staging area,
a second area, or hang out in front of the door with your phone
and until you can get into that second area.
So I actually kind of piggybacked to get into the facility.
And then I went to the break room and kind of would follow people around
from the break room to the second area to where I could get to a cube.
Ended up at a cube.
And this guy across from me was, you know, Bob, whatever his name was.
This guy Bob coded applications for the support of the company.
I don't know what he coded in, but he was a coder.
And you know, I talked to him and said, you know,
how long he's been there and what he's been up to.
And he asked me, you know, he asked me what I was here for.
And I said, yeah, I'm here to do some consulting for you guys,
which wasn't a lie.
I wasn't lying to anyone.
And I try not to lie to him, to people in general.
I just tell them what I'm there for and what I do.
And I said, yeah, I'm hearing you know,
I'm just consulting to do some security stuff.
And, you know, he figured I had a badge and all that good stuff.
I don't even think I wore a badge.
And it's during this assessment.
So I plug in setup.
Of course, I can jump straight on the network.
So I kind of start my discovery efforts and go through that mess.
You know, kind of the quiet, tell-out approach is what,
is what generally you all end up doing.
So I start doing my testing.
I get through access default credentials, of course,
to a box or a SO8067, which is an XP vulnerability
that's been around since the ages.
So it started out with kind of, I think,
a vulnerable service or default credential.
Usually that's what it is.
Passwords, brain, things like that.
So I got access to that.
Started looking around to get access to their Citrix environment,
which was where the meeting potatoes was.
Everything they had was in Citrix.
Every app they had was inside of a Citrix app.
And I have very little knowledge with Citrix
to that it's basically the kiosk that you remote into.
And you can kind of do stuff and it's sort of a kiosk
to where you can't really do much of anything
except run that application.
And that's the intention.
But it's not often explained that you can break out of a kiosk
and how easy that is.
So I knew that stuff was inside of this virtual,
whatever you call it, the Citrix garbage.
So I went around, started hunting around to see which users
were using the application.
And I kind of got lazy, right?
So what I ended up doing was adding myself
to, I had domain admin at this point
by what usually happens is you take credentials
and spray them across the network.
So if I have valid credentials or valid hash
for a particular system and SMB signing is not enabled,
which is very rare even today, SMB signing is not enabled.
You can take those credentials and spray them across the network.
So you can try to get administrator level access
and then dump those credentials to playing text
if there's no AV on there, whatever.
So I get domain admin by getting access to several boxes
and escalating from there straight to domain admin.
I started to add myself to, I think, I had a script
that would add me to every single domain user.
And don't ever do that because if you think about it,
if you've ever been technology,
sometimes people create scripts based on what group you're in.
So if you're in a group or if you trigger a specific thing
or script, it kicks off something, some kind of process.
So if I put myself in all of the groups
in all of the active directory,
that's usually not going to go well
because in some cases there's groups in there
that are like disabled groups.
Like does it disable users group or something like that?
I essentially kind of got lazy and I wanted to see
what would happen if I could just add myself to all the groups
and then see what happened if I had, if I could actually
do this with all these pieces.
So the idea is that I let this script run
and it kind of got wonky and I killed it.
And this was about two days in the assessment.
Generally speaking, under about 3,000 hosts or so,
it starts to get pretty easy to compromise an entire network.
If it's Windows-based and you've got no singular point
of segmentation and you've got about 3,000 or more hosts,
it starts to get pretty easy.
Things kind of go down pretty quickly.
Not so much today.
This was probably, you know, eight years ago or so.
So things go down and hit quickly.
After about the first day you get your recon,
you get your target boxes, you get your shells
and then maybe after the second day or by the end of the first day,
you're pivoting around in your and or I have domain
I've been by the second or third day.
Usually I usually get domain I'm in about the third day
because that leaves me the rest of the week to
kind of do some pilfering, right?
If you go too hot and heavy, you might get caught, right?
So we're trying to compress an attacker's
what an attacker would do over the course of a week.
Maybe sometimes if you're lucky, you get two weeks.
So you're taking what an attacker would do slow and steady and stealthy
and you're trying to spread that over the course of four days sometimes
and if you're lucky a couple of weeks.
So what I thought was that I had myself to these domain groups
and see what happened.
Maybe I can get access to the Citrix crap.
Do that.
Don't have a whole lot of success.
And then all of a sudden I noticed that my account
is been disabled or something like that.
