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595 lines
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Plaintext
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Episode: 1622
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Title: HPR1622: An interview with Michael Tiemann
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Source: https://hub.hackerpublicradio.org/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/hpr1622/hpr1622.mp3
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Transcribed: 2025-10-18 05:59:12
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---
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This episode of HBR is brought to you by AnanasThost.com.
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Get 15% discount on all shared hosting with the offer code HBR15.
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That's HBR15.
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Better web hosting that's Honest and Fair at AnanasThost.com.
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Hello Hacker Public Radio.
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This is Semiotic Robotic and today I'm happy to bring you a very special open source newsbreak
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from OpenSource.com.
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Today's episode is an interview show.
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I recently sat down with Michael Teaman, vice president of open source affairs at a red
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hat to discuss his history as an open source entrepreneur.
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Here's a bit of background on Teaman for those of you who might need it.
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In 1989, Teaman co-founded Signus Solutions, the world's first company to offer support
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for open source software.
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Ten years after Signus incorporated, it merged with red hat, so in 1999, Teaman became red
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hat's chief technical officer.
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He also served as president of the open source initiative, stepping down in 2012.
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Today, he continues his work as an open source evangelist through his writing and speaking.
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In fact, you'll find more of his work at opensource.com.
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Teaman and I discuss the early days of the open source movement.
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I actually begin the interview by asking him to take us back to 1987.
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And the interview is full of anecdotes about its genesis.
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He explains to me how his company took $6,000 of startup capital and the odd idea that
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one might make money from so-called free software and turned it into millions.
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Finally, Teaman shares his insight on the ways competition and innovation function in
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the open source software market.
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Chatting with him certainly was an honor and I really do hope you enjoy listening to
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our conversation.
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I'll see you next episode and as always, I wish you peace, love and open source.
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All right.
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I am here with Michael Teaman.
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Michael, thanks for being with me today.
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I wonder if we could start in, go all the way back.
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Go back to 1987 and I'm wondering if you can describe for me the moment or maybe it was
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a series of moments that led you to the realization that building an open source business might
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not only be viable but lucrative as well.
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Well, in 1987 it was really more just beginning to realize the potential of open source.
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Richard Solomon had released the GNU Seacompiler in June of 1987.
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And I was familiar with GNU EMAX, which if you've ever used EMAX is a mind-blowing experience
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of that of itself and I had also become acquainted with the GNU Debugger as well.
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But the release of the compiler for me was a very watershed event because first of all,
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I was really interested in compilers.
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I really wanted to work in the compiler field and I saw absolutely no pathway to getting
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a job in that field because all the people who were employed there were far more senior
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than I was.
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They were tiny little companies, the charge millions of dollars and I saw no way to convince anybody
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that I could be on a team of two or three people justifying these multimillion dollar price
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tax along comes the GNU Seacompiler and suddenly I get a chance to actually see a recipe
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for a compiler.
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And the recipe is not exactly simple when I untard the files.
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It was over 110,000 lines of code and my very first inclination was to print it all out
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so that I could study it.
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And I had more than a few people visiting my cube during the day saying, are you sure
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you really want to be printing all this out?
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And I said yes.
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And I don't remember how many reams of paper it was.
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But it was a lot and I brought it home and I just started pouring over it.
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I had just bought a dining room table with two leaves and I put both leaves in a table
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and I started out by just putting each of the sheets of paper belonging to individual files
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in a pile.
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And then as I began reading it, I began sort of making links about this refers to that
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and here's this idea, et cetera.
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And over the course of a long weekend, I put into my mind what those 110,000 lines of
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code did.
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And I started to write a machine description file and some other configuration files to
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do the very first port of the compiler external to the first two that Richard Stallman had
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created.
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And much to my amazement, a process which normally took two to three years and cost two to
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three million dollars, namely the porting of a compiler in two weeks.
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I had completed a compiler port which generated code 10% faster than the vendor's compiler.
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And that in and of itself sounds pretty special and I was very proud of that.
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But the other little detail that really fired my imagination was that the port that I
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did this, the port that I accomplished, which was to a processor called the National Semiconductor
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of 32, 032, had famously been sold as a one MIPS chip.
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But it did not deliver one MIPS.
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It delivered about 0.8 MIPS.
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And that was sort of seen as a failure in the marketplace that left the window open for
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another vendor to come out with a higher performance chip and basically make nationals
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effort worth nothing.
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So you do a little bit of math and 10% better than 0.8 does not quite get you to that one
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MIPS number.
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But after publishing what I had done after two weeks, I then spent another two weeks optimizing
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this port that I had done and I got it up to a full MIPS on the chip.
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So what that told me was that it was possible for an independent person to accomplish by
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themselves something that an entire company, an entire marketing team, an entire engineering
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and development team could not do, which was to hit a target.
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Right.
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Exactly.
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I published those results and actually one of the first invitations that I received to
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talk about this compiler came from Israel, came from the development team of national
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semiconductor that was in, I believe, Herzlia.
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So I had no immediate plans to travel there.
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But a year later, when I took a job with the French government hacking open source software
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outside of Paris, that put me close enough that I was able to continue on and give a lecture.
