115 lines
9.2 KiB
Plaintext
115 lines
9.2 KiB
Plaintext
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Episode: 3888
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Title: HPR3888: KeePassXC recent CVE
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr3888/hpr3888.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-25 07:29:51
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---
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This is Hacker Public Radio Episode 3888 for Wednesday, the 28th of June 2023.
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Today's show is entitled, He Pass XC Recent CVE.
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It is hosted by some guy on the internet, and is about 10 minutes long.
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It carries a clean flag.
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The summary is, some guy on the internet talks about KeyPass XC's security model and
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a recent CVE.
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Hello and welcome to another episode of Hacker Public Radio.
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I'm your host, some guy on the internet.
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Today we're going to be talking about KeyPass XC, so on June 20, 2023, Jonathan White posted
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on a KeyPass XC blog about an alleged vulnerability dubbed CVE Charlie Vector Echo, 2023 35 866.
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This is centered around KeyPass XC version 2.7.5.
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A user submitted this CVE suggesting that there is a flaw in KeyPass XC version 2.7.5,
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and it classified it as a vulnerability suggesting that the password, the offline password manager,
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does not offer online two-factor authentication during changes to the database, such as exporting
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passwords into clear text.
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If you wanted to export your entire database to plaintext or HTML or whatever,
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the user wanted it to prompt you for the master password before exporting the passwords to plain
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text.
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The user also mentioned that the password manager does not prompt you for authentication whenever
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you're doing things like registering a Ubiki, a hardworking, so the user filed this CVE
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suggesting that the slack of second authentication for the offline password manager leaves the user
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vulnerable.
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Now, I'm just going to go ahead and tell you right now, I'm siding with the KeyPass XC development
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team.
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This is not a vulnerability, and I believe that yes, the user is confusing the KeyPass XC security
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model when comparing it against online password managers that have to authenticate through
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the wire.
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There's been discussions on the blog, I'll have links down in the show notes.
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Other users have brought up some, you know, I guess these are members of the KeyPass XC team.
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They've been mentioning things like, you know, if an attacker has access to your unlocked database,
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you have already lost.
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And I believe that wholeheartedly, if you leave your KeyPass XC database unlocked for an attacker to
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simply have full-fettered access, there is nothing that could stop them from screenshotting,
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just, you know, using their phone, using a notepad, taking pictures, whatever.
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So, you lost, you just need to lock your database when you're not using it, and they offer
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the KeyPass XC development team, offer some suggestions, you know, setting up the,
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the expiration timer on your database.
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So, if it's inactive for, let's say, five minutes, it'll automatically lock the database,
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protecting you. Now, the user also pointed out that they believed the user was made vulnerable
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to the database being locked by the attacker, which would in result lock the owner out of their
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own password manager. So, an example would be that the attacker approached the computer with the
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unlocked database, registers a Ubiqui, and then lock the original owner out, because now the original
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owner does not have the Ubiqui to unlock the database. KeyPass XC made clear that that's not
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something to worry about, because if they wanted to just lock you out, they could just corrupt
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your database, right? If that's all they were trying to do is just lock you out, they would corrupt
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your database. Boom, now you no longer have access to it, because it's corrupted, and we all know
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that backups, backups, backups, backups, or the solution for things like this, because I mean,
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after all, sometimes hard drives, you know, I'm not going to go into all of that, but either way,
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this is not a vulnerability, but it will be brought up in the press as some, you know, some massive
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vulnerability that's going to leave you vulnerable to all sorts of attacks across the world,
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and I want to give my two cents on it before it got a little too wide spread. So KeyPass XC version
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2.7.5 is very safe to use. It's a local offline password manager, so you don't have to worry about
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these additional steps of authentic, you know, reauthenticating once you've unlocked your database.
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You understand, if you're following decent practices, the reasonable ones that have been
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mentioned in the past by me and others, and KeyPass XC also has information on their website that
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can further assist you with how to manage your database in a safe practice. You got nothing to
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worry about. They also mentioned that there are petitioning against this CVE, because it's not
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of vulnerability, you know, it's a user that got a little confused about the security model and
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things, things got out of hand. All right, so let's talk about security theater. I just learned
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this term while going over this whole article from KeyPass XC. I'm going to take us on over to
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Wikipedia. Will we have a CC BYSA 4.0 article that we can use? Wikipedia tells us that security
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theater is an unsafe practice. It only gives the user the illusion of security with unnecessary
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security practices, such as prompting you over and over and over again for a password
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on an offline password manager, that kind of thing, where some users may feel like this is a benefit.
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The reality is it's so minuscule if any benefit is provided through this practice. Overall,
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what it's going to do is it's going to convince people not to use security at all to avoid this
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constant prompting, right? In other words, turning off the whole password prompting just because
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it's annoying. It gets in the way. I'm going to start including this once I get set up to reboot
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the Oh no news again. I'm going to make sure I include this in the additional information section
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of the show. They give some great examples here on the page as well, such as confiscating water bottles,
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but then allow you to buy bottled water. That's something you've experienced if you've ever been to
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certain airports may do it. Don't let you bring your own bottled water in or whatever,
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but you can buy bottled water once you get in. But I think airports will allow you to bring a
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thermostat. It's so long as it's empty when you bring it in, and then you fill it up at like a
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a water fountain or something like that. I'd also like to put the question out to the community.
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Do you guys find this to be a helpful feature? Like if you use keypass XC, do you find it to be
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helpful at all for you to be constantly prompt for your password after you've unlocked your password
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manager and begin using it? So whenever you want to add a new entry into your password manager
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or change an entry in your password manager, do you want to be prompted over and over again
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because you're making changes to the database or if you were exporting, say for instance,
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you're going to create a new database so that you can export some of your credentials from your
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personal database over to this new one because maybe you're going into a work environment where you
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don't want to have all your credentials unlocked only the necessary ones for that environment so you
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export the necessary ones into a separate database that you can bring with you on like a thumb drive.
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Do you think it's necessary to prompt you whenever you're making changes even though you've already
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authenticated? Personally, I don't. I don't think it's necessary. I think we all have to take a certain
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level of responsibility. You know, we have to own our own security and be responsible when using
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these technologies. I don't need key pass XC to hold my hand as I'm using this password manager.
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They've done enough in creating it and making it superb in my opinion. I don't need them looking
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over my shoulder constantly going, hey, are you sure you need to do that? Are you sure you need to
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know it? It just gets annoying in my opinion. But what do you think? You want to be prompted over
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and over again? Do you think the props are necessary? Do you think the props will help new users be
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more security minded or anything of that nature? What do you think? I'll tell you what though,
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key pass XC may want to take some time and better explain how their technology is intended to
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to be used. I think that would be an excellent step forward because if people are going to make
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the comparison in this technology and offline password manager against something like an online
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password manager, it's best to have it made abundantly clear. Yes, they serve the same purpose,
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but they operate differently and offer some detail as to why you are not necessarily prompted
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for every single action. Whereas in an online password manager, you may need to be prompted simply
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because someone else is managing your secrets. All right, that's enough rambling from me on this
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episode. I just wanted to get in here and do a quick show on key pass XC in the latest news.
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I'll catch you guys in the next episode.
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You have been listening to Hacker Public Radio. Hacker Public Radio does work. Today's show was
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contributed by a HBR listener like yourself. If you ever thought of recording a podcast,
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you click on our contribute link to find out how easy it leads. Hosting for HBR has been kindly
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provided by an honesthost.com, the internet archive and our syncs.net. On the Sadois status,
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today's show is released under Creative Commons, Attribution, 4.0 International License.
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