And I used legitimate credentials from a different user
to actually give myself domain admin.
So I said, okay, that's funny.
Hilarious.
Let me just give myself, reactivate my account or
re-add my account as domain admin.
So at this point, I realized that somebody had realized what I was doing
and that they were, they had visibility into what was going on.
After the engagement, what I realized is that they were,
they had alert scripts set up for active directory
but they didn't have alert script for domain admin.
So essentially when I add myself to, you know,
Sally or accounting manager's group or whatever,
that is actually what triggered the alert
because they weren't watching for new domain admins.
Which was kind of funny because they,
they're like, oh, we got rid of it and we killed them the first day.
And it was like, well, I had domain admin for like three days before,
two or three days before you guys actually detected me.
So that was kind of interesting and fun.
What actually happened in the client was,
what she said she would walk by my cube and just be an utter awe and dismay
that I was sitting there for, you know, two or three or four days
and not being caught or asked questions or escorted or whatever.
It ended up being, I don't think I ever got caught that first time.
Um, and I don't know how much time we're on here.
You look, about 12 minutes, so maybe go over another 15 minutes.
So I don't think I ever got caught when I went the first time around.
I got that domain admin.
I kind of filtered a little bit.
I never got access to the data that I wanted to get access to student records
and all that stuff.
I did find some websites and had some database access to some of that information
that I never could pilfer and get kind of proof of concept going for
or what that was.
But generally speaking, usually you can log into the CFO's email or somebody
important's email and show their email and that actually shows more impact than
actually getting to the data that will scare most people.
So between those two things, generally if you go straight domain admin,
people aren't really going to understand that.
They're not going to understand the impact unless they see like,
you know, Bob's email and like, oh, Bob's super important.
It's, you know, this email is important where that's not really what's important.
What's important is the access that you have through domain admin.
But that's how you can easily show impact.
So anyways, I've got domain admin.
I've got access to everything and I think that pretty much ended that engagement.
I did my normal right up and pretty standard access to one box
to pivot to another and move the ladder over here on the network and then go over there.
So pretty, pretty cut dry.
So fast forward a year later, excuse me trying not to get hit here in the car.
Fast forward a year later, I have the same engagement set.
They want me to do the same thing.
And I don't know, yep, I remember this one and they all kind of blend together after a while.
So the second time around, I ended up not in a meeting room, but I ended up somewhere else.
They had, they had like full disk encryption, I think, with a smanteck or some other piece of software.
And I tried to, it wasn't full disk encryption.
It was like signing of particular binaries through some antect, some kind of some antectal.
So if you modified any of the binaries in a, it wasn't encrypted, this wasn't encrypted.
But if you've modified any of the binaries inside of like the system folder or something like that.
So if you did these to keep these bypass, to get a command prompt shell,
it would say, oh, I can't boot no more, no, no bad, bad, bad doggy, you know, donut.
And you would get like blue screen basically and you would get screwed.
And yeah, eventually that computer ended up fixing itself.
But I think I found a workstation in like a meeting room to, to hijack,
potentially try to hijack credentials off of it.
And that's when I discovered this smanteck, piece of smanteck technology that was kind of like
signed binary checking thing that would check from the boot from boot to see if it had,
you know, been mangled with. I don't really understand why you would do that,
not just go full disk encryption and be done with it. But,
anyways, we had that set up. So I was able to get past the batch system like again before, same building.
And I was able to get access to a system, but I wasn't able to get
root to it or anything because of that signing stuff.
I may have gotten access to it in a different way, but I don't think I did.
Hey, I left that conference room. I trolled in there for a while, I think until I got kicked out.
So I trolled in there for a while, and eventually I system ended up fixing itself.
The client told me that somehow I didn't fix it self or maybe somebody else fixed it.
So I get kicked out that conference room, I think, and I end up in one of the,
something called pods, which is essentially a little, you know, if the contractor is working,
they'll sit in these little pods. And it's usually like a really tiny cube,
like a third of a cube with a phone, a network jack, and then like some level of privacy where you
can close a door, slide a slide or whatever. I ended up in one of these, and it was actually
fairly close to the, I remember it was fairly close to the front entrance of the
administration building of the technical school this was. And I don't know if she ever came by
or anything like that, but the lady, I think I talked to her and said I was there for security
and stuff, and had pointed out that, you know, I would be sitting over in this pod of, and she,
you know, asked me if I ever need anything or whatever, nobody bothered to check my credentials,
at least at this time. So this is the second time around. Sit on site, doing my thing, kind of
pilfering around, kind of running neccess and about mid day, day one, day two.