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And I had the technique on there in Nier Tel Aviv.
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So that was sort of the very beginning and what excited me at that time, back in the 80s,
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there was a lot of microprocessor development.
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There were lots of different ideas that the Intel X86 had by no means won the war.
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The Macintosh was still a relatively new sensation in the Motorola 68, O20, O30, O40,
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where you must be getting their leapfrogs, Motorola and a lot of other chip companies were
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heavily investing in a new technology called RISC, reduced instruction set computing.
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And the microprocessor arena was about to explode with all kinds of new designs needing
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all kinds of new compilers.
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And later, after accomplishing this port to the national 32 or 32, I then undertook the
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port to the Motorola 88,000.
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And again, I beat the Motorola team by 10 percent on my first time in that.
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That got a little bit of attention there.
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And then I started doing other compiler ports.
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And one day, a manual for the Spark processor from Sun showed up on my desk entirely anonymously.
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And I sort of, you know, my first question was, who the heck sent this to me?
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And my second question is, do I have enough time?
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Yeah, I got it on Friday and I thought to myself, wouldn't it be cool if I could actually
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get the port done before I identify who actually sent it to me?
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Right.
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And in fact, that is what happened.
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I did a port over a weekend.
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And as I was coming into the final stretch, I remembered that Wayne Rosen from Sun Microsystems,
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he would later become the first CTO at Google, but Wayne Rosen had visited our facility in
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Austin, Texas, had seen me doing some making some outrageous claims about the compiler.
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And I think on a large, he just sent me the instruction manual and I popped out of port.
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So those were the early days.
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And that was just an example where, you know, if you imagine the part of the movie where,
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you know, that you throw everything at the, you know, at the protagonist and somehow
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they send it back, you know, with an extra 10% speed on the ball.
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Right.
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That's where I was in 1987.
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So when you said you published the code today, people would do that by pushing code to
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a repository.
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That's right.
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How did you publish your code?
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I published both the files, the complete files themselves as well as diff files to an FTP site
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in Massachusetts.
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So we used FTP and back in those days, one was very, very lucky.
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You know, my modem, I believe, was a 19.2 K-bode modice.
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And that was special.
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And that was, that was high in smoking, yeah, back in the day.
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Of course, real companies had T1 lines, which we all know is a one megabit connection, but
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they usually only had one.
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And I actually got a visit when I was at Inlia, the institute, the translation is the National
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Institute for Research and Computer Science.
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But in French, it's an institute, National Poiré Shush on Infomateque, an automatic.
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And I got a visit from the general administration people who were curious how it was that I
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was using more bandwidth than the rest of the whole lab combined.
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And I explained what I was doing and they were very happy that I was only there for the
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summer.
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It was the summer job.
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I would be going soon.
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And that problem would go with itself, yeah.
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So you once described another insight that you had at this time, and you were thinking
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about the notion of the commons, and you were thinking about the notion of law.
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And you talked, you wrote once about the way that code and law might be related to each other
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in this regard, with regard to a commons.
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You said that while law is a common resource, lawyers are nevertheless fairly well paid
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for the work they do with the law.
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And so you made a case that software could work the same way.
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You applied this thinking to the business of supporting free software.
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And I'm wondering if you could elaborate on that insight for us a little bit.
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Yeah, I can tell you that when I was promoting this idea that this superior technology could
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absolutely move the industry forward, I got a tremendous amount of pushback from people
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who basically said, look, in our capitalist environment, you cannot be successful if you
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cannot exclude competitors from the marketplace.
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You cannot be successful if you cannot force customers into a trap, basically.
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And I really did not believe that because I saw so much potential gain for the industry
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to be able to move forward without impediments, to my mind, any business whose success depended
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on slowing things down, that was just a bad idea.
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But it was very much counter the prevailing wisdom.
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And so I began looking to a whole bunch of different industries to try to figure out
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are there analogies which, if one were to understand them in a slightly different way,
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they could justify that the software industry was also ripe for this transformation.
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And one of the first ones I did seize on was this analogy with lawyers that the law is
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not privileged information to which one needs a license.
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Every precedent becomes public domain.
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Yet the expertise that the lawyers have in knowing these precedents, arguing these precedents,
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in having composed briefs that inform these precedents, that when you look at the difference
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between the rates that are run on the middle of the lawyer can charge versus a top lobbyist
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in Washington, DC, there's many, many orders of magnitude there.
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And I saw an opportunity that basically said, hey, if we are more expert in being able
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to adapt this software faster, apply it to a wider range of problems, et cetera, et cetera.
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If we can help people move to the next field faster, then we should be able to write a ticket
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based on the value that's open by that.
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So that was one analogy, but there were some other analogies.
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It's actually one of my favorite analogies.
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Once I got the lawyer thing working, I then started thinking about banks.
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One of my favorite analogies was, in the conventional world, a bank pays interest based on the amount
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of money that's deposited.
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Now this analogy may make absolutely no sense in 2014 where banks basically no longer pay
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interest.
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This is true.
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Back in the day, back in the day in the 1980s, if you had a past book savings account,
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you might expect to be paid for or 5% interest on your savings.
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And if you were willing to commit it for longer, you could get even a better rate with a
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certificate of deposit, which again today basically pays no interest.
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But imagine a bank where no matter how much you deposit, the bank pays interest on the
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sum total of all the assets to which you'd make the deposit to.
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So if a whole bunch of my friends all put money into a communal bank account, and then we
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all get paid, the total interest on that sum total, how attractive is that number one?
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How attractive is it number two to go to a person who does not yet bank at that bank
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and tell them, you know what, all you need is 10 bucks to open an account and you can
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share in the interest on $250,000, how cool would that be?
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And I began to see that that was the force multiplier of this free software ecosystem
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and what later became known as the open source model, that by making small contributions
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to this code, I became a member of a community which aggregated all their enhancements as
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well.
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And so I put in a little and I got back a lot and that seemed to me to be an outrageously
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great trade.
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And it seemed to everybody else that they were making a good trade too, you know, they
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appreciated that Michael Teammate was handing them free compiler patches all the time.
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So you found sickness in 1987 based on these ideas?
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No.
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In 1987, that was when I began the search for how it just started, in 1987, after really
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convincing myself that this was the next big thing, I then sought to find an entrepreneur
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who could found the business for me and I could be their first employee.
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I wouldn't charge too much, but I would be a great worker, I'd be very dedicated and
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I had this track record that I could now really trade upon.
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It was, it was pretty exciting to see this reputation grow.
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It was very exciting when at one point Richard Stolman came out to Stanford University
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and we were talking about the hierarchy of programmers and I was paying a compliment
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to somebody as being a potential wizard and Stolman called me a wizard and I just about
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fell out of my chair.
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But I could not find anybody who was willing to start a business around free software because
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nobody could see how to exclude competitors.
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We could see how to lock in customers and so for two years I struggled to find somebody
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who was willing to think outside those boxes and I was simply unable to do so.
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And then as I was relating these problems to a friend of mine who I happened upon in
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the Stanford coffee shop in the student union as I began explaining to him how difficult
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it was to find people who all agreed that this software was better than anything else
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out there but similarly we're of the opinion that it would never work because nobody would
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pay money for free software because I was explaining that I had this amazing epiphany
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which is that if everybody thought the software was better it probably was and if nobody
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thought the business would work I would have no competition.
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And it was that insight that made me believe hey if I can start a company with no competition
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how could I fail.
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So you've got skepticism on coming at you in three different directions one for potential
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customers, one from potential business partners and one from investors right.
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So how can you recall at the time what some of those primary sticking points were from
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those folks and you say that they're saying it's not going to work you can't exclude competitors
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but is there any other points of skepticism these folks were really stuck on.
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I think the real skepticism really was that because it had never been done before nobody believed
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it could be done and so as soon as I had this insight and at the time I had enough money
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in my bank account to make the mortgage and chip in to start a company which I believed
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could go cash flow positive in time before my second rent payment.
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Right.
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Okay.
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The great thing about starting a software company back then was that it cost almost nothing.
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We had we bought a computer, we bought a telephone and then we started it in apartments.
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In fact when I saw the movie The Social Network which is the story of Mark Zuckerberg
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and Facebook, I had all these wicked flashbacks because apparently he started Facebook
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basically in exactly the neighborhood that we started singin' back in the late 80s and
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so I was intimately familiar with all those houses in Palo Alto and although we didn't
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do any of the crazy stuff that they probably made up in the movie, it very much was something
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that we grew very organically out of the apartments.
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The original business plan called for the three founders to put in $5,000 a piece except
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I didn't have $5,000, I don't know, $2,000 and so we started with an initial seed capital
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of from three founders, $2,000 a piece for a total of $6,000 and in November of 1999
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we negotiated with Red Hat a sale of the company for $687 million that closed in January
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of 2000.
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I don't want to get to that in a moment but talking about skepticism strikes me that I think
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you've written about this before but I also hear this still ongoing today is this notion
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of fragmentation right there's this assumption that you can't make a business on free software
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you can't make a business on open source software because fragmentation is going to be a
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persistent issue your platform is going to be so fragmented everybody's going to do their
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own thing with the source code you're never going to be able to support it and you're
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never going to be able to exert the kind of control you need to make a profit on the
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product.
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How did you overcome that and I think it persists today so how do you respond to that today?