I had a gentleman stop by and just kind of peek his head in, and he's like blah, blah, blah.
And that was when I got caught. And talking with him, I realized that he's basically the reason
he got hired because of the assessment we did the year prior. So I was wondering why I didn't have
all this low-hanging fruit sitting out there, you know, usually there was a, you know, if you run
in map on someone that's not really taking security or neccess or any vulnerability scanner on
somebody that's not really taking security seriously, you'll get this low-hanging fruit and it will
always be there and it'll always be one system on the network that has that low-hanging fruit,
unless you've got somebody that's confident and that has the skills and tool sits and support
they need to squash out and they need that low-hanging fruit stuff. So I noticed none of this low-hanging
fruit that was there before. You know, I had like two or three AMC with a six sevens, I had probably
some default logins here and there. And none of my old stuff worked, you know, the old passwords I
probably didn't work and I was like, this is weird. Like, why did they fixed all this stuff?
Which is not normal for most people to actually fix things with an environment.
So what I did was is after he stopped by, I said, yeah, you got me, you know, blah, blah, blah.
I'm here to his security assessment, you know, here's the get out of jail card and he's like, well,
I don't know what to do, like, yeah, blah, blah, blah. And I'm like, I don't know what to do.
It's your job, like, what's your process. So he has cursed me out and I still have a copy of the
get out of jail card and I do whatever. And I think at some point in time, the actual campus,
school campus with students was the secondary target or a secondary target. But I actually ended
up going back in to try to get a t-shirt from the client. And I essentially, of course, I still
still engineer my way back in and I'm walking down the hallway and they're like, here he is again,
here's that guy again. And they go and like escort me out of the building again that the same
client asked me back out of the building after being caught the second time trying to get a shirt.
And that was my excuse is that I was like, yeah, I'm trying to get a shirt. So when I go to the thing,
and of course, I was met with some a little bit of hostility given that they had already escorted me
out of the building once. But I tried to get a shirt. I never did get a shirt. So here I am trying
to go to the school campus with the, for the second time, well, for the third time, essentially,
this will be the third time that they've been attacked by a third party consulting firm. So
I recon during the day and then I eventually, this might have been the second week I was there.
I might have not done this all in one week. It might have been one week. But I go to the school,
I walk around my book bag. I can't find anywhere set up. There's a little tech lab. I walk in the tech
lab. I try to, you know, there's a computer lab with a guy literally a guy walking around.
I call him a goon. Anybody that's going to try to catch you with a goon. So the goon's walking around
kind of watching his students and kind of creeping me out. So I bail out of there. I didn't really
see anything super interesting. I think they were logged in with some kind of default login. But
they didn't have admin and it was kind of like a kiosk. There wasn't a whole lot of fruit there.
The guy just honestly weirded me out. So I didn't like, I don't like anybody of authority sitting
around me. I wanted to be a bunch of, a bunch of people that aren't, that aren't going to ask me any
questions or why I'm there. So I wanted a while, I wanted a while, and eventually finding a room
that was kind of off into the corner that had a desktop, that had a desktop that was plugged into
the wall. And now this desktop, I think, if I remember correctly, they had more monitoring on. And
what you can't do with more monitoring is what most people do is they'll do a MAC address
based. They won't use certificates, as the cell certificates, they'll do like MAC address base. So
they'll assign, you know, a MAC address to, they'll assign a port on a switch to a MAC address.
And maybe only two devices can be on that switch. So your phone and your computer. So if you go to
Walmart by a new computer or plug into the port, it's going to kick you off because that, or not
allow you on the network at a minimum, because that MAC address is not why listed. So there's two
methods you can do this. You can actually plug in that exact computer to your computer.
And instantly, the computer will try to talk to your computer over a link table or nowadays,
you only have to do a link cable. You can just plug in a regular ethernet cable into your laptop,
fire up a wire shark, and you'll see the MAC address of the computer that's trying to access the
internet. And so you can look on the back of the computer. Sometimes they'll have the MAC address
on there. But for simplicity's sake, I always just plug it directly into the back of my computer.
And then when it tries to get DHCP, if it tries to get an IP address for me, I can see the MAC address
that it's requesting and all that good stuff. So what I'll do is I will unplug, keep that
cable unplugged from the desktop. And I will take that MAC address and use it to get on the network.