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Well with the benefit of hindsight what I have seen in many many cases both in the
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free and open source world but also in the larger business community is that really the
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key to success of an entrepreneurial business is having a vision you can execute and having
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a vision that people really want to buy into because ultimately it benefits them comprehensively
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it benefits not only their bottom line it solves not only their problem of the day but
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it moves them forward in their life in some meaningful way and that could be up the career
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ladder it could be saving the planet it could be doing a whole bunch other great things
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but what I have sort of generalized from my experience is that a thing we did right
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at Cygnus was by golly we built a kick ass software company there was a there was a point
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in time where the VP of engineering came to me and said you know Michael I've just been
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reviewing our contract deliverables over you know since I started keeping these records
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about three four years ago what I have found is that in all these contract developments
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remember doing custom contract software development is a complex thing right there's an industry
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statistic that says 18% of all software projects are abandoned before they go into production
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and 55% are either late sometimes very late missing key functionality or shipped with operational
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defects that materially affect performance when you take that 18% that never ship right and the
|
||
|
|
55% that limp across the finish line you know missing an arm a leg or a head that's that's a pretty
|
||
|
|
miserable average statistic but here was ours we shipped 98.5% of all deliverables on time or
|
||
|
|
ahead of time and on budget or under budget when you read the risk report that shows the days of
|
||
|
|
risk of Red Hat Enterprise Linux and you look at how well we function in this increasingly challenging
|
||
|
|
security context and you look at how good we are at patching holes before they're publicly
|
||
|
|
disclosed right or patching holes you know in very very short amount of time if it's a zero day
|
||
|
|
exploit it's also it's a stellar stellar metric when you look at how how well defended the Linux
|
||
|
|
kernel is against mischief because of comprehensive work we've done at the runtime level at the
|
||
|
|
kernel level you know at the system level etc that again is super high quality but going back to
|
||
|
|
sickness by creating basically a perfect reputation right all these theoretical skeptical arguments
|
||
|
|
simply go by the wayside and you know people would say well you know sickness once once we started
|
||
|
|
the company and we started delivering this it well that's all well and good but you know wait
|
||
|
|
wait a Michael team and can no longer program you know because he's spending too much time selling
|
||
|
|
and managing and your whole thing is going to fall apart because there are no more Michael teammates
|
||
|
|
bullshit yeah there are so many great young talents ready to do amazing things when they can
|
||
|
|
find the right environment when they can find the right mentors you know and when they've got
|
||
|
|
enough field in front of them and they can turn on the afterburners and see what they can really do
|
||
|
|
and we recruited a lot of those people at sickness a lot of them are still here at Red Hat you know
|
||
|
|
we have a number of people who's whose years of service exceed you know the the time that Red
|
||
|
|
Hat has been in business because they got credit for their for their days at sickness so I what
|
||
|
|
I would say is that a lot of the skepticism is is a response to the abstract it's a response to
|
||
|
|
the unknown and when you bring a concrete success story with just absolutely stellar credentials
|
||
|
|
that that doesn't just outperform the field but embarrasses the field then then the skeptics begin
|
||
|
|
to look like they're on the wrong side so this is a great this is a great segue to what I wanted
|
||
|
|
to ask about next and that is the notion of competition in an open source market right so you've
|
||
|
|
written before about the nature of competition in open source and free software is different from
|
||
|
|
the nature of competition perhaps in other markets because it's not a zero sum game you've
|
||
|
|
described it and I really like this image as a sort of mobius strip right where value is always
|
||
|
|
flowing between different parties and it's never a zero sum game some morning if you could elaborate
|
||
|
|
on that or just rearticulate that because I think that's a really interesting point I think our
|
||
|
|
listeners especially would find that interesting yeah so and and let me let me preface this and I
|
||
|
|
don't want to sound arrogant by saying this but I believe it to be true you know it is easy to talk
|
||
|
|
about the positive sum gain yeah when so much is going in your direction right okay yeah you know
|
||
|
|
so I will I will be the first to say that I have enjoyed seeing the open source community developed
|
||
|
|
from a very privileged position that sickness had years of consistent growth their red had has
|
||
|
|
enjoyed years of consistent growth our ability to execute at both of those companies has been
|
||
|
|
phenomenal and I believe that a lot of the open source business value accrues to to those who
|
||
|
|
have been successful so we just get that out of the way but let me also say that there are there
|
||
|
|
are many who have tried to bring the zero sum game concepts to the open source community they
|
||
|
|
want to wall off some piece of technology at least from a positioning point of view they want
|
||
|
|
they want to force everybody into that particular world view and a lot of folks have found themselves
|
||
|
|
really really struggling by trying to be the Microsoft of X yeah where which of course doesn't
|
||
|
|
really have a valid place in in an open source world but that being said I read a book in 2005
|
||
|
|
which I recommend to everybody it's called the only sustainable edge by John Hagle and John
|
||
|
|
C. Lee Brown and although it never mentions open source by name or even implies it they tell
|
||
|
|
story after story of companies who successfully transformed their business by shifting from the
|
||
|
|
paradigm of the zero sum game to the paradigm of the positive sum game and to me the most compelling
|
||
|
|
story in that book is a story of Lee and Fung which is which was in the 1970s a textile
|
||
|
|
manufacturer in Hong Kong like 10,000 other textile manufacturers and they made the paradigmatic leap
|
||
|
|
from looking at competition as a zero sum game to looking at all of their competitors
|
||
|
|
as potential complimentary assets and more importantly and this was the key insight for their
|
||
|
|
company they saw themselves as a potential complimentary asset to their competitors and one by
|
||
|
|
one as they would lose a deal here or a deal there they would ask themselves the question if we
|
||
|
|
had been working with the competitor who won this deal instead of against them how much how could
|
||
|
|
we have done better and step by step they began building new systems new relationships and in the
|
||
|
|
book they talk about how 5,000 employees of Lee and Fung now manage 7,500 relationships with
|
||
|
|
other Asian textile manufacturers and they do 5 billion dollars a year in revenue which if you do
|
||
|
|
the math means that as a former textile company this company does a million dollars per employee
|
||
|
|
in revenue which by any measure is one of the highest revenue per employees I know of in the whole
|
||
|
|
S&P 500 it is miles ahead of probably at least 90% of that market and and they got there by
|
||
|
|
recognizing this idea of how do we make ourselves a complimentary asset and in a lot of ways the
|
||
|
|
open source community is in a perfect position to ask and answer that question how can we help
|
||
|
|
company X build a better airplane or how can we help company Y build a better factory or how can
|
||
|
|
we help companies eat create a better website or you name it so you talked a little bit about
|
||
|
|
in your response there you said about sort of creating a position of value creating a sort of
|
||
|
|
you said value accrues to those who are in successful positions so becoming successful
|
||
|
|
looks different in an open source market right becoming successful becomes more about what you
|
||
|
|
enable as opposed to what you can withhold right and it becomes more about how you can maintain
|
||
|
|
a standard right that's right as opposed to how you can monopolize something that's a big
|
||
|
|
good summary that's a great summary and another another book that I recommend to everybody is a book
|
||
|
|
called Switch by Chip and Dan Heath what I did not realize when I started sickness was that you
|
||
|
|
can't simply be different and expect to be successful if you are different enough than the status
|
||
|
|
quo you must change the status quo to be successful and Switch is all about managing that change
|
||
|
|
especially when that change is hard and and to your point about success again when I started
|
||
|
|
sickness the general measure of success which was typified by Bill Gates was your wealth
|
||
|
|
is a proxy for your intelligence your wealth is a proxy for your success and whenever Bill Gates
|
||
|
|
I went to some CEO conferences back when he was a CEO of Microsoft and he would spout all kinds
|
||
|
|
of theories about all kinds of stuff I thought was pretty much nonsense and from time to time
|
||
|
|
the press would call him on it and say well we think that's not true and Bill Gates would
|
||
|
|
gleefully say all right short the stock yeah daring them right right and and and because
|
||
|
|
Microsoft stock at that time was always on an upward trend yeah everybody sort of treated that
|
||
|
|
as the final death of argument right and and going back to how open source changes things
|
||
|
|
it's not it's not just whether we deliver on time and on budget it's not just whether or not
|
||
|
|
this particular thing works or not but changing how the customers think about and use software
|
||
|
|
to reach things that they previously may not have even imagined right and to give credit for
|
||
|
|
this dynamic flexible evolutionary software platform for being that ticket to the next level
|
||
|
|
and so getting people to understand the transformational capacity of open source was very much
|
||
|
|
part of maintaining success with these customers so 10 years after sickness incorporates
|
||
|
|
in 1989 it's 1999 and sickness merges with Red Hat yeah do you remember when those discussions
|
||
|
|
began and how speaking of value and success how both parties in that deal discuss the mutual benefit
|
||
|
|
or value that each could add to the other and what that merger meant for both companies yeah so
|
||
|
|
you've probably heard the expression no plans survives first contact with the enemy
|
||
|
|
okay and and the same may also be you know the set of business bedfellows as well I think that our
|
||
|
|
our conversations about the theories of mutual benefit ahead of time were paled in comparison
|
||
|
|
to the actual benefits that we derived but the facts are these Red Hat what sorry sickness was
|
||
|
|
the first company that venture capitalists invested in and we sort of taught the venture
|
||
|
|
capital community the the play yeah and and and I believe that Red Hat may have been the second
|
||
|
|
such company to receive a major investment from from Greylock but we were the first
|
||
|
|
and as a result of that investment the venture capitalists got substantial stakes in in both
|
||
|
|
companies and and and they began to sort of look for what their exits would be because venture
|
||
|
|
capitalists put money in in order to get 10 to 40 times that amount of money out that's their that's
|
||
|
|
their general goal and with respect to sickness the challenge that we had was that as successful as
|
||
|
|
we were in the tools space the total market opportunity of tools is just not as big as the total
|
||
|
|
market opportunity of operating systems yeah because operating systems really lead to platforms
|
||
|
|
and that's the big play and sickness missed its opportunity to get into the platform space
|
||
|
|
back in 1995 somebody had told me about this little company in North Carolina called Red Hat
|
||
|
|
which had just grown from five to fifteen employees and was it was doing Linux far better than
|
||
|
|
any of the other myriad companies also commercializing and selling Linux distributions and I was
|
||
|
|
impressed enough to try to convince my co-founders that we should take 10% of our equity and buy Red Hat
|
||
|
|
but they thought that was a waste of time and then five years later Red Hat took 10% of their
|
||
|
|
equity and bought us so so there was that but the the the the opportunities that became clear
|
||
|
|
sort of immediately after the the deal was consummated was that the sickness sales team
|
||
|
|
and the sickness engineers were very very comfortable building multi-year multi-million dollar
|
||
|
|
relationships with customers you know our our normal entry price was about six hundred thousand
|
||
|
|