So I've essentially hijacked the identity that's not signed or encrypted or whatever of that system
to masquerade as that interface. So I'll plug in. I think I actually ended up using the desktop itself.
And I have a bootable USB stick. Now I've got a solid state 120 gig bootable
Ubuntu or Debian, a Debian build with portable PTF-pintesting framework. It's kind of like
Cali, but you can build it yourself and you don't have to worry about repose getting all jack up.
So that's what I use now with this. At the time I had like a portable backtrack or maybe it was
Cali or whatever it is at that time. So I boot up to that with all my tools and all my VMs.
And I was using the, I was thinking I was using the actual workstation itself.
And I think I pulled off, I pulled the credentials off of it and cracked them.
Or somehow I was able to, I think because of the disk wasn't encrypted, I was able to somehow
run binaries on that system. I want to say I did invent some necessary stuff through there
or some basic scans. What I wanted to do is get credentials. So I think I was trying to crack
the credentials of that workstation through Windows and booting it off of a third party.
Application and dumping the registry and then trying to crack those, that registry or kind of
crack the hash for that user name offline. If I remember correctly and again this is years and years
ago. The funny part is, let me get the funny part of the story. I was sitting in there kind of
by myself and I just kind of got lazy. I had logged in as I had out of myself as a local administrator.
And what you can find in some instances is you can find that other processes run
when the computer is started. So for example, there might be a user that run the local admin user
that's running some kind of process where maybe some other process is jacked into your,
maybe it's a monitoring service that runs as system, you know, some kind of system administrator
user. And I think I was using trying to use dump credentials, plain text credentials for some reason,
into the system to try to either pass some, pass the hash to somewhere or something like that.
So I ended up copying the binary from the Windows system for Windows Credential Editor,
which is kind of nemicats, but same thing.
Um, it was, uh, excuse me, triggering the AV. So how about I would say 30 minutes after I triggered
the AV, some cat comes in there. I think it's an older guy and he was like the owner, the runner of
that class. So he was the, the teacher that taught in that class or that workout room or whatever,
breakout room. Um, and he came in and he was like, hey, you know, what are you doing here in my room
on my workstation and I gave him some BS that I was, you know, I was just, I was the IT guy and then
I was installing some kind of something wrong with his AV, giving him some BS. So he disappears
for a minute and I'm not feeling super warm and fuzzy. I should have bugged out in hindsight
when I, when I, whatever, but I'm not the biggest fan of like, you know, kind of run around and
make everybody crazy. Um, generally, if I get caught, I'll just kind of slowly just kind of let
people know and say, hey, try to make people feel comfortable and I don't want to run around circles
and hide in bathrooms and make people crazy to try to find me. Um, but he came back shortly after
and said, look, you know, I'm talking to my IT guy. He says you're not supposed to be here. Um,
you know, blah, blah, blah. And he stays with me and is asking me all these questions and I let
him know it basically what I'm, who I'm way that I'm trying to, I think I'm still at this point.
No, I haven't really used my get out of jail card yet. So at this point, I, uh, I'm kind of,
I've kind of given up or, or realized the assessments isn't really going anywhere. I think I had
credentials, hash credentials from the actual machine itself and then I don't even think I'd
gotten access to anything really. Um, I went a little bit too noisy too quickly because there was
actually a kid on the other end that was responding to the AV alerts which nobody really does. Um,
usually there's dashboards or AV, but nobody actually responds to like someone downloading it.
Maybe this was years ago, but someone downloading a virus or something. Um, not a whole lot of people
do that, especially larger, uh, infrastructures as clients. So kid comes in, you know, is, you know,
probably can't be more than 20 years old comes in and it's like, you know, trying to figure out
what's going on. I let him know and give him the get out of jail card and all that stuff and,
you know, he's like, I don't know what to do. So if you follow the process, escort me out of the
building, all that. I bail, take a quick break, get grab some dinner, whatever. And then I decide
that I'm going to go back to try to try to find, either go back to that same place or try to find
a better place to hang out with and try and try and get some, some, some better, some better fruit.