dollars to to do a tool chain and and and then we also had some larger customers who would do
|
||
|
|
six million dollar deals Red Hat at that time was selling hats and t-shirts and Linux distributions
|
||
|
|
at best buy for seventy nine dollars and so Red Hat knew how to be super popular Red Hat had
|
||
|
|
more of a national brand than we did but other than other than relationships with IBM and Dell
|
||
|
|
and a couple of other companies Red Hat really did not know how to build a customer relationship
|
||
|
|
at the enterprise level and so we had this great cross pollination exercise I remember overseeing
|
||
|
|
one of these first sales integration meetings where all the signal sales guys were just
|
||
|
|
so eager to sell something so hot as Linux and all the Red Hat sales people were so eager to learn
|
||
|
|
how to sell multi hundred thousand dollar you know right enterprise support agreements and not
|
||
|
|
long after that merger we began the path of creating the world's first enterprise Linux and
|
||
|
|
enterprise Linux it's obviously it's a term you could apply to anything I mean marketing
|
||
|
|
guys will stick lipstick kind of big if they think that's what makes it prettier but
|
||
|
|
the reality is and I think history shows Red Hat did do a very legitimate job of building a
|
||
|
|
platform that had the right impedance match to the enterprise market we had the applications
|
||
|
|
support we had certifications we had a great training program that went along with it
|
||
|
|
and and and we really quickly grabbed the enterprise Linux market and then grew that market pretty
|
||
|
|
much as fast as it could be grown given how slow moving a lot of enterprise evolution actually is
|
||
|
|
right right so the merger happens you become what is it CTO CTO yeah Red Hat okay and in a few years
|
||
|
|
there's a there's a lot of change as new you know the company makes new strategic directions you
|
||
|
|
move into enterprise you know Red Hat Enterprise Linux becomes real and sort of Spadora there's a lot
|
||
|
|
of new strategic directions happening what's your day-to-day like around that time what are you
|
||
|
|
working most most heavily on at that point well around that time what we're really doing is we're
|
||
|
|
building reference customers that we're gonna that we're going to help us win the industry so
|
||
|
|
I was meeting with CIOs of Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs
|
||
|
|
okay Merrill Lynch and and we were we were listening to understand what enterprise really meant
|
||
|
|
to them we were explaining what we really felt we could do and we were we're negotiating those
|
||
|
|
partnerships with a whole bunch of vendors who at that time would have been delighted to see us
|
||
|
|
actually go away yeah yeah but but we had an amazing amazing value proposition which was to
|
||
|
|
deliver the full power and efficiency of an Intel processor that by that time had completely
|
||
|
|
lapt the spark risk processor I mean we one of the reasons that customers were so willing to
|
||
|
|
move to Linux is that the Sun platform had simply run out of gas okay these these main frame style
|
||
|
|
machines had performance caps that were too low for the next generations that these banks wanted to
|
||
|
|
build and a horizontal scale out strategy trumped the scale up strategy that Sun had adopted the
|
||
|
|
cost profile was dramatically lower but even the susceptibility to improvements the the ability
|
||
|
|
to incrementally and rapidly change technologies was very very appealing to an industry that was
|
||
|
|
really chasing at the bit to to roll forward and they they had they had been happy with Sun but
|
||
|
|
they had become very dissatisfied and and we were there to pick up this like and nobody else
|
||
|
|
you know as much as they didn't like what Sun was doing nobody else in the whole market was doing
|
||
|
|
anything better yeah it was kind of a real Confederacy of DUNCES at the time and along comes
|
||
|
|
enterprise Linux some really really brilliant engineering from Red Hat from some other people
|
||
|
|
uh working on the kernel and and we were able to demonstrate performance capabilities that
|
||
|
|
just lit up the sky we you use the term innovation a couple times and that term can get pretty
|
||
|
|
buzzy get pretty vapid really quickly but you've also written extensively about the way that
|
||
|
|
innovation the character of innovation in in open source markets and in open under open source
|
||
|
|
models and sort of the motor of innovation when things are done the open source way can you
|
||
|
|
can you elaborate a little bit on the nature of innovation in open source business well uh so I think
|
||
|
|
it was Plato who said that necessity is the mother of innovation and I think that one of the things
|
||
|
|
that had really come to be devil the proprietary software industry is that people had simply
|
||
|
|
claimed far larger territories than they were willing to cultivate let alone you know they were
|
||
|
|
willing to defend the territories but they were not willing to cultivate those territories and so
|
||
|
|
to give you some examples there was a there was a time when people were looking for
|
||
|
|
building far more scalable systems than could be built out of proprietary risk architectures
|
||
|
|
and there were lots of different theories about how this could be done the great thing about
|
||
|
|
open sources we could put all those different theories into competition uh and those competitions
|
||
|
|
could allow any kind of team configuration to be built so it might be that somebody who was
|
||
|
|
developing an application of Goldman Sachs would hop on and join a given kernel team
|
||
|
|
that would that was going and pursuing a particular kind of multi-process or multi-threaded or
|
||
|
|
you know multi-programming system a different person has a different theory they join a different
|
||
|
|
team and one of the things that has been great about the way that Lena's Torvales has managed all
|
||
|
|
this is he truly has upheld this idea that the that the best ideas went he he really has
|
||
|
|
he has he has often been difficult to work with he often you know
|
||
|
|
reminds the world he's just an asshole but when a really really good solution shows up
|
||
|
|
he'll bump he'll he'll merge it in he'll bump that version number and we're and we're off to
|
||
|
|
the races and what I would say is that at that time when a company would basically say well you know
|
||
|
|
we own enterprise storage but we're not going to do this thing you want for five years because
|
||
|
|
you know it's not really correct it's it's all well and good for a company to say we're not
|
||
|
|
going to do it but it's no good at all to say and you can't yeah yeah and that's really what
|
||
|
|
open source is all about we you know numerous times during that period and since we've we've
|
||
|
|
even heard from Lena's himself saying we're never going to do that that's stupid that's ridiculous
|
||
|
|
get it out of here and then a couple of years later after after there's some some some some more time
|
||
|
|
with the idea and whatnot all of a sudden wow that's it's it's it's in the mainstream works yeah
|
||
|
|
yeah yeah you you're obviously able to glimpse this these insights very early and it sets you
|
||
|
|
up for success very early and you are able to become a sort of open source visionary and open source
|
||
|
|
evangelist very rapidly and for a number of years you've written and spoken about the power of
|
||
|
|
open source thinking open source methodologies the open source way I'm wondering if there's
|
||
|
|
ever a time that open source has disappointed you well for sure yes I try and think of some some
|
||
|
|
good illustrative examples I think that often when I was president of the open source initiative
|
||
|
|
we spent an extraordinary and I think sometimes excessive amount of time obsessing about
|
||
|
|
licensing in ways that were not necessarily all that productive one of the early ideas
|
||
|
|
that came out of the open source initiative before I joined was this idea that you know we need
|
||
|
|
to have a lot of different licenses to be able to choose which one is best okay so there's
|
||
|
|
this idea that having a lot of different licenses would would let us choose the best one and that is
|
||
|
|
a fine theoretical argument but the Mozilla public license generated dozens of mutually incompatible
|
||
|
|
licenses that really took a long time to untangle so it there there there there became sort of two
|
||
|
|
conversations that were constantly going on simultaneously the first was what is open source
|
||
|
|
and many many clever lawyers or clever programmers who are lawyer wannabes yeah we're trying to
|
||
|
|
figure how do I get just up to the edge of an open source allows on the theory that the closer you
|
||
|
|
got to the edge the better the solution would be because open source somehow is weak at the center
|
||
|
|
yeah you know which is a bizarre bizarre idea but anyway so the what is open source and the second
|
||
|
|
thing is how can I make my open source thing different than everybody else so I can prove that
|
||
|
|
I'm the smartest one and this would this would lead to a lot of of infighting or lack of
|
||
|
|
cooperation that I think was very that that was ultimately detrimental but I have seen lately I
|
||
|
|
saw a post just this past week saying that we live in a post open source world yeah and the premise
|
||
|
|
of the post the premise of the post is that with GitHub becoming a super major repository for new
|
||
|
|
open source development the some substantial percentage of code is being checked in with no
|
||
|
|
license whatsoever and so one way to read that is hey it could be licensed under any license
|
||
|
|
another way to read it is hey it's public domain another way to read it is hey all this code is a
|
||
|
|
potential feature liability that's right yep and it's and it's a big mess and one of the one of the
|
||
|
|
ideas the open source initiative was to was to make open source a safe choice to make it be
|
||
|
|
something that was well enough defined as you knew what it was you knew what you could do with it
|
||
|
|
and you knew who you could trust yeah and to have so much code being developed with no license
|
||
|
|
with no developer origin of you know a certification or anything like that it plays into many of
|
||
|
|
the fears that existed back when I was starting and we addressed those fears by being upfront
|
||
|
|
by being not only transparent but also really standing for something very specific and
|
||
|
|
and the transparency of GitHub is great yeah but the but the nebulousness of no license
|
||
|
|
is a big problem so so those are those are some things that are that are on my mind
|
||
|
|
I would say that it also has been somewhat frustrating that from time to time major players
|
||
|
|
decide that that they want to stop and turn the game into a zero sum game and it is it is
|
||
|
|
frustrating because it slows progress down for for everybody the way that some vendors have
|
||
|
|
decided to try to compete on price number one which is a good way of keeping everybody honest
|
||
|
|
but then to also put into their competitive terms and oh by the way if you use the other guy's
|
||
|
|
stuff then right right we're we're not going to sell all the rest of the stuff you depend on
|
||
|
|
so so people are using I think very traditional anti-competitive tactics against against open source
|
||
|
|
which is which is again very unhelpful yeah and and there's not a there's not a whole lot of
|
||
|
|
leverage that one happens if you if you take a step back and just look at some some big time
|
||
|
|
geopolitical problems that exist right now while it may be super courageous for a party and one
|
||
|
|
of those big fights to simply turn the other cheek you know and to and to bring peace by simply
|
||
|
|
not fighting back you you wonder just you know how many people can you can you stand and watch
|
||
|
|
getting killed before you realize or before you decide that that may not be a good strategy
|
||
|
|
and in the world of open source you know on a on a on a much more concrete layer
|
||
|
|
and and and not involve a human life but just you know the success of a given business when
|
||
|
|
when open source does not have the kind of market power that many of these proprietary guys have
|
||
|
|
and that should be a great advantage but it can be turned around to be a a disadvantage and
|
||
|
|
and the only you know the the question that always resonates in my mind is the is the question
|
||
|
|
that Abraham Lincoln asked about you know can our better angels really arise and and so far
|
||
|
|
what encourages me is is that there is a lot of positive energy from both the younger people
|
||
|
|
getting into open source as well as the older people who have seen the generational ebb and flow
|
||
|
|
of proprietary versus open systems and I think that they that there still are a lot of people
|
||
|
|
who are not as interested in seeing what can be destroyed as they are and seeing what can be built
|
||
|
|
well I'm really glad you brought up Abraham Lincoln in that last response because it allows me
|
||
|
|
to ask my final question which is a rather selfish question because it's something I've always
|
||
|
|
been curious about in your writing and now that I've had this conversation with you also in your
|
||
|
|
speech you pepper your pros with maxims with rotations from historical figures authors
|
||
|
|
popular figures and that's always struck me as an interesting sort of video synchrosy in your
|
||
|
|
in your writing in your explanation your mode of explanation and an explication and I'm wondering
|
||
|
|
if that stems at all from your pension for open source right the notion that there's eloquence in
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the simplistic there there's beauty in the shortest solution to the realization of insight