So this is late. I mean, the lights are out, the sun's down. So I park in the parking lot,
I had no problems. Uh, start walking into the building and I make it like two turns into the
building and this dude, it's like six feet tall, um, six or seven feet, just massive dude, just
wide and tall, um, is wearing the goons shirt. It's like a black goons shirt and he walks up
and he's like, he says something, whatever to the point where it is, he's like looking at me
and like pointing towards the door and telling me to like, that I need, you know, a vinyl
have a shirt or a vinyl have an IT, I need to get out. Um, they had, they had, I guess they had
identified me and told people to look out for me and had goons patrolling always because I did not
make it very far at all. Um, and I was not met with friendly, uh, friendly, uh, anything.
So anyways, um, that one was pretty fun because I felt like, uh, I felt like I got, I got, I made
a change, I made a difference in people, people cared enough to fix the problems that I, that we
had articulated during our assessment. So, um, you know, that was one example, one of many examples
where we did some assessments for clients and they actually fixed things and that, that kind of
makes, makes you feel good at the end of the day that you made, or you made a real change
somewhere, um, because they hired the security guy who's like super, in security. Um, so I think
that's pretty much it. I think I ended up going that same day or the day before. I ended up
trying to go to the accounting level of the administration building and that might have been before,
I completely got escorted out, I think. Um, so I go to this, this level with all the accounting
people are on and they're all neat, they're all like close knit, apparently. So I go in there
and I do my full, my whole phone trick and somebody asked me if I need anything, I said no,
I'm just waiting for somebody else, you know, who you with, and they go with the consulting company
and KPMG. So she disappears. I don't have the warm fuzzies. Um, I kind of, I think I'm okay at that
point. Um, so then I'm sitting in the room and she comes back and she's like, you know, you need to
like figure out what's going on, you know, what you can't really be here. This is like the accounting
floor. Super important. So I said, I okay, you know, I'm on the phone with a now, let me, let me figure
out what's that. Maybe he's on the other side of the building. I don't know, he says he's here.
So I go to the other side of the building and I camp out, um, I actually end up grabbing credentials
from somebody that didn't like their workstation. So, um, using a USB Ducky, um, I think I launched
the payload on that system and I had that interpreter shell on that, uh, on that box,
particular system. If I remember correctly. Um, so I'm sitting there trying to, you know,
escalate privileges and move laterally and like, don't make it drop creds and all that stuff,
trying to figure out what he's on there. Um, so I'm, I've got an active shell and then out of the
corner of my eye, I see this woman like just hauling ads down, uh, down the cubes and she's like
running and I noticed that it's the same woman that had asked me if I needed anything in this,
she was getting kind of refuffled. So I think what happens is she came around the corner or something
and saw me and somebody's cube or saw me in the different cube, um, and like banging on the
keyboard. She's like, who the heck is this guy? So she finally, she runs down the hallway and
grabs her manager by the way. And none of this is the actual client contact. They're on the first floor
and I'm on like the fourth floor where all the accounting people are. So none of these people have
any clue what's going on. So they finally come over like two girls, uh, two ladies come over. They
they kind of ask me what's going on and why am I here? And that's when I said, okay, I'm here for
an assessment. Here's my get a jail car blah blah blah blah. Um, I think that was kind of funny
because it's just to watch her like hauling it down the hallway trying to figure out who the heck
have I am and why I'm there and what to what to do. Um, what's kind of interesting. Um, but that's
pretty much the story there. I might, uh, depending on the feedback and if you guys find it interesting
or you find that I can't tell stories very well because I have ADD, um, let me know. And uh, I've got
probably three or four more decent ones, pretty pretty good ones that are that can be pretty funny.
And as I, as I do these, if the, if it comes out to be whatever, I can think of the ones that are,
that can be quite hilarious with back stories and all that stuff too. Um, so let me know if you, uh,
if you, if you're into it, yeah, if you're not, or if you have any constructive criticism of
about the storyline, I know what's kind of all over the place. Um, it kind of comes to me as I,
as I talk about it because I haven't talked about it or thought about some of these engagements
in probably eight years or so. So anyways, let me know if you have any input and, um,
put some comments in the show notes if you want to see more of this or if you want some constructive
criticism or if you think this is just the horrible idea that, um, this is not fun at all. But I heard
the Dark Knight Diaries and some really funny stories about that and obviously this one's not as
funny as, as interesting, but it's still an interesting story, uh, nevertheless. Anyways, uh,
hope you guys enjoy it and, uh, I'll probably do a couple more of these before. Um, I'll, I'll,
I'll stop and let you guys give me, give us some feedback.
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