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or if it's if it's more about your tendency to do that is more about building on the ideas and
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the work of others that's a great question any eloquence is entirely accidental okay the E
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word that I would look for is evidence so because of my background in science I think that being
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able to look at analogous situations and to and to sort of you know validly argue similarities
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similar cause and effect mechanisms similar properties of state or motion that those those help
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to discern whether the the effect being presently observed is is something that can be observed as
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it more of a rule of nature or some special case earlier in this conversation I talked about how
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you know people after after the initial success of sickness the the the next premise of demise
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was well as soon as Michael team and stops programming then the whole thing's going to fall apart
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and of course that didn't happen we know from history that it didn't happen but at that moment in time
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how do we know that this whole enterprise is not really built on underpricing the you know the
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product of one hacker versus being able to build a sustainable model and so from my perspective it
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is important to not only be able to show here is something that's happening right now
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and is real but to also reference other to reference the best analogies that we can find
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not just best in terms of supporting the argument but best in terms of of really showing that the
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argument is really meaningful is is really general and applies beyond the question of are you really
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going to provide seven by twenty four support right you know are you really going to honor your
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SLA when you when you do all this stuff and at the end of the day it is a question I'm sure keeps
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our our support team up in night how do we meet the SLA right how do we make sure that the
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customers are happy and want to do but a lot of you know to my mind what really makes that happen
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is is the ability of the team the department the business unit the company to all be working on
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some larger page which by the way includes the tens or hundreds of thousands or perhaps millions
|
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of other contributors who are all part of that ecosystem making stuff work so that our credit is
|
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good no matter where we go whether we're you know working deep in some defense installation or
|
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whether we're working you know in some research lab cracking you know bosons and mesons everything
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like that or or whether we are you know simply setting up an infer an intranet for some major college
|
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campus the the ability to to to make work what we have been able to make work which continuously
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requires the participation of a larger community that's that's what it's all about and I reference
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these other moments of history or these other bits of sage advice because
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people understand how those quotations applied to other great movements and and how they
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applied to the more significant parts of our humanity right then those that decide on vendor
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excerpt right right product excerpt product why it reminds me of another thing I think you once
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wrote is that you differentiate your thinking on open source and free software from from folks who
|
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think about it differently I'll just use one example it might be arbitrary but I think you've
|
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been voted before you said folks some folks who champion free software like Richard Stahlman for
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example will make the case for open source and free software on philosophical or ideological grounds
|
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but it strikes me that you almost see open sources almost a force of nature or some kind of
|
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universal tendency that is bigger than I don't want to say mere ideology but it's not just a world
|
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view I am I am very very happy that those two can coexist you know I think it's it I think it's a
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terrible dilemma right when one's you know where where one's ethical worldview is a direct conflict
|
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with actual survival yes I mean it's it's great to see a movie about what kind of choices
|
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somebody's gonna make yeah yeah between saving their girlfriend or rebooting the computer
|
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but but honestly speaking I do believe that these two can operate in concert and I I support and
|
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honor those who lift up the ethical behavior of free software right but I also respect and support
|
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those who are who are making pragmatic progress making practical progress by applying these to
|
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the day-to-day business Michael team and thank you so much for speaking with us today it's
|
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going to be a real honor and a real pleasure thank you
|
||
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you've been listening to Hacker Public Radio at Hacker Public Radio dot org